GURU CHARAN SINGH v. SUPERINTENDENT, CENTRAL JAIL — 1985 DIGILAW 898 (ALL)

P. S. GUPTA, J. ( 1 ) BY this Habeas Corpus Petition, the petitioner Guru Charan Singh has challenged the validity of his continued detention on the basis of the detention order passed by the District Magistrate, Varanasi, on 18/10/1984 under section 3 (2) of the National Security Act. ( 2 ) THE petitioner was involved in a case Crime No. 314 of 1984 under sections 147, 148, 149, 307 and 302, I. P. C. of Police Station. Chetganj, district Varanasi. The offence related to an incident committed on 18th September, 1984 at about 9. 30 p. m. The petitioner surrendered in the court on 20th September, 1984 and was sent to District Jail, Varanasi. The detention order, which was passed on 18th October, 1984, was served on the petitioner the same day in District Jail, Varanasi. The State Government approved the detention order on 27th October, 1984, and despatched the report to the Central Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in the opinion of the State Government, had bearing on the necessity of the order on 29th October, 1984. This report of the State Government was received by the Central Government in the Home Ministry on 9th November, 1984. The matter of the petitioner came before the Advisory Board on 26th November, 1984. On the recommendation of the Advisory Board, the State Government confirmed the detention order on 12th December, 1984. ( 3 ) THE validity of the detention has been challenged on various grounds. Since the petition succeeds on the ground, which we are going to discuss shortly, we do not propose to enter into the other grounds. ( 4 ) SECTION 3 (5) of the National Security Act provides:when any order is made or approved by the State Government under this section, the State Government shall, within seven days, report the fact to the Central Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in the opinion of the State Government, have a bearing on the necessity for the order. ( 5 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the matter was not reported by the State Government to the Central Government within seven days from the date of the approval of the order by the State Government. ( 5 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the matter was not reported by the State Government to the Central Government within seven days from the date of the approval of the order by the State Government. ( 6 ) THE admitted facts in this connection, are that the State Government approved the order on 27th October, 1984, and the report of the State Government together with the required documents was sent to the Central Government on 29th October, 1984. It is admitted in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India that a report a envisaged under section 3 (5) of the National Security Act, 1980. about the detention of Shri Gurucharan Singh, was made by Government of Uttar Pradesh to the Central Government in the Ministry of Home Affairs vide their letter dated the 29th October, 1984. That the said report was received by the Central Government in the Ministry of Home Affairs on the 9th November, 1984, and it was immediately attended to and considered. The Central Government completed the consideration of the report in the Ministry of Home Affairs on the 13th November, 1984. ( 7 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the report of the State Government should be received by the Central Government within seven days from the approval of the order of detention. The learned counsel has relied upon a Division Bench case of Bombay High Court in Vinayak Ramchandra Sakhalkar and etc. Petitioners v. D. Ramachandran, Commissioner of Police, Thana and others etc. , Respondents. in which it has been held: Section 3 (5) casts a duty on the State Government to report the fact to the Central Government within seven days together with the grounds on which order has been made and such other particulars, as in the opinion of the State Government, have bearing on the necessity of the order. Therefore, unless the report sent by the State Government under 5. 3 (5) of the Act is received by the Central Government, it cannot be said that the fact of detention together with the grounds on which the order has been made is communicated or reported to the Central Government within the meaning of S. 3 (5) of the Act. Therefore, unless the report sent by the State Government under 5. 3 (5) of the Act is received by the Central Government, it cannot be said that the fact of detention together with the grounds on which the order has been made is communicated or reported to the Central Government within the meaning of S. 3 (5) of the Act. ( 8 ) PRIOR to the enactment of the National Security Act, 1980, the Maintenance of Internal Security Act, 1971, was in the field. Sub-Section (4) of Section 3 of the said Act reads as under: 3 (4 ). When any order is made or approved by the State Government under this section, the State Government shall within seven days, report the fact to the Central Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in the opinion of the State Government have a bearing on the necessity for the order. The said provisions of Section 3 (4) of the MISA and Section 3 (5) of the National Security Act are pan materia and identical. The Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the provisions of Section 3 (4) of the MISA in Sher Mohammads case2, and has made the following observations:- A fair reading of section 3 indicates that the State Government may directly issue an order of detention or, if it is done by a lesser authority, approve of such detention order as provided in the statute. Sub-section (4) of section 3, which we have extracted, obligates the State Government to communicate, within seven days of the order of detention it makes or it approves, that fact to the Central Government, together with the grounds on which the order has been made and other relevant particulars. Even assuming that the order is made by the District Magistrate and is approved by the State Government, the communication has to be made to Central Government within the time specified. This procedural mandate is invisible except on peril of the order being voided. Thus the words and expression report the fact to the Central Government within seven days were construed by the Supreme Court to mean to communicate the fact within seven days. In Bidya Beb Barma v. District Magistrate Tripura, Agartala, expression communicate was used for the said word. This procedural mandate is invisible except on peril of the order being voided. Thus the words and expression report the fact to the Central Government within seven days were construed by the Supreme Court to mean to communicate the fact within seven days. In Bidya Beb Barma v. District Magistrate Tripura, Agartala, expression communicate was used for the said word. Therefore, it is quite obvious that unless the fact of the detention is communicated to the Central Government within seven days, it cannot be said that the mandate of section 3 (5) is complied with. In State of Punjab v. Jagdev Singh and Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar. The Supreme Court has observed: Preventive detention is a necessary evil, but essentially an evil. Therefore deprivation of personal liberty, if at all, have to be on the strict terms of the Constitution. Nothing less. Preventive detention is considered so treacherous and such an anathema to civilized thought and democratic policy that the safeguards against undue exercise of the power to detain without trial, have been built into the Constitution itself and incorporated as fundamental rights. There are two sentinels, one at either end. The Legislature is required to make the law circumscribing the limits within which persons may be preventively detained and providing for the safeguards prescribed by the Constitution; and the courts are required to examine, when demanded, whether there has been any excessive detention, that is, whether the limits set out by the Constitution and Legislature have been transgressed. It has always been the view of the Supreme Court that the detention of individuals without trials for any length of time, however short, is wholly inconsistent with the basic ideas of our Government and the gravity of the evil to community resulting from anti-social activities can never furnish an adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of citizen except in accordance with the procedure established by law. It is well settled that the law of preventive detention is a hard law and therefore, it should be strictly construed. In Vinayak v. D. Ramchandran (supra), it has been held: The word report is also used in section 3 (4), section 11, and section 12 of the Act. Section 11 contemplates submission of report to the appropriate Government by the Advisory Board within seven weeks from the date of the detention of the person concerned. In Vinayak v. D. Ramchandran (supra), it has been held: The word report is also used in section 3 (4), section 11, and section 12 of the Act. Section 11 contemplates submission of report to the appropriate Government by the Advisory Board within seven weeks from the date of the detention of the person concerned. This clearly means that the appropriate Government must receive the report of the Advisory Board within the time prescribed, because the State Government has to act on it. Similar is the position qua the report under section 3 (4 ). Same meaning will have to be given to the word report as used in section 12. The rule is well settled that where the same expression is used in the same statute at different places the same meaning ought to be given to that expression, as far as possible (see Lalchand v. Radhekishan. AIR. 1977 S. C. 789 ). Even in common parlance to report the fact means to give or furnish information about the fact. In Sher Mohammads case (1975 Cr1. Li. 1751), Supreme Court has interpreted it as to mean communicate. Ordinary meaning of the term communicate is to impart, confer or transmit information (see Shorter Oxford English Dictionary ). The Supreme Court had also an occasion to consider the true import of the word communicate as used in Article 22 (5) of the Constitution, in Lallubhais case (1981 Cr1. Li. 288) (S. C. ). It means that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds should be imparted effectively and fully to the detenu in writing in a language which he understands. In AIR. 1962 S. C. 911, Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra, the Supreme Court held that communication means bringing home the effective knowledge of facts. In our view same is the import of expression report the fact as used in Section 3 (5) of the Act. Section 3 (5) casts a duty on the State Government to report the fact to the Central Government within seven days together with the grounds on which order has been made and such other particulars, as in the opinion of the State Government, have bearing on the necessity of the order. Section 3 (5) casts a duty on the State Government to report the fact to the Central Government within seven days together with the grounds on which order has been made and such other particulars, as in the opinion of the State Government, have bearing on the necessity of the order. Therefore, unless the report sent by the State Government under section 3 (5) of the Act is received by the Central Government, it cannot be said that the fact of detention together with the grounds on which the order has been made is communicated or reported to the Central Government within the meaning of Section 3 (5) of the Act. 8. We are in respectful agreement with the above view expressed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. In our view, the report of the State Government must reach to the Central Government within seven days from the date of the approval of the detention order. ( 9 ) IN the present case, the State Government approved the detention order on 27. 10. 1984. Though the report was despatched by the State Government on 29th October, 1984, but it was received by the Central Government on 9th of November, 1984. Thus, in the present case, the fact of the approval along with the required papers was pot communicated or reported to the Central Government within a period of seven days and the mandatory provisions of section 3 (5) of the National Security Act has not been complied. On this ground alone the continued detention of the petitioner, becomes illegal and invalid. ( 10 ) IN the result, the petition succeeds. The petitioner shall be set at liberty forthwith if not required in connection with any other case. Petition allowed. .