JUDGMENT T. R. Handa, J.—This short order is intended to dispose of C. M. P. (M) No. 201 of 1984 made under Order 22 Rules 3 and II read with section 151 C. P. C. in Civil Revision No. 61 of 1976 filed under section 15 {5) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, hereinafter referred to as the Act. 2. The CMP, in question came to be filed in the following : - 3. Shri K. L. Dhawan, the sole petitioner in Civil Revision No. 61 of 1976 was the tenant under the respondent, Shri Darshan Singh Sethi in respect of the premises known as set No 2 Argyle House Shimla. The respondent-landlord brought an action before the Rent Controller, Simla, for ejectment of Shri K. L. Dhawan from the said promises on the solitary ground of non-payment of arrears of rent The action was brought under section 13 of the Act. The tenant, that is, Shri K. L, Dhawan contested that action of the land-lord. He denied if he was in arrears of rent and as such liable for ejectment. His plea, however, did not find favour with the Rent Controller who ordered his ejectment as claimed by the land-lord. On appeal the Appellate Authority maintained the order of ejectment against Shri Dhawan as passed by the Rent Controller. Shri Dhawan there after approached this Court in revision, under section 15 (5) of the Act. 4. During the pendency of the said revision petition, Shri K. L. Dhawan expired on 9-9-1984. His son Rajesh Dhawan, his wife Smt. Sarla Dhawan and his daughter Smt. Reva Meier, claiming themselves to be the legal representatives of the deceased have made the present C M, P. praying that they be substituted as petitioners for the deceased. 5. This application has been opposed on behalf of the respondent-landlord. The sole contention raised on behalf of the respondent in opposing this C. M. P. is that Shri K. L. Dhawan, being a statutory tenant, had no heritable interest in the demised premises like the one held by a contractual tenant and on his death, therefore, the right to prosecute the revision petition does not survive to his heirs or legal representatives. 6. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners does not dispute that Shri K. L. Dhawan was a statutory tenant. 6. The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners does not dispute that Shri K. L. Dhawan was a statutory tenant. His counter contention, however, is that even as a statutory tenant Shri Dhawan had a heritable interest in the premises under his tenancy and after his death, therefore, the right to prosecute the revision petition does survive to his heirs and legal representatives. 7. The short question which thus falls for consideration in this case is whether a statutory tenant has, like a contractual tenant, a heritable interest in the premises under his tenancy. This question in my view should present no difficulty as it already stands answered by the Supreme Court in the case of Damadi Lal and others v. Parshram and others AIR 1976 SC 2229. The facts, o? the above case show that a suit fox ejectment under section 12 of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 was instituted by the appellant landlord against their tenants S/Shri Begmal and Budharmal. The suit was dismissed by the trial Court but decreed by the first Appellate Court. The tenants then approached the High Court in second appeal. During the pendency of the appeal before the High Court, both the tenants died. Their legal representatives ware then brought on record and substituted for the deceased tenants. The High Court thereafter allowed the appeal, set-aside the decision of the first Appellate Court and restored that of the trial Court. The matter being brought to the Supreme Court, one of the contentions raised on behalf of the appellants-landlords before the Supreme Court was that S/Shri Begamal and Budharmal were both statutory tenants and had no heritable interest in the demised premises and for that reason that right to prosecute the appeal in the High Court did not survive to their heirs and legal representatives on their death. In other words, the contention of the appellants was that the appeal of the tenants in the High Court should have been dismissed as abated. 8. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court repelled that contention of the appellants-landlords after observing that for the purposes of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, which governed the suit between the parties, a statutory tenant was on par with a contractual tenant and as such had a heritable interest in the demised premises. 8. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court repelled that contention of the appellants-landlords after observing that for the purposes of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961, which governed the suit between the parties, a statutory tenant was on par with a contractual tenant and as such had a heritable interest in the demised premises. In returning this verdict, their Lordships mainly relied on the definition of the expression "tenant" as found in section 2 (i) of the Madhya Pradesh Act s This definition reads : "a person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of a^ accommodation" is, or, but for a contract express or implied would be payable for any accommodation and includes any ^ person occupying the accommodation as a sub-tenant and also any person continuing in possession after the termination of his tenancy whether before or after the commencement of this Act; but shall not include any person against whom any order or decree for eviction has been made/ After extracting the above definition, their Lordships observed: "The definition makes a person continuing in possession after the determination of his tenancy a tenant unless a decree or order for eviction has been made against him, thus putting him on par with a person whose contractual tenancy still subsists. The incidents of such tenancy and a contractual tenancy must therefore be the same unless any provision of the Act conveyed a contrary intention. 9. The ratio of the above referred to pronouncement of the Supreme Court and its reasoning will equally apply to cases relating to statutory tenancies arising under the Act as the definition of the expression "tenant" as found in section 2 (i) is practically in the same terms. 9. The ratio of the above referred to pronouncement of the Supreme Court and its reasoning will equally apply to cases relating to statutory tenancies arising under the Act as the definition of the expression "tenant" as found in section 2 (i) is practically in the same terms. The expression "tenant" has been defined in section 2 (i) of the Act as under: — "(i) "Tenant" means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building or rented land and includes a tenant continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour, but does not include a person placed in occupation of a building or rented land by its tenant, unless with the consent in writing of the landlord or a person to whom the collection of rent of fees in a public market, cart-stand or slaughter house or of rent for shops has been framed out or leased by a municipal, town are committee” 10. This definition, if at all is in wider terms than the definition found in the Madya Pradesh Act. The above quoted observations of the Supreme Court would therefor, apply in this case with all the more force. 11. I would thus find that for the purposes of the Act there is no distinction between a statutory tenant and a contractual tenant and if contractual tenancy, as admitted by either side, is heritable, there is no reason why statutory tenancy should not be considered heritable. I would accordingly, accept the application of the applicants and direct that they be substituted as petitioners in the main revision petition for the deceased, Shri K. L. Dhawan. Corrections be made in cause title of the revision Petition. Order accordingly.