ORDER K.P. Singh, J. - This writ petition is directed against the order of the Consolidation Officer dated 13-5-1985 and confirmed by the revisional court on 2-7-1985. 2. It appears that an objection filed by the contesting opposite party was dismissed in default on 3-6-1983. A restoration application was moved on 6-7-1984 which was allowed by the Consolidation Officer through his order dated 13-5-1985 and the aforesaid order was confirmed by the revisional court on 2-7-1985. Aggrieved the petitioners have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. The learned counsel for the petitioners has contended before me that close of the consolidation operation regarding the village wherein the disputed land is situate had taken place on 12-11-1983, therefore, the consolidation officer had no jurisdiction to allow the restoration application moved by the contesting opposite party. The revisional court has patently erred in confirming the order. 4. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has tried to refuse the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners. My attention has been drawn to the ruling reported in 1981 Rev Dec 307, Shyam Narain Rai v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Ballia wherein a learned single Judge of this Court has indicated that even after the notification a restoration application can be filed with an application for condonation of delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act. 5. In AIR 1973 All 411 , Dilawar Singh v. Gram Samaj a Division Bench of this Court has indicated thus vide paragraph 7 : " ......................This indicates that there is no basic difference between the appellate and the revisional powers. If under a statute a party has a right to approach the superior Court with a prayer to revise the order of the subordinate Court, the proceeding can be said to be pending till the right to exercise the right of approaching the superior Court subsists in the applicant and so long that right subsists, it cannot be said that the proceedings had finally come to an end. The right to approach the Superior Court through an appeal or a revision can be exercised only after an adverse judgment or order is passed against the party. Till then the right only remains dormant and when that right is exercised, the original proceedings become pending." 6. The right to approach the Superior Court through an appeal or a revision can be exercised only after an adverse judgment or order is passed against the party. Till then the right only remains dormant and when that right is exercised, the original proceedings become pending." 6. In AIR 1973 All 414 , Ram Bahadur v. D.D.C. another Bench of this Court has indicated that the principle enunciated in the ruling reported supra, is applicable to an application for setting aside an ex parte order. Section 41 of the U.P.C.H. Act makes the provisions of Chapters IX and X of the U.P. Land Revenue Act applicable to all proceedings under the Consolidation of Holdings Act. Sections 200 and 201 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act are in Chapter 10. Section 200 provides that whenever any party to such proceeding neglects to attend on the day specified in the summons or on any day to which the case may have been postponed the Court may dismiss the case for default or may hear and determine it ex parte. Section 201 says that no appeal shall lie from an order passed under S. 200 ex parte or by default. That Section provides for rehearing on proof of good cause for non-appearance." (See paragraph 3 of this Ruling). 7. In view of the above observations of the Division Benches of this Court, I find no merit in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the consolidation officer had no jurisdiction to restore the objection dismissed in default. It is well known that when a case is restored and an opportunity for hearing to a party is granted, this Court is very loath to interfere with the order of the subordinate authorities in the exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. 8. In the result, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. There would be no order as to costs. 9. Both the parties have been heard at the admission stage and the claims of the parties have been decided on merits in accordance with the principle contained in 2nd Proviso to Rule 2 of Chapter XXII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952.