JUDGMENT D.N. Jha, J. - This petition has been filled by Prem Shanker and it was connected with Writ Petition No. 2344 of 1977 and Writ Petition No. 1151 of 1978. Since the facts of this petition are slightly in variance with the aforesaid two petitioners, it was heard separately and it being disposed by this separate judgment. 2. The facts giving rise to this petition are that petitioner is the owner of House No. 138/3 situate in Mohalla Begum Ward, Pratapgarh. This property was purchased in the year 1964. This bouse bad several portions. A portion of this house which it in dispute it in occupation of opposite party No. 3 Sri Jamuna Prasad The petitioner moved application under Section 21 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Prescribed Authority dismissed this application on 3rd December, 1973 vide Annexure 4. The appeal preferred by the petitioner was also dismissed on July 9, 1977 by the learned IInd Additional District Judge, Pratapgarh. This order was challenged by the petitioner through Writ Petition No. 2245 of 1977 which was beard and decided by Hon'ble K.N. Goyal, J. as he then was. This petition was allowed on September 25, 1978 and the case was remanded to the appellate authority to restore the appeal and consider the question of bona fide need also. Copy of this judgment is Annexure 6 to this petition. The learned IVth Additional District Judge after hearing the parties again dismissed the appeal vide order dated April 18, 1980 contained in Annexure 10. The petitioner feeling aggrieved by the said order is before this Court by means of this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. The petition has been resisted on behalf of Sri Jamuna Prasad opposite party No. 3 and a counter-affidavit has also been filed. It is asserted that the order impugned in this petition is legal, just and proper and calls for no interference by this Court in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the lengthy order passed by the learned Additional District Judge. It is asserted that the order impugned in this petition is legal, just and proper and calls for no interference by this Court in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the lengthy order passed by the learned Additional District Judge. The short question canvassed by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the learned lower appellate court merely concentrated on the genuine need of the petitioner but made no comparative assessment as envisaged by the proviso to Section 21 of the Act. The relevant proviso - relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner reads as under : - "Provided also that the prescribed authority shall, except in cases provided for in the Explanation, take into account the likely hardship, to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application and for that purpose shall have regard to such facts as may be prescribed" 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that the lower appellate court erred in observing that since the need of the petitioner was not genuine it was Dot necessary to make any comparative assessment between the claim of the landlord and the tenant. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondents vehemently urged that the primary consideration before the court was the genuine Deed of the landlord and if the appellate court was of the view that there was some substance with respect to the need of the petitioner only then it was incumbent for him to make the comparative assessment. He, therefore, urged that since at length the learned lower appellate court has considered the genuine need of the petitioner and after having recorded a finding that the need of the petitioner was Dot genuine, he committed no error in law by not making the comparative assessment. Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on a case of this Court Babu v. IInd Additional District Judge, Pilibhit and Others, 1978 Alld Rent Cases 186. In this case Justice M.P. Saxena as he then was in Paragraph 8 has observed that under Section 21 of the new Act the prescribed authority and the appellate court are required to dispose of two important matters. In this case Justice M.P. Saxena as he then was in Paragraph 8 has observed that under Section 21 of the new Act the prescribed authority and the appellate court are required to dispose of two important matters. Firstly, about bona fide need of the landlord and secondly whether rejection of the application will cause greater hardship to the landlord than is likely to be caused to the tenant if the application is allowed. The learned Judge held that since in the case the Additional District Judge has given a clear finding on the first point but he has erred in not comparing the relative hardship of the landlord and the tenant, the learned Judge committed an error. The little comparison was not acceptable to the learned Judge. It may be mentioned that the learned Judge has not placed any decision of this Court or the Supreme Court and he has also not mentioned any reasons for formulating the two propositions to be considered in an application under Section 21 of the Act. 6. On the other hand learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the case Sharda Prasad v. Smt. Sampati Devi and Others, 1983 Alld LJ page 868. In this case the dispute that had arisen was to the effect that landlords had moved an application under Section 21 (1)(a) of the Act for release of the accommodation on the ground that the family had considerably increased on account of the death of one of the descendants and the accommodation in their possession on the first floor was not sufficient hence the ground floor was also necessary for their occupation. The application was resisted on the ground that the alleged need of the landlord was not bona fide and that they had other accommodation also at their disposal and in the event of any release order being passed in their favour the tenant would suffer greater hardship. The landlord filed writ petition in the High Court which was allowed on February 28, 1979. The main point which had been canvassed on behalf of the landlord in that petition was that during the pendency of the writ petition the tenant had purchased House No. 354 - Mohatshimganj, Allahabad and was residing in that house and the accommodation in dispute was actually lying vacant hence the landlords were entitled to release of the accommodation in dispute. On these allegations the writ petition filed earlier was allowed and the appellate court was directed to consider the appeal afresh in accordance with law and in the light of observations made in the judgment. The parties produced evidence, regarding purchase of house by tenant during the pendency of the writ petition. The appellate authority after considering the entire facts allowed, the landlords appeal and the tenant had gone up before the High Court again under Article 226 of the Constitution through a writ petition. 7. Two main points came up for consideration before the Court. Firstly that order did not contain any finding that the accommodation in question was bona fide required by the landlords. Secondly it was contended that the appellate authority actually applied explanation (i) to Section 21(1)(a) of the Act to the present case. The first contention was rot accepted. With respect to the other contention the court observed : - "In order to arrive at a correct interpretation it is necessary that the explanation proviso. It was suggested, that the explanation really provides an exception and, therefore, there was no necessity of any finding about the bona fide claim of the landlords being recorded. This argument is untenable. The explanation only dispenses with the requirement which is embodied in the proviso, namely, 'taking into account likely hardship of the tenant' as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application. Only this part of the procedure which enjoins a comparison of the respective needs of the landlord and tenant is dispensed with the explanation but its effect must be circumscribed within this limit. It cannot be projected farther so as to suspend the existence of the preliminary condition enshrined in the substantive part of Section 21(1) (a) which makes a consideration of the bona fide requirement of the landlord imperative. It cannot be projected farther so as to suspend the existence of the preliminary condition enshrined in the substantive part of Section 21(1) (a) which makes a consideration of the bona fide requirement of the landlord imperative. The fallacy in placing a different construction on the explanation arises from an omission to appreciate the distinction between substantive law and a mere rule of evidence." On giving my anxious consideration to both the aspects I am of the view that so far as the case falling within the category to explanation provided under Section 21 calls for no requirement for taking into account likely hardship of the tenant as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application, otherwise in all other cases the exercise of comparative assessment has to be undergone by the Prescribed Authority as well as the appellate court. In my opinion the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents in fact also helps the petitioner. In the instant case the landlord has not invoked the explanation provided under Section 21 of the Act but his plain and simple case is of requirement of the premises. In the circumstances, the appellate court fell into error by dealing with only one aspect of the matter, namely the genuine need of the landlord but failed to take into account the comparative assessment especially when it had been asserted on behalf of the landlord that the defendant-respondent had certain other shops at his disposal. I am unable, therefore, to subscribe to the view expressed by the lower appellate court. The order, therefore, falls short of the legal requirement and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 8. The petition is accordingly allowed. The order dated April 18, 1980 contained in Annexure 10 is, therefore, quashed. Let certiorari issue accordingly. I further direct that the learned IVth Additional District Judge, Pratapgarh will restore the appeal and will proceed to consider the evidence on the basis of comparative assessment that it to say be will take into account likely hardship of the landlord from the refusal of the application under Section 21 of the Act. I, however, make no order as to coats.