Ravi Saraswat v. Ram Chandra Maheshwari — 1985 DIGILAW 912 (ALL)

JUDGMENT By The Court 1. In our opinion it was rightly held in the case of Kuldeep Narain v. Mahendra Lal Jain 1984 ACR 374 : 1984 AWC 653 that a person who moves the court for taking action for contempt of court has no right to file an appeal u/s 19(1)(a) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 before a Division Bench against the order of a Single Judge dismissing his application. This appeal is accordingly not maintainable. 2. Let our opinion be placed before the appropriate Bench for orders. B.N. Katju, J. 3. Appellant Ravi Saraswat filed an application u/s 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) praying that Ram Chandra Maheshwari, Secratary, Board of High School and Intermediate Education, Allahabad opposite-party No. 1 and Radhey Shyam Tripathi, Principal, Government Inter College, Allahabad opposite-party No. 2 be punished for committing civil contempt by wilfully disobeying the order of this Court dated 9th August, 1984 passed in Writ Petition No. nil of 1984 Ravi Saraswat v. Board of High School and Intermediate Education U.P. through its Secretary. Notice was issued to opposite party No. 1 only and a charge was framed against him by a learned Single Judge on 23rd August, 1984. Opposite-party No. 1 thereafter filed his counter-affidavit and the learned Single Judge subsequently dismissed the application by his order dated 11th October, 1984 and discharged the notice issued to opposite-party No. 1. The Appellant thereafter filed this appeal u/s 19(1) of the Act against the aforesaid order of the learned Single Judge dated 11th October, 1984 before a Division Bench. It was reported by the Stamp Reporter that the appeal u/s 19(1) of the Act was not maintainable in view of the decision of this Court in Kuldeep Narain v. Mahendra Lal Jain (supra) in which it was held that an appeal u/s 19(1) of the Act only lay against an order punishing a person for contempt of Court. 4. Learned Counsel for the Appellant contended before the Division Bench that the view taken by this Court in the case of Kuldeep Narain v. Mahendra Lal Jain (supra) was erroneous and the Division Bench by its order dated 16th December, 1984 held that the decision in the case of Kuldeep Narain v. Mahendra Lal Jain (supra) requires reconsideration. 4. Learned Counsel for the Appellant contended before the Division Bench that the view taken by this Court in the case of Kuldeep Narain v. Mahendra Lal Jain (supra) was erroneous and the Division Bench by its order dated 16th December, 1984 held that the decision in the case of Kuldeep Narain v. Mahendra Lal Jain (supra) requires reconsideration. That is how this appeal has come up before us and the question we are required to determine is whether it is maintainable u/s 19(1)(a) of the Act. Section 19(1)(a) of the Act is as follows: 19. Appeals (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt (a) where the order or decision is that of a single judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the court; 5. It appears from a plain reading of Section 19(1)(a) of the Act that any order or decision of a single judge is appealable to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the High Court if it is in the exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt of Court. It was held in the case of Baradakanta Mishra Vs. Justice Gatikrushna Misra, Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court, AIR 1974 SC 2255 It is only when the court decides to take action and initiates a proceeding for contempt that it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt, whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. 6. It is thus settled law that any order or decision by the Court after the initiation of proceeding for contempt is in the exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In the present case notice was issued to opposite party No. 1 by the learned Single Judge on the application moved by the Appellant for initiating contempt proceeding against opposite-party No. 1 and opposite party No. 1 also filed his counter-affidavit and thereafter the application made by the Appellant was dismissed and the notice issued to opposite party No. 1 was discharged by the learned Single Judge by his order dated 11th October, 1984. It must, therefore, be held that the above mentioned order of the learned Single Judge dated 11th October, 1984 was made in the exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt. 7. The question that requires determination is whether a person whose application for initiation of contempt proceedings against the contemner is dismissed in the exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt, has a right of appeal u/s 19(1) of the Act against the order dismissing his application. This question was left open by the Supreme Court in the case of Baradakant Mishra v. Mr. Justice Gatikrushna Mishra, C.J. of the Orissa H.C. (supra), which is evident from the under-mentioned observations: .... We may point out that in the present case it is unnecessary to consider whether an appeal u/s 19, Sub-section (1) is confined only, to a case where the High Court after initiating proceeding for contempt finds the alleged contemner guilty and punishes him for contempt as contended by the learned Additional Solicitor General or it extends also to a case where after initiating a proceeding for contempt, the High Court finds that the alleged contemner is not guilty of contempt and exonerates him, or even if he is found guilty of contempt, declines to punish him. A question may well arise whether in the latter case the Advocate General or any other person who has, with the consent in writing of the Advocate General, move the High Court an appeal as of right against the order or decision of the High Court. That question does not arise in the present case and we need not, therefore, express any opinion upon it, though we may point out that in England a right of appeal is given to a disappointed applicant u/s 13, Sub-sections (1) and (2) of the Administration of Justice Act, 1960. 8. It is settled law that appeal is the creation of statute. The right of appeal may be conferred by statute on a person either expressly or by implication. Section 19(1)(a) of the Act only states that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of a Single Judge in the exercise of his jurisdiction to punish for contempt to a Bench of not less than two judges. It does not mention who may file the appeal under that Section. Section 19(1)(a) of the Act only states that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of a Single Judge in the exercise of his jurisdiction to punish for contempt to a Bench of not less than two judges. It does not mention who may file the appeal under that Section. It does not thus confer a right of appeal on any person expressly. It is, therefore, necessary to determine on whom it confers a right of appeal by implication. 9. It has been held in the case of Baradakanta Mishra v. Mr. Justice Gatikrushna Mishra, C.J. of the Orissa H.C. (supra): .... So far as the contempt jurisdiction is concerned, the only actors in the drama are the Court and the alleged contemner. An outside party comes in only by way of drawing the attention of the Court to the contempt which has been committed : he does not become a party to the proceeding for contempt which may be initiated by the Court. 10. It is thus settled law that a person who moves the court for initiating proceedings against the contemner is only an informer and is not a party to the contempt proceedings after they are initiated against the contemner. In contempt of court injury is caused to the court and not to the person who moves the court for initiating proceedings against the contemner. Thus if his application for initiating contempt proceedings against the contemner is dismissed it cannot be held that he is aggrieved by the order of dismissal. As the right of appeal is normally conferred on an aggrieved party it must be held that u/s 19(1)(a) of the Act, a right of appeal is not conferred by implication on a person whose application for initiating contempt proceedings against the contemner is dismissed. The only aggrieved party in contempt proceedings is the contemner when he is punished for contempt of court or an order is passed affecting his right. It, therefore, follows that u/s 19(1)(a) of the Act, a right of appeal is conferred by implication only on the contemner against orders punishing him for contempt of Court or affecting his right. 11. The only aggrieved party in contempt proceedings is the contemner when he is punished for contempt of court or an order is passed affecting his right. It, therefore, follows that u/s 19(1)(a) of the Act, a right of appeal is conferred by implication only on the contemner against orders punishing him for contempt of Court or affecting his right. 11. Sections 13(1) and (2) of the Administration of Justice Act, 1960 is as follows: (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, an appeal shall lie under this section from any order or decision of a court in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt of court (including criminal contempt); and in relation to any such order or decision the provisions of this section shall have effect in substitution for any other enactment relating to appeals in civil or criminal proceedings." (2) An appeal under this section shall lie in any case at the instance of the Defendant and, in the case of an application for committal or attachment, at the instance of the applicant. It is noteworthy that Section 19(1) of the Act is similar to Section 19(1) of the Administration of Justice Act, 1960. Section 13(2) of the Act confers a right of appeal expressly on both the contemner and the person who moves the court for taking action for contempt of court against any order or decision of a court in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt of court. If the Legislature intended to confer a right of appeal on the person who moves the court for taking action for contempt of court against an order dismissing his application it would have enacted a provision similar to Section 13(2) of that Act. The fact that it has not done so goes to show that it did not intend to confer a right of appeal on such a person against an order dismissing his application for taking action for contempt of court and that Section 19(1) of the Act confers a right of appeal only on the contemner by implication when he is the aggrieved party. 12. 12. The historical background in which Section 19(1) of the Act was enacted, also shows that a right of appeal has been conferred under that section by implication only on the contemner against orders punishing him for contempt of Court or affecting his rights and not on the person moving the Court for taking action for contempt of Court. This is evident from the under-mentioned observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Baradakanta Mishra v. Mr. Justice Gatikrushna Mishra C.J. of the Orissa H.C. (supra): It is, therefore, clear that under the laws as it stood prior to the enactment of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 no appeal lay at the instance of a party moving the High Court for taking action for contempt, if the High Court in the execise of its discretion refused to take action on the motion of such party. Even if the High Court took action and initiated a proceeding for contempt and in such proceeding the alleged contemner, being found guilty, was punished for contempt, the order being one made by the High Court in the exercise of its criminal jurisdiction, was not appealable under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent and, therefore, no appeal lay against it from a Single Judge to a Division Bench and equally, there was no appeal as of right from a Division Bench to this Court. The result was that in case of criminal contempt, even a person punished for contempt had no right of appeal and he could impugn the order committing him for contempt only if the High Court granted the appropriate certificate under Article 134 in fit cases or on the refusal of the High Court to do so, this Court intervened by granting special leave under Article 136. This was a highly unsatisfactory state of affairs and it was largely responsible for the criticism against the large powers of the Court to punish for contempt. This unsatisfactory feature of the law of contempt was adversely commented upon by Sanyal Committee in its Report dated 28 th February, 1963 submitted to the Government of India. The Sanyal Committee pointed out in paragraph 21 in Chapter XI of its Report : "The present state of the law relating to appeal in cases of criminal contempt appears to be more the result of accidents of legal history than a matter of policy. The Sanyal Committee pointed out in paragraph 21 in Chapter XI of its Report : "The present state of the law relating to appeal in cases of criminal contempt appears to be more the result of accidents of legal history than a matter of policy. That this is so is clearly evident from the fact that in those cases of contempt for which specific provision is made in the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure a right of appeal is provided for u/s 486 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the case of contempt falling within the purview of inherent powers of the High Courts no specific provision has been made in the Letters Patent of the High Courts and the only explanation for this seems to be that no such provision was made in England in regard to the English superior courts. Further, under the provisions of the Letters Patent, no appeal is ordinarily permissible where the order of the court is made in the exercise of criminal jurisdiction. It has also been held that Section 411-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not afford any remedy by way of appeal in contempt cases. The result has been that before the Constitution came into force, an appeal in contempt cases from the decision of a High Court could lie only in special cases to the Judicial Committee. The Constitution did not atler this position very much for the effect of Articles 134 and 136 of the Constitution is merely to substitute the Supreme Court for the Privy Council. In short, there is only a discretionary right of appeal available at present in cases of criminal contempt Then Paragraph 3.1 in Chapter XI of its Report the Sanyal Committee proceeded to state : ....We accordingly recommend that against an order of a Single Judge, punishing for contempt, the appeal should lie, in the High Court, to a Bench of Judges and against a similar order of a Bench of Judges of a High Court the appeal should lie as of right to the Supreme Court. Chapter XII of the Report contained the recommendations of the Sanyal Committee and Clause 25 of the recommendations was in the following terms: Provision may be made for an appeal as of right from any order or decision of a High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The appeal should lie to a Bench of Judges of the High Court where the order or decision is of a Single Judge. Where the order or decision is of a Bench the Appeal should lie to the Supreme Court. 13. It was in pursuance of this recommendation made by the Sanyal Committee that the Parliament, while enacting the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, introduced Section 19, Sub-section (1) in that Act conferring an appeal as of right "from any order or decision of a High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. 14. It must, therefore, be held that the Appellant has no right to file on appeal u/s 19(1)(a) of the Act against the order of the learned Single Judge dated 11th October, 1984 dismissing his application for initiating contempt proceedings against opposite party No. 1. 15. For the reasons given above I am of the opinion that it was rightly held in the case of Kuldeep Narain Lal v. Mahendra Pal Jain (Supra) that the order of the Single Judge dismissing the application of the Appellant for taking action for contempt of Court against the Respondents was not appealable u/s 19(1)(a) of the Act. B.D. Agarwal. J. 16. Doubt being raised in regard to the correctness of the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Kuldeep Narain Lal v. Mahendra Pal Jain, District Magistrate Ballia and Anr. (Supra) on the point whether appeal u/s 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is maintainable at the instance of the applicant who moved the High Court for proceeding in civil contempt but the alleged contemner was exonerated after notice, this question has been referred to larger Bench. 17. (Supra) on the point whether appeal u/s 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is maintainable at the instance of the applicant who moved the High Court for proceeding in civil contempt but the alleged contemner was exonerated after notice, this question has been referred to larger Bench. 17. The Appellant was a candidate in the High School Examination, 1984 conducted by the Board of High School and Intermediate Education, U.P. His grievance is that despite order of this Court dated 9th August, 1984 disposing of his writ petition whereby the Respondent No. 1 who is the Secretary, Board of High School and intermediate Education was directed to issue provisional mark sheet to the Petitioner within three days of the service of a copy of the order and even though the order was served on 13th August, 1984, the provisional mark-sheet was not issued till 30th August, 1984. After issue of notice on this motion to the Respondent and having heard the parties, learned Single Judge dismissed the application in contempt jurisdiction on 11th October, 1984 with the finding that this is not a fit case to punish the Respondent for having committed civil contempt by wilfully disobeying the order passed by this Court. It was held that the Respondent had acted promptly to comply with the Court's order as soon as it came to his knowledge ; the applicant was issued provisional mark-sheet on the basis whereof he has also been admitted in Intermediate Classes. The applicant took the matter to appeal purporting to be filed u/s 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 wherein reference to larger Bench was made on 16th November, 1984. 18. In Kuldeep Narain Lal v. Mahendra Pal Jain, District Magistrate Baflia (Supra) the correctness of which is assailed by Sri V.N. Agarwal learned Counsel for the Appellant before us, the Appellant challenged before the Public Service Tribunal an order of the Respondent No. 1 where he was made seasonal collection Amin for the post of officiating Collection Amin held by him. The Tribunal directed by interim order that status quo be maintained. The Appellant's grievance therein was that this order of the Tribunal was ignored that his pay was not given. Therefore, it was alleged, there was contempt of the order of the Tribunal. Ojection was filed by the Respondent contending that there was no contempt committed. The Tribunal directed by interim order that status quo be maintained. The Appellant's grievance therein was that this order of the Tribunal was ignored that his pay was not given. Therefore, it was alleged, there was contempt of the order of the Tribunal. Ojection was filed by the Respondent contending that there was no contempt committed. Learned Single Judge dismissed the petition for taking action for committing the alleged contempt being of the opinion after hearing the parties that no case was mace out for the same on merits. The applicant appealed purporting to do so u/s 19(1) of the Act. The Division Bench took the view that no appeal lay at the Applicant's instance against an order where the High Court has refused to exercise its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. 19. Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act 1971 in so far as material reads as under : 19(1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. (a) Where the order or decision is that of a Single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court: (b) Where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union Territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court. (2) Pending any appeal, the appellate court may order that (a) the execution of the punishment or order appealed against be suspended: (b) if the Appellant is in confinement, he be released on bail ; and (c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the Appellant has not urged his contempt. 20. Prior to the enforcement of this Act, 1971 there is no appeal provided as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in its Contempt jurisdiction. Section 486 read with Section 480 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 made limited provision for appeal in the matter of summary proceeding arising u/s 228, Penal Code ; corresponding provisions exist in Section 351 read with Section 345 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The question arose whether the Privy Council was competent to entertain an appeal from an order of a Court of Record inflicting a penalty for contempt of Court. The question arose whether the Privy Council was competent to entertain an appeal from an order of a Court of Record inflicting a penalty for contempt of Court. In Rain v. Justice of Sierra Leone (1852) 2 Moo PC 47 the view entertained by the Privy Council was that no such appeal lay. Later there was departure from this view and it was held that there exists supervisory jurisdiction to entertain such appeal but the discretion had to be exercised with circumspection. In Andre Paul Terence Ambard v. A.G. of Trinided and Tabago AIR 1936 PC 141 , Lord Atkin speaking for the Judicial Committee opined: Everyone will recognise the importance of maintaining the authority of the Courts in restraining and punishing interferences with the administration of justice whether they be interferences in particular civil criminal cases or take the form of attempts to depreciate the authority of the Courts themselves. It is sufficient to say that such interference when they amount to contempt of Court are quasi/criminal acts, orders punishing them should, generally speaking, be treated as orders in criminal cases, and leave to appeal against them should only be granted on the well known principles on which leave to appeal in criminal cases is given. 20. Under the letters patent provision made no doubt was for appeal with certain exceptions against a ' judgment .' The classical meaning given to the expression ' judgment ' as appearing in the Justice of the Peace for Calcutta v. Oriental Gas Company 1872 (17) WR 364 was " a decision which affects the merits of the question between the parties by determining some right or liability." See also Shah Babulal Khimji Vs. Jayaben D. Kania and Another, AIR 1981 SC 1786 . In Narendrabhai Sarabhai Hatheesing Vs. Chinubhai Manibhai Seth, AIR 1936 Bom 314 the appeal arose against an order of Single Judge of the High Court on a notice of motion to commit Defendant No. 1 for breach of an undertaking given to the Court and embodied in its order. The learned Judge found that no breach of the order was proved which could justify him in committing the Defendant to prison. The question was whether an appeal lay against this order of refusal to commit. The learned Judge found that no breach of the order was proved which could justify him in committing the Defendant to prison. The question was whether an appeal lay against this order of refusal to commit. The Division Bench consisting of Beaumont, C.J. and Rangnekar, J. held that the order appealed from did not decide any question between the parties and determine any right or liability. Beaumont, C.J. pointed out: The undertaking is given to the Court if it is broken and that fact is brought to the court's notice, the Court may take such action as it thinks fit. If it comes to the conclusion that the order has been deliberately broken, it will probably commit the defaulter to jail, but the Court is free to adopt such course as it thinks fit. Rangnekar, J. in his separate but concerning judgment observed: Proceeding for contempt are matters entirely between the Court and the person alleged to have been guilty of contempt. No party has any statutory right to say that he is entitled as a matter of course to an order for committal because his opponent is guilty of contempt. All that he can do is to come to the Court and complain that the authority of the Court has been flouted, and if the Court thinks that it was so then the Court in its discretion takes action to vindicate its authority. It is, therefore, difficult to see how an application for contempt raises any question between the parties, so that any order made on such an application by which the Court in its discretion refuses to take any action against the party alleged to be in the wrong can be said to raise any question between the parties. 22. The position existing in this behalf did not change with the enactment of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1926. This was a brief legislation giving express recognition to the power of the High Courts established by Letters Patent to exercise the same jurisdiction and authority in respect of contempt of courts subordinate to them as they have in respect of contempt of themselves. Even apart from the provision specifically made in this Act, this Court took the view that the power to protect its inferior courts is coeval with the foundation and institution of the High Court. Sulaiman, J. Sheo Bachan Pandit Vs. Even apart from the provision specifically made in this Act, this Court took the view that the power to protect its inferior courts is coeval with the foundation and institution of the High Court. Sulaiman, J. Sheo Bachan Pandit Vs. Ram Dhari Gir and Another, AIR 1962 All 623 laid down at page 632: This High Court is in an equal degree the guardian and protector of public justice throughout these provinces and has superintendence over the inferior civil courts to protect such courts, otherwise their independence and usefulness would be considerably impaired. I have therefore, no hesitation in holding that such a power exists. I might add that new Contempt of Courts Act, 1926 has been enacted in order to remove doubts which had arisen as to the powers of a High Court. This enactment does not imply that the legislature has recognised that no such power did in fact exist. 23. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 which replaced the 1926 Act as well maintained silence in regard to provision for appeal as of right in the matter of an order passed by the High Court in exercise of Contempt jurisdiction. This continued to be left over to the powers of the Supreme Court exercisable in exceptional circumstances existing under Article 136 of the Constitution. The High Court has the power to grant leave to appeal under Article 134(1) but only on the limited grounds akin to those in which the Privy Council granted special leave. In this background, the H.L. Sanyal Committee in its report dated 28th February, 1963 considered at length this lacuna and approving of the opinion of the Lord Shawcross Committee (U.K.) observed : The feature of the law of contempt which has given rise to considerable criticism relates to the non-appealability as of right of a sentence passed for criminal contempt. It is urged that much of the criticism against the large powers of the court to punish contemners will disappear if a right of a appeal is provided. In an earlier Chapter, we have pointed out how Judges, like other human beings, are not infallible and inasmuch as any sentence of imprisonment for contempt involves a fundamental question of personal liberty, it is only proper that there should be provision for appeal as a matter of course. As the Shawcross Committee observed: .... In an earlier Chapter, we have pointed out how Judges, like other human beings, are not infallible and inasmuch as any sentence of imprisonment for contempt involves a fundamental question of personal liberty, it is only proper that there should be provision for appeal as a matter of course. As the Shawcross Committee observed: .... In every system of law of any civilized State, there is always a right of appeal against any sentence of imprisonment. There is no justification whatsoever for making any exception to this universally recognised principle in the case of sentence for contempt. The present state of the law relating to appeal in cases of criminal contempt appears to be more the result of accidents of legal history than a matter of policy. That this is so is clearly evident from the tact that in those cases of contempt for which specific provision is made in the Indian Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure a right of appeal is provided for u/s 486 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the case of contempt falling within the purview of inherent powers of the High Courts, no specific provision has been made in the Letters Patent of the High Courts and the only explanation for this seems to be that no such provision was made in England in regard to the English superior courts Further, under the provisions of the Letters Patent, no appeal is ordinarily permissible where the order of the court is made in the exercise of the criminal jurisdiction. It has also been held that Section 411A of the Code of Criminal Procedure does not afford any remedy by way of appeal in contempt cases. The result has been that before the Constitution came into force, an appeal in contempt cases from the decision of a High Court could lie only in special cases to the Judicial Committee. The Constitution did not alter this, position very much for the effect of Articles 134 and 136 of the Constitution is merely to substitute the Supreme Court for the Privy Council. In short, there is only a discretionary right of appeal available at present in cases of criminal contempt. The Committee in para (III), (i) of the report stated : .... In short, there is only a discretionary right of appeal available at present in cases of criminal contempt. The Committee in para (III), (i) of the report stated : .... We accordingly recommend that against an order of a Single Judge, punishing for contempt, to a Bench of Judges and against a similar order of a Bench of Judges in a High Court, the appeal should lie as of right to the Supreme Court. 24. It was in pursuance of this recommendation made by the Sanyal Committee, observe their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Baradakanta Mishra v. Mr. Justice Gatikrushana Misra, Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court (Supra) that the Parliament, while enacting the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, introduced Section 19(1) in that Act conferring an appeal as of right " from any order or decision of a High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. " We have found it necessary to advert to the legislative history behind this statutory provision in order that the ambiguity existing on its face in regard to the language used in Section 19(1) be satisfactorily resolved. The note-worthy feature is that the (sic) given expression to by the Sanyal Committee was against the absence of a right of appeal as a matter of course to a person found guilty and punished in exercise of contempt jurisdiction. Instead of leaving this to realm of discretionary exercise of powers of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution sparingly in extraordinary situations, the Parliament has in its wisdom considered appropriate to provide for appeal as a matter of course where the Appellant has been met with punishment by the High Court in its contempt jurisdiction. The expression " as of right " appearing in Section 19(1) is significantly in juxta position to the discretionary exercise of power, to entertain the appeal under the law as it was before this enactment coming into force. This does not warrant, in our opinion, a wider meaning to cover within its ambit an appeal at the instance of the applicant who sets the machinery of the High Court in motion. 25. True the appeal envisaged u/s 19(1) is "from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. This does not warrant, in our opinion, a wider meaning to cover within its ambit an appeal at the instance of the applicant who sets the machinery of the High Court in motion. 25. True the appeal envisaged u/s 19(1) is "from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. " The word ' any ' has a diversity of meaning and may be employed to indicate " all " or " every " as well as ' some ' or ' one ' and its meaning in a given statute depends upon the context and the subject matter of the statute. It is often synonymous with ' either ' " every " or " all ". Its generality may be restricted by the context thus, giving of right to do some act " at any time " is commonly construed as meaning within a reasonable time, and the words " any other " following the enumeration of particular class are to be read as " other such like " and include only others of like kind or character-vide Blacks' Law Dictionary 5th Edition 1979 page 86. 26. The successive decisions of the Supreme Court leave no room to doubt that in the context of Section 19(1) the word ' any ' preceding " order or decision " is not, synonymous with the expression " every " or " all ". Bardakanta Misra (Supra) is authority for the proposition that on a reference made by the Advocate General if the court declines to take cognizance and to initiate proceeding for contempt, the order is not an order initiating contempt proceeding and it is not appealable u/s 19. It is difficult to imagine, contended the Appellant therein that the Legislature should have conferred a right on the Advocate General or any other person with the consent in writing of the Advocate General to move the High Court for taking action for contempt, but should have refused to grant a right of appeal to the Advocate General or such other person even if the motion was wrongly rejected by the High Court. Hon'ble Bhagwati, J. (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the Division Bench thus elucidated the true nature of the contempt jurisdiction exercised by the High Court : It has always been regarded as well as settled law that as far as criminal contempt is concerned, it is a matter entirely between the Court and the alleged contemner. No one has a statutory or common law right to say that he is entitled as a matter of course to an order for committal because the alleged contemner is guilty of contempt. All that he can do is to move the Court and draw its attention to the contempt alleged to have been committed and it will then be for the Court, if it so thinks fit, to take action to vindicate its authority and commit the alleged contemner for contempt. It is for the Court in the exercise of its discretion to decide whether or not to initiate a proceeding for contempt. Even if the Court is prima facie satisfied that a contempt has been committed, the Court may yet choose to ignore it and decline to take action. There is no right in any one to compel the Court to initiate a proceeding for contempt even where a prima facie case appears to have been made out. The same position obtains even after a proceeding for contempt is initiated by the Court on a motion made to it for the purpose. The Court may in the exercise of its discretion accept an unconditional apology from the alleged contemner and drop the proceeding for contempt, or even after the alleged contemner is found guilty, the Court may having regard to the circumstances, decline to punish him. So far as the contempt jurisdiction is concerned, the only actors in the drama are the Court and the alleged contemner. An outside party comes in only by way of drawing the attention of the Court to the contempt which has been committed : he does not become a party to the proceeding for contempt which may be initiated by the Court. 27. An outside party comes in only by way of drawing the attention of the Court to the contempt which has been committed : he does not become a party to the proceeding for contempt which may be initiated by the Court. 27. In para 5 the Supreme Court approvingly referred to the opinion expressed by the Bombay High Court in Narendrabhai Sarabhai Hatheesing (Supra) extracted by us earlier which was a case of alleged civil contempt on the basis that the Defendant had not observed an undertaking given to the Court and incorporated in its order. It was laid down that the court assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt " only when the Court decides to take action initiates a proceeding for contempt. " The exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt, whether a suo motu on a motion or a reference. 28. In the other case of Barada Kanta Mishra Vs. Orissa High Court, AIR 1976 SC 1206 the order impugned was interlocutory. It only said that all the points arising in the case, including the one of maintainability of the proceedings would be heard together and the prayer of the Appellant to hear the case piecemeal was rejected. It was held that against such order appeal was not maintainable u/s 19(1) the reason being that only those orders or decisions in which same point is decided or finding is given in the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court to punish for contempt are appealable u/s 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 29. In Barda Kanta Misra (supra) the High Court had declined to issue notice on the Appellant's motion. In Purshotam Dass Goel Vs. Hon'ble Mr. B.S. Dhillon and Others, AIR 1978 SC 1014 the High Court had directed the issue of notice to the Appellant to show cause why he should not be proceeded against for committing contempt of Court. The question arising was whether appeal lay u/s 19(1) against an order to issue notice. This was answered in the negative holding that an order merely initiating the proceeding without anything further, does not decide anything against the alleged contemner and cannot be appealed against as a matter of right u/s 19. In a given case special leave may be granted under Article 136 of the Constitution far from an order initiating the proceeding. This was answered in the negative holding that an order merely initiating the proceeding without anything further, does not decide anything against the alleged contemner and cannot be appealed against as a matter of right u/s 19. In a given case special leave may be granted under Article 136 of the Constitution far from an order initiating the proceeding. The Supreme Court reiterated that Section 19(1) does not contemplate appeal as a matter of right from each and every order made by the High Court. It was pointed out : It would appear from a plain reading of the section that an appeal shall lie to this Court as a matter of right from any order or decision of a Bench of High Court if the order has been made in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. No appeal can lie as a matter of right from any kind of order made by the High Court in the proceeding for contempt. There proceeding is initiated u/s 17 by issuance of a notice. Thereafter, there may be many interlocutory orders passed in the said proceeding by the High Court. It could not be the intention of the legislature to provide for an appeal to this Court as a matter of right from each and every such order made by the High Court. The order or the decision must be such that it decides some bone of contention raised before the High Court affecting the right of the party aggrieved. Mere initiation of a proceeding for contempt by the issuance of the notice on the prima facie view that the case is a fit one for drawing up the proceeding, does not decide any question. This Court, for the first time, cannot be asked in such an appeal to decide whether the person proceeded against has committed contempt of the High Court or not. The matter has to be decided either finally or, may be, even at an earlier stage an order is made, which does decide a contention raised by the alleged contemner asking the High Court to drop the proceeding. It is neither possible, nor advisable, to make an exhaustive list of the type of orders, which may be appealable to this Court u/s 19. A final order, surely will be appealable. See also Union of India v. Maris Carbral 1982 (3) SCC 262 . It is neither possible, nor advisable, to make an exhaustive list of the type of orders, which may be appealable to this Court u/s 19. A final order, surely will be appealable. See also Union of India v. Maris Carbral 1982 (3) SCC 262 . An impression, therefore, such as entertained by the Appellant before us that an appeal by him is maintainable merely because Section 19(1) contemplates an appeal as of right and against any order or decision is clearly misplaced. 30. This Court in the present case having issued notice to the alleged contemner and there being the determination thereafter on merit that he is not guilty of contempt, the Court has acted in exercise of contempt jurisdiction within the meaning of Section 19(1). The crucial question still remains whether in such a case the applicant can appeal as of right againgt the order or decision of the High Court. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court expressly left this question open in Baradakanta Misra (supra) with the observations: The question does not arise in the present case and we need not, therefore, express any opinion upon it, though we may point out that in England a right of appeal is given to a disappointed applicant u/s 13, Sub-sections (1) and (2) of the Administration of Justice Act, 1960. 31. We have looked into these provisions. Section 13 of the Administration of Justice Act, 1960 in so far as relevant provides : (1). Subject to the provisions of this section, an appeal shall lie under this section from any order or decision of a court in the exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt of court (including criminal contempt); and in relation to any such order or decision the provisions of this section shall have effect in substitution for any other enactment relating to appeal in civil or criminal proceedings. (2) An appeal under this section shall lie in any case at the instance of the Defendant, and in the case of an application for committal or attachment, at the instance of the applicant. (2) An appeal under this section shall lie in any case at the instance of the Defendant, and in the case of an application for committal or attachment, at the instance of the applicant. (3) The court to which an appeal is brought under this section may reverse or vary the order or decision of the court below, and make such other order as may be just; and without prejudice to the inherent powers of any court referred to in Sub-section (2) of the section, provision may be made by rules of court for authorising the release on bail of an Appellant under this section. 32. Formerly, under English law the right of appeal could only be exercised against a decision concerning civil contempt but no appeal lay from an order of attachment or commitment in case of criminal contempt. This anomaly arose from the fact that the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907 gave for the first time a general right of appeal in criminal cases to the court of criminal appeal but as it applied only to 'those convicted on indictment' it did not cover contempt prosecution, since they were tried summarily. At the same time no appeal could lie to the court of appeal since it was expressly provided that no appeal lay to that court in any criminal cause or matter' and a criminal contempt was held to be such a ' criminal cause or matter '. This anomaly was remedied by the Administration of Justice Act. Section 15 now provides, a uniform procedure for appeal in respect of both criminal and civil contempt.-Halsbury's Laws of England (4th Ed.) Vol. 9 (para 107): Borrie and Lowe's Law of Contempt (2nd Ed.) 1983, p. 369-7. 33. The significant feature in regard to Section 13 is that in Sub-section (2) thereof express provision is inserted providing for appeal not only at the instance of the Defendant but also in the case of an application for committal or attachment, at the instance of the applicant. The appellate court is given the power in view of Sub-section (3) to reverse or vary the order or decision of the court below and make such an other order as may be just, including in an appeal brought by the applicant. The appellate court is given the power in view of Sub-section (3) to reverse or vary the order or decision of the court below and make such an other order as may be just, including in an appeal brought by the applicant. Commenting upon Section 13(2) Borrie and Lowe's observe in their treatise at page 372 : Although this section makes it clear that either party may appeal it would appear that it was intended that an applicant should have a more limited right of appeal for whereas a Defendant may appeal in any case an applicant can appeal only in respect of an application for committal or attachment. However, such a distinction seems to have been ignored by the court of appeal in Hoffman-La Roche (F) and Co. v. Sieczko where the applicant appealed against a refusal to issue a writ of sequestration, Harman L. J. commenting that it was an: ' Unusual type of appeal, being an appeal by Plaintiffs in an infringement action against the refusal of judge to enforce in their favour undertakings given by the Defendants and said to have been broken by them...' 34. No reference was made to the fact that this was an appeal by applicant in respect of a writ of sequestration rather than a Committal or attachment but it may well be that the courts will continue to ignore the more restrictive inter-pretation. Indeed it would seem preferable to do so as it would have. 35. Sub-section (1) of Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 is in pari materia with Section 13(1) of the Administration of Justice Act, 1960. But in our opinion, this is of considerable importance, there is no provision in Section 19 corresponding or analogous to Sub-section (2) of Section 13 providing for appeal at the applicant's instance. The text of 1960 Act was before the draftsman when the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 was drawn. It might be safely assumed that, unless it was otherwise intended, Sub-section (2) of Section 13 of the English Act, will have as well been incorporated in suitable language. The departure made in this behalf is not accidental. 36. Section 19(2) is indeed meaningful and suggestive of the legislative intent. The words are " pending any appeal, the appellate court may order that. The departure made in this behalf is not accidental. 36. Section 19(2) is indeed meaningful and suggestive of the legislative intent. The words are " pending any appeal, the appellate court may order that. " Each of the three Clauses (a), (b) and (c) refers to order such as may be made in appeal at the instance of the person punished or committed in contempt jurisdiction. If the intention were to provide for appeal at the instance of the applicant also, instead of using the words " pending any appeal " the words " where the appeal is by the person punished for Contempt of Court......" or some such words will have been employed. At the present, the words " pending any appeal" make it clear that the only kind of appeal contemplated is such wherein any of the orders referred to in Clauses (a), (b), (c) may be passad as an interim. 37. It is trite that it is not to be assumed that there is a right of appeal in every matter which comes under the consideration of a Court: such right must be given by statute, or by some authority equivalent to a statute such as rules framed under a statute. Unless a right of appeal is clearly given by statute, it does not exist. No right of appeal can be given except by express words. In other words, a right of appeal inheres in no one and therefore an appeal for its maintainability must have the clear authority of law-vide Narayan v. Secretary of State 20 Bom. 803 , Dhan Singh Ramkrishna Chaudhari and Others Vs. Laxminarayan Ramkishan and Another, AIR 1974 SC 1613 , Zair Hussain Khan v. Khurshed Jan 28 All. 545. 38. In contempt jurisdiction to adopt the metaphor used by the Supreme Court the only actors in the drama are the court and the alleged contemner. An application for contempt such as moved by the Appellant in the instant case does not raise any question between the parties. All that the Appellant could do so to complain that the statutory right to say that he is entitled as a matter of course to an order for committal because the Respondent is allegedly guilty of contempt. It is in the discretion of the court to take action in vindication of its authority. There was no right to appeal provided in the earlier enactments. It is in the discretion of the court to take action in vindication of its authority. There was no right to appeal provided in the earlier enactments. The mischief which the Parliament chose to undo in the light of recommendation of the Sanyal Committee was to provide for appeal as of right against a sentence passed in contempt jurisdiction. The contention of Shri. Agarwal learned Counsel for the Appellant that the application of the Appellant be treated as that of execution and hence he may be deemed a party to the contempt proceeding and that to hold otherwise would leave such an application remedyless cannot be sustained. The application is not of execution in essence though this might have the effect to accelerate compliance to the Courts order which had allegedly been flouted : the authority being flouted and then, as stated above, it thinks fit while the execution can be prayed for as a matter of right. In execution the applicant prays for the fruits of the decree or order being awarded to him; in contempt application, the prayer is to punish the guilty for not having abided by the undertaking, decree or order as the case may be. A Division Bench of this Court affirmed this distinction in Godu Ram v. S. Suraj Mal (1904) 277 All. 380, pointing out that the application (in that case also the application was in matter of civil contempt) could not be treated as of execution but as an application to the court to exercise its inherent power of punishing for contempt of court. As for the second limb of Sri. Agarwal's argument, the remedy may lie by way of seeking special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution provided the case is shown as fit otherwise for exercise of that extra-ordinary discretionary jurisdiction. 39. We are not unconscious of the proposition that a person who is not a party to a proceeding may still prefer an appeal from an order parsed in the (sic) pro-observed in re Securities Insurance Company reported in (1094) 2 Ch 410 as follows : I understand the practice to be perfectly well settled that a person who is a party can appeal (of course within the proper time) without any leave, and that a person bound by the order or is aggrieved by it, or is prejudicially affected by it cannot appeal without leave. It does not require much to obtain leave. If a person alleging himself to be aggrieved by an order can make out even a prima facie case why he should have leave he will get it, but without leave he is not entitled to appeal . 40. This dictum has been accepted by some of our High Courts. (See, for instance, The Province of Bombay Vs. Western India Automobile Association, AIR 1949 Bom 141 , wherein Chagla, C.J. observed that, "in the case of a person not a party to the suit who is affected by the order has no right, but the court of Appeal may in its discretion allow him to prefer an appeal". In Nookala Setharamaiah Vs. Kotaiah Naidu and Others, AIR 1970 SC 1354 , Shah, J. quoted the observation of Lindley case of a person not a party to the suit who is affected by the order has no right, but the court of Appeal may in its discretion allow him to prefer an appeal". In Nookala Setharamaih v. Kotiah Naidu (supra) Shah, J. quoted the observation of Lindley L.J. (supra) with approval and noted that the said proposition has been accepted by the High Courts in India. The Supreme Court in Smt. Jatan Kumar Golcha Vs. Golcha Properties (P) Ltd., AIR 1971 SC 374 , also observed that it is well settled that a person who was not a party to a suit might prefer an appeal with the leave of the Appellate Court and such leave should be granted if he would be prejudicially affected by the judgment. The material consideration which, however, disentitles the Appellant such as the one before us from appeal is that he cannot claim to be a person prejudicially affected by the order exonerating the alleged contemner. As a non party to the proceeding he has to establish that the order affects him adversely so as to permit him to file appeal against the same. 41. For the Appellant there was reference made to L.D. Khanna and Others Vs. Chohan Huhtamaki (India) Pvt. Ltd., (1977) CriLJ 1530 , which in our opinion is of no assistance to him. In that case, a learned Single Judge had issued notice to the Appellants to show cause why they be not proceeded against for contempt which they sought to be discharged. This was declined. Chohan Huhtamaki (India) Pvt. Ltd., (1977) CriLJ 1530 , which in our opinion is of no assistance to him. In that case, a learned Single Judge had issued notice to the Appellants to show cause why they be not proceeded against for contempt which they sought to be discharged. This was declined. Upon appeal against this order, the Division Bench speaking through R.S. Pathak, C.J. (as his Lordship then was) held that no appeal lay u/s 19(1) Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, since in the proceeding for contempt it was not intended to be against an order merely directing issue of notice in a contempt proceeding or declining to discharge such notice as the Supreme Court has observed in Baradaikanta Mishra v. Mr. Justice Gati Krushna Misra, C.J. of the Orissa High Court (supra), Section 19 was enacted pursuant to the recommendation of the Sanyal Committee set forth in Clause 25 of Chapter XI of its Report." 42. This, therefore, is not an authority for proposition that an appeal lies against an order where the Court has after hearing the parties declined to punish the Respondent. The observation at p. 1533 that the concluding stage is the stage contemplated by Clause (d) where the Court exercises the jurisdiction to make an order for the punishment or discharge of the person accused of contempt and that it is to that stage of the exercise of jurisdiction that Sub-section (1) of Section 19 refers must be construed in its context. Their Lordships were not concerned in that case with the issue which precisely is before us. 43. Sri. K.P. Agarwal learned Senior Counsel also appearing for the Appellant submitted making reference to certain passages in reported decisions that to uphold the dignity of the Court is not the concern of the Judges alone but also of the members of the public. The passages cited are para 14 in re P.C. Sen, Chief Minister of West Bengal AIR 1966 Cal. 44 ; in The State Vs. Raghubir Sahai Kaithwar, AIR 1967 All 586 ; Advocate General, State of Bihar v. M.P. Khair Industries AIR 1980 SC 546 and Asharam M. Jain Vs. A.T. Gupta and Others, AIR 1983 SC 1151 . The passages cited are para 14 in re P.C. Sen, Chief Minister of West Bengal AIR 1966 Cal. 44 ; in The State Vs. Raghubir Sahai Kaithwar, AIR 1967 All 586 ; Advocate General, State of Bihar v. M.P. Khair Industries AIR 1980 SC 546 and Asharam M. Jain Vs. A.T. Gupta and Others, AIR 1983 SC 1151 . The Supreme Court observed that the public have an interest and vital stake in the effective and orderly administration of justice and that the Court is entrusted with power to commit for Contempt of Court not in order to protect the dignity of the Court against insult or injury as the express "Contempt of Court" may seem to suggest, but to protect and to vindicate the right of the public that the administration of public shall not be prejudiced, obstructed or interfered with. There can be absolutely no exception taken to it nor is there any controversy about this before us. The crucial question is what is the extent of the right to appeal conferred by the Legislature. Has an outside party who comes in only by way of drawing the attention of the Court to the contempt which has been committed and does not become a party to the proceeding for contempt which may be initiated by the Court been conferred u/s 19 of the Act a right to go in appeal also if the reference or the motion has failed on merit in the issue ? It is no answer to say as to this that the initiator is equally interested in upholding the dignity of the Court and hence he should be deemed to have been given this right to appeal also. The policy underlying would appear to be that if the Court upon scrutiny concludes that there is no case of contempt the chapter stands closed. In case there be some special circumstances or extra-ordinary situation arising, the initiator may invoke the discretionary jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. In AIR 1980 SC 546 the appeal was against the order dismissing the application as barred by the time provided by Section 20 of the Act. Sri. Agarwal candidly concedes that there was no issue raised of maintainability of the appeal in that case. 44. In AIR 1980 SC 546 the appeal was against the order dismissing the application as barred by the time provided by Section 20 of the Act. Sri. Agarwal candidly concedes that there was no issue raised of maintainability of the appeal in that case. 44. The difficulty apparently arises due to the use of the expression "in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt" in Sub-section (1) of Section 19. The Supreme Court has clearly laid down that the exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt whether suo motu or on a motion or a reference. Where the Court rejects a motion or a reference and declines to initiate a proceeding for contempt, it refuses to assume or exercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt and such a decision cannot be regarded as a decision in the exercise of its jurisdiction "to punish" for contempt. It may be argued with some degree of force that once initiated the jurisdiction continues till it culminates into the final order and irrespective of whether the order is against or in favour of the alleged contemner it is an order in the exercise of the Court's jurisdiction to punish for contempt. This at once gives rise to ambiguity which the Court has to resolve applying the settled norms. The most firmly established rules for construing an obscure enactment are those derived from the Heydons case. What was the mischief and defect for which the common law did not provide? The Court may also consider whether a statute is intended to alter the law and if so to what extent. The rule ex-visceribus actus-within the four corners of the Act is another settled principle in this behalf (Craies on Statute Law 710 ed. p. 98). The Court does not have to be prompt to ascribe except upon necessity or some sound reason to the language of the statute tautology or superfluicity. The rule ex-visceribus actus-within the four corners of the Act is another settled principle in this behalf (Craies on Statute Law 710 ed. p. 98). The Court does not have to be prompt to ascribe except upon necessity or some sound reason to the language of the statute tautology or superfluicity. Judges in the back form of the legislative history, the report of the Sanyal Committee which constitutes the immediate precursor to the Bill culminating into the Act, the English precedent which was before the draftsmen, the language employed in Sub-section (2) of Section 19 and that all that the Appellant in such a case can do as to move the Court and draw its attention to the contempt alleged to have been committed, the conclusion to our mind is irresistible that there is no statutory right to appeal conferred on such person u/s 19(1) of the Act. 45. Our attention was drawn for the Appellant to a decision of the Delhi High Court appearing in Vishwanath Khanna v. Ram Swarup Rastogi and Sons 1980 CriLJ 109, where as appears from the Headnote 'A' a contrary view was taken. We asked for a certified copy of the judgment containing the full text but this has not become available and the learned Counsel submitted that it could not be had despite effort made. Without looking into the reasons advanced we are not persuaded with utmost respect to submit to this view. Nor is the decision of the Division Bench of this Court reported in Pratap Singh v. J.C. Gupta 1985 AWC 432 of help to the learned Standing Counsel who cited the same the reason being that therein too the appeal was against the order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt and this was found not to lie. 46. For the reasons given by me I am in agreement with the conclusion arrived at in Kuldip Narain Lal v. Mahendra Pal Jain, District Magistrate, Ballia (supra) and in our considered opinion the instant appeal is not maintainable u/s 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. 47. The papers may be laid before the Division Bench with this opinion of ours. S.I. Jafri, J. 48. 47. The papers may be laid before the Division Bench with this opinion of ours. S.I. Jafri, J. 48. I have the advantage of going through the judgments of Hon'ble B.N. Katju, J. and Hon'ble B.D. Agarwal, J Both of them have held that the law laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in Kuldeep Narain Lal v. Mahendra Lal Jain, District Magistrate Ballia (supra) is the correct law. 49. I also agree with the view expressed by the Hon'ble Judges of this Bench, In my view also this appeal is not maintainable u/s 19(1) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and is liable to be dismissed.