JUDGMENT B.D. Agarwal, J. - The Petitioner and the Respondent No. 2 is husband and wife having been married in 1970, On October 8, 1982 the Petitioner filed a petition in the court of the Civil Judge, Allahabad u/s 13, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, for divorce on various grounds. The petition is being resisted by the Respondent who applied on March 1, 1983 u/s 24 of the Act for maintenance pendentelile and expenses of proceedings. This was opposed by the Petitioner. On September 17, 1.984 the Respondent No. 1 directed the Petitioner to pay Rs. 500/- as expenses for litigation to the Respondent and Rs. 200/- per mensem for maintenance of the Respondent and one female child aged about 9 years placed Under the custody of the Respondent. An application lore review made against this order was rejected on January 18, 1985. Earlier, it appears, the Respondent had applied u/s 125 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for grant of maintenance that was rejected on December 21, 1981 with 'he observation that the Respondent appeared to be earning nearly Rs. 200-250/- per month by sewing and embroidery work and that the income of the husband was in the neighborhood of Rs. 200/- per month only. Revision filed against this order did not succeed; and application u/s 482 of the Code at the Respondent's instance is pending. Aggrieved against the order made by the court below upon application u/s 24 Hindu Marriage Act, the Petitioner has approached this Court. 2. Sri S.P. Srivastava learned Counsel for the Petitioner urged that in face of the order made u/s 125 of the Code dated 21st December, 1981, the Civil Court could not direct payment of interim maintenance to the Respondent. The trial court, it is argued, was in error in declining to look into the order passed in proceeding u/s 123 by the criminal court with the observation that the same is not relevant in these proceedings. Sri Radhey Shyam appears for the Respondent No. 2 has countered these contentions. With the consent of the counsel for the parties and since the affidavits have been exchanged already, the petition is being disposed of finally upon preliminary hearing. 3. Section 24, Hindu Marriage Act deals with maintenance pending in proceedings under this Act and expenses so such proceedings. Sri Radhey Shyam appears for the Respondent No. 2 has countered these contentions. With the consent of the counsel for the parties and since the affidavits have been exchanged already, the petition is being disposed of finally upon preliminary hearing. 3. Section 24, Hindu Marriage Act deals with maintenance pending in proceedings under this Act and expenses so such proceedings. This section enables the court on the application of either spouse to order that the expenses of the proceeding be paid to the applicant and likewise a monthly sum during the proceeding, having regard to the applicant's own income and the income of the Respondent. The object is to ensure that a party to a proceeding does not suffer during the pendency of the proceedings by- reason of property and such party may be either the Petitioner or the Respondent in the petition in which the application is made. The grant of maintenance pendentelile and expenses u/s 24 is discretionary with the court though such discretion has to be judicially exercised. The guiding principle would appear to be that if the applicant has no independent means he or she is entitled to maintenance and expenses, unless good cause is shown to deprive the applicant of it. The order exhausts itself with the conclusion of the main proceedings including the appeal filed if any. 4. The right to maintenance u/s 125 of the Code is independent of any proceeding for divorce or the like. Section 125 which corresponds to Section 488 of the old Code intends to serve a social purpose Jagir Kaur and Another Vs. Jaswant Singh, AIR 1963 SC 1521 . In Nanak Chand Vs. Chandra Kishore Aggarwal and Others, AIR 1970 SC 446 Sikari, J. pointed that the scope of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 and that of Section 488 was different and that Section 488 was applicable to all persons belonging to all religions and had no relationship with the personal law of the parties. The statutory right available to the wife u/s 125 of the Code is unaffected, it has been held, by the provisions of the personal law applicable to her. The constitutions Bench of the Supreme Court, enunciated this recently also in Mohd. The statutory right available to the wife u/s 125 of the Code is unaffected, it has been held, by the provisions of the personal law applicable to her. The constitutions Bench of the Supreme Court, enunciated this recently also in Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum 1985 AWC 557 : 1985 A CR 327 stating: Under Section 488 of the Code of 1898, the wife's right to maintenance depended upon the continuance of her married status. Therefore, that right could be defeated by the husband by divorcing her unilaterally as under the Muslim Personal Law, or by obtaining a decree of divorce against her in under the other systems of law. It was in order to remove this hardship that the joint committee recommended that the benefit of the provisions regarding maintenance should be extended to a divorced woman, so long as she has not remarried after the divorce. That is the genesis of Clause (b) or the Explanation to Section 125(1), which provides that 'wife' includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from her husband and has not remarried. Even in the absence of this provision, the courts had held under the Code of 1898 that the provisions regarding maintenance were independent of the personal law governing the parties. The induction of the definition of 'wife' so as to include a divorced woman lends even greater weight to that conclusion. 'Wife' means a wife as defined irrespective of the religion professed by her or by her husband. Therefore, a divorced Muslim woman, so long as she has not remarried, is a 'wife' for the purpose of Section 125. The statutory right available to her under that Section is unaffected by the provisions of the personal law applicable to her. 5. Mere divorce does not end the right to maintenance under this provision. The grant of maintenance there under is hedged in with certain conditions expressly enacted which need not here be reproduced. (Sections Sub-Section 4/5). Some of these may in appropriate case guide the discretion of the civil court in considering the application made u/s 24 of the Act. In proceedings u/s 125 of the Code maintenance is payable for the child also. There is then a ceiling placed at Rs. (Sections Sub-Section 4/5). Some of these may in appropriate case guide the discretion of the civil court in considering the application made u/s 24 of the Act. In proceedings u/s 125 of the Code maintenance is payable for the child also. There is then a ceiling placed at Rs. 500/-per month which has been interpreted to mean that the court cannot grant more than this amount to each one of the claimants, assessment on material placed before it in proceedings u/s 24 of the Act. 6. In Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal (supra) the argument for the Appellant was that a civil court's determination of the quantum was entitled to serious weight and the criminal court in its summary decision could not ignore the same. The Supreme Court laid down that as an abstract proposition it is valid to assert that a final determination of a civil right by a civil court must prevail against a like decision by criminal court but this principle could not be applied to the case on account of two distinguishing factors, namely, that the direction by the civil court u/s 24 is not a final determination under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act but an order pendentelile and, secondly this amount does not include the claim for maintenance of the child. It was further pointed that "barring marginal relevance" for the Magistrate the order u/s 24 does not bar his jurisdiction to award a higher maintenance. This, therefore, does not support the argument that the order made u/s 125 binds the civil court in proceedings u/s 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The order can be claimed to have marginal relevance no doubt and hence it was not correct approach of the court so to have declined to look into the order outright under the impression that the same was not relevant. 7. Counsel for the Petitioner next cited Smt. Gauri Devi Vs. Bishwanath Banerjee, AIR 1970 All 185 . In that case there was a suit in the civil court for declaration that the order passed by the Magistrate in proceedings u/s 488 of the old Code was void. 7. Counsel for the Petitioner next cited Smt. Gauri Devi Vs. Bishwanath Banerjee, AIR 1970 All 185 . In that case there was a suit in the civil court for declaration that the order passed by the Magistrate in proceedings u/s 488 of the old Code was void. It was held that the Civil Court ordinarily does not have jurisdiction to set aside an order duly and properly passed by a Magistrate u/s 488 but the position is different where the order is shown to have been obtained by fraud played against the court and the cause of action is founded on frivolous conduct of the party obtaining the order. This also does not assist the Petitioner to contend that the order made u/s 125 of the Code be taken to preclude the civil court from examining on its own merit of the application put forth for pendente lite maintenance. If the applicant had applied for maintenance under the code and has been refused that may be relevant consideration in deciding the application-- Mukan Kunwar Vs. Ajeetchand, AIR 1958 Raj 322 . In Mulla: Hindu Law 15th Edition we find it stated at page 871 that the mere fact that there is a pre-existing order for maintenance against the husband under the Code would not bar the court from making an order u/s 24 in exercise of its judicial discretion. The court below had in the circumstances to weigh the relevant material on record including the decision reached by the criminal court in proceeding u/s 125 and decide upon such consideration whether the case put forth is made out on the ingredients of Section 24 itself. 8. Another infirmity in the impugned order dated 17th September, K84 passed by the court below is that it labored under the impression that there is no denial from the side of the husband in regard to the averments made by the applicant concerning the resources or the income of the former. Under this impression the court below has not in fact entered into the appraisal of material relevant to the controversy. This is against the record. Under this impression the court below has not in fact entered into the appraisal of material relevant to the controversy. This is against the record. The applicant referred to the resources/income of the Petitioner in paragraph 6 of her affidavit filed in the court below vide Annexure III to the writ petition, to this there is denial in the counter affidavit filed by the Petitioners as appearing from paragraph 8 thereof vide Annexure V. The omission of the court below, therefore, to appraise the evidence on merit is unjustified. 9. Exception is also taken for the Petitioner to maintenance granted by the court below for the female child in the custody of the Respondent. This, it is true, is outside the purview of Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act. I would Captain Ramesh Chander Kaushal Vs. Mrs. Veena Kaushal and Others, AIR 1978 SC 1807 . No ceiling or provision for maintenance ofchildren is contained in Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The difference in the scope of the two provisions is, therefore, obvious; the common denominator being that in assessing the quantum of maintenance, the income of the husband would be relevant consideration in both cases and so also the earning made by the wife, if any, on her resources. I am unable for these reasons to accede to the contention for the Petitioner that the order passed u/s 125 of the Code is conclusive or that it precludes the civil court fro like to make it clear however, that in case the lower court finds that the Respondent has some earnings of her own, the expenses which she has reasonably to incur for the maintenance of the child shall have necessarily to be excluded. 10. In so for as the sum granted by way of expenses for litigation to the Respondent is concerned, that is covered fully u/s 24 of the Act and there is no dispute raised either. 11. For the reasons stated above, the petition succeeds in part and is allowed accordingly. The order passed by the Respondent No. 1 dated 17th September, 1984 and the order dated 18th January, 1985 are set aside in so far as these pertain to grant of pendentelile maintenance. 11. For the reasons stated above, the petition succeeds in part and is allowed accordingly. The order passed by the Respondent No. 1 dated 17th September, 1984 and the order dated 18th January, 1985 are set aside in so far as these pertain to grant of pendentelile maintenance. The trial court is directed to proceed in the matter afresh and decide the application made by the Respondent on merit expeditiously in accordance with law and in the light of the observations contained in this judgment. There will be no order as to costs.