ORDER R.M. Sahai, J. - In this petition directed against orders passed by Assistant Sugar Commissioner (Appellate Authority) under U.P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Act, 1961 and Khandsari Inspector and assessing authority the question that arises for consideration is whether in facts and circumstances of the case it can be said that petitioner had not complied with the provisions of proviso to S. 3 of U.P. Sugarcane (Purchase Tax) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred as Act), read with Rule 13-A. 2. Basic facts as they emerge out of affidavits filed by both parties are that for assessment year 1978-79 petitioner exercised its option in August, 1978 to be assessed on assumed basis as provided by first proviso to S. 3 of the Act. The option was exercised in form X III. By letter dated 1st Jan., 1979 petitioner further informed the assessing authority that he shall start his unit from 10th Jan., 1979. It was received in office of assessing authority on 4th January, 1979. Since 10th, January onwards the petitioner paid advance tax as provided in R. 13(3) at the rate of Rs. 11520/- per month except that it reduced the amount proportionately for month of January the month in which unit was started and April when the unit was closed on 9th. The license was also renewed for 1979-80. In January, 1981 petitioner received an order of Assessing Officer requiring petitioner to pay Rs. 24,824/- over and above the payment that had already been made in 1978-79. This amount was demanded as in audit objection it was pointed out that option exercised by petitioner having not mentioned the date from which unit was to start functioning it was not in accordance with rule 13-A(1). Therefore, he was liable to pay tax on actual purchases made by it. No notice appears to have been given to petitioner before raising this demand. The appellate authority noticed the argument advanced on behalf of petitioner. But by a cryptic order without disclosing any reason dismissed it by saying that he did not find any error in assessment order. 3. That the order of appellate authority is liable to be quashed for being bad admits of no doubt. Nor can the order of assessing authority be maintained it having raised demand without giving any notice to petitioner. But this would result in direction to decide these proceedings afresh. 3. That the order of appellate authority is liable to be quashed for being bad admits of no doubt. Nor can the order of assessing authority be maintained it having raised demand without giving any notice to petitioner. But this would result in direction to decide these proceedings afresh. That however is not necessary as even assuming whatever has been stated in counter-affidavit and the order of assessing authority the orders are manifestly erroneous in law. It may be mentioned that in the counter-affidavit it was stated that intimation sent by petitioner that it was going to start its unit sent on 1st January, 1979 was received on 4th January, 1979 but since before this date the application sent by petitioner exercising option to be assessed on assumed basis had been rejected being contrary to rules the petitioner could not claim any right on it. As it appeared to be very vital the learned standing counsel was granted time to file supplementary affidavit disclosing the exact date on which application for exercise of option to be assessed on assumed basis in Form XIII was rejected. And to great astonishment it has been averred that it was rejected in 1981 by the same order by which impugned demand was created. How can Government official afford to file such irresponsible affidavit on basis of record on crucial (matter) leaves one amazed. It is expected that department shall take notice of it and instruct its officials to be more vigilant and careful as this Court places great reliance on affidavit filed on behalf of State. 4. Proviso to S. 3 of the Act permits a unit to pay tax on the quantity of sugarcane actually purchased or assumed to have been purchased. Sub-sec. (1-b) further provides that option should be exercised by such date in such form as may be prescribed and shall relate to whole of assessment year. In pursuance of this sub-section, R. 13A has been framed giving in detail the time and manner in which option should be exercised. Sub-r. 1 provides for exercising option by way of declaration in Form XIII so as to reach the Sugar Commissioner and the Assessing Officer under registered cover on or before 31st January of each year or 15 days before the start of the unit whichever is earlier. Sub-r. 1 provides for exercising option by way of declaration in Form XIII so as to reach the Sugar Commissioner and the Assessing Officer under registered cover on or before 31st January of each year or 15 days before the start of the unit whichever is earlier. It further requires an owner to specify the date from which he decided to start the unit. The two proviso to this sub-rule are significant. They visualise situation where owner decides to start the unit from any day earlier or subsequent to the date specified in the sub-rule then he shall intimate in writing one week before he decides to start unit or from the date specified. These provisos, therefore, make it clear that specification of date in the sub-rule is not final. It can be altered depending on exigency of situation. The absence of date of start of unit in form XIII, therefore, could not render the option futile or inoperative. Apart from it R. 13(3) requires owner of a unit exercising option to pay tax by 25th day of the month immediately preceding the month for which the tax is due. It is not disputed that petitioner deposited advance tax as required by this rule and it was accepted by assessing authority. Further the assessing officer never disputed it nor it intimated owner under R. 15(2) about any other amount to be payable in addition to what petitioner paid as advance tax. The claim of petitioner, therefore, that the option exercised by him was not accepted but acted upon appears to be well founded. In this view of the matter it is not necessary to examine if audit report could furnish material for rejecting option exercised for 1978-79 in 1981. In fact the purpose of specifying date for start of unit is to inform authorities before hand the date from which the liability to pay tax arises. If no date was mentioned in Form XIII it could not render option invalid. It could not permit owner to start the unit. There is no report or material disclosed either before the authorities or before this Court which may establish that the unit was started prior to 10th January. There is no bar for intimating the date by a separate intimation. As pointed out earlier the proviso supports this. It could not permit owner to start the unit. There is no report or material disclosed either before the authorities or before this Court which may establish that the unit was started prior to 10th January. There is no bar for intimating the date by a separate intimation. As pointed out earlier the proviso supports this. Therefore, if petitioner exercised option in Form XIII and intimated about start of unit by a separate letter that by itself did not render the option invalid. 5. In the result this petition succeeds and is allowed. Orders passed by opposite parties 1 and 2 are quashed. Petitioner shall be entitled to its costs.