JUDGMENT S. Saghir Ahmad. J. 1. The petitioner, who is said to be a Building Contractor, has been detained under the provisions of the National Security Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) under an order dt.16-12-84 passed by the District Magistrate, Lucknow. 2. A perusal of the order and the ground on which it is based, indicates that the petitioner is one of the accused in Crime Case No 1034 registered at Police Station Hazratganj, Lucknow, under Sections 147/148/149/307 IPC read with Section 5 of the Indian Explosives Act on the basis of the FIR lodged by one Surya Kumar who was allegedly fired at by an associate of the petitioner and a hand granade was also thrown at his car. It may be stated that there were several persons including the petitioner mentioned in the FIR who were said to be armed with pistols, revolvers and guns and the petitioner was said to have had a band granade. The incident is said to have disturbed the public order and consequently the petitioner and some of his other associates were detained under the Act in pursuance of the order passed separately and indivisually against them. The petitioner was arrested in the above criminal case and was released on bail on 15-12-84. The next day i.e. on 16-12-84 the impugned order of detention was passed by the District Magistrate, Lucknow. In the meantime the persons, who had stood as petitioners sureties, withdrew themselves and petitioner surrendered on 14-2-85 and was lodged in Jail where the detention order was served on him on 23-2-85. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner has raised two contentions before us. His first contention is that the incident in question which is the basis of the detention order, relates to " Law and Order " and not Public Order " and, therefore, the order is liable to be quashed as under Section 3 of the Act an order of detention can be passed only in respect of " Public Order " and not in respect of " Law and Order. " 4. " 4. This question is concluded by our decision in Habeas Corpus Petitions Nos.5805 of 1984 Kamlesh Pratap Singh v State of U. P. connected with Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 5806 of 1984 Subhash Bhandari v. State of U. P. and Habeas Corpus Writ Petition No. 309 of 1985 Ashok Arora alias Ashoki Thekedar v. State of U. P., decided on February 14, 1985 by a common judgment in which we have held that the incident, which is the basis of the impugned order in the present case, related to public order. It may be stated that the above Habeas Corpus Petitions had been filed by persons who are co-accused with the petitioner in Crime Case No. 1034. The other contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the order of detention which was passed on 16-12-84 was served on the petitioner on 23-2-85 while the petitioner was in Jail he having surrendered on 14-2-85. In between 16-12-84 and 14-2-85 no effort was made by the opposite parties to execute the order of detention against the petitioner and to arrest him thereunder. The opposite parties had not taken any steps under Section 4 or 7 of Act. These sections are quoted below : "4. Execution of detention orders-A detention order may be executed at any place in India in the manner provided for the execution of warrants of arrest under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)." "7. Powers in relation to absconding persons : (1) If the Central Government or the State Government or an Officer mentioned in sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 3, as the case may be, has reason to believe that a person in respect of whom a detention order has been made has absconded or is concealing himself so that the order cannot be executed, that Government or Officer may- (a) make a report in writing of the fact to a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction in the place where the said person ordinarily resided ; (b) by order notified in the Official Gazette direct the said person to appear before such officer, at such place and within such period as may be specified in the order. (2) Upon the making of a report against any person under Clause (a) of sub-section (1), the provisions of Sections 82, 83, 84 and 85 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) shall apply in respect of such person and his property as if the detention order made against him were a warrant issued by the Magistrate. (3) If any person fails to comply with an order issued under Clause (b) of sub-section (1), he shall, unless he proves that it was not possible for him to comply therewith and that he had, within the period specified in the order, informed the officer mentioned in the order of the reasons which rendered compliance therewith impossible and of his whereabouts, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine or with both. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) every offence under sub-section (3) shall be cognizable. 5. Under Section 4 of the Act the detention order can be executed in the manner provided for the execution of warrant of arrest under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 1973. The order of detention can also be executed in the manner indicated in Section 7 under which a report in writing is to be made to the Magistrate concerned and the person concerned can also be required by an order notified in the official Gazette to appear before such Officer at such place and within such period as may be specified therein. On report being made to the Magistrate under clause (a) of sub-section (1), the provisions of Sections 82, 83, 84 and 85 of the Code of Criminal Procedure become applicable to such person and his property. If the person concerned fails to comply with the order issued under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 7, he becomes liable to be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine, or with both. 6. If the person concerned fails to comply with the order issued under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 7, he becomes liable to be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year or with fine, or with both. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that if the detention of the petitioner was at all required under the Act so that he could be prevented from committing other prejudicial acts, he should have been immediately detained in execution of the impugned order and because no steps were taken by the opposite parties under Section 4 or Section 7 of the Act, his detention was not at all called for and the lapse on the part of the opposite parties in getting the order executed under Section 4 or Section 7 of the Act will have the effect of vitiating the order. He has, in this connection relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Nizamuddin v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1973 SC 2353 in which the order of detention was not served for about two and half months and for this reason the order was held to have been vitiated In order to show that the order of detention was attempted to be executed against the petitioner, the Additional Government Advocate filed a supplementary counter affidavit dated 27-9-85 in which it has been stated that Sri Hari Ram Singh Bhati. Inspector-In-charge Police Station Hazratganj, Lucknow, had made several efforts to arrest the petitioner in execution of the order of detention but the petitioner could not be arrested. The relevant extracts of G. D. entry no. 9 dated 19-12-84, G D. report no. 2 dated 20-12-84, G D. report no. 4 dated 31-12-84, G. D. entry no. 79 dated 5-1-85, G. D. report no. 5 dated 8-1-85, G. D. entry no. 36 dated 22-1-85, G. D. report no. 75 dated 23-1-85, G. D. report no. 12 dated 31-1-85, G D. report no. 9 dated 3-2-85, G. D. report no. 3 dated 11-2-85 and G, D. report no. 7 dated 12-2-85 have been filed as Annexures 1 to 11 to this affidavit. 5 dated 8-1-85, G. D. entry no. 36 dated 22-1-85, G. D. report no. 75 dated 23-1-85, G. D. report no. 12 dated 31-1-85, G D. report no. 9 dated 3-2-85, G. D. report no. 3 dated 11-2-85 and G, D. report no. 7 dated 12-2-85 have been filed as Annexures 1 to 11 to this affidavit. It was in this background that the District Magistrate in his counter affidavit dated April 14, 1985 had stated as under :- "The detention order was sent to S.S.P. Lucknow for being served on the petitioner and further to arrest and detain the petitioner in Jail. Tne aforesaid order could not be served on the petitioner as the petitioner was not available and efforts made by the police authorities failed. As already stated above the S.S P. Lucknow returned the detention order informing deponent vide letter dated 14-2-85 that the petitioner is in Jail and that the detention order and the grounds be got served through the Superintendent District Jail, Lucknow. Under these circumstances the detention order was served on the petitioner on 23-2-84. The detention order could not be served on the petitioner as the petitioner was hiding himself and same was served when he was available. The petitioner has filed a supplementary rejoinder affidavit dated September 29, 1985 in which the averment of facts made in the supplementary counter affidavit have been denied. 10. It has been contended by the learned Additional Government Advocate that there was no delay in executing the order of detention and that every effort was made by the Police to execute the Order and to arrest the petitioner. The order will not, it is submitted, be vitiated as there was no Iepse on the part of the opposite parties in executing it. Our attention has, in this connection, been invited to the decision of the Supreme Court in Indradeo Mahto v State of West Bengal, AIR 1973 SC 1062 wherein Their Lordships of the Supreme Court who had an occasion to consider the effect of Section 87 of CrPC. Our attention has, in this connection, been invited to the decision of the Supreme Court in Indradeo Mahto v State of West Bengal, AIR 1973 SC 1062 wherein Their Lordships of the Supreme Court who had an occasion to consider the effect of Section 87 of CrPC. 1898 (corresponding to Sections 83 and 84 of the present Code) have laid down as under :- "Section 87 CrPC which occurs in Part C of Chapter VI of that Code merely empowers a Court issuing a warrant of arrest to publish a written proclamation requiring the person concerned to appear at a specified place and time as required by that section, if the court has reason to believe that the said person has absconded or is concealing himself to evade execution of the warrant, Section 88 empowers the said court to attach the property belonging to the proclaimed person. In the case in hand no warrant was issued by any court as indeed Section 3 of the Act does not contemplate the authorities empowered to make orders of detention to function as courts. In terms, therefore, these sections may not be attracted. But even assuming it is permissible to have resort to such procedure the mere omission to do so could not, in our opinion, render the order of detention either illegal or mala fide as the suggestion connoted. The petitioner's detention cannot, therefore, be considered illegal on this ground. 11. It is on the strength of this decision that the learned Additional Government Advocate has contended that the order will not be vitiated merely by reason of the fact that the order was not sought to be executed under Sections 83 or 84 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. We are inclined to agree with the submission. The Supreme Court itself in a subsequent decision in Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. The State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1979 SC 541 had laid down as under :- "It is true that the purpose of detention under the COFEPOSA is not punitive but preventive. The purpose is to prevent organised smuggling activities and to conserve and augment foreign exchange. It is true that the masimus period for which a person may be detained under the COFEPOSA is one year. The purpose is to prevent organised smuggling activities and to conserve and augment foreign exchange. It is true that the masimus period for which a person may be detained under the COFEPOSA is one year. It is further true that there must be a live and proximate link " between the grounds of detention alleged by the detaining authority and the avowed purpose of detention namely the prevention of smuggling activities. We may in appropriate case assume that the link is snapped if there is a long and unexplained delay between the date of the order of detention and the arrest of the detenu. In such a case we may strike down an order of detention unless the grounds indicate a fresh application of the mind of the detaining authority to the new situation and the changed circumstances. But where the delay is not only adequately explained but is found to be the result of the recalcitrant or refractory conduct of the detenu in evading arrest there is warrant to consider the " link ", not snapped but strengthened. That, precisely, is the state of affairs before us. The order of detention was made on 19th December, 1974. The detenu was found to be absconding Action was taken pursuant to Section 7 of the COFEPOSA and he was proclaimed as a person absconding under Section 82 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The proclamation was published in several leading English and local language daily newspapers. His photograph was exhibited in cinema halls. A reward of Rs. 5,000/- was also announced for his apprehension. Despite all this effort he could not be arrested until he surrendered on 1st February, 1978. We do not have any hesitation in overruling the submission of Sri jethmalani based on delay in the execution of the order of detention. The impact of the above Supreme Court decision is that if there is adequate explanation available on the record as to the non-execution of the order of detention, the same will not be vitiated merely on the ground that the detenu was not immediately arrested or apprehended. 7. Since in the instant case it has been shown by the opposite parties that they had made several efforts with the local police to arrest the petitioner in execution of the order of detention, the second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner must also be rejected. 8. 7. Since in the instant case it has been shown by the opposite parties that they had made several efforts with the local police to arrest the petitioner in execution of the order of detention, the second contention raised on behalf of the petitioner must also be rejected. 8. No other point was pressed. In view of the fact that we have disposed of the petition finally, the bail application does not require any separate order inspite of the fact that there is an appeal pending in the Supreme Court against our judgment dated February 14, 1985 passed in Habeas Corpus Petition Nos.5805 of 1984, 5806 of 1984 and 309 of 1985, wherein the detenus, we are informed, have been released on bail by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. 9. In view of the above the writ petition fails and is dismissed but without any order as to costs. 10. Immediately after we had dictated the judgment, a request was made that a certificate may be granted that the case is a fit case for appeal in the Supreme Court. In deciding this case, we have followed the principles laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court. In our view, the case does not involve any question of general importance which is required to be decided by the Supreme Court. The certificate prayed for is, therefore refused. Petition dismissed.