JUDGMENT P.R. Vyas Bhiman, Chairman. - This revision arises in a case of demarcation. The S.D.O. by his order dated March 3, 1981 refused demarcation on the understanding that Section 41 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act is meant mainly for those cases where the boundaries of cultivated fields are broken or otherwise disturbed. It may be stated here that the present case relates to an area of Abadi land with a rice mill standing on it. The Commissioner in his appellate order dt. May 9, 1983, held the view that there is no bar of demarcation of Abadi land if the plots continued to be shown in the survey map maintained by the Collector. In this view of the matter, he set aside the order of refusal and sent the case to the S.D.O. for proceeding on merits. Hence the present revision. 2. Learned counsel for the revisionist made two main points. The first was that in the survey map the plot in question has been shown without divisions while what has been sought to be demarcated is sub-plot bearing the No. 612/1/2. The other point was that in a subsequent development the land has been declared non-agricultural under Section 143 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and, therefore, it was argued that it is beyond the purview of demarcation proceedings. Learned counsel for O.P. while pointing out that declaration under Section 143 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act has been set aside on January 3, 1984 also argues that the consequence of Section 143 do not include abrogation of map. According to this argument, as long as the map exists demarcation can be made under the U.P. Land Revenue Act which applied to whole of U.P. His other contention was that separate plots exist in the Khatauni and the Khasra. The S.K. carried out the demarcation according to Tarmimi map and the learned counsel argues that the existing survey map mentioned in Section 41 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act includes the map with all legal changes duly incorporated. 3. I have gone through the record of the case and considered the above arguments. The S.K. carried out the demarcation according to Tarmimi map and the learned counsel argues that the existing survey map mentioned in Section 41 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act includes the map with all legal changes duly incorporated. 3. I have gone through the record of the case and considered the above arguments. As far as the legal position is concerned, I am inclined to agree with the learned counsel for the O.P. Unlike the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, the U.P. Land Revenue Act applies to whole of U.P. Neither urban areas nor non-agricultural lands are exempted therefrom. Therefore, wherever the Collector under law maintains a map he or the duly authorised authority under him is entitled to carry out demarcation under Section 41 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act. Section 41 also does not speak of Settlement map but only the existing survey map. Under Section 28 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act the duty is cast on the Collector to maintain the map up-to-date and, therefore, the existing survey map will include a map duly corrected under this legal provision. I am afraid, However, that this interpretation cannot be extended to correction made by the Lekhpal as a result of his partal where he makes entries for his convenience. I am supported in this view by a judgment of the former Chairman, Sri Maheshwar Prasad, reported in Allahabad Vidhi Nirnya 1983 page 136. 4. A perusal of the present case is enough to high light the dangers inherent in acting on a map in which certain divisions had been made by the Lekhpal himself. The record shows that the real dispute is not about the boundaries but about over which portion the parties are respectively in possession. One portion of the plot is recorded in the name of the O.P., a certain sum-number has been given to it but obviously in the Khasra there is no indication on which side of the total plot this is situated. According to the Tarmimi map this falls in a certain location which is said to contain a rice mill and this rice mill is alleged to have been given as the share of the revisionist in a family settlement. So, while is clear that the parties are owners of different parts of the bigger plot it is not clear which portion is whose. So, while is clear that the parties are owners of different parts of the bigger plot it is not clear which portion is whose. The Lekhpal has choosen to give a number corresponding to the sub-plot of the O.P. over a certain area but there is no proof of its authority. The proper course for the parties would be to get the map corrected under Section 28 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act by means of a judicial decision where all these points can be thrashed out. I wish to make it clear here that the provisions of Section 28 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act are wide enough to cover such cases. This kind of a case will fall within the meaning of "all changes in the boundaries" and not within the meaning of "correct any errors". In fact, a reference to the demarcation application itself shows that the O.P. claims that in plot No. 612 he has purchased 3/4 of an acre but on spot he is in possession of a lesser area. There is no allegation that the boundaries had been disturbed or that there had been any encroachment by the adjoining Khatadar. In these circumstances, the application for demarcation was correctly thrown out by the S.D.O. though on wrong reasoning. The order of the Commissioner reopening the proceedings is a futile exercise exercise and cannot lead to and lawful result. 5. In the light of the above observations, the revision is allowed, the order of the Commissioner is set aside and the order of the S.D.O. dated March 23, 1982 is upheld.