JUDGMENT S.C. Mathur, J. - Sri Nirbhay Narain has directed this petition against the order dated 25.8.83 (Annexure3) passed by the District Magistrate, Lucknow, whereby the premises in dispute have been derequisitioned under the provisions of U.P. (Temporary) Accommodation Requisition Act, 1947. The facts about which there is no dispute between the parties may be stated. 2. Smt. Chandrawati Seth, opposite party no. 3, is owner of House no. 13, situate at Ashok Marg, Lucknow. This house was requisitioned by the District Magistrate in March, 1954, under Section 3 of the aforesaid Act. Thereafter it appears that it was occupied by a nominee of the State Government. The said house was allowed to be occupied by the petitioner who at that time was holding the office of Minister of Agriculture and Parliamentary affairs. In pursuance of the order passed by the State Government the District Magistrate issued an order dated 7.7.81 (Annexure1) by which the petitioner was allowed to occupy the house in dispute. By the impugned order dated 28.5.83 the District Magistrate has derequisitioned the house and has directed the petitioner to deliver possession of the premises to opposite party no. 3 within 15 days of the receipt of the order. The petitioner has challenged this order on the following grounds : (1) The allotment of the house in favour of the petitioner had been made by the State Government and it was State Government alone which could cancel the allotment and, therefore, the impugned order passed by the District Magistrate is illegal. (2) Admittedly the petitioner was in occupation of the house in dispute and yet no opportunity of hearing was afforded to him; (3) The order of allotment has been passed on wrong appreciation of the factual position, and, (4) Opposite party no. 3 has got several houses in the city of Lucknow and, therefore, there was no occasion to derequisition the house in her favour. 3. The writ petition has been opposed by opposite party no. 3, the owner of the house, as well as on behalf of opposite parties nos. 1 and 2. 4. On behalf of opposite party no.3 counteraffidavit has been filed by Sri P.D. Seth who claims to hold Power of Attorney on her behalf. 5. On behalf of opposite parties nos. 1 and 2 counteraffidavit has been filed by Mahesh Chandra Saxena, Senior Supply Inspector, District Supply Office, Lucknow. 6. 1 and 2. 4. On behalf of opposite party no.3 counteraffidavit has been filed by Sri P.D. Seth who claims to hold Power of Attorney on her behalf. 5. On behalf of opposite parties nos. 1 and 2 counteraffidavit has been filed by Mahesh Chandra Saxena, Senior Supply Inspector, District Supply Office, Lucknow. 6. The petitioner's casethat the allotment order had been passed by the State Government and, therefore, only the State Government was competent to derequisition the property, is entirely misconceived. The power of requisition has been conferred under Section 3 of the aforementioned Act. This Section provides that where the District Magistrate is of opinion that any accommodation is needed or likely to be needed for any public purpose, not being a purpose of the Union, and that the accommodation should be requisitioned, the District Magistrate may pass the order of requisition. This power under the Act has been conferred upon the District Magistrate of the District in which the house is situate and not upon the State Government. The provision relating to derequisition is contained in Section 8 of the said Act. This Section provides that where any accommodation requisitioned under the Act is to be released from requisition, the District Magistrate shall release it in favour of the person from whom it was requisitioned. In view of these statutory provisions it is not possible to accept the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the order of derequisition can be passed only by the State Government, The reliance placed by the learned counsel upon the order dated 8. 1. 1981, Annexure no. 2, of the State Government is entirely misconceived. By the said order the accommodation in question was merely declared to be the official residence of the Minister of State for Agriculture and Parliamentary Affairs, Sri Nirbhai Narayan Singh. After this declaration had been made the petitioner was permitted use of the house by the District Magistrate, Lucknow through his order dated 771981, Annexure no. 1. 7. So far as the question of opportunity of hearing is concerned we are of the opinion that the petitioner cannot claim the same. The Act does not provide for any opportunity of hearing to be provided to the occupant of a requisitioned accommodation at the stage of derequisition. In fact at this stage the occupant does not come in the picture at all. The Act does not provide for any opportunity of hearing to be provided to the occupant of a requisitioned accommodation at the stage of derequisition. In fact at this stage the occupant does not come in the picture at all. It is only at the stage of requisition that he comes in the picture, as under the Second Proviso to Section 3 he is entitled to alternative accommodation. 8. The learned counsel has submitted that the District magistrate did not correctly appreciate the factual position when he stated in the order of derequisition that no public purpose was being served by allowing the petitioner to remain in occupation of the house after he ceased to be a Minister. According to the learned counsel the house had not been allotted to the petitioner in his capacity as State Minister but in his private or individual capacity. This submission is sought to be substantiated by pointing out that in the District Magistrate's order dated 771981 (Annexure No. 1) the Petitioner's name has been mentioned first and there after his designation has been given. The counsel submits that the designation has been given only to describe the person in whose favour the allotment has been made. We are unable to accept the submission. Under Section 3 of the Act an accommodation can be requisitioned only for public purpose. Public purpose may be served if the accommodation is allowed to be occupied by a person in his official capacity, but it cannot be served if an individual is allowed to occupy it in his private capacity. In fact a requisitioned premises cannot be allowed to be occupied by a private individual. It was for this reason that the allotment order made earlier in favour of petitioner's son was cancelled. 9. The petitioner's submission cannot be sustained for another reason. The order of the District Magistrate cannot be read in isolation. It has to be read along with the State Government's order dated 861981, reference to which has been specifically made in the order of the District Magistrate. In the order of the State Government the petitioner's name does not precede his designation but follows the same. The petitioner's plea is thus defeated by the force of his own argument. 10. The falsity of the petitioner's plea is exposed by the terms of the State Government's order dated 86 1981. In the order of the State Government the petitioner's name does not precede his designation but follows the same. The petitioner's plea is thus defeated by the force of his own argument. 10. The falsity of the petitioner's plea is exposed by the terms of the State Government's order dated 86 1981. By this order the accommodation was declared to be the official residence of the State Minister for Agriculture and Parliamentary Affairs under the provisions of Uttar Pradesh Mantri Aur Rajya Vidhan Mandal Adhikari Niwas Asthan Niyamawali, 1959. Rule 2 (ka) of these Rules defines the term''Sarkari Niwas Asthan to mean an accommodation reserved for the residence of a Minister, State Minister, Adhyaksh Vidhan Sabha or Sabhapati of Vidhan Parishad. It appears that these Rules were amended by the U.P. Ministers, Deputy Ministers, Parliamentary Secretaries and Legislature Officers' Residence (Amendment and Consequential Provisions) Rules, 1968, and the term Sarkari Niwas Asthan was replaced by the term Shaskiya Niwas and the definition was extended to include more persons like Parliamentary Secretaries, Deputy Ministers and others. Rule 3(1) provides that the State Government shall provide furnished rentfree Sarkari Niwas Asthan to, amongst others, each Minister and State Minister. From the reference made to this Niyamawali in the order of the State Government it is apparent that the Government, while passing the order, was discharging the legal obligation of providing an official residence to the petitioner who had become a Minister of State. Under this Niyamawali the petitioner could not obtain allotment of the house in his private or individual capacity. For the reasons herein above we reject the third ground of attack also. 11. The fourth ground is equally untenable. In para13 of the writ petition it has been stated that the opposite party No. 3 owns three or four houses of her own in the city of Lucknow. The allegation is vague inasmuch as the location of these houses has not been disclosed. However, in the counteraffidavit filed on behalf of the opposite party No. 3 it has been stated that she does own a cottage, but the same is not available to her, inasmuch as it is occupied by a Journalist. Since the cottage was not in vacant state it could not be said that the same was available to the opposite party No. 3 and, therefore, she could not press her claim for release. Since the cottage was not in vacant state it could not be said that the same was available to the opposite party No. 3 and, therefore, she could not press her claim for release. Apart from this, under Section 8 of the Act the District Magistrate has ample power to release an accommodation from requisition even when the owner has got several houses in his or her possession. The retention of an accommodation by the District Magistrate has to be for a public purpose. Once the public purpose has ceased, there would be no justification for the District Magistrate to retain possession of a requisitioned accommodation. In fact, under Section 8 the District Magistrate can release an accommodation from requisition even though the public purpose has not ceased. 12. The petitioner is a political leader. Such a person is expected to set up healthy precedents, because the citizens frame their behavior after the behavior of their leader. In the present case it is clear that the accommodation in dispute was allowed to be occupied by the petitioner in his capacity as State Minister, yet the petitioner, in order to gain the advantage of continuing to occupy the same even after he ceased to be State Minister, falsely stated in paragraph2 of the petition that the accommodation was not allotted to him in his capacity as State Minister but in his Capacity as a member of the Legislative Assembly. On his own showing the petitioner became a member of the Legislative Assembly in the year 1980. At that time hi was allotted an accommodation in Vidhayak Niwas. This is clear from Annexure No. 2 filed by the petitioner himself. It was only in the year 1981 when he became State Minister that the accommodation in question was allowed to be occupied by him. Neither in the Government order dated 861981 (Annexure No. 2) nor in the District Magistrate's order dated 771981 (Annexure No. 1) issued in pursuance thereof, the petitioner has been described as a member of the Legislative Assembly. Thus it is entirely false on his part to assert that the accommodation was allotted to him in his capacity as a member of the Legislative Assembly and not as a State Minister. Thus it is entirely false on his part to assert that the accommodation was allotted to him in his capacity as a member of the Legislative Assembly and not as a State Minister. Perhaps the petitioner was conscious of the false stand taken by him and he has, therefore, avoided to file his own affidavit and has allowed his son Sarvashakti Kumar Singh to take the false oath and file affidavit on his behalf. Rule 3 of the Uttar Pradesh Ministers, Deputy Ministers, Parliamentary Secretaries and Legislative Officers' Residence Rules, 1978 framed under Section 6 of the U.P. Ministers and Deputy Ministers (Salaries and Allowances) Act, 1952, subsection (1) of Section 8 of the U.P. State Legislature Officers' Salaries and Allowances) Act, 1952 and Section 12 of the U.P. State Legislature Officers, Ministers, Deputy Ministers, Parliamentary Secretaries and Members (Salaries and Allowances and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1956 prescribes that a person who had been provided with official residence may on his ceasing to hold the office, continue to occupy that residence for a period of fifteen days without payment of any rent, taxes or charges and may, by an order of allotment by the Rajya Sampatti Adhikari (Estate Officer) be permitted to continue to occupy the residence, with or without furnishings, for such further period as may be specified, on the terms and conditions mentioned in clauses (i) to (v). It is not the claim of the petitioner that he obtained any order of allotment from the Rajya Sampatti Adhikari. Therefore, his occupation after the expiry of fifteen days from the date on which he ceased to be State Minister was entirely unauthorised and yet he approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 13. Law a part, propriety demanded that the petitioner should have vacated the accommodation in dispute and gone back to the Vidhan Niwas meant to be occupied by members of the Legislature. If every ExMinister resorts to the method adopted by the petitioner, a great burden will be put on the public exchequer, apart from the difficulty which the incoming incumbents of public offices will have to face in getting an accommodation befitting their office. By filing the instant writ petition the petitioner has acted not only contrary to law but also against propriety. For these reasons he must pay compensatory costs to opposite party No. 3. 14. By filing the instant writ petition the petitioner has acted not only contrary to law but also against propriety. For these reasons he must pay compensatory costs to opposite party No. 3. 14. In view of the above the petition is dismissed with costs to the oppositeparties. The oppositeparties Nos. 1 and 2 will get one set of costs and the oppositeparty No. 3 shall get separate set of costs, her counsel's fee being taxed according to the certificate of fee filed, subject to a maximum of Rs. 500 (Rupees five hundred).