JUDGMENT B.D. Agrawal, J. - This bench of writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution raises certain common questions and is dealt with together in this judgment. 2. The U.P. Avas Evatn Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965 (U.P. Act 1 of 1966) (the Adhiniyam for short) provides for the establishment, incorporation and functioning of a housing and development board in this State. This aimed to ensure effective co-ordination and control in the matter of tackling the housing and development problems of the growing urban areas and areas with potentialities of development on planned basis. Tire Board constituted accordingly is a body corporate. The functions of the Board include the framing and execution of housing and improvement Schemes which may be Grihsthan Yojana (house accommodation scheme) or Bhumi Vikas Yojana (land development Scheme) or both. Certain combined Bhumi Vikas Evam Grihsthan Yojanas were framed from time to time. These were given publicity and for proposed acquisition notice was given to the persons concerned individually. For considering objections thereto, the Board delegated its authority to a Committee called the Niyojan Samiti. After hearing the objectors the Samiti gives its report. This was taken into account by the Board and its recommendation Sent for sanction to the Board in cases where the estimated cost of the scheme is over Rs. 20 lacs. The sanction of the State Government was notified in the gazette followed by the steps to take possession and make the award. 3. Aggrieved due to their objections being not accepted to, the petitioners have approached this Court In some of these cases their grievance is directed against the demolition proposed of certain constructions on the footing that these are unauthorised. 4. The object and reasons of the Adhiniyam as appearing from the statement for the introduction of the Bill published in the U.P. Gazette Extraordinary dated April 15, 1965, are : "Migration of people from rural to urban are influx of displaced persons, increasing import of the development activity generated by the Five Year Plans and Several other factors have resulted in rapid increase of population in towns of this State. Construction of new houses and the planned development of towns has, however, not kept with this rapid increase of urban population. Construction of new houses and the planned development of towns has, however, not kept with this rapid increase of urban population. The efforts in this direction made by the State Government, Nagar Mahapalikas, Nagar Palikas, Improvement Trusts, Development Boards and other smaller local bodies have, for want of effective co-ordination and control, not met with the desired success. The said local bodies with their limited resources and know how and due to other factors has not been able to relieve the housing Shortage and to undertake the requisite development of land. There are areas in this state with immense potentialities of development, but they still remain as they were a decade or so back. It is now considered essential for tackling the housing and development problems of practically all the fast growing urban areas, and areas with potentialities of development, that an autonomous control body to be known as Housing and Development Board be created for the whole State. A comprehensive Bill, called the Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Vidheyak has accordingly been Prepared to provide for the establishment, incorporation and functioning of a Housing and Development Board in this State. This bill is being introduced accordingly." 5. The U.P. Avam Evas Vikas Parishad, referred to as the Board, which is a body corporate, created under the Adhiniyam is assigned among others the function to frame and execute Housing Improvement Schemes and other projects and to plan various housing activities in the State and to ensure expeditious and efficient implementation of Housing Improvement Schemes in the State. The Board is given power in this behalf to acquire movable and immovable properties for any of the purposes aforesaid. (Vide Section 5). A Housing or Improvement Scheme drawn by the Board may provide Inter alia for the acquisition by purchase, exchange or other vise of any property necessary for or affected by the execution of the scheme [Section 17 (a)]. Section 18 enumerates the types of Housing and Improvement Schemes which the Board may frame. Grihsthan Yojana (House Accommodation Scheme) is referred to in Section 19 as under : "(1) Whenever the Board is of opinion that it is expedient or necessary to meet the need for house accommodation in any area, the Board may frame a Gristhan-Yojana (house accommodation scheme). Grihsthan Yojana (House Accommodation Scheme) is referred to in Section 19 as under : "(1) Whenever the Board is of opinion that it is expedient or necessary to meet the need for house accommodation in any area, the Board may frame a Gristhan-Yojana (house accommodation scheme). (2) Such scheme shall specify the lay - out of the area where the houses are to be constructed and may provide for the building of houses by the Board and by others. (3) The Board may lease out or sell, including Sale on hire purchase basis, any house so built by the Board. (4) The Board may provide in the area, roads, streets, drainage, water - supply, street lighting, community buildings and other amenities". Section 25 deals with Bhoomi Vikas Yojana (Land Development Scheme) and it runs as follows : "(1) Whenever the Board is of opinion that it is expedient to provide building Sites in any area, the Board may frame a Bhoomi Vikas Yojana (land development Sc.heme). (2) Such scheme - .hall specify the proposed lay - out of the area to be developed and the purposes for which particular portions thereof are to be utilised. (3) The Board may provide roads, streets, open spaces, drain ages, water supply, street - lighting and other amenities for the area comprised in the scheme. (4) The Board may lease out or sell, including Sale on hire - purchase basis, the building Sites in the area comprised in the scheme." 6. Upon any Housing or improvement Scheme being framed, the Board is placed under obligation By Section 20 to prepare a notice to that effect specifying : (a) the boundaries of the area comprised in the scheme ; (b) the dates, hours, and place or places at which a map of the area, particulars of the scheme and details of the land proposed to be acquired and of the land in respect of which betterment fee is proposed to be levied may be seen ; and (c) the dates by which objections to the scheme may be made ; The notice is to be published weekly for three consecutive weeks in the Gazette and two daily newspapers having circulation in the area besides a copy of notice being Sent to the local authority within whose jurisdiction the area comprised in the scheme lies. Section 29 envisages that within six weeks from the date on which any notice is first published under Section 29 in respect of any housing or improvement Scheme, the Board shall serve a notice in such form, on such parsons or classes of persons and in such manner as may be prescribed, stating that the Board proposes to acquire and Specified land or building for the execution of the scheme. Any person to whom notice under Section 29 has been served may within 30 days from the service of the notice or within such further time as the Board may for sufficient cause allow make objection in writing to the Board against the scheme or the proposed acquisition [Section 30 (2)] Section 31 which deals with abandonment, modification or sanction of scheme is material and it reads as follows : "31 (1). After considering the objections, if any, received in pursuance of the foregoing provisions and after giving an opportunity of being heard to the objectors, the Board may, so far as may be within six months from the date of receipt of the last such objection, either abandon the scheme, or if the estimated cost of the scheme does not exceed twenty lakhs of rupees, sanction it with or without modifications, and if the estimated cost of the scheme exceeds twenty lakhs of rupees, submit it to the State Government for sanction with such modifications, if any, as the Board may suggest. (2) The State Government may sanction with or without modification, or refuse to sanction or return for reconsideration, and Scheme submitted to it under Sub-section (1)" 7. Upon a housing or improvement Scheme being Sanctioned, it shall be notified in the Gazette. The notification in respect of and Scheme shall be conclusive evidence that the scheme has been duly framed and Sanctioned (vide Section 32). 8. Section 55 (1) empowers the Board to acquire any land or any interest therein for purposes of the Adhiniyam in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as amended in its application to this State. The Land Acquisition Act is to apply to such acquisition subject to the modification Specified in the Schedule to the Adhiniyam. 8. Section 55 (1) empowers the Board to acquire any land or any interest therein for purposes of the Adhiniyam in accordance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act as amended in its application to this State. The Land Acquisition Act is to apply to such acquisition subject to the modification Specified in the Schedule to the Adhiniyam. According to the Schedule, in so far as relevant the first publication in the Gazette of any notice of any housing or improvement Scheme under Section 20 is to have the same effect as a notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act. The provisions of Section 5 - A of that other Act are in applicable in the case of such land. A notification made under Section 32(1) of the Adhiniyam is to have the effect of a declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. In view of the provision made in clause 3 of the Schedule. For the expeditious execution of a housing or improvement Scheme, the State Government may direct the Collector, though no award has been made, to take possession of any land needed for the purposes of the Adhiniyam, whereupon the land Shall vest absolutely in the Government free from all incumbrances. This substitutes Sub-section (1) and (1-A) of Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act. Subsequent to acquisition the land is transferred to the Board by the State Government vide Section 17-A as amended by the Schedule. 9. Section 12 (1) makes provision for delegation of powers by the Board in the following terms : "(1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules, the Board may, by general or special order delegate, either unconditionally or subject to such conditions, including the condition of review by itself, as may be specified in the order, to any committee appointed by it or to the Housing Commissioner or any officer of the Board such of its powers and duties under this Act, as it may deem necessary." 10. As per Rule 3 (a) of the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (Delegation of Powers by the Boar and the Housing Commissioner) Rules, 1968, the Board may subject to the provisions of Section 12 of the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, and Such conditions and restrictions including the condition of review as may be specified from time to time, delegate to any committee appointed by it such of its powers and duties under the Adhiniyam other than those specified in the Schedule appended to this Rule. The Schedule lays down that abandonment, modification or sanction of the scheme may not be delegated by Board too Committee or any other person for that matter. 11. The form and the manner of service of notice required in Section 29 is prescribed by the Avas vam Vikas Parishad (Form and Manner of Service of Notice) Rules, 1967. Rules 4 and 6 which are relevant for our purposes provide as under : "4(1) Every per on whose name appears in the assessment list of the local authority within whose jurisdiction the area comprised in the scheme lies as being primarily liable to pay any tax assessed upon the annual value of any land or building which the Board proposed to acquire or m regard to which the Board proposed to levy betterment fee. (2) Every tenure holder or Gaon Sabha whose name appears in them Khatauni in respect of and Such land or building. 6. (1) Every such notice shall be served by an officer or servant of the Board (i) by living or tendering the notice to the person to whom it is addressed, or (ii) if such person is not found by leaving the notice at his last know place of abode or by giving or tendering it to some adult member or servant of his family, (iii) if his address elsewhere is known by forwarding Such notice to him by registered post under cover bearing the said address. (2) If after due diligence it has not been possible to serve a notice on any person the manner prescribed in sub-rule (1) a copy of the notice shall bed fixed on some conspicuous part of his land or building which the Board proposed to acquire or in regard to which the Board proposed to levy betterment fee. (2) If after due diligence it has not been possible to serve a notice on any person the manner prescribed in sub-rule (1) a copy of the notice shall bed fixed on some conspicuous part of his land or building which the Board proposed to acquire or in regard to which the Board proposed to levy betterment fee. (3) Whenever the person on whom the notice is to be served is a minor service upon his guardian or upon an adult male member of his family shall be deemed to be service upon minor. (4) A copy of the notice shall be published by proclamation in the neighbourhood of the land." 12. Section 35 (1) places restriction upon creation, re - erection, addition or alteration to any building by any person subsequent to publication of a notice under Section 28 in respect of housing or improvement Scheme until the scheme is abandoned or sanctioned except in accordance with the scheme and Subject to such restrictions and conditions as the Housing Commissioner may upon an application for permission in that behalf, impose. Contravention of these restrictions is made punishable by Section 73. Power is conferred then upon the Board to direct remove of unauthorised erection in accordance with Section 82 which reads : "(2) The Housing Commissioner may by notice require the owner of a building referred to in Section 73 to stop further work on such building and to alter or demolish the same in such manner and within such time as may be specified in the notice. (2) Where the notice under Sub-section (1) is not complied with the Housing Commissioner may cause the building or any portion thereof to be altered or demolished, as the case may be, and he may recover the expenses incurred in so doing from the owner in such manner as may be prescribed." 13. A common issue to which these petitions gave rise is whether the notification under Section 32 of the Adhiniyam and the subsequent proceedings consequent thereto are to be deemed null and void because more than three years elapsed between the publication of the notifications under Section 28 and 32 of the Adhiniyam. Section 55 makes the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act applicable to any land acquired by the Board established under the Adhiniyam. Section 55 makes the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act applicable to any land acquired by the Board established under the Adhiniyam. Clause 2 of the Schedule to the Adhiniyam equats a notification issued under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam with a notification under Section 4 (1) Land Acquisition Act. Notification issued under Section 32 (4) of the Adhiniyam is equated with a notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Adhiniyam is a self contained enactment including in the matter of acquisition of land Manzoor Khan and others v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2548 By the U.P. Act 13 of 1967 a proviso was added to Section 6 (1) Land Acquisition Act stating that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under Section 4 (1) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validiation) Ordinance, 1967 shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of such publication. The contention raised is that since more than three years elapsed between the publication of notifications under Section 28 and 32, the notification under Section 32 and the subsequent proceedings in consequence are rendered in effective and void under the law. This contention was repelled by a Full Bench of this Court in Doctors Sahkari Grah Nirman Samiti Ltd. Agra and another v. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Lucknow and another, 1984 A.W.C. 493 : 1984 UPLBEC 524 (FB) wherein it was held that - (i) the three years period of limitation mentioned in the first proviso to Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act has no bearing on the notification to be issued under Section 32 of the Adhiniyam ; (ii) The provisions contained in the Adhiniyam relating to compulsory acquisition of land do not suffer from the vide of discrimination forbidden by Article 14 or arbitrariness merely because like the provisions contained in the Land Acquisition Ac:, the Adhiniyam does not provide a period of limitation which the notification under Section 32 (4) is to be issued. 14. Nothing has been urged before us by the learned counsel to suggest a departure from this pronouncement and it is also not contended that on the facts thereof the Board has been guilty of laches or that the notification under Section 28 was not followed up with notification under Section 32 (4) of the Adhiniyam with reasonable despatch. 14. Nothing has been urged before us by the learned counsel to suggest a departure from this pronouncement and it is also not contended that on the facts thereof the Board has been guilty of laches or that the notification under Section 28 was not followed up with notification under Section 32 (4) of the Adhiniyam with reasonable despatch. 15. The other question which these petitions raise in common is whether the power given to the Board under Section 31 of the Adhiniyam to consider the objections filed under Section 30 after giving opportunity of being heard to the objectors was not delegatable to the Niyejan Samiti. This also stands answered in the negative and against the petitioners by a Division Bench in Smt. Annapurna Devi v. U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Lucknow and others, 1984 A.L J. 1069 : 1984 UPLBEC 692 (DB) After considering two pronouncements of the Supreme Court and the observations in de Smith : Judicial Review of Administrative Action (3rd Ed.) page 263 and Wade : Administrative Law (4th Ed.) page 311, it was laid down in para 13 of the reported decision as under : "The position which emerges out of the above authorities, to our mind, leads to the unmistakable conclusion that if the statute which confers power on an authority named by itself either expressly or by necessary implication provides that the authority can delegate all or any of its functions and duties to any other committee or individual, no exception can be taken to the fact that the functions delegated were exercised not by the authority specifically named in the statute but by his delegate. In this case we find that under Section 12 of the Adhiniyam, the Board has been specifically empowered to delegate, either unconditionally or subject to Conditions, to any committee appointed by it or to the Housing Commissioner or any other officer of the Board such of its powers and duties under the Adhimyam, is it may deem necessary." 15-A. The petitioners' learned counsel have not given up the points though there was nothing cogent made out to persuade us to form a different opinion. There is no challenge made, it will be noticed, to the vires of Section 12 of the Adhiniyam. There is no challenge made, it will be noticed, to the vires of Section 12 of the Adhiniyam. Section 12 (reproduced above) expressly empowers the Board to delegate to any committee appointed by it by general or special order, either unconditionally or subject to conditions as may be specified in the order "such of its powers and duties" under Adhiniyam, as it may deem necessary. Read with Section 15 (a) (b) (k) which pertains to functions of the Board, the delegation to the committee may be in relation to framing and execution of housing and improvement Schemes the efficient implementation thereof or acquisition of land to carry out these purposes. It is true as Sri Jagdish Swarup in his leading arguments for some of the petitioners urged that the power to delegate under Section 12 is made expressly subject to the provision of the Adhiniyam (including Section 31) and the rules. Rule 4 framed under Section 92 (2) (g) by the State Government to which reference has been made above forbids delegation of power of abandonment, modification or sanction of scheme under Section 31 of the Adhiniyam. The resolutions passed by the Board (which are referred to in paragraph 22 in Smt. Annapurna Devi's case and the veracity whereof is not challenged before us) delegating powers to various Niyojan Samities constituted by it authorised them merely to receive evidence, consider the objections give their decision on the objections and thereafter submit their recommendations thereon. It is manifest that care .has been adequately taken in making there delegation not to transgress the statutory limitations en grained in Section 12. The power of sanction of the scheme continues to be retained by the Board to itself ; it retains as well the power to itself to make recommendation to the State Government for sanction if the estimated Cost of the scheme exceeds Rs. 20 lacs. Abandonment or modification of the scheme also vests with the Board ; in essence the status assigned to the Niyoian Samiti is that of the recommendatory body. Undeniably under the general law too the delegate is subject to the authority and control of the principal and exercise of delegated power can always be directed, corrected or cancelled by the Principal Avinder Singh etc. Undeniably under the general law too the delegate is subject to the authority and control of the principal and exercise of delegated power can always be directed, corrected or cancelled by the Principal Avinder Singh etc. v. State of Punjab etc., A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 321 There is no deviation made from this either as is clear from the content aN.S.ope of the delegation actually made in the instant case. 16. A functionary who has to decide an administrative matter, of the nature involved in the present, can obtain the material on which he is to act in such manner as may be feasible and convenient provided only the effected party "has a fair opportunity to correct or contradict any relevant and pre-judicial matter". Board of Education v. Rice, 1911 AC 179 (H.L.): Local Government Board v. Arlidge, (1915 A.C. 120) As pointed out by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Pradyat Kumar Bose v. Hon'ble Chief Justice of Calcutta High Court, A.I.R. 1956 S.C. 285 a statutory functionary exercise such a power cannot be said to have delegated is functions merely by deputing a responsible and competent official to enquire and report. That is the ordinary mode of exercise of any administrative power. What cannot be delegated except where the law specifically so provides is the ultimate responsibility for the exercise of such power." The case before us stands on higher footing because there is express statutory sanction to delegation and the power to take the ultimate decision is not divested in favour of the Niyojan Samiti. 17. Sri Aditya Narain Singh, learned counsel appearing for a group of these petitioners, argued that though the Board may be competent to delegate its powers, there could be no assignment made of its duties to any other authority. We are not impulsed with this contention. The duties and powers of the Board are inextricably in it together like two facts of the same coin. The Board is constituted to tackle the housing and development problems of the fast growing urban areas and areas with potentialities of development. That might be termed as the bundle of duties which the Board is to discharge. The duties and powers of the Board are inextricably in it together like two facts of the same coin. The Board is constituted to tackle the housing and development problems of the fast growing urban areas and areas with potentialities of development. That might be termed as the bundle of duties which the Board is to discharge. In legislative language these have been described as functions of the Board ; we may, for instance say that it is the Board's duty to frame and execute housing and improvement Scheme ; this same thing can be put as being among the Board's powers. It is futile for Sri Singh, therefore, to attempt to drive a wedge between power and duty in the present contest. The decision is State of Bombay v. Shivabalak Gaurishankar Dube and others, A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 661 which he cites assists the respondents rather than the petitioners. Section 83 of the Act under consideration therein empowered the State Government to delegate to its officers all or any of the powers conferred on it by the Act. The High Court took the view that there was obligation imposed on the State Government to make an enquiry as to whether the agricultural land in question had remained uncultivated or follow for the prescribed period and the obligation or duty to hold such enquiry which was distinct and Separate from the power or authority to make a declaration consequent upon the enquiry, could not be delegated under Section 83. This ti e Supreme Court negatived with the observations : "Now, it seems to us that the authority to delegate all or any of the powers which is expressly conferred on the State Government by Section 83 would be rendered almost meaningless if the duty to hold an enquiry as a condition precedent for the exercise of the said authority cannot be delegated. In the context, the power which can be delegated is inseparable from the enquiry which must precede the exercise of the power, and so in order to make Section 83 effective it is necessary to hold that the delegation of the power authorised by the said section must necessarily involve the delegation of the discharge of obligations or functions which are necessary for the exercise of the said power." 18. It is contended then by Sri Jagdish Swarup which submission the other learned counsel have adopted that the exercise of the power under Section 31 of the Adhiniyam is discriminatory because there are no guidelines provided for. It is unspecified as to which land may be exempted and vice versa. Acquisition of existing buildings as distinct from mere building Sites is arbitrary and not contemplated under Section 19. In relation to a scheme estimated to cost over rupees 20 lacs the sanction accorded is of State Government, but there is no provision for appeal against such sanction though where the sanction accorded is by the Board an appeal to the State Government Her under Section 32 (3) of the Adhiniyam. We have after giving careful thought to these contentions found them devoid of merit. 19. The law is settled that guidelines need not be found in the impugned provision. The same may be ;o heated from the setting in which the provision is placed, the purpose for what the Act is enacted and even the Preamble of the statute in which the provision is incorporated. A legislation or statute is enacted to achieve some public purpose and the policy of law and the object sought to be achieved can furnish reliable guide - lines for the exercise of discretionary power. These proportions enunciated in State of Mysore and others v. M.L. Nagade and Gadeg and others, (1983) 3 SCC 253 and also receive support from the following passage in Prof. Willis : Constitutional Law p. 587 which Desai, J, cited it approval : "If a statute declares a definite policy, there is a sufficiently definite standard for the rule against the delegation of legislative power, and also for equality it the standard is reasonable. If no Standard is set up, to avoid the violation of equality, those exercising the power must act as though they were administering a valid standard." 20. If no Standard is set up, to avoid the violation of equality, those exercising the power must act as though they were administering a valid standard." 20. Decision of the Supreme Court before and after the decision in Moopil Nair's case, AIR 1961 S.C. 552 show that an exemption section is solid if there is guidance for its exercise bee use the power to exempt must be used to further the policy and purpose of the Act P.J. Irani v. State of Madras, A.I.R. 1961 S.C. 1731; Sirdar Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan, A.I.R. 1967 S.C.R 605 In Harishankar Bagla v. State of M.P., A.I.R. 1954 S.C. 465 it was held that Section 3, Essential Supplies (Temporary powers) Act, 1946 did not confer any unfettered discretion because the discretion was to be exercised in the light of the policy of the Act as gathering comets preamble and from the other provisions of the Act. The objects so , it to be achieved by the enactment and the policy and purpose thereof were l aid to furnish dependable guide - lines in applying Section 19, Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act 1956 vide Jyoti Prasad v. Administrator for Delhi, A I.R. 1961 S.C. 1602 When the Board proposes a scheme in compliance to the requirements of Sections 15,17, 19, or 25 of the Adhiniyam, it is a manifest expression of its opinion that the scheme is designed to subserve the purpose of the enactment Gullapalli Nageshware Rao and others v. A.P. State Road Transport Corporation and others, A.I.R. 1959 S.C. 308 at p. 320 The ultimate sanctioning authority in these cases is moreover the State Government regard being had to the estimated cost of the scheme. The authorities are pointers in the dire upon "that the vesting of discretionary power in the State or public authorities of a very high standing is treated as a guarantee that the power will be used family and with a sense of responsibility" (Seevai : Constitutional Law, Vol. I (3rd Ed.) p. 381). See also Union of India v. Annam Ramalingam and others, (1985) 2 S.C.C. 443 at p. 446 21. The Case State of Punjab and another v. Khan Chand, (1974) 1 S.C.C. 549 stands on distinct footing. I (3rd Ed.) p. 381). See also Union of India v. Annam Ramalingam and others, (1985) 2 S.C.C. 443 at p. 446 21. The Case State of Punjab and another v. Khan Chand, (1974) 1 S.C.C. 549 stands on distinct footing. The noteworthy feature is that the East Punjab Movable Property (Requisitioning) Act, 1947 did not lay down any principle or policy for guidance in the exercise of the wide discretion conferred by it as the executive authorities. Section 2 of the Act was struck down since it conferred arbitrary and uncontrolled discretion without any guidelines whatsoever with regard to the exercise of that discretion. Khanna, J. speaking for the majority view observed ; "If the purpose for which property can be requisitioned under the Act had been specified of saying that it should be a public purpose or some other specified purpose, it might have been possible to sustain Section 2....,..., Mathew, J, dissented bowing : "I should have thought that nothing hinges upon the presence or absence of such phrases as public interest' public good or 'public purpose'. The substance is the same whether the Legislature says 'deal with the problem' or says 'deal with the problem in the public interest 'or' exercise the power for public "good or 'for public purpose." Courts and parties all assume that the Legislature always wants protection of the public interest, to serve public cause and do things for public good or to exercise powers for public purpose and always intends that administrators act justly and reasonably whether the Legislature says so in the statute or not (See Kenneth Culp Davis, "Administrative Law Treatise", (1958, Vol. I p. 87). Every legislative body must be presumed to favour the true, the good and above all the public interest and public good and whether it says so or not is of absolutely no - consequence. Could any Court have said or could any Court say for that matter, on reading the section, that the power conferred on the State Government could be exercised for any private purpose ? Government exists and its only title to exist is its claim to advance the public good and Serve the public interest. Could any Court have said or could any Court say for that matter, on reading the section, that the power conferred on the State Government could be exercised for any private purpose ? Government exists and its only title to exist is its claim to advance the public good and Serve the public interest. So when the Section said that the State Government, if it considers it necessary or expedient so to do, may by an order in writing requisition any movable property, it can only mean, when it considers it necessary or expedients so to do in public interest or for public good or purpose. That is implied in the section. Nobody could or would, in the year of our Lord 1973, read the section in any other manner." The purpose for which a power is given may not be specified in the enabling Act, but that does not necessarily prevent the Court from inferring the purpose and holding that the power has been abused." Commenting upon this Seervai in Constitutional Law Vol. I at p. 386 opines that on "public purpose", Matliew, J. was clearly right for the reasons which he gave. Further, it is submitted that reading "public purpose" into the Act would have involved no judicial legislation ; it would mere have made explicit what was implicit in the Act. 22. The Adhiniyam we are concerned with scrupulously avoids these pit falls. This spells out in unequivocal term the underlying policy and purpose of the enactment. There is little roof left to doubt as we peruse over again the statement of Objects and Reasons that the Board has been set upto relieve the housing Shortage and to undertake the requisite development of land. The object is that this might tackle the housing and development problems of the fast growing urban areas and areas with the potentialities of development. This is the increasingly felt necessity of the times because construction of new houses and planned development of towns had not kept pace with the rapid increase of urban population. 'Planned development' of urban areas and areas with potentialities therefore is the key word which constitutes the central theme of this legislation. This is the increasingly felt necessity of the times because construction of new houses and planned development of towns had not kept pace with the rapid increase of urban population. 'Planned development' of urban areas and areas with potentialities therefore is the key word which constitutes the central theme of this legislation. It is now well settled that though the Statement of Objections and Reasons accompanying a legislative Bill cannot be used to determine the Hue meaning and effect of the substantive provisions of the statutes (which is not our purpose either), it is permissible to refer to this for the purpose of understanding the background, the antecedent State of affairs, the surrounding circumstances in relation to the statute and the evil which the Statute sought to remedy (Narain Khamman v. Parduman Kumar Jain (S.C. dated 19-10-1984). Provisions relating to functions of the Board, matters which may be provided for in housing or improvement Schemes, the various to pes of housing and improvement Schemes which the Board may formulate entertain inbuilt safeguards of being intended to subserve the purpose of the enactment The point is clinched by the Constitution Bench of 7 Hon'ble JJ. in State of Karnataka and another v. Shri Ranganatha Reddy and others, (1977) 4 S.C.C. 471 which laid down : "Whether the law of acquisition is for public purpose or not is a justiciable issue. But the decision in that regard is not to be given by any detailed enquiry or investigation of facts. The intention of the legislature has to be gathered mainly from the Statement of objects and Reasons of the Act and its Preamble. The matter has to be examined with reference to the various provisions of the Act, its context aN.S.t up, the purpose of acquisition has to be culled out therefrom and then it has to be judged whether the acquisition is for a public purpose within the meaning of Article 31 (2) and the law providing for such acquisition." Now 'planned development' like 'public purpose' or public interest is itself of wide import. Plan signifies a delineation, a design ; a draft, form or representation '(Blacks 'Law Dictionary, 9th Ed. p. 1036). In the Oxford Dictionary the word 'planned' has been defined as a scheme in accomplishing a purpose. The word 'Development' has been defined in Websters' III New International Dictionary Vol. Plan signifies a delineation, a design ; a draft, form or representation '(Blacks 'Law Dictionary, 9th Ed. p. 1036). In the Oxford Dictionary the word 'planned' has been defined as a scheme in accomplishing a purpose. The word 'Development' has been defined in Websters' III New International Dictionary Vol. I at p. 618 as below : "To convert (as raw land) into an area suitable for residential or business purposes also to alter a land into an area suitable for building Site." The word 'development' is defined in Oxford Dictionary, 1962, Edition also as gradual, unfolding, evolution, realisation of potentialities on sites or territory by building or mining. 23. In Aflatoon and others v. Governor of Delhi, (1975) 4 S.C.C. 285 Mathew, J. speaking for the Constitution Bench took note of the fact that the influx of disputed persons in 1947 from West Pakistan into Delhi and others factors aggravated the problem of housing accommodation in Delhi. This was not accompanied by an adequate growth of houses in different areas ; land also was not available at reasonable prices. The Government having found it necessary to take effective steps to check the haphazard growth of houses and to prevent sub-standard construction, the scheme framed by it could be considered as one for 'planned development of Delhi' and the notification made under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act stating that land was needed for development and utilisation of the said lands as an industrial and residential area was sufficient Specification of public purpose, (vide Pt. Leela Ram v. Union of India, etc., (1975) 2 S.C.C. 547 This was followed in Smt. Ratni Devi and another v. Chief Commissioner Delhi and others (1975) 4 S.C.C. 467 . It was observed that where acquisition is for public purpose reasonableness is presumed for such public purpose. The plan made provision for bona fide requirements of the public for residential, industrial and commercial purposes and to ensure healthy and properly planned development of Delhi. Following these and other authorities Division Bench of this Court concluded in Somdutt and others v. State of U.P. and another, [1976 (2) A.L.R. 529]. "These decisions would show that anything which is antithesis of haphazard development may amount to 'planned development'. Following these and other authorities Division Bench of this Court concluded in Somdutt and others v. State of U.P. and another, [1976 (2) A.L.R. 529]. "These decisions would show that anything which is antithesis of haphazard development may amount to 'planned development'. In the instant case, the notification issued by the State Government mentions that the land is being acquired for 'Rural Housing Scheme' This conveys an idea of a 'planned development'. The Fifth Five Year Plan, Vol. I page 252, and Annual Plan for 1975-76, pages 130 and 144, read closely would show that the Government is acquiring the land in pursuance of a scheme. One of the paragraphs which deals with this question is 10.42, and the order is 10.50. These read together would show that the house site for rural landless labourers and artisians is a provision made by the Fifth Five Year Plan which is being fulfilled through these acquisitions." 24. The relevant paragraphs from the Fifth Five Year Plan may also he found extracted at p. 5 - 5. In the words of Krishna Iyer, J., who spoke for the Division Bench in State of Kerala and others v. T M. Peter and others (1980) 3 S.C.C. 554 keeping in view the complex nature of modern urban development Schemes these have to be placed in a different category altogether from the common run of 'public purposes' for which compulsory acquisition is undertaken by the State. Concept wise and Strategy wise Development Schemes stand on a separate footing and classification of town planning Schemes differently from the routine projects demanding compulsory acquisition may certainly be justified as based on a rational differentia which has a reasonable relation to the end in view viz., improvement of towns and disciplining their development. It is without substance, therefore, to contend in our opinion that the power conferred upon the Board in the matter of acquisition of land under the Adhiniyam is unquided or arbitrary. 25. Learned counsel takes exception then to exemption being not granted to all types of buildings standing on the land under acquisition. The submission made is that public purpose is not served by pulling down the existing Structures only to be replaced by new constructions. This argument overlooks the central object which underlies such acquisition. The governing criterion being planned development whatever is in furtherance thereof falls within its purview. The submission made is that public purpose is not served by pulling down the existing Structures only to be replaced by new constructions. This argument overlooks the central object which underlies such acquisition. The governing criterion being planned development whatever is in furtherance thereof falls within its purview. The haphazard growth of buildings has to give way to more scientific and better organised delienation such as ensures maximum benefit to the largest number. A building may be large covering vast space but if it cannot been fit a well thought out planned scheme alteration oven substantial following acquisition becomes inevitable. The contention that under Section 19 of the Adhiniyam a Grihsthan Yojana excludes existing house accommodation does not appeal to us. The scheme is designed to meet the need for house accommodation and as provided in Sub-section (2) the scheme is also to specify the lay out of the area where the houses are to be constructed. The building Sites may likewise be developed under Bhoomi Vikas Yojana (Section 25). We do not discern any bar express or implied in even existing building Structures being acquired for being remodelled and Suitably altered without or with demolition. During the course of arguments which were spread over several hearings we repeated of put it to learned counsel if they could demonstrate with the aid of some ma r or plan or otherwise that the building raised in controversy is so located that planned development may be carried through reasonably even on exclusion there of. It is of considerable significance; in our view that with the exception of Writ Petition No. 4842 of 1980 wherein supplementary affidavits were filed none of the other petitioners made by serious effort in this direction. In a planned scheme the Board would certainly need compact area in surroundings camp able of being made habitable and hygenic and the buildings raised would be of standard pattern to suit different income groups. 26. Under the Constitution the State must endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities amongst groups of people residing in different areas to bring about a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people (Article 38). 26. Under the Constitution the State must endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities amongst groups of people residing in different areas to bring about a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people (Article 38). Our founding fathers have ordained raising the standard of living of its people as among the primary duties of the State (Article 47) promotion with special care of the economic interest of the weaker sections of the people and in particular of the Scheduled Caste; - , and the Scheduled Tribes is another such duty of the State (Article 46). The target to be achieved being from each according to his capacity to each according to his needs, the Board as an instrumentality of the State may not find itself in position to exempt a building from the purview of acquisition on the basis merely that it is large or valuable. May be, the houses raisin place thereof on standard pattern equipped with modern amenities and of reasonable size, serve for greater needs of the community if planned development is pushed through. The power to grant exemption has therefore to be exercised in a reasonable way, Lord Greene M.R. defines the expression 'reasonable way' in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporate (1984) 1 KB 223 as implying that a person entrusted with a discretion must dirt at himself properly in law. He must call his attention to the matter which he is bound to consider. Similarly, there may be something so absured that no Sensible person could ever dream that it lay within the powers of the authority. (See Indian Express News Papers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. Etc. v. Union of India etc., (1985) 1 S.C.C. 641 Applying this test, as will presently appear, buildings or land in most of these cases do not qualify for exemption. 27. The other argument canvassed on the petitioners' side has been that there is no appeal provided where sanction is accorded to the scheme under Section 31 (1) of the Adhiniyam by the State Government and this introduces an element of arbitrariness. This need not detain us long. 27. The other argument canvassed on the petitioners' side has been that there is no appeal provided where sanction is accorded to the scheme under Section 31 (1) of the Adhiniyam by the State Government and this introduces an element of arbitrariness. This need not detain us long. Apart from the fact that the State Government which is at the apex and is assumed to act with the utmost degree of responsibility, it is a mistake to entertain the impression that the absence of a right of appeal in all situationsS.ells arbitrariness Organo Chemical Industries and another v. Union of India (1979) 4 S.C.C. 573 Dealing with Section 54 Bombay Town Planning Act, 1954 the law on this aspect was thus stated by Tulzapurkar, J., speaking for the Division Bench in M/s. Babubhai and Co. and others v. State of Gujarat and others (1985) 2 S.C C. 732 at page 736 - "It cannot be disputed hat the absence of a provision for a corrective machinery by way of appeal or revision to a superior authority to rectify an adverse order passed by an authority or body on whom the power is conferred may indicate that the power so conferred is unreasonable or arbitrary but it is obvious that providing Such corrective machinery is only one of the several ways in which the power could be checked or controlled and its absence will be in one of the factors to be considered along with several others before coming to the conclusion that the power so conferred is unreasonable or arbitrary ; in other words where absence of a corrective machinery by way of appeal or revision by itself would not make the power unreasonable or arbitrary, much less would render the provision invalid. Regard will have to be had to several factors, such as, on whom the power is conferred. Regard will have to be had to several factors, such as, on whom the power is conferred. Whether on a high official or a petty officer, what is the nature of the power whether the exercise thereof depends upon the subjective satisfaction of the authority or body on whom it is conferred or is it to be exercised objectively by reference to some existing facts of rests, whether or not it is a quasi - judicial power requiring that authority or body to observe principles of natural justice and make a speaking order etc., the last mentioned factor particularly ensures application of mind on the part of the authority or body only to pertinent or germane material on the record excluding the extraneous and irrelevant and also subjects the order of the authority or body to a judicial review under the writ jurisdiction of the Court on grounds of perversity, extraneous influence, mala fides and other blatant infirmities. Moreover all these factors will have to be considered in the light of the scheme of the enactment and the purpose intended to be achieved by the concerned provision, If on an examination of the scheme of the enactment as also the purpose of the concerned provision it is found that the power to decide or do a particular thing is conferred on a very minor or petty officer, that the exercise thereof by him depends on his subjective satisfaction, that he is expected to exercise the power administratively without any obligation to make a speaking order (lien of course, the absence of a corrective machinery will render the provision conferring Such absolute and unfettered power invalid. But it is the cumulative effect of all these factors that will render the provision unreasonable or arbitrary and liable to be struck down." 28. The Niyojan Samiti under the d. legated authority of the Board Collects evidence and hears the parties. Local inspection is also made by the members thereof. The recommendations of the Samiti together with the record are placed before the Board composed of official and non - official members representing different sections of public opinion. The satisfaction reached is objective upon relevant material and not subjective. If the Board considers the matter fit for sanction it gees to the State Government the states being high and it remains open to the State Government to vote or to suggest modification. The satisfaction reached is objective upon relevant material and not subjective. If the Board considers the matter fit for sanction it gees to the State Government the states being high and it remains open to the State Government to vote or to suggest modification. In face of screening thus contemplated at different levels the absence of a right of appeal against the sanction accorded by the State, Government is of little consequence. In scheme of less than Rs. 20 lacs as the estimated cost, the sanctioning authority is the Board, but in the case too the final seal is put by the State Government in appeal and hence it is idle to talk of discrimination in this behalf. 29. Considerable stress was laid by Sri Jagdisii Swarup upon this contention that the power exercised in this respect by the Niyojan Samiti, the Board is quasi-judicial and the action taken upon their recommendation is vitiated due to lack of reasons and for adequate opportunity being not accorded to the objectors at different Stages in the process. We consider it unnecessary to probe into the academic question whether the function discharged by the Niyojan Samiti, the Board is quasi-judicial or administrative in nature the obvious reason being that for practical purposes the line of demarcation between the two is getting more and more blurred. The settled principle is that subject to certain necessary limitations natural justice is now a brooding omnipresence although harrying in its play. The soul of the rule is fair play in action and this extends to both the fields. Administrative action in a democratic set up is not allegic to fairness in action and discretionary executive action cannot degenerate into unilcteral injustice. It must however be born in mind that fairness itself is a flexible, prag matic and relative concept, not a rigid, ritualistic or sophisticated abstraction Mohinder Singh Gill and another v. Chief Ejection Commissioner, New Delhi and others (1978) 1 S.C.C. 405 at p. 434. The practical result of different judicial pronouncements as a natural justice and the duty to act fairly' which the learned counsel cited but we do not consider necessary to refer in detail is best described in the words of de Smith Judicial control of Administrative Action : "Since 1967 the concept of duty to act fairly has often been used by judges to denote an implied procedural obligation. In general it means a duty to observe the rudiments of natural justice for a limited purpose in the exercise of function which are not analytically judicial but administrative." The rudiments of natural justice are : That the person affected must be informed of the case against him and has given a fair opportunity of meeting it. The law is thus clear, if an administrative decision causes an injury to a person, the duty to act fairly requires that he must be informed of the case against him, and given a fair opportunity to meet it before the decision is taken. 30. Under the Scheme of the Adhiniyam, when and housing or improvement Scheme has been framed, the Board has to get notice published in newspapers (Section 28). This is followed by notice in prescribed proforma to individuals to be served in the manner laid down under the rules (Section 29). The notice, it is true, specifies the boundaries and not the numerous plots comprised in that area. It is settled however that where the acquisition is of large tracts for development purposes absence of further specification regarding the plots affected is immaterial Munshi Singh etc. v. Union of India, (1973) 2 SCC 337 : Aflatoon end others (supra). Inspection is allowed at the same time of a map of the area, particulars of the scheme and details of the land proposed to be acquired. If in a particular case these provisions are shown to have been observed to objectors cannot complain of lack of notice. 31. Section 30 (2) provides then for objection being filed in writing within thirty days from the service of the notice. The objections received are to be 'considered' by the Board after giving an opportunity of being heard to the objectors. Section 12 read with the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (Delegation of Powers by the Board and Housing Commission) Rules, 1968 enables the Board, as we have discussed above, to delegate this power to collect evidence and hear the objectors to the Niyojan Samiti. In our opinion there is no force in the submission that opportunity of being heard includes personal hearing or that over and above the hearing given by the Niyojan Samiti it was incumbent upon the Board also to hear the objectors. In our opinion there is no force in the submission that opportunity of being heard includes personal hearing or that over and above the hearing given by the Niyojan Samiti it was incumbent upon the Board also to hear the objectors. Reasonable opportunity of being heard does not comprise personal hearing as an adjust of natural justice or fair play in action unless there be a provision for the same in the statute or it is asked for and acceded to by the authority. Farid Ahmad v. Municipal Corporation, A.I.R. 1976 S.C. 2095 : Union of India v. J.P. Mitter, A.I.R. 1971 S.C. 1093: State of Assam v. Gauati Municipality, A.I.R. 1967 SC. 1398 :F.N. Roy v. Collector of Customs, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 648 This has been the meaning given to the expression "reasonable opportunity of being heard" occurring in Article 311 (2) of the Constitution also. Section 5 - A (7) of the Land Acquisition Act significantly provides in express terms that the Collector shall give objector "an opportunity of being heard either in person or by pleader". There being no such requirement under Section 31 (1) of the Adhiniyam, it is not permissible to import these words thereunder. It in a case where complex and difficult questions requiring familiarity with technical problems are raised personal hearing may conduce better administration and more satisfactory disposal of the objections but there is and such contingency shown to have arisen in any of the case before us. The delegation in favour of the Niyojan Samiti being valid the petitioners are not justified in claiming that there should have been hearing given to them again by the Board subsequent to the receipt of recommendations of the Niyojan Samiti. A duplication of this kind is neither envisaged under Section 31 nor is this warranted by the rudiments of natural justice. The further argument made in this continuation that opportunity should have been accorded also by the State Government when considering the question of sanctioning the scheme may easily be discarded as too ambitious. The State Government is supposed to act upon the relevant material placed before it accompanied with the views of the Board and the recommendation which the Niyojan Samiti has made. In connection with Section 5 - A/6 Land Acquisition Act upon similar argument raised Untwalia, J., observed in Bai Malimabu and others v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 515. The State Government is supposed to act upon the relevant material placed before it accompanied with the views of the Board and the recommendation which the Niyojan Samiti has made. In connection with Section 5 - A/6 Land Acquisition Act upon similar argument raised Untwalia, J., observed in Bai Malimabu and others v. State of Gujarat, A.I.R. 1978 S.C. 515. "Proper enquiry was held under Section - A of the Act and full opportunity was given to the appellants. It was not the requirement of law to give any further opportunity after a report was made to the State Government, it is the function of the State Government to consider the report of the Collector and proceed further in the matter as they think fit and proper to do." 32. Undoubtedly, in support of its recommendations the Niyojan Samiti had to assign reasons. Their has to be a speaking report in the sense that the conclusion is supported by reasons. This is too well settled to be supported by a precedent. In Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1966 S.C. 671 The Supreme Court observed that a speaking order will at best be a reasonable and at its worst be at least a plausible one. The public should not be deprived of this safeguard. In Mahabir Prasad Santosh Kumar v. State of U.P., A.I.R. 1970 S.C. 1302 it was reiterated that satisfactory decision of a disputed claim may be reached only if it be supported by reasons that appealed to the authority. Sri Jagdish Swarup placed strong reliance on the decision in King v. Electricity Commissioners, 1924 1 K.B. 171 to buttress the contention that even where the report is recommendatory, (ii) cannot overlook rules of fair play in action. Sri Jagdish Swarup placed strong reliance on the decision in King v. Electricity Commissioners, 1924 1 K.B. 171 to buttress the contention that even where the report is recommendatory, (ii) cannot overlook rules of fair play in action. Much to the same to the same effect is the view taken by the Supreme Court are appearing in State of Gujarat and others v. Ambalal Haiderbhai and others, (1976) 3 SCC 495 Rule 4 (3) of the Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules 1963) requires the Collector to submit his report to the concerned Government which in turn is required before making a declaration under Section 6 of the Act to consider that report as well as the report, if any, submitted by it under Section 5 - A of the Act after ascertaining the view of the Committee under Rule 3 of the Rules in regard to the Collector's report under Rule 4. In reference to this rule, it was laid down "Although the above mentioned rule is silent regarding the mode and method of the enquiry to be held by the Collector and the report of the Collector is of recommendatory character, yet regard being had to the legislative history and purpose of the rule, and the mischief sought to be prevented, we have no hesitation in holding that, in conducting the enquiry, the Collector has, in the interest of fair play to observe the principles of natural justice by affording the persons interested in the land a reasonable opportunity of being heard and of adducing material before the Collector to refute the allegations of the company. The concept of natural justice which as evident from the observations made in A.I. Kraipak's case, has undergone a great deal of change in recent years. The dividing line between an administrative and quasi - Judicial function is often blurred. See also : State of Gujrat v. Patel Chalurbhuj Narsibhai, (1975) 1 SCC 583 . There is no deviation so far as this aspect of these provisions is concerned in the recent pronouncement reported in (1988) 2 SCC 152 M/s. Formento Resorts and Hotels Ltd. case. It is clear also that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reason so mentioned and cannot be supplementary by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. 33. It is clear also that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reason so mentioned and cannot be supplementary by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. 33. The principle is settled equally, however, that nature and the elaboration of the reasons necessarily depends upon the facts of each case (M.P. Industries Ltd., (Supra). The (requirement that the State Government must given reasons for the order it makes does not necessarily require it to record a judgment judicially arrived at (Vide Radhe Shyam Khare and another v. State of U.P. etc., ( AIR 1959 SC 107 ). If the authority which takes the final decision acts mechanically and without applying its own mind, the order may be bad, but if the decision making body, after fair and independent consideration, reaches a conclusion which tallies with the recommendations of the subordinate authority which held the preliminary enquiry, there is no error in law. Recommendations are not binding but are merely raw material for consideration. Where there is no Surrender of judgment to the recommending report, there is no contravention of the cannons of natural justice, Chairman, Board of Mining Examination and Chief Inspector of Mines etc. v. Ramjee, (1977) 2 SCC 256 . In this connection the nature and contents of objections raised and the material adduced in support thereof are of importance too. In the cases we are concerned with the objections merely asserted by and large that the objectors had their use residential or otherwise cover the land and hence that be not acquired and further that other land could be had for the purpose. The objections of the nature could not prevail as against the larger public interest which flows from development on planned basis. Explanations were acceded to where these did not tend to affect adversely the substratum of the housing and land development Scheme. The selection of site made upon technical advice and which could be availed of to raise construction suited for different income groups in good number could not be given up on the basis that this might result in financial loss to the owner or cause inconvenience to him. The Niyojan Samiti formulated certain norms and then after local inspection and granting personal hearing to such of the parties with choose to appear submitted its proposals. The Niyojan Samiti formulated certain norms and then after local inspection and granting personal hearing to such of the parties with choose to appear submitted its proposals. As mentioned above also, natural justice does not require that the hearing Should in all cases be oral (Paul Jackson : Natural Justice (2nd edn. P. 67) the general principle being that there is no right to an oral hearing unless the refusal of an oral hearing would prejudice the applicant. In a number of contexts the courts have held natural justice to have been satisfied by an opportunity to make written representation to the deciding body and there are still many Situations where a person will be able to present his case adequately in this way (de Smith : Judicial Review of Administrative Action, (14th ed). P. 201. The Niyojan Samiti thought it fit still to extend oral hearing which is suggestive of objective approach to the issue. The report is to be read in each case along Side with the map with the Samiti endorsed at the same time with or without modification There was suggestion made also where considered appropriate for alternative sites being provided to the dislodged holders of the land. Pucca and habitable structures with the expectancy of long life were left never except where this did not seem feasible keeping in view of the object and purpose of the Act. All this furnishes intrinsic evidence of the application of mind. We, therefore, are unable to accept the submission made for the petitioners that the recommendations were made mechanically. 34. In support of the contention that the hearing Should have been given by the Board in the course of consideration made by it the recommendations received from the Niyojan Samiti and that the State Government Should have also accorded hearing to the petitioners before sanction was given to the Scheme, there is reliance placed on the decision in Gullapali Nageshwara Rao v. A.P. Road Transport Corporation, ( AIR 1959 SC 308 ). In that case there was no power of delegation vested in the authority under Section 68 C and 68 D Motor Vehicles Act. Rule 10 made it incumbent moreover that the authority hears the objectors in person or through authorised representatives. For both these reasons that case is clearly distinguishable. 35. In that case there was no power of delegation vested in the authority under Section 68 C and 68 D Motor Vehicles Act. Rule 10 made it incumbent moreover that the authority hears the objectors in person or through authorised representatives. For both these reasons that case is clearly distinguishable. 35. Section 31 (1) of the Adhiniyam, reproduced above, makes use of the expression "after considering the objections". Learned counsel for the petitioners sought to equate 'consideration' with 'decision' or 'determination' and invoked the meaning given to this expression in the case of TR Challapan (1976) 3 SCC190. This has been dissented by the Constitution Bench in the recently decided case of Union of India and another v. Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398 at P. 492 in para 114 in these words : "The words 'consider' however, does not bear the meaning placed upon it in Challapan's case. The word consider is used in rule 14 as a transitive verb. The meaning of the word 'consider' as so used is given in the Oxford English Dictionary as 'To contemplate mentally, fix the mind upon ; to think over, meditate or reflect on, bestow attentive thought upon give heed to, take note of". The relevant definition of the word' consider' given in Webster's Third New International Dictionary is "to reflect on; think about with a degree of care or caution". Below this definition are given the synonyms of the word 'consider' these synonyms being "contemplate study, weight, revolve, excogitate." While explaining the exact different Shades of meaning in this group of words, Webstor's Dictionary proceeds to state as under with respect to the word "consider." 'Consider' often indicates little more to an think about. It may occasionally suggest somewhat more conscious direction of thought, somewhat greater depth and Scope, and Same what greater propose-fulness It is thus obvious that the word 'consider' in its ordinary and natural sense is not capable of the meaning assigned to it in challapan case." 36. It may occasionally suggest somewhat more conscious direction of thought, somewhat greater depth and Scope, and Same what greater propose-fulness It is thus obvious that the word 'consider' in its ordinary and natural sense is not capable of the meaning assigned to it in challapan case." 36. Moreover to decide' connotes a meaning which is not synonymous with 'consideration' According to the dictionary meaning 'to decide' means "settle (question, issue, dispute) by giving victory to one side, give judgment between, for, in favour, of, against .." and 'decision' means 'settlement (of question etc.) conclusion, formal judgment, making up ore's mind, resolve resolution..." (P) P.L. Lakhanpal v. Union of India, AIR 1967 SC 908 : AIR 1958 SC 222 at page 229 The Board or the Niyojan Samiti as its delegate for that matter considers and not 'decides' there being indeed no visor issue in that sense to be adjudicated upon. The expectation is that the pros and cons be weighed taking the objections into account before proceeding to recommend for sanction to the State Government or otherwise. It would not be right, therefore, in our opinion to treat this at par with arriving at a 'decision' in that strict sense. 37. Criticism was also made of the sanction accorded by the State Government to the schemes in question under Section 31 (2) of the Adhiniyam. It was urged that this being nonspeaking the inference should be that there was no application of mind. We find difficult to accede to this proposition. There was consideration at the level of the delegated authority and there after the Board too. in this backdrop and keeping in view the contention and the nature of the objection, the recording of reasons by the State Government in the order of affiance would have only been a duplication. Government had before it when considering the question of sanction the entire relevant material including the objections preferred by the petitioner and the recommendations of the Niyojan Samiti. 'Sanction' denotes prior approval or ratification. The dictionary meaning of the word' sanction' is varying. The appropriate meaning of that word seems to be "act of ratifying, or giving authority ; confirmation ; support; permission ; countenance ; to give validity to ; to authorise ; to countenance. 'Sanction' denotes prior approval or ratification. The dictionary meaning of the word' sanction' is varying. The appropriate meaning of that word seems to be "act of ratifying, or giving authority ; confirmation ; support; permission ; countenance ; to give validity to ; to authorise ; to countenance. (Minerva Talkies Kakinada v. State of A.P., (1972) AWR 216 For ratification the State Government is not required either under the Adhintyam or the principles of natural justice to repeat the process of giving opportunity to the objectors. The submission made also is that copy of the report of the Niyojan Samiti was not furnished. The Board refutes that it was asked for. Even if this were, it does not vitiate the hearing. In Kalumiya Karimmlya v. The State of Gujarat and others, (1977) 1 SCC 715 the argument was that a proper hearing would include furnishing of a copy of the report under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act. This the Supreme Court negatived and laid down : "Although, ordinarily, there should be no difficult in furnishing a copy of the report under Section 5-A to an objector, when he asks for the same, it is not a correct proposition that hearing under Section 5 - A is invalid because of failure to furnish a copy of the report at the conclusion of the hearing under the said section. Unless there were weighty reasons, a report in a public enquiry like this, should be available to the persons who take part in the enquiry. But failure to furnish a copy of the report of such an enquiry cannot vitiate the enquiry if it is otherwise not open to any valid objection.". 38. Coming now to the individual cases, writ petition Nos. 4842 of 1980," 6944 of 1980 and 6311 of 1981 were argued before us as the leading cases and these may, therefore, be discussed in some greater detail. Taking up Writ Petition 4842 of 1980 first, the Board on 27th May 1974 framed by a resolution the Firozabad Bhumi Vikas Fvam Grihsthan Yojana No. 1 Faizabad Agra Road covering about 54 acres of land for an estimated cost of Rs. 115.44 lacs. Notice under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam was published in the official gazette on December 4, 11, 18, 1976 and also in the newspapers of the area. 115.44 lacs. Notice under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam was published in the official gazette on December 4, 11, 18, 1976 and also in the newspapers of the area. Individual notices were issued under Section 29 in response to which the petitioners filed objections on December 30, 1976. The Niyojan Samiti under the delegated authority from the Board made their recommendation dated May 24/25 1977 which was taken up before the Board for consideration on August 20, 1977. The record together with the Board's opinion was remitted to the State Government which accorded sanction on July 19, 1978 and this was notified under Section 32 (I) of the Adhiniyam on November 4, 1978. It was followed by the order of the State Government to the Collector under - Section 7 of the Land Acquisition Act on 4-10-1979 and the notification under Section 17 of that Act dated 13-11-1979. 39. The chief grievance of the petitioners as contended by the learned counsel is that the Niyojan Samiti did not assign specific reasons for not according to their objections and they did not have the opportunity to appear before the Board or the State Government thereafter. A little scrutiny reveals that this submission is not possessed of merit. Members of the Niyojan Samiti visited the premises held by the petitioners and inspected the site in their presence. Personal hearing was accorded to such of these petitioners who appeared before the Samiti on May 24/25, 1977. The report prepared by the Samiti contains to begin with a gist of various objections filed by different persons. The objections had been trialled by the officials of the Board and the reference made is to those serials including in brief to their contents. The Samiti also had before them the plan or the map pertaining to the scheme ; this was looked into by them closely and the recommendations correspondingly indicated by different colours in the map under the signature of the Chairman who presided over the Samiti. The report then proceeds with the discussion and recommends that the abadi area shown in blue be exempted from acquisition ; the area occupied by religious spots, temples, shown in yellow is left out next ; in para 3 it is recited that of the buildings in the area those which are pucca and in good condition shown in pink be released. In regard to glass factories existing in the area of this scheme, the suggestion made in para 4 was that after ascertaining from the Director of industries such of these factories which are registered and operating be exempted from acquisition, but those which are unregistered and have become definite be not granted release. In regard to the constructions other than those dealt with above and other open land, the objections raised were advised to be rejected (Para 5). It was also provided that those dislodged due to acquisition be as far as possibly suitably provided for in developed and newly constructed areas and the map be treated as part of the report Annexure S.C.A.f). 40. There can be little doubt in our opinion that these recommendations proceed after adequate opportunity provided to the person interested, and there can be no grouse reasonably made on the score of fair play in action. We find also that the report is analytical and depicts unbiased approach. The Niyojan Samiti laid down certain norms to dent with the residential and commercial blocks which they have Sought to apply at uniform level. The conclusion reached is neither irrational nor arbitrary. The permeating thought is of development on planned basis to enable as many persons as reasonably possible being provided for residence within the available area. The object is to make the units compact and Self contained. Learned counsel takes exception to the use of the expression "Chhutput" used in para 5 of the report and dilated that the Samiti did not deal with expressly in relation to each of the petitioners five or six plots. This seems to overlook that para 5 is residuary in nature; it refers to those which do not qualify either under the proceeding paras 3 or 4, and the remaining objections have been considered to be devoid or force on the basis of those norms. The report has moreover to be read alongside with the map and together the denote in which category a particular piece of land falls. It is not correct to say, therefore, that these plots are left out of consideration. It is ne it of judicious nor reasonable to expect of a Niyojan Samiti composed as it was to pronounce its verdict with the S3me thoroughness as a person experienced in the art of writing judgment would do. It is not correct to say, therefore, that these plots are left out of consideration. It is ne it of judicious nor reasonable to expect of a Niyojan Samiti composed as it was to pronounce its verdict with the S3me thoroughness as a person experienced in the art of writing judgment would do. The basic fact is that there is examination done on Board principles decided upon and the attempt made to take a balanced view. The Court cannot be asked to supplant this with its assessment even if it were to be of different opinion. The application of mind on the part of the Samiti to the issue before them is manifest, 41. Subsequent to the hearing before the Niyojan Samiti, the petitioners were not entitled to rehearing before the board or the State Government. The report and also their objections were before the heard for consideration. The Board after deliberation modified the report in part. It gathered the information that there were in all 21 factories located in the area of which it were registered ; one had applied for registration and for two it was not known. The units in production were 14. The Board d id not agree that these be continued in the area proposed for residential homes and Suggested that be instead provided suitable alternative sites in the commercial area. This evidently reflects independent consideration at their level ; we were shown the original record too which bears out that complete set of papers (including the objections) was sent to the State Government which granted sanction affirming the Niyojan Samitis report as, modified by the Board. 42. The petitioners urged that they have two godowns in part of plot No. 561 and 562 which they have leased on rent to the Regional Food Controller and there are also two glass bangle factories. In plot No. 564 they claim to have had garden and Same servant's quarters besides passage ; a road in plot No. 565 and regarding plot No. 566 it was alleged that they have residential building. We are happy to record that at the close of the long arguments in this case, learned counsel for the parties were substantially argued to a balance formula. In so far as the two glass factories of the petitioners are concerned, they are to be shifted like other similar, units to alternative sites. We are happy to record that at the close of the long arguments in this case, learned counsel for the parties were substantially argued to a balance formula. In so far as the two glass factories of the petitioners are concerned, they are to be shifted like other similar, units to alternative sites. In para 4 of the supplementary counter affidavit filed for the Board on 15-11-1984 it is stated that so long as the Board has not been able to provide alternative since for shifting the running factories the same shall not be disturbed. This implies (as stated also in para 7 of this affidavit), that for so long as the shifting is not dote, ingress and egress to the factories through the passage - in plot no. 565 be maintained as at present, and, further on bring Shifted, provision for passage to and from the factories is as well suitably made. From the map which the Niyojan Samiti endorsed it would appear that they placed and advisedly too the two factories in pink colour bracketed with the glass factories. Alternative site for the godowns would also need be provided, therefore, upon the factories being Shifted to the commercial area. There is no case so far as the barrage, the rooms and the courtyard are concerned, for these did not exist when the notice issued under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam and on the petitioners' own showing they were in the process of construction and the same is true of the alleged residential building (see para 5 of the objection filed by the petitioners on 10th December, 1976 vide annexure 2-D to the writ petition). We have no reason to doubt and in fact learned standing counsel for the Board also indicated that in executing the scheme the concessions referred to above shall be provided to the petitioners. 43. Writ petition No. 6944 of 1980, 1982 also concerns the Firozabad Bhumi Vikas and Grihsthan Yojna No. 1. The notice under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam was published On December 4, 1976 and in the successive weeks. Individual notices were given under Section 29 and duly served. Personal nearing was accorded by the Niyojan Samiti to the objectors including the petitioners representative. The commendations of the Samiti were taken up by the Board for consideration. The notice under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam was published On December 4, 1976 and in the successive weeks. Individual notices were given under Section 29 and duly served. Personal nearing was accorded by the Niyojan Samiti to the objectors including the petitioners representative. The commendations of the Samiti were taken up by the Board for consideration. The estimated cost of the Scheme being over the prescribed limit, the relevant material was forwarded to the State Government which gave sanction and this was notified under Section 32 (1) of the Adhiniyam on 30th November, 1978. 44. The petitioner is a Trust for charitable purposes. The dispute raised is regarding plot No. 565/1 Governing the area of 1 Bigha 5 Biswas only. The objection raised by the petitioner in response to the notice was in general terms stating that there is existing construction over substantial part; that there remains much to be done to achieve the objection of the trust and that there being a number of buildings in the vicinity the scheme might not be of use (vide Annexure C.A.I.). In the writ petition there are some more details given to the effect that there are four shops and Same other constructions which are held out on rent and this is a source of income. The trust, intends to set up a charitable hospital over the rest of the land and to build residences for doctors and patients. The Niyojan Samiti heard the petitioner's representative in person on May 24/25, 1977 and as in writ petition No. 4842 of 1980 dealt with above, it laid down certain norms vide Annexure 7' to the writ petition. Local inspection was made also. The Samiti recommended release of 377 sq. metres which alone was found constructed in the petitioner's land, for the rest the objection was dismissed. This also is suggestive of application of mind on their part. In the objection there is no indication that the lay out under the scheme may be executed appropriately without affecting the rest of the petitioner's plot. For the Board on the contrary it has been asserted that the technical staff after deliberations have made the selection of the site and found the retention of the land necessary in larger interest. We are not persuaded to treat the decision reached by the Board in the circumstances as vitiated under the law. For the Board on the contrary it has been asserted that the technical staff after deliberations have made the selection of the site and found the retention of the land necessary in larger interest. We are not persuaded to treat the decision reached by the Board in the circumstances as vitiated under the law. The allegation that there was some kind of assurance given by members of the Niyojan Samiti for release is neither substantial; d on fact nor does any thing of this sort bind the Board or the State Government for that matter the report of the Samiti being only recommendatory in character. 45. This is true substantially in relation to the writ petition No. 6311 of 1981 also. Therein the scheme is the Damdama Kotbi Bhumi Vikas Evam Grihsthan Yojna No. 5 Moradabad. The requisite formalities were indisputedly complied with. Subsequent to the notification of the State Government under Section 32 (I) of the Adhiniyam dated 1st November, 1975 possession has been taken by the Board partly on 8th November, 1,79, and for the rest on 26th August, 19.52. The substance of the objection filed by the petitioners before the Board on November 18, 1969 (Annexure I to the writ petition) was that the Damdaina Kothi is a huge mansion strongly built ; that the acquisition thereof will prove a costly affair beyond the Board's financial resources and that in either event whether the building is retained in its present condition or pulled down, the purpose will not be fulfilled while the present occupants will have been ousted. The petitioners have it appears, taken various some results during the progress in this matter. On 5th August, 1976 there was a representation made by them to the State Government requesting for possession being taken over and the compensation paid at the earliest (Annexure CA IV). Frantic efforts were made thereafter at political level by putting external pressure to get the property released from acquisition. This, ho .ever, did not materialise. The State Government by their formal order dated November 3,1981 turned this down finally (Annexure SRA VI). The collector was directed on 6th January. 1976 under Section 7 Land Acquisition Act to take possession aN.S.ction 17 of this Act was invoked on 31st May, 1979. The contention for the petitioners, therefore, that the State Government released the land in their favour is without substance. 46. The collector was directed on 6th January. 1976 under Section 7 Land Acquisition Act to take possession aN.S.ction 17 of this Act was invoked on 31st May, 1979. The contention for the petitioners, therefore, that the State Government released the land in their favour is without substance. 46. The other argument is that there has been no application of mind by the authorities. This also is not bourne out. The Niyojan Samiti in this case consisting of the Housing Commissioner (a member of the Indian Administrative Service), the Chief Town and Country Planner and a Member of Parliament visited the site on 17th January, 1982 and gave hearing to the objections. The report drawn by the Samiti gives a list of the objections raised including for the petitioner and directed release of portions held for public utility on this land viz the Scouts Hostel, the Teacher's Hostel and the Zila Parishad Office building. Relief was also granted to four small families occupying house in plot No 484 and the, flood affected refugees. It is difficult to accept that in declining to exempt the Kothi held by the petitioners for their personal gain the Niyojan Samiti or the Board for their matter proceeded irrelevantly. The petitioners could not make out with any degree of reason that the building with suitable alterations or otherwise cannot be availed to provide roof over the heads of teeming millions placed in the small or medium income groups. Instances are not un-know where colonies have sprung up on land held by a group or a family confined to their use or for the sake of deriving rental income. Planned development would eminently warrant suitable adjustment so that the available land is shared by as many as conveniently practicable. The land covered under the Scheme covers nearly 26.37 acres and is situate within the municipal limits. Nothing was placed on record to satisfy the authorities that the layout plan could be carried through to any appreciable extend after excluding the Kothi, to exclude the Kothi from its purview would mean indeed the scheme itself being Scrapped. And in so far as the cost is concerned, it is upto the State Government to provide. That is not the issue before us. It is not suggested that the authorities have directed release of and Such other property similarly situate or having like potentialities for planned development. And in so far as the cost is concerned, it is upto the State Government to provide. That is not the issue before us. It is not suggested that the authorities have directed release of and Such other property similarly situate or having like potentialities for planned development. The financial loss, if any, to the petitioners or the inconvenience resulting to them which is inevitable in the process could not be made the governing criterion, Not being a judicial pronouncement by persons proficient in the art of writing judgment the report of the Niyojan Samiti is not, it is true, as elaborate but it speaks of their mind adequately and the approach adopted cannot be characterised as arbitrary or irrational anal. The Board and thereafter the State Government could legitimately ratify this recommendation. 47, Learned counsel in these cases have also taken exception to the exemption granted to oN.S.t. Mithlesh Kumari in respect of plot No. 570 (5 biswas). It appears this plot was also under acquisition in the Firozabad Scheme. Later Smt. Mithles Kumari moved the State Government for exemption under Section 42 of the Adhiniyam which was acceded to by Government on January 20, 1983 as is revealed from Annexure SCA-VIII read with paragraph 18 of the Supplementary counter - affidavit in writ petition No. 4842 of 1980. This does not vitiate the acquisition of the land so far as the petitioners are concerned. Where a notification is issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act in respect of land belonging to other persons but before taking possession a part thereof is ordered to be released in favour of its owner subsequent to acquisition and it transpires that no valid reason existed to single out the land belonging to a particular owner only, that would not render the notification under Section 4 void there being no discriminatory action taken at the time of its issue vide : Chandra Bansi Singh and others v. State of Bihar and others, (1984) 4 SCC 316 . The question as to what factors weighed with the authorities concerned in deciding not to acquire the land of others need not be gone into in these proceedings because, it has been held that it would not in any way affect the validity of the acquisition of the land of the petitioners Pandit Lila Ram v. Union of India and others, (1975) 2 SCC 547 In Narain Dass v. Improvement Trusts, AIR 1972 SC 865 the appellants did not bring their case within Section 56 of the Punjab Town Improvement Act and it was held that merely because some other party had erroneously succeeded in getting his land exempted ostensible under that section that by itself would not clothe the appellant with the right to secure exemption for their. Therefore, even if release granted to Smt. Mithilesh Kumari was unjustified that cannot invalidate the proceedings for acquisition of the petitioner's land. It is not shown moreover that the case of the petitioners is parallel in material respect to that set - up by the third person on the basis whereof the exemption was granted by the State Government to her under Section 49 of the Adhiniyam. Writ Petition No. 1530 of 1982 Writ Petition No. 17 of 1984 Writ Petition No. 13369 of AJ81 Writ Petition No. 11785 of 1982 48. These petitions pertain to the Bhalupura Housing Accommodation and General Development Scheme. The Scheme was framed initially by the then Improvement Trust Varanasi under Section 24 (t) of the U.P. Town Improvements Act, 1919. This was notified under Section 36 of that Act in the year 1949. Sanction was accorded by the State Government under Section 41 followed by the notification required under Section 42 of that Act dated September 1, 1951. The U.P. Town Improvement Act, 1919 was repealed by Section 581 of the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959. Section 577 (b) of the repealing Act provides that notice or notification or sanction of any improvement Scheme for the area included in the city issued in the repealed Act shall be deemed to have been issued under this Act and further proceedings in furtherance of such scheme may be taken accordingly. Section 577 (b) of the repealing Act provides that notice or notification or sanction of any improvement Scheme for the area included in the city issued in the repealed Act shall be deemed to have been issued under this Act and further proceedings in furtherance of such scheme may be taken accordingly. Upon the Board coming into existence there was an agreement in writ in and registered entered into by the Board with the Nagar Mahapalika in pursuance of Section 47 (2) of the Adhiniyam of June 25, 1968 whereby the execution of tho scheme aforementioned was transferred to be Board. The Board is thereafter to execute the scheme as if it had came into force under Section 32 (5) of the Adhiniyam. The award has been given by the Special Land Acquisition Officer on December 31, 1973 and possession of the land taken over by the Board on January 3, 1974. 49. Learned counsel for the petitioners in these cases submitted that there had been abandonment of the Scheme by the Nagar Mahapalika of Varanasi and hence it did not survive for being taken over by the Board under Section 47 (2) of the Adhiniyam. For this proposition they rely on Section 367-A of the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959 which empowers the Mahapalika with the prior approval or in accordance with the conditions as may be imposed by the State Government to abandon and Scheme notified under Section 42 of the U.P. Town Improvement Act, 1919. The abandonment alleged is claimed to be made out on the strength merely of a resolution which the Nagar Mahapalika passed on January 3, 1961 vide Annexure III to the Writ Petition No. 17 of 1984. A perusal of this resolution reveals clearly that there had been no abandonment as such of the Scheme for acquisition. The resolution recites that the proceedings for acquisition initiated earlier shall continue to operate and that simultaneously with this where there are parcels of land carved out which did not have roads or other things of public utility, it shall be open to the owners to raise construction thereon subject to the payment of development charges by them and conditional further upon such construction being raised in conformity with the plan drawn in pursuance of the scheme and with the permission expressly obtained of the Nagar Mahapalika. It is stated over again therein that while the proceedings for acquisition would remain alive the taking over of possession was being deferred for six months. To be constructed as an act of abandonment there has necessarily to be exhibition of intention to this effect. No Such intention can be deduced from this resolution which suggests, on the contrary that it was throughout designed not to give up the acquisition but only to permit construction, if any, to come into being in keeping with the plan and the taking over of possession alone was for the time being postponed. This resolution was moreover, as contended for the respondents, rescinded later on April 22, 1966 vide Annexure CA-IV in the writ petition No. 17 of 1984. The rescission was permissible because there had been no abandonment at and Stage. This was followed by the taking over of actual possession by the Board on January 3, 1974. The construction raised, if any, during the period of January 3, 1961 to April 21, 1966 or thereafter till 3rd June, 1974 was evidently at the risk of those who did it. Even the resolution dated 3rd January, 1961 can he of no assistance unless it is established that the construction raised was in conformity with the plan drawn under the scheme and further that the same was with the permission expressly obtained from the Nagar Mahapalika. The case in Ahailia Housing Private Ltd. v State of U.P., 1975 ALJ 191 cited for the petitioners does not help since in that case there was the finding recorded by the Collector on the direction of the State Government after entering into the facts that the land was covered by Section 2 (f) (e) of the U.P. Zamiadari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and the petitioners had acted upon those findings; it was held that the State Government was estopped from subsequently Issuing notification that such land was not held under Section 2 (1) (c) for public purposes. In the case before us the language of the resolution dated 3rd January, 196 does not at all bear the interpretation which the petitioners have attempted to assign to it and moreover due to the necessary conditions contained therein being not complied with, no question of estoppel may arise. In the case before us the language of the resolution dated 3rd January, 196 does not at all bear the interpretation which the petitioners have attempted to assign to it and moreover due to the necessary conditions contained therein being not complied with, no question of estoppel may arise. The stand taken for the petitioners in the Writ Petition No. 13369 of 1981 in regard to construction allegedly raised in the years 1964 and 1974 is on its face shifting and Self - contradictory as is revealed on perusal of the affidavits filed in support of the application for amendment of the rejoinder affidavit and the two supplementary rejoinder affidavits. The petitioners have not placed on record either the map or any evidence of permission obtained from the local authority to raise the construction. 50. For the reason Stated above, the Board is competent to execute the scheme taken over in terms of Section 47 (2) of the Adhiniyam. Upon the Scheme framed tinder Section 36 of the U.P. Town Improvement Act being continued under the Adhiniyam, its notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, as was also held in Smt. Annapurna Devi's case (supra) with which we are in respectful agreement. The exemption granted to some of the tenure - holders under this Scheme is not on invidious basis but on the basis of the conditions laid down in the Government order dated July 27, 1967 and April 9, 1980 being fulfilled. These Government orders make exception in regard to development undertaken by the Co-operative Housing Societies. A detailed reference to these orders will appear when we pass on to deal with the case of the Co-operative Housing Societies in particular. Writ Petition No. 3886 of 1984 Writ Petition No. 3890 of 1984 Writ Petition No. 3901 of 1984 Writ Petition No. 3902 of 1984 Writ Petition No. 3903 of 1984 Writ Petition No. 3904 of 1984 Writ Petition No. 3905 of 1984 Writ Petition No. 11568 of 1983 Writ Petition No. 12251 of 1983 51. The dispute raised in this group of petitioner is as to the application and effect of Section 59 (b) of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, The petitions pertain to the Tulsipur Grihsthan Yojana, Varanasi. The notice under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam was published on April 8, 15 and 22 of 1972. The dispute raised in this group of petitioner is as to the application and effect of Section 59 (b) of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, The petitions pertain to the Tulsipur Grihsthan Yojana, Varanasi. The notice under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam was published on April 8, 15 and 22 of 1972. In exercise of the power under Section I (3) of the Adhiniyam, with effect from April 1, 1976 in the cities of Kanpur, Allahabad, Varanasi, Agra and Lucknow as constituted under Section 3 of the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959. This notification was published in the Gazette dated March 29, 1966. The notification to which reference was made for the petitioners dated October 14, 1969 published on October 25, 1969, under Section 1 (3) of the Adhiniyam provides only that the Adhiniyam shall not come into force in the area of Kanpur, Agra, Varanasi, Allahabad and Lucknow as they are declared regulated areas under Section 3 (1) of the U.P. Regulation of Building Operation Act, 1958, not falling in the limits of the above mentioned cities declared as such under Section 3 of the U.P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam, 1959. On a conjoint reading of these two notifications it is clear that there is no conflict existing between them. The Adhiniyam was made applicable to the cities aforementioned with effect from April 1, 1966 ; the areas taken out of the purview thereof later are only those covered under Section 3 (I) of the U.P. Regulation of Building Operation Act, 1958. There is no force consequently in the argument for the petitioners that as a result of this subsequent notification, the Adhiniyam may not be said to be applicable to the area we arc concerned with in these cases. 52. It was next argued for the petitioners that there was a news item published in AAJ of the 6th December, 1973 and from this it should be inferred that the scheme framed under the Adhiniyam was abandoned by the Board under Section 31. The inference thus attempt d to be drawn is altogether misplaced. Initially there was a scheme framed for registration according to which the applicants were to deposit Rs 30/ - per month and be entitled to construction raised by the Board. The procedure is specified in the advertisement dated October 30, 1973, vide Annexure CA-7 to Writ Petition No. 3886 of 1984. Initially there was a scheme framed for registration according to which the applicants were to deposit Rs 30/ - per month and be entitled to construction raised by the Board. The procedure is specified in the advertisement dated October 30, 1973, vide Annexure CA-7 to Writ Petition No. 3886 of 1984. This facility for registration was not provided, however, in the city of Varanasi and it is this which was clarified in the issue of AAJ dated 6th December, 1973, vide Annexure CA - 8. There can be no abandonment inferred by the Board of the Scheme in question on the basis of this news item. 53. Learned counsel referred then to Section 59(1) of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973 as it was prior to the U.P. (Amendment) Act, 1976 (U.P. Act No. 47 of 1973). It was argued that thereunder the scheme framed under the Adhiniyam in respect of development area was placed under suspension and hence there could be i.o implementation made of the same. This overlooks the significant amendment brought about in Section 59 (1) of U.P. Act 47 of 1976 and the material fact teat this amendment is retrospective in effect. This is expressly so provided as is manifest from Section 6 of the Amending Act. Section 59 (1) (as amended) and in so far as relevant provides that the operation of the Adhiniyam in respect of the development area shall remain suspended : "Except in relation to those housing or improvement Scheme which have either been notified under Section 32 of Uttar Pradesh Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1956, before the declaration of the area comprised therein as development area are which having been notified under Section 28 of the said Adhiniyam before the said declarations are thereafter approved by the State Government for continuance under the said Adhiniyam or which are initiated after such declaration with the approval of the State Government hereinafter in this section referred to as Special Avas Parishad Scheme." 54. The declaration of development area is made under Section 3 of the 1973 Act by the notification of the State Government. This Act came into force on June 12, 1973. It is not in dispute that the Varanasi area was declared development area with effect from August 20, 1974 when the notification under Section 3 of that Act dated August 19. This Act came into force on June 12, 1973. It is not in dispute that the Varanasi area was declared development area with effect from August 20, 1974 when the notification under Section 3 of that Act dated August 19. 1974 was published in the Official Gazette. The notice under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam had been published on April 8, 15 and 22, 1972. This, therefore, was prior to this area being declared as development area The notification of the State Government granting Sanction to the Scheme under Section 32 (1) of the Adhiniyam is dated 2nd September, 1980 and was published on September 20. 1980. There was approval accorded by the State Government on August 6, 1980 to the Scheme being continued as is contemplated under Section 59 (1) of the 1973 Act vide Annexure CA - 9. Viewed in the light of these undisputed facts, the enforcement of this scheme is clearly covered under the exception provided for in Section 59 (1) (extracted above) The Scheme had been notified under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam before the declaration of this area as 'Development Area' under Section 3 of the 1973 Act, subsequent to the area being declared 'Development Area' the Scheme was approved by the State Government for continuance on 6th of August, 1980 and hence this does not remain suspended any longer. The notification made under Section 32 dated 2N.S.ptember, 1980, as published on 20th of September 1980, validly enforces the scheme in question. 55. In so far as Writ Petition Nos. 4776 of 1984 and 4775 of 1984 concerning development area in the city of Kanpur are concerned, they stand on a different footing. The Scheme therein was notified under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam on March 8, 15 and 20, 1980. The area was declared 'Development Area' under Section 3 of the U.P. Urban Planning and Development Act, 1973, published on August 20, 19.74. The sanction of the State Government to the scheme came to be notified under Section 32 (I) of the Adhiniyam on August 28, 1982. This mean clearly that in these cases there had been no notification under Section 32 of the Adhiniyam before the declaration of the area as 'Development Area". Nor had there been notification under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam for that matter prior to August, 1974, when the area was declared Development Area'. This mean clearly that in these cases there had been no notification under Section 32 of the Adhiniyam before the declaration of the area as 'Development Area". Nor had there been notification under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam for that matter prior to August, 1974, when the area was declared Development Area'. The first part of the exception to Section 59 (1) is consequently not attracted. The second part too may not be held to apply for the reason that the Scheme cannot be claimed to have been 'initiated' after the area was declared Development Area with the approval of the State Government. The approval of the State Government relied upon by the Board came only on June II, 1982. It was argued on behalf of respondents that the word 'initiated' appearing in Section 59 (I) be interpreted to cover also 'concluded'. In other words, the submission made is that even though the Scheme is not one initiated with the approval of the State Government after August 20,1974, when the area was declared 'Development Area', this be held to be covered under the exception since the approval of the State Government was given on 11th June, 1982, before the scheme became final in the form of notification under Section 32 (1) of the Adhiniyam dated 28th August. 1982. We are not persuaded to agree to this submission. The word 'initiated' in the context cannot be construed to include 'concluded'. The word 'initiated' is defined in the Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed.) at page 7u5 to mean: "commence, start, originate, introduce inchoate". The initiation is to set afoot ; the ball sets rolling but there is a long way to go and Several hurdles to be crossed and Steps taken before the journey comes to an end. The essential condition for this part of the exception to apply is that the Scheme should have commenced or have started with the State Government's approval given subsequent to the area being declared 'Development Area'. Where this is not the case, the Scheme framed under the Adhiniyam has to remain suspended and the power to develop the area might in that event be exercised by the Development Authority in accordance with the provisions of the 1973 Act. In these two cases consequently the Scheme notified under Section 32 (1) cannot be given effect to in regard to the land involved in dispute. 56. In these two cases consequently the Scheme notified under Section 32 (1) cannot be given effect to in regard to the land involved in dispute. 56. The discussion made above concerning the Tulsipur Grihasthan Yojana, Varanasi, governs equally the Writ Petition No. 11568 of 1983 and Writ Petition No. 12251 of 1933 relating to this same housing and land improvement Scheme. The additional point raised in Writ Petition No. 12251 of 1983 by the learned counsel is the it though the petitioners are co-sharers in the land, the notice under Section 29 of the Adhiniyam was served only upon one of them, namely, Ramadhar. On this ground it is claimed that the notice be taken as ineffective. It cannot be ignored that the notice issued was in the name of the co-sharers and Ramadhar accepted this not for himself alone but for the co-sharers who are his brothers vide Annexure CA. II. Not only this there was objection filed before the Niyojan Samiti on June 1, 1972 signed by Ramadhar expressed as being on behalf of the co-sharers also. The petitioners were thus adequately represented through one of them and no exception may be taken on this account. Writ Petition No. 1175 of 1977 57. The Scheme was notified under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam in this case on May 9, 16, 23, 1970. Subsequent to notice issued under Section 29, the Niyojan Samiti gave the hearing on 4th of January, 1973. The recommendation of the Samiti was approved by the Board followed with the notification of the State Government under Section 32 (l) dated 3rd June, 1976 and published on the following day in the Gazette. The area in Meerut in this case was declared 'Development Area' under Section 3 of the 1973 Act by notification dated 10th June, 1976, which means that in this case too the scheme had been notified prior to the declaration of the area as the Development Area. Subsequent to June 10, 1976, there was approval accorded by the State Government to the continuance of the Scheme and hence this scheme is covered too under the purview of the exception incorporated in Section 59 (1) of the 1973 Act in the same manner as in the case relating to the land in dispute in Varanasi city area covered under the Writ Petitions No. 3886 of 1984 and others of this group. 58. 58. An additional argument raised in this Writ Petition No. 1175 of 1977 is that in the Master Plan the land in question has been shown as falling under the 'Green Belt' recreation area and hence this could not be acquired by the Board. For the Board, it has been made clear that in terms of the scheme the acquisition is intended to carve out the area as a part/road and hence there arises no conflict as against the Master Plan and no invalidity may, therefore, be said to arise on this account. There is no other point raised in this writ petition which has to fail for reasons discussed above. Writ Petition No. 10776 of 1982 Writ Petition No. 13155 of 1982 Writ Petition No. 10880 of 1982 Writ Petition No. 13669 of 1982 Writ Petition No. 14366 of 1982 Writ Petition No. 12989 of 1984 59. The petitioners in this group of petitions are the Co-operative Housing Societies registered under the Co-operative Societies Act. In the Government order dated July 27, 1967 addressed to the Administrators of the Nagar Maha-palikas/Improvement Trust, it was provided that such Co-operative Societies were not to be treated on the same footing as the private colonisers. The Societies had acquired land and they also intended to develop the area in a planned manner. The plots had thereafter been allotted by them to the respective members on no profit or loss basis. The Government had themselves made acquisition of land for their sake. The decision taken, therefore, was that in case such societies fulfill certain conditions the land held by them be not acquired by the local authorities. The conditions enumerated were :- (1) the Co-operative Housing Society be a registered body and in existence and Should have acquired the land prior to the commencement of the acquisition proceedings by the Nagar Mahapalika/Improvement Trust; (2) the Society be prepared to get its area developed by the Improvement Trust/Nagar Manapalikas, on payment of development charges in advance ; (3) the Society be such as owns a compact area and making allotment of plots after development on no profit or loss basis; (4) the Society be prepared to execute agreement and deposit reasonable security to ensure full and proper development in the area; (5) the Society be financially sound. 60. 60. These directions were reiterated by the State Government in the Government Order dated 9th April, 1980 which is addressed also to the Board. Therein to the policy indicated is that of granting exemption from acquisition in regard to the Co-operative Societies upon the conditions enumerated as above being fulfilled. An additional condition therein is that the Society shall have previous consultation with the U.P. Co-operative Housing Federation Ltd. before proceeding to raise construction or develope the land. As a follow up measure the Housing Commissioner wrote to the Assistant Housing Commissioners on July 8, 1980 for compliance along these lines. 61. On March 13, 1985 after hearing the learned counsel on both sides we made an interim order to the effect that within one month these petitioners might represent their case to the Board and produce the relevant material whereupon the decision by the Board may be arrived at in three weeks thereafter. It appears the Board recorded its decision on June 1, 1985 which is in regard to the Writ Petitions Nos. 10776 of 1982 and 13155 of 1982 only. In regard to the four other writ petitions in this group, the learned Standing Counsel for the Board urged that they did not submit their representations to the Board directly within the time specified, file representations were handed over, it appears, to the Superintending Engineer at Kanpur and in the letter given by them the Societies intimated that they would be prepared to bear reasonable costs for the development on mutual agreement arrived at on reasonable basis. This has been taken exception to for the Board. The argument advanced is that this does not amount to unequivocal acceptance on their part of the relevant conditions in this behalf. It is not disputed that all these Societies fulfill the conditions Nos. 1, 3 and 6. It further appears that at no point of time was a draft agreement made available to any of these petitioners from the side of the Board nor was it precisely indicated as to what may be the amount of costs required to be paid or deposited by them. In their supplementary affidavits the petitioners have reiterated their unqualified willingness to abide by the condition enumerated above. We feel that there is nothing contained in the letter from these petitioners which may reflect a grievance on their part from the conditions laid down. In their supplementary affidavits the petitioners have reiterated their unqualified willingness to abide by the condition enumerated above. We feel that there is nothing contained in the letter from these petitioners which may reflect a grievance on their part from the conditions laid down. Our attention has been drawn also to the recital contained in the order made on June 1, 1985 by the Board that in the event of these Societies being prepared to fulfil the required conditions, their case for exemption may still be reconsidered. That would be in keeping indeed with the letter and of the Government policy as indicated in the Government Orders dated July 27, 1967/9th April, 1980. Accordingly in our opinion these petitioners would deserve to be allowed as to enable the Board to reconsider the petitioner's case for exemption subject to the latter agreeing unequivocally within specified period to abide by the conditions contained in the Government order dated April 9, 1980. This would ensure implementation of the State policy in this direction instead of letting it be set at naughty bare technicality despite a genuine desire on both sides to arrive at an agreed settlement. Writ Petition No. 15440 of 1983 Writ Petition No. 6125 of 1980 Writ Petition No. 15780 of 1983 Writ Petition No. 15781 of 1983 Writ Petition No. 15564 of 1983 62. For this group the question involved principally is of the application of Section 82/83 read with Section 35 of the Adhiniyam, Taking up first the Writ Petition Nos. 15780 of 1983 and 15781 of 1983 the petitioners made purchase admittedly of the land in question m two distinct parts from one R. S. Awasthi by registered deeds of sale dated May 21, 1983 for consideration. The vendor had made purchase of the property from one Chhotey Lal Mali under registered deed dated October 30, 1965. R. S. Awasthi was mutated in the municipal record the land being Situated within the municipal limits of Kanpur. This was by resolution of the Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur, dated 15th May, 1968. The assessment extracts for the period 1968-83 placed on record consistently bear this out. The notice under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam was first published on March 8, 1980. This was by resolution of the Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur, dated 15th May, 1968. The assessment extracts for the period 1968-83 placed on record consistently bear this out. The notice under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam was first published on March 8, 1980. Admittedly there was no notice given under Section 29 to R.S. Awasthi, the then recorded holder of this land in the Municipal record as contemplated under Rule 4 (1) cite Adhiniyam. The notification under Section 32 (i) of the State Government cane to be published on April 18, 1981. A nominee purporting to be under Section 83 of the Adhiniyam was given to the petitioners on 10th of November, 1983, laying that they had commenced raising unauthorised construction on this land with effect from 28th October, 1983. To this they protested in writing that was repelled and the notice for demolition was issued on December 14, 1933. 63. Under Section 82 of the Adhiniyam on which the respondents' counsel placed reliance the provision made is that the Housing Commissioner may by notice require the owner of a building referred to in Section 73 to stop further work on such building. If the notice is not complied with the Housing Commissioner may cause the building or any portion thereof to be altered or demolished as the case may be. Section 73 makes provision for penalty for buildings erected, re-erected or altered in confirmation of Section 35. Section 35, prohibits erection etc. of building on the land :n question during the period when a notice is published under Section 28 in respect of a housing or improvement Scheme and continued up to two years from the date of the commencement of the scheme. The commencement of the scheme takes place, according to Section 32 (5) from the date of the notification of the State Government, relating to the Scheme. To attract this provision, there fore. the respondents had to make out ti at the construction impugned came into being during March 8, 1980 to 17th April, 1983 the date when two years from the date of the commencement of the Scheme under Section 32 (5) expired. On the respondents' own showing as stated in the notice the construction was commenced on October 28, 1983 ; the petitioners have maintained on the other hand that the construction is much older and they acquired it as such upon purchase. On the respondents' own showing as stated in the notice the construction was commenced on October 28, 1983 ; the petitioners have maintained on the other hand that the construction is much older and they acquired it as such upon purchase. In support they have placed reliance on the assessment record in the Nagai Mahapalika right from 1968, the receipt for payment of Municipal taxes and the affidavit of Chhotey Lal Mali, the predecessor-in-interest, pointing that the instruction had been made by him and the recitals contained in the deed of sale dated 21-5-1983 as well bear this out. The theory set up by the respondents, therefore, that the construction is liable to demolition under Section 82/83 of the Adhiniyam is not borne out. The notice issued on 14th December, 1983 has in consequence to be quashed. 64. Taking up now with Petition No. 6125 of 1980 the case set up by the respondents is that subsequent to the notification under Section 32 (1) dated August 13, 1976, the petition e.s trespassed over the land on 2nd April, 1980 though possession had been acquired by the Board earlier on March 25, 1980. According to this theory, therefore, the construction over the land came into being, if any, after 2nd April, 1980. This, the petitioners' learned counsel rightly urged, is not made out from the record. The Commissioner, who submitted his report dated 29th April, 1980 to the Competent Officer, vide Annexure III to the writ petition after local inspection bears out that there existed a large number of houses on this track of the land and they were on the very face of considerable age. The petitioners have averred that the construction was raised during 1965 - 69 and there is large abadi in the area occupying those houses running into thousands. It is difficult to accept that these will have sprung up over night as the respondents seek to make out. The notification under Section 28 was made on May 9, 1970 and the notification under Section 32 (1) came to be made on August 13, 1976. There being no material to conclude that the construction may have been raised during the period covered under Section 35, there could be no demolition directed thereof in exercise of powers under Sections 82/83 of the Adhiniyam. There being no material to conclude that the construction may have been raised during the period covered under Section 35, there could be no demolition directed thereof in exercise of powers under Sections 82/83 of the Adhiniyam. The notice issued on this behalf vide Annexures 4 to 7 would, therefore, also deserves to be quashed. 65. As regards Writ Petition No. 13440 of 1983, the notice under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam was published for the first time on March 8, 1980. The notification under Section 32 (i) of the State Government was published on April 18, 1981. In the notice issued under Section 83 dated September 28, 1983, October 6, 1983, November 21, 1983 (vide Annexure 1 - B to the writ petition), it was stated that the construction had been raised unauthorisedly with effect from July 14, 1983. This evidently would come to the period beyond two years from April 18, 1981, when the scheme commenced under Section 32 (I). The petitioners have contended that the construction is old but that apart on the respondents' own showing the construction being not such as to fall within two years from the date when the scheme commenced, the period for the purpose of Section 35 (1), there could be no demolition thereof made in exercise of powers under Sections 82/83 relied for the respondents. 66. The petitioners in Writ Petition No. 15564 of 1984 made purchase of plot No. 176 in two distinct parts from one Asbarfi Lal by registered deeds of sale executed on January 10, 1975 for consideration. Their case is that there is boundary wall and a room each in those portions and they have been using the same for residential purpose: In the notice described under Section 83 of the Adhiniyam, dated 18th September, 1984, it was recited that the construction was commenced unauthorisedly on September 15, 1984. To this the petitioners protested, but it was repelled and on 12th October, 1984 and direction was issued to demolition. The petitioners contended that the construction was raised by there during 1976 - 77 with the permission obtained by the Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur. No Such permission by the local authority or a plan submitted for sanction is placed on the record The notice under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam had been published on 17th of February, 1973 which corresponds to 1380 falsi. No Such permission by the local authority or a plan submitted for sanction is placed on the record The notice under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam had been published on 17th of February, 1973 which corresponds to 1380 falsi. The Khasra of 1380 fasli vidt C.A. II reveals that the entire land was recorded as Banjar. Notices had been issued to Asharfi Lal and his brother, the persons recorded under Section 29, to which they objected, which was considered by the Niyojan Samiti. There was no question of the notice being given to the petitioners since they came in by purchase only on January 10, 1975. The argument on their side that plot No. 176 stands exempted from acquisition is only imaginary. The area and the boundaries given in the notice under Section 28 and also in the notification made under Section 32 (1) reveal that there is no Such exemption granted and it may not be overlooked that even for alteration or recreation there had to be permission obtained or wise the construction is liable to demolition falling, as it does, during the period of 17th February, 1973 (when the notice under Section 28 was published and September 19, 1982 the two years subsequent to the notification under Section 32 (I) published on September 20, 1980. This petition is, therefore, liable to fail 67. In the ground of the petitioners discussed below the short question raised is whether there was notice serve upon the persons concerned in conformity with Section 29 read with the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad (Form and Manner of Service of Notice) Rules, 1967, and it not its effect. In accordance with Section 28 of the Adhiniyam the Board has to publish notice of a housing or improvement Scheme. Within six weeks from the date on which the notice is published under this Section, the Board is required by Section 29 to serve a notice in the prescribed manner on such persons and in such manner as may be laid in the Rules stating that the Board process to acquire and Specified land or building for the execution of the scheme. The person on whom a notice under Section 29 has been served is given the right by Section 30 (2) to make objection within thirty days from the service of the notice. The person on whom a notice under Section 29 has been served is given the right by Section 30 (2) to make objection within thirty days from the service of the notice. The notice has to be served according to Rule 4 (2) on every tenure-hokler, whose name appears in the khatauni in respect of land or building proposed for acquisition. The mode of service Such notice is specified in Rule 6, which has been reproduced above already. The proforma of the notice is also given under the Rules. It is obvious that the service of notice in the manner laid down by the Rules is preliminary to the acquisition of jurisdiction to proceed in the matter of acquisition by or at the instance of the Board. We may now proceed to examine the difference cases within this category :- Writ Petition No. 5243 of 1981 68. Contention of the petitioner in this case is that he is the recorded tenure - holder, but there was no notice issued to him under Section 29 of the Adhiniyam. The petitioner is Thakur Prasad Pandey, the husband of Smt. Kalawati, who is the petitioner in Writ Petition No. 6842 of 1980 dealt with above. For the respondents it has been argued that notice was given to Basant Lal and he is the person shown in the revenue record. The notice under Section 28 was published on May 26,1979, corresponding to 1386-F. The extract of khatauni 1386-81-F (C-A-l-A, RA-III-RA-V) records Thakur Prasad Pandey under Ziman 9 with effect from 1377F over the plots in dispute. The name of Basant Lal appears in the column of tenant-in-chief. From the extracts of khasra 1387-F and 1389-F (CA-I/PA-IV) the possession over the land is shown to be of the petitioner. Basant Lal filed an application under Section 39 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act seeking that the entry in the name of the petitioner be expunged. This was rejected after contest by order of the Sub - Divisional Officer dated February 19, 1975 (vide RI). The suit filed by a Basant Lal thereafter under Sections 229B/209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act was also dismissed on merit on 4th August, 1982, (vide certified copy of the judgment, which is RA - I1). This was rejected after contest by order of the Sub - Divisional Officer dated February 19, 1975 (vide RI). The suit filed by a Basant Lal thereafter under Sections 229B/209 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act was also dismissed on merit on 4th August, 1982, (vide certified copy of the judgment, which is RA - I1). In face of these documents there can be no escape from the conclusion that the effective entry in the revenue record during the relevant period was that of the petitioner and, therefore, the notice had to issue to him, In the event oi the land being acquired the interest adversely affected would be of the petitioner. There was, however, no notice given to him in person or through his wife. The contention for the petitioner in this connection consequently holds goods and the petition is liable to be succeed. Writ Petition No. 4577 of 1982 69. Land in dispute in this case is held admittedly by a number of co-sharers. For the petitioners it has been argued that there was no notice served under Section 29 in any case upon the petitioners nos. I to 6 and 8 to 14 Luxmi Narain, Bal Govind Sanker, Ram Murti, Mahabir and Raghunath were, it is not in dispute, among the co-shares in this land. The petitioners have contended that these persons died long back nearly ten to twenty five years prior to the issue of notice. In support of this averment there is reliance placed by them on the entries contained in the extract ok khatauni 1386F - 9IF, which has been filed for tile respondents as Annexure CA-I. From the entires contained in this extract it is manifest that there was mutation directed in place of these deceased persons by order dated 5th February, 1979. There is specific mention as to the death of these co-tenure holders who were substituted by the petitioners now before us. The petitioners have also placed on record other evidence to substantiate the factum of the death of these tenure-holders. In face of all this, there could be No Service of notice upon them in or about June, 1979. There is specific mention as to the death of these co-tenure holders who were substituted by the petitioners now before us. The petitioners have also placed on record other evidence to substantiate the factum of the death of these tenure-holders. In face of all this, there could be No Service of notice upon them in or about June, 1979. The notices under Section 29 were not issued lo the legal representatives of these tenure - holders, i. e, petitioners mutated in their place, but instead to person who had died and even if those notices were accepted by someone Signing in the names of the deceased persons, that would not amount to due service of notices as contemplated by the Rules. The notice under Section 29 itself was published on May 26, 1979, corresponding to 1386 F and it is only thereafter that the notice under Section 29 could issue. In so far as the petitioners no. 7 and 15 are concerned their share in the disputed land is nominal being 1/9th and ?th respectively and this too is un-demarcated. For these reasons the acquisition in respect of the disputed land in this case, as at present, may not proceed. Writ Petition No. 4576 of 1982 70. Land under acquisition in this case is comprised in plots nos. 28/2, 35 and 36. In regard to plots nos. 35 and 36 the entry in the relevant khatauni 1386 F is in the name of the petitioner no. 2. There is no denial in the counter affidavit that notice was not issued to her. Plot No. 28/2 is recorded in the name of oN.S.t. Ganesha in the chief tenant's column and in column no. 5 the entry is of the petitioner no. 1. The notice given under Section 29 was to Smt. Ganesha according to the respondents and not to the petitioner no. 1. It appears the petitioner no. 1 filed declaratory suit under Section 229B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition & Land Reforms Act against Smt. Ganesha, which was decreed on March 30, 1981. The decree, no doubt, is of the period subsequent to the fixing of notice, but then the right is traced to the date of vesting under the U.P. Act 1 of 1951 and, thus, the absence of notice to the petitioner no. The decree, no doubt, is of the period subsequent to the fixing of notice, but then the right is traced to the date of vesting under the U.P. Act 1 of 1951 and, thus, the absence of notice to the petitioner no. 1 constitutes serious infirmity which goes to the root, it was also contended on petitioners' behalf that there was no personal hearing given by the Niyojan Samiti and that the report was not communicated to them. But even if these are discarded, for reasons discussed already, the absence of the basic requirement of notice to either of the petitioners itself is fatal. Writ Petition No. 13264 of 1981 71. The Board resolved to frame the scheme in question on July 10, 1972, which was published in the Gazette successively on August 17, 24, 31, 1972. This was followed by issue of notice under Section 29 to which objections were filed and also heard by the Niyojan Samiti on August 20, 1976. The objections are CA III/IV. The scheme was thereafter approved by the Board on 1.11.1976 followed by sanction accorded by the State Government, which was notified under Section 32 (1) of January 27, 1979. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners is unable to make out, on the material placed on the record that the notice was not served on the petitioners or that the acquisition for that matter suffers from any other infirmity. This petition has, therefore, to fail. Writ Petition No. 1258 of 1982 72. In paragraph 30 of this writ petition the averment guardedly made is that "no such notices" as mentioned under Sections 28 and 29 of the Adhiniyam had been given. There is no categorical averment denying the factum of service of notice. From the other side it has been pointed - out, as appearing from paragraph 22 of the counter affidavit, that notice was duly given and also served whereupon objections were filed by the petitioners in November, 1973 (vide CA III to VI). Personal hearing was given to the petitioners before the Niyojan Samiti disposed them of. In this petition too, therefore, the contention made during the course of arguments relating to want of notice cannot be sustained. Writ Petition No. 11558 of 1983 73. The scheme was published under Section 28 on April 8, 1972, which corresponds to 1379F. Personal hearing was given to the petitioners before the Niyojan Samiti disposed them of. In this petition too, therefore, the contention made during the course of arguments relating to want of notice cannot be sustained. Writ Petition No. 11558 of 1983 73. The scheme was published under Section 28 on April 8, 1972, which corresponds to 1379F. The notices under Section 29 are alleged to have issued on May 14, 1972 (corresponding to 1979). T1 e averment is that these were served on the recorded tenure - holder Purshottam through his grandson Jhagaroo Ram (vide para 8/18 of the counter affidavit). The petitioners nos. 1 to 4 are sons of Putshottam ; petitioner no 5 is Shiv Prasad while petitioners nos. 6 and 7 are sons of one Jagannath. According to the averments made in the counter affidavit itself there was neither service of notice upon petitioners nos. 1 to 4. 6 and 7 nor could any objection be filed by them. The alleged notice suffers from obvious infirmities. This was not addressed to the tenure - holder recorded in the relevant year 1379 F. There was no Service made upon Purshottam whose name appears in the khat uni of 1378F. There is no evidence whatsoever to the effect that he was not available and, therefore, notice had to be given to his grandson Jhagaroo Ram. It is also not alleged that the person to whom notice was given was adult. There was thus no Compliance to the requirement under Rules 4 and 6 aforementioned and in consequence this petition has to succeed. Writ Petition No. 13934 of 1983 74. According to the respondents the notice in this case under Section 29 was served on the petitioner by affixation. It has been said vaguely in the counter affidavit that it was in the presence of witnesses. For the petitioner, it was urged, not without force, that in terms of Rule 6 (1) affixation could not be resorted to without evidence that the petitioner was not found. The duplicate or counter - foil of the notice referring to endorsement of affixation no if any, is not filed either. There is no affidavit of the person who might claim to have made the affixation nor is any mention made of the witnesses allegedly present. We are also unaware when was the affixation made if at all. The duplicate or counter - foil of the notice referring to endorsement of affixation no if any, is not filed either. There is no affidavit of the person who might claim to have made the affixation nor is any mention made of the witnesses allegedly present. We are also unaware when was the affixation made if at all. The service of notice consequently remains unestablished. It is also not shown that there was appearance before the Niyojan Samiti by or on behalf of the petitioner through his representative. Writ Petition No. 6048 of 1981 75. Contention of the petitioner's Counsel in this case that service of notice was not effected is believed by the express averment made in para 8 of the writ petition, which says that the Board issued notice inviting objections from persons, who were going to be affected by the scheme in question and further that the petitioners filed objections to the notice. It is argued that in paragraph 7 of the counter affidavit it has not been stated that there was service made upon the petitioner no. 2 also. But that is rendered immaterial in view of what is admitted in the writ petition itself. The petition consequently fails. Writ Petition No. 13855 of 1983 76. Land under acquisition in this petition belonged to M/s Raja Bahadur Sugar Company (PI Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as the 'Company'). Under the U.P. Sugar Undertakings (Acquisition) Act, 1971, there was acquisition made including of the undertaking belonging to the company by the State Government. With effect from July 3. 1971, the undertaking vested in and Stood transferred to the U. P State Sugar Corporation Ltd., which is the petitioner before us. The Company challenged the vires of the Act in a writ petition filed in this Court. On July 5, 1971, by order of this Court the operation of Acquisition Act was stayed and further the Corporation was directed to return the undertaking to the owners during the pendency of the writ petition. The writ petition was dismissed later on May 3, 1979, and thereafter the Corporation acquired possession on November 2, 1979. 77. The notice under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam was published in this case on September 8, 15, 22, 1973, in the Gazette and also the newspapers. In the revenue extracts of the relevant period the tenure - holder recorded was the Company. 77. The notice under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam was published in this case on September 8, 15, 22, 1973, in the Gazette and also the newspapers. In the revenue extracts of the relevant period the tenure - holder recorded was the Company. Notice under Section 29 was issued to the Company and also served upon them. In response to this objection was filed by the Company which was represented before the Niyojan Samiti by its lawyer. The objection is dated 18th October, 1973 (vide CA - II). Personal hearing was accorded on 20th August, 1976. The Niyoian Samiti recommended release of plot no. 41/2, which had construction on it. The Board approved the recommendation on November 1, 1976, and the estimated cost of the scheme in this case being less than Rs. 20 lacs there was sanction accorded by the Board on June 25, 1977, which notified in the Gazette under Section 32( I) dated August 22, 1977. Possession was also obtained over the land by the acquiring body. 78. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the writ petition directed against the Acquisition Act, 1971, having been dismissed finally by this Court on May 3, 1979, the interim stay made on 5th July, 1971, got merged and lost Its efficacy. It is argued, therefore, that the notice under Section 29 had to be given to the Corporation because the undertaking vested in the petitioner with effect from July 3, 1971. The argument though attractive at its face is in reality fallacious. True, as stated above, the issue of notice under Section 29 is mandatory and also that under the law the interim order merged into the final decision ; but it may not be overlooked that in September, 1973, when notice under Section 29 of the Adhiniyam was issued the operation of the Acquisition Act stood stayed in pursuance of the interim stay granted by this Court on July 5, 1971, and the actual control and possession over the undertaking including the land in dispute passed over to the Company. It is the Company and not the petitioner, who was recorded in the relevant extract of revenue papers and objection too had been filed by the Company. To require of the Board to have issued notice to the Corporation none less would mean suggesting that it should have acted in violation of the stay granted by this Court. It is the Company and not the petitioner, who was recorded in the relevant extract of revenue papers and objection too had been filed by the Company. To require of the Board to have issued notice to the Corporation none less would mean suggesting that it should have acted in violation of the stay granted by this Court. For all practical purposes the Acquisition is to be taken as being out of the field at the relevant time when the notice had to issue. The Board proceeded in the light of the factual position as it existed at that time and this may not, in our opinion, be said to suffer from illegality. Writ Petition No. 10142 of 1984 79. Land in question belongs to the petitioners. The stand taken in the writ petition specifically is that there was no notice served on any of the two petitioners The reply in para 11 of the counter affidavit was that the notice tendered to the petitioners had been refused. It was upto the respondents to have placed on record the relevant material in support of this averment. There is neither the notice nor the affidavit of the person who may have tendered the notice or of any witnesses to make this out. It is admitted that no objections came to be filed from the side of any of the petitioners. The petition has obviously to succeed, therefore, on this score. Writ Petition No. 13822 of 1983 80. Land under acquisition in this petition vests in a deity. One Munti Lal executed a registered waqf dated 10th July, 1952, in favour of the deity (vide Annexure to the writ petition). The petitioner no. 2 (son of Muni Lal deceased) is the managing trustee. In this case too it has been contended for the petitioners that there was no notice served under Section 29 of the Adhiniyam. There is nothing placed on the record to substantiate the alleged giving of notice to the petitioners. Reference is made for which reasons to the objections which is Annexure IV to the writ petition. It is neither shown that a notice required under this provision was served on the petitioner, nor is it indicated that there came to be any objection filed as contemplated under Section 30(2) subsequent to service of notice required by Section 29. The basic requirement consequently remains unfulfilled. It is neither shown that a notice required under this provision was served on the petitioner, nor is it indicated that there came to be any objection filed as contemplated under Section 30(2) subsequent to service of notice required by Section 29. The basic requirement consequently remains unfulfilled. Writ Petition No. 9402 of 1984 81. The contention of the petitioner's learned counsel in this case to the effect that there was no service of notice issued under Section 29 of the Adhiniyam is not borne out from the record. From the averments in the counter affidavit it would appear that the notice was served on Baij Nath, the husband of the petitioner and an objection in writing in respect thereto was also filed on July 14, 1979, (vide Annexure CA-I/CA-II). The petitioner's husband appeared before the Niyojan Samiti on October 30, 1979, and was given a hearing. Writ Petition No. 7456 of 1983 82. Suffice it may to say in this petition that the sole contention of the petitioner's counsel regarding Service of notice is that the same was served upon the petitioners grandfather and this covered under Rule 6 the reason being that the petitioners were minors at the relevant time. There was objection also filed on behalf of the petitioner before the Niyojan Samiti under Section 29 which was duly taken into consideration. Writ Petition No. 6494 of 1984 83. For the petitioners the contention raised by the learned counsel is that there has been Service of the notice under Section 29 of the Adhiniyam effected and consequently no objection came to be filed by any of them before the Niyojan Samiti. We find Substance in this contention. In this contention in paragraph 3 of the counter affidavit it is admitted that the land in question was recorded in the name of the petitioners when the notification under Section 28 was published. The averment made in paragraph 5 of the counter affidavit is that the notices issued under section 29 were served on the grandson of the petitioner No. 1 on June 2, 197). In view of Rule 6 read with Section 29 of the Adhiniyam this may not avail in the complete absence of averment to the effect that the petitioners were not available and that the recipient was major at the relevant time. In view of Rule 6 read with Section 29 of the Adhiniyam this may not avail in the complete absence of averment to the effect that the petitioners were not available and that the recipient was major at the relevant time. Nothing of the kind has been stated for the respondents upon whom lay the burden to prove that the notice was duly served. The fact that no objection came to be filed despite the petitioners being recorded in the revenue papers is, an additional circumstance in support of their contention that the notice was not received by them. Writ Petition No. 5881 of 1984 84. Criticism made by the petitioner's learned counsel is that the service of notice issued under Section 29 of the Adhiniyam was made only upon three out of them and not the rest. This appears to over look that as stated in paras 2 and 7 of the Writ petition the plots in question were held by the petitioners jointly. The service upon some of them could, therefore, be taken as service on the other joint tenure holders. Moreover, in paragraph 9 of the writ petition, it is admitted that the petitioners appeared before the Niyojan Samiti and filed objections on September 6, 1980. Paras 26 and 27 also state that the petitioners were given the opportunity of hearing before Samiti following the issue of notice under Section 29 when there was extension made of the scheme. The proceedings consequently cannot be claimed to suffer in the instant case on the ground of notice. Writ Petition No. 9194 of 1984 85. Learned counsel for the petitioners urged in this case that the acquisition made by the Board is vitiated because there was no consultation made with the Avas Samiti. Section 10(1) of the Adhniyam provides that the State Government may for any unit constitute a local Advisory Committee to be called Avas Samiti the constitution thereof is to be such as is prescribed. According to subsection (3) the Board has to consult Avas Samiti on such matters as may be prescribed and may also consult it on any other matter. Rule 9 of the L.P. Avas and Bhumi Vikas Parishad (Constitution of Avas Samities) Rules, 1967 specifies the matters on which the Avas Samiti is to be consulted. According to subsection (3) the Board has to consult Avas Samiti on such matters as may be prescribed and may also consult it on any other matter. Rule 9 of the L.P. Avas and Bhumi Vikas Parishad (Constitution of Avas Samities) Rules, 1967 specifies the matters on which the Avas Samiti is to be consulted. But the snag in this submission of the learned counsel is that it is not obligatory upon the State Government to constitute an Avas Samiti. The obligation cast is only to take the Samiti into confidence on matters prescribed provided that there is such Samiti brought into being. That depends upon the exercise of sound administrative discretion by the State Government taking the relevant factors of a particular area into consideration. From the petitioners side there is nothing to suggest that the State Government has not acted bona fide or on relevant considerations in not constituting Avas Samiti for the area we are concerned with. The other argument for the petitioners in regard to the want of notice under Section 29 of the Adhiniyam is also devoid of merit/the reason being that the notice was served personally and not only objection was filed there to, there was appearance personally put in before the Niyojan Samiti on May 4, 1980 in support thereof. Writ Petition No. 6900 of 1984 Writ Petition No. 6901 of 1984 Writ Petition No. 6897 of 1984 86. Dispute does not exist in these cases on the point that notice was issued and also served on the petitioners. The argument is that the notice is defective since this refers to betterment fee also. A perusal of the notice on record in each of these cases reveals that was following the notification made under Section 28 proposing the scheme and that in substance the notice refers to acquisition proposed of the land covered within the boundaries given therein. No question arises for declaring betterment fee in respect of the land which is coveren under acquisition and proposed to be taken over as is manifest from Section 50 of the Adhiniyam. A reference, therefore, to betterment fee in the notice is rendered of no consequence when in effect the notice is for acquisition proposed of the land. Writ Petition No. 12469 of 1983 87. A reference, therefore, to betterment fee in the notice is rendered of no consequence when in effect the notice is for acquisition proposed of the land. Writ Petition No. 12469 of 1983 87. The petitioner is a partnership firm operating as colonisers under the name and Style of M/s Krishna Grih Nirman Yojana, Kanpur. The Kanpur Bhumi Vikas Evam Grihasthan Yojana No. 2 a - framed by the Board and the notice under Section 23 of the Adhiniyam published on March 10, 1970, and in the successive weeks. It is not in dispute that nonce under Section 29 was served individually and that petitioners also filed objections dated February 24,1973/ January 16, 1980. There was appearance put in before the Niyojan Samiti by the petitioner through their representative ; the Board accorded approval to the recommendation of the Samiti on March 28, 198c. The notification under Section 32 (1) of the Adhiniyam dated September 2, 1980, was published in the Gazotte on September 20, 1980. 88. For the petitioner the submission made n that the decision taken by the authorities to proceed with the acquisition in respect of the land held by them is irrational and arbitrary. The petitioner is registered partnership firm operating as Private Colonisers from about 1969. The Controlling Authority under the U.P. (Regulation of Building Operations) Act, 1958, gave permission to the petitioner far back on April 8, 1970, to develop the colony. The lay out plan drawn by the petitioner was sanctioned by the Nagar Mahapalika, Kanpur, on June 4, 1973. On June 28, 1973, the Nagar Mahapalika resolved to permit them to carry on the construction on deposit of the requisite development charges. The matter also came up before the State Government in connection with the exemption applied for by the petitioner under Section 20 of the Urban Land (Chilling and Regulation) Act, 1976. Section 20 (1) (a) empowers the State Government to grant Such exemption if it is satisfied having regard to the location of such land, the purpose for which the land is being acquired or proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case require that it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do. The exemption was granted by the State Government in respect of the land to the petitioner on February 26, 1979. The exemption was granted by the State Government in respect of the land to the petitioner on February 26, 1979. This necessary shows by implication the satisfaction of the State Government as to the ingredients laid in Section 20(1) and we are at a loss in attempting to ascertain as 11 what could have possibly led the State Government in face thereof to give s notion later on to the Board's proposal for acquisition notified in the Gazette dated September 20, 1980. The sanction thus given is not reconcile with the exemption which the State Government had granted under the Ceiling Act. In the absence of any affidavit for on behalf of the State it remains undisclosed that there took place any change in the circumstances during this period or that the exemption granted under the Ceiling Act was vitiated due to fraud, misrepresentation or anything of that kind. The petitioner has also specified that there has been allocation made to a large number of persons of different parcels of land from time to time and the construction to the extent of nearly 60 per cent, has been raised already in-voling huge investment both by the petitioner and those to whom the land has been allotted. These averments of fact also remain un-controverted in the court counter affidavit which the Board of loose to file in this case. We are not satisfied from the material placed before us that these various factors were taken into consideration before the recommendation to acquire the land was made by the Board of the State Government gave sanction the proposal. 89. There was dispute raised on behalf of the Board to the locus standi of this petitioner. This in our opinion is untenable. The petitioner is evidently interested in retaining the land and the acquisition affects them adversely. There is no conflict of interest between the petitioner on the one hand and the tenure/ holders to whom the land has been allocated on the other. The petitioner also holds power of attorney on their behalf and permission was as well given to them to appear before the Niyojan Samiti through their representative. The Board and the State Government must, therefore, reconsider in the light of these observations in case acquisition of the petitioner's land is still to be proceeded with. Writ Petition No. 9490 of 1984 90. The Board and the State Government must, therefore, reconsider in the light of these observations in case acquisition of the petitioner's land is still to be proceeded with. Writ Petition No. 9490 of 1984 90. Acquisition in dispute in this petition is of 00.40 acre out of the plot No. 69 in village Harpur district Ballia, the total area there of is 00.58 acre. Upon survey by the Niyojan Samiti construction was found existing over 16.20 X 9.20 X 149.04 square meters only. There has been release made out of this plot in respect of area covering 149.24 square meters only In the map drawn by the Niyojan Samiti and appended to their report the portion released is specifically denoted also. No other construction was found at the place and the petitioners were unable to establish before the authorities that there was any other construction existing either. In so far as the plot No. 50/1 (00.74 acre) is concerned, the petitioners contend that they have their cold storage on it but this entire plot admitted stands released from acquisition in their favour already. The grievance of the petitioners in this petition is thus unfounded. Writ Petition No. 9491 of 1984 91. Contention for the petitioner is that there is construction on plot No. 141/53/1 (00.21 acre) situate in village Harpur district Ballia and hence this ought to have been released. In the counter affidavit the plea taken was that this is agricultural plot with only a small tin shed standing The resolution of the Board framing the scheme governing this case was passed on December 10,1979, followed by publication of notice under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam in March, 1980. The notice under Section 29 was given thereafter. In paragraph 4 of the rejoinder affidavit the petitioner significantly staled that he got the plan for construction sanctioned by the local authority in the year 1980 and that the construction w as made when the plan been sanctioned the plan filed by him shows that this was sanctioned on February 23, 1980. This mentions on his own showing that the construction, if any, came to be raised after the publication of the notice under Section 28 and as per Section 25 of the Adhinyam this is unauthorised. The inspection made by the members of the Nyojan Samiti revealed that there was boundary wall alone existing in or about September 1983. This mentions on his own showing that the construction, if any, came to be raised after the publication of the notice under Section 28 and as per Section 25 of the Adhinyam this is unauthorised. The inspection made by the members of the Nyojan Samiti revealed that there was boundary wall alone existing in or about September 1983. The theory put forward by the petitioner, therefore, fall on this account as well. Writ Petition No. 7852 of 1980 92. Dispute raised before us in this petition centres round plot No. 57 of village Baroda a district Mirzapur sought to be acquired under the Domrault Bhumi Vikas and Grihasthan Yojana. The total area of this plot is 00.18 biswas. Notice under Section 28 of the Adhiniyam was published on May 26, 1979. The service of notice under Section 29 took place on June 16, 1979. For the petitioners Sri Kailash Nath Tripathi contends that the service being on one Gulab Chandra Verma who is a stranger, this can be of no avail. For that he referred to paragraph 8 of the counter affidavit A scrutiny into the record including the supplementary counter-affidavits filed for the Board has revealed that this averment in paragraph 8 of the original counter affidavit was made under some mis-apprehension. We were shown the duplicate of the notice issued in original where in token of receipt of the notice, the signatures put in it by Gulab Chardra. The surname is not legibily written and is capable of being misread as 'Verma' instead of 'Pandey'. Gulab Chand Pandey is admittedly the son of Smt. Kalawati wife of Thakur Prasad Pandey. Any doubt on this score is removed further by the fact that the disband of the petitioner filed his objection in writing before the Niyojan Samiti dated 16th October, 1979. Personal hearing was given to him. The construction standing on plot No 57 has been expressly excluded by the Niyojan Samiti in their report. In tho second Supplementary counter affidavit it has been further made specific supported with the map drawn by the Samiti that the portion excluded covers. X012 acre and is denoted in the said map by the letters Ba Sa Da Ya. In face of the existing material we find little force in the convention of Sri Tripathi that there has been no application of mind to the issue. 93. X012 acre and is denoted in the said map by the letters Ba Sa Da Ya. In face of the existing material we find little force in the convention of Sri Tripathi that there has been no application of mind to the issue. 93. In the petitioner other that those dealt with above the learned counsel for the petitioners stated candidly and rightly too that over and above the points raised by Sri Jagdish Swarup in the course of this leading arguments which they adopt, there is nothing more to be added. A discussion on the points concerned raised by Sri Jagdish Swarup has been made above already. It is also stated in this connection that these are covered by the Full Bench decision in the Doctors Sahkari Girh Niraman Samiti Ltd., (supra) and the decision of the Division Bench in Smt Annpura Devi, (supra). The objections filed by these petitioners before the Niyojan Samiti were in substance to the effect that they were in possession for their use over the land Sought to be acquired and there might be alternative sites available. These were taken into consideration by the Niyojan Samiti and thereafter by the Board. In writ petition No. 10470 of 1984 where the petitioners asserted that there is construction standing on plot No. 46/5 (.4 acre) it was found upon survey that barring the foundation laid there was no other building raised. The entire material including the objections filed by the petitioners and the report of the Niyojan Samiti along with the map drawn by the authority and the recommendations ms of the Board were submitted thereafter to the State Government which accorded sanction. There is no merit consequently, so far as these after petitions are concerned. 94. Having regard to the discussion made above these writ petitions are dismissed except as under : (1) Writ petition Nos. 4776 of 1984 aid 4775 of 1984 are allowed and the notification made by the State Government under Section 32(l) of the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam 1965 is quashed in so far as that pertains to the land in dispute in these petitions. (2) Writ Petitions No. 15780 of 1988, 15781 of 1983, 6125 of 1980 and 15440 of 1983 are allowed and the notices issued to the petitioners under Sections 83/82 of the Adhiniyam area set aside. (3) Writ petition Nos. (2) Writ Petitions No. 15780 of 1988, 15781 of 1983, 6125 of 1980 and 15440 of 1983 are allowed and the notices issued to the petitioners under Sections 83/82 of the Adhiniyam area set aside. (3) Writ petition Nos. 5243 of 1981, 577 of 1982, 4576 of 1982, 11558 of 1983 13934 of 1983, 10142 of 1984, 13822 of 1983 and 6494 of 1984 are allowed The notification under Section 32 (1) of the Adhiniyam pertaining to the land in dispute in these petitions is set aside. If remains open to the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad to proceed in the matter afresh in these petitions according to law after issue of notice under Section 29 of the Adhiniyam to persons concerned. (4) Writ Petitions Nos. 10776 of 1982,13155 of 1982, 10880 of 1982, 13669 of 1982. 14366 of 1982 and 12989 of 1984 are allowed in part. Upon the petitioners representing to the Parishad within six weeks from this date undertaking to abide by the conditions contained in the Government orders dated July 27, 1967, April 9, 1980 and furnishing the relevant material required thereunder, the Parishad shall reconsider as expeditiously as possible whether the land covered under these petitions be acquired and proceed according to law. The notification under Section 32 (1) of the Adhiniyam concerning this land is set aside. (5) Writ Petition No. 12469 of 1982 is allowed in part. The notification made under section 32 (1) of the Adhiniyam in respect of the land covered thereunder is quashed. The Parishad and the State Government are directed to take into consideration in the light of the observations made in this judgment, the claim raised by the petitioners for exemption and proceed thereafter according to Law. 95. With the exception of these, all other writ petitions in this bunch are dismissed. The interim order of stay which are still subsisting in those petitions are hereby discharged. 96. In the circumstances of this case there shall be no order as to costs.