JUDGMENT V.K. Mehrotra, J. - The petition was last heard on September 20, 1985 and a judgment, dismissing the petition, was dictated in open Court that day. More, however, that judgment was signed and Sealed, an oral request was made by the counsel for the petitioner that he wished to argue the matter further. This was followed by an application with a prayer to that effect which was presented before me on September 27, 1985. The petition was, therefore, directed to be listed for further hearing with the consent of the counsel tor the respondents. Today, the petition has been taken up in the revised list. Sri V.B. Singh, appearing for the petitioner, has argued the matter further. 2. The challenge in the petition is to an order passed by Industrial Tribunal (IV), U.P. at Lucknow on July 19, 1976. This was passed in Misc. Case No. 10 of 1975 arising out of an application under Section 6-F of the U. P Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. By this order, the Tribunal has directed the petitioner to pay to 23 of its workmen, who are arrayed as respondents no. 2 to 24, a sum equivalent to three months, two months and 15 days wages to the permanent, probationer and Substituted workmen respectively. 3. The services of these respondents had been terminated by the petitioner by an order of March 23, 1974. The workmen bad gone on illegal strike with effect from February 19, 1975. They refused to return to work in spite of the persuasion of the petitioner. After the order of termination, an application under Section 6-F was made by the workmen before the Industrial Tribunal. Their case was that there was a pending reference in regard to some dispute between the workmen and the petitioner before the Industrial Tribunal during the pendency whereof the services of the workmen had been dispensed with in contravention of the provisions of Section 6-E of - the Act. In the complaint it was, inter alia, alleged that the violation of Section 6-E was on account of termination of their services without the management Seeking approval of the Tribunal for it. It was also said that no charge - sheet had been issued to any of the workmen nor was any opportunity of defence given. It was prayed that suitable orders be passed in favour of the workmen. 4. It was also said that no charge - sheet had been issued to any of the workmen nor was any opportunity of defence given. It was prayed that suitable orders be passed in favour of the workmen. 4. The petitioner, apart from raising an objection that the complaint under Section 6-F was not maintainable as there had not been any violation of the provisions of Section 6-E of the Act, also gave out facts justifying their action. By way of additional pleas it was also pleaded that the application made by the workmen was not maintainable, inasmuch as, their services were not terminated on account of any misconduct which could be said to be connected with the matter of dispute which was pending adjudication before the Tribunal. 5. After going into the evidence led before it, the Industrial Tribunal came to the conclusion that the workmen were on illegal strike from February 19, 1974 and refused to return to work inspite of the persuasion of the management. The orders of the management dated March 23, 1974 terminating the services of the workmen were found to be justified by the Tribunal. The Tribunal felt that the workmen were entitled to notice or else pay in lieu thereof under Standing Order No. 23 of the U.P. (Industrial Employment) Standing Orders, 1972. 6. In the earlier hearing the effort of the learned counsel for the petitioner was to establish that the U.P. (Industrial Employment) Standing Orders were not in operation at the relevant time. However, he had failed to produce necessary material to that effect before this Court. Consequently, the plea raised on behalf of the respondents in this Court that these Standing Orders were in operation at the relevant time, was found to be established by this Court. The order of the Industrial Tribunal was, therefore, not found to suffer from any manifest error of law on that account. After hearing, by the judgment dictated earlier, noticing the aforesaid situation, the petition was dismissed. That unsigned judgment is on the record and Shall continue to remain on the record as it is. 7. Today, Sri V.B. Singh has made two submissions. After hearing, by the judgment dictated earlier, noticing the aforesaid situation, the petition was dismissed. That unsigned judgment is on the record and Shall continue to remain on the record as it is. 7. Today, Sri V.B. Singh has made two submissions. The first of these is that, admittedly, the complaint of the workmen was under Section 6-F. The Industrial Tribunal having not recorded any finding that there was any breach of any provision contained in Section 6-E the complaint Should have been dismissed by the Tribunal. 8. Section 6-F of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act reads thus : "6-F. Special provision for adjudication as to whether the conditions of services, etc. changed during the proceedings. - Where an employer contravenes the provisions of Section 6-E during the pendency of proceedings before a Labour Court or Tribunal, any workmen aggrieved by such contravention may make a complaint in writing in the prescribed manner, to the Labour Court or Tribunal as the case may be, and on receipt of such complaint that Labour Court or Tribunal as the case may be shall adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were ta dispute referred to or pending before it in accordance with this Act and Shall submit its award to the State Government and the provisions of this Act shall apply accordingly." 9. A perusal of the provision reveals that it is only upon contravention of the provisions of Section 6-E that the Tribunal, on receipt of a complaint, is to adjudicate upon it as if it was a dispute referred to or pending before it. This part of Section 6-F presupposes that a finding Should be recorded by the Tribunal, in the first instance, to the effect that there was a breach of Section 6-E before proceeding to grant relief to the workmen. 10. Annexure 'X' to the petition is a copy of the impugned order passed by the Tribunal. The Tribunal has noticed the plea raised before it on behalf of the petitioner that provisions of Section 6-E were not violated. Yet, it has not recorded any conclusion of its own whether or not there was a breach of the provisions of Section 6-E in this case. 11. The Tribunal has noticed the plea raised before it on behalf of the petitioner that provisions of Section 6-E were not violated. Yet, it has not recorded any conclusion of its own whether or not there was a breach of the provisions of Section 6-E in this case. 11. Even assuming that it was open to the Tribunal to proceed with the matter under Section 6-E, even without a finding that provisions of Section 6-B had been violated, it is noticeable that the power of the Tribunal under Section 6-E is to adjudicate upon the complaint as if it was a dispute referred to or pending before it in accordance with the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act and thereafter "to submit its award to the State Government." It is inherent in this part of Section 6-F that once the Tribunal comes to the conclusion that the action of the employer in terminating the services of the workmen was justified, it would not be open to the Tribunal thereafter to proceed to grant relief on the footing that the action taken by the employer was invalid. It is implicit in Section 6-F that while proceeding to grant relief to the workmen, the Tribunal would be alive to the position that the employer is not penalised even where he has taken an action justified in law except, for instance, in case of the breach of a statutory provision the applicability whereof is pleaded and pronounced upon by it. From the pleadings in the instant case, of which copies have been appended as annexures to the writ petition, it is clear that the question whether the order of termination was invalid on account of the violation of Standing Order No. 23, was not in issue between the parties at all. 12. That apart, Sri V.B. Singh is right in his submission that Standing Order No. 23, on which the Tribunal has founded the relief granted by it to the workmen, would not be attracted in a case of the present kind. Standing Order No. 23 was in these terms : "23. 12. That apart, Sri V.B. Singh is right in his submission that Standing Order No. 23, on which the Tribunal has founded the relief granted by it to the workmen, would not be attracted in a case of the present kind. Standing Order No. 23 was in these terms : "23. (1) (a) Subject to the provisions of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, (U.P. Act No. XXVIII of 1947), the employment of a permanent and probationer workmen may be terminated party after giving prior notice to the party or making payments equivalent to the wages for the period of such notice and the name of substitute workmen may be struck off the register of substitute workmen. In the case of substitute workmen the period of such notice shall be two months, in the case of permanent workmen it shall be three months and in the case of probationer workmen it shall be fifteen days. (b) In case either party wants to enforce termination of employment before the expiry of the period of notice, it shall be liable to pay to the other party an amount equivalent to wages in lieu of the unexpired period of the notice. (c) The reasons for the terminations of employment Shall be recorded in writing and Shall be communicated to the workmen concerned by the employer. (2) Where the employment of any workman is terminated, the wages earned by him and other dues payable to him shall be paid to him by the employer before the expiry of second working day from the day on which his employment was terminated." 13. A perusal of the terms in which the above Standing Order is couched, makes it clear that the said Standing Order was meant to be applied to a termination simpliciter as urged by Sri Singh. It could not be made applicable to a termination which, according to the findings recorded by the Industrial Tribunal was justified because "the workmen were on illegal strike and refused to return to work in spite of the persuasion of the management." The order of the Tribunal, in so far as it directs the petitioner to make payment to the workmen in terms of Standing Order No. 23, cannot be upheld. In other aspects, it deserves to be upheld. 14. The petition succeeds in part as aforesaid parties are left to bear their own costs.