ORDER D.N. Jha, J. - The facts giving rise to this petition filed by Ganesh Misra under Article 226 of the Constitution are that shop No. 14 situate at Hazratganj, Mahatma Gandhi Marg, P. S. Hazratganj, Lucknow, was in tenancy of M/s. K. T. Financers. Late Begum Zahida Khatoon was the landlady of the said shop. Her interest is now being represented by opposite parties 5 to 7 Zafar Ibrahim, Smt. Razia Mahmood and Smt. Zakia Khatoon. On the basis of a report submitted by the Inspector dated 19-9-1973 and after hearing, it was ordered on 29-11-73 that vacancy be notified. The vacancy was duly notified on 30-11-1973 and the allotment order in favour of the petitioner was passed on 3-12-1973 vide Annexure 3. It may be mentioned that there were two applicants for allotment viz. Raghunandan Nath Arora who had submitted his application on 31-8-1973 and Ganesh Misra who had submitted his application on 3-10-1973. Against this order revisions were preferred by Jitendra Singh, opposite party No. 4 and Raghunandan Nath Arora, opposite party No. 3. Both these revisions were decided by Sri P. N. Roy, the then Addl. District Judge, Lucknow vide order dated 27-5-1977. The learned Addl. District Judge was pleased to set aside the allotment order and the case was remanded to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer calling upon him to decide whether the premises in question had fallen vacant and in that connection he was to decide whether Jitendra Singh is the lawful occupant of the premises in question and this occupation stood regularised under S. 14 of the U. P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter called the Act) and if the authority was of the view that the premises in question had fallen vacant he would notify the vacancy and proceed to decide as to whom the shop in question be allotted. The petitioner, who was allottee of the premises has questioned this order through this petition. 2. The petition was admitted in August, 1977 and an interim order had also been passed. In the course of hearing the Official Liquidator, High Court, Allahabad, acting as Official Liquidator of M/s. K. T. Financiers Private Ltd., (in liquidation) moved an application for being impleaded in the said writ petition and was allowed to be arrayed as one of the opposite parties. 3. In the course of hearing the Official Liquidator, High Court, Allahabad, acting as Official Liquidator of M/s. K. T. Financiers Private Ltd., (in liquidation) moved an application for being impleaded in the said writ petition and was allowed to be arrayed as one of the opposite parties. 3. The petition has been resisted by the respondents, specially the Official Liquidator Sri Jitendra Singh, counter-affidavit and rejoinder affidavit have been exchanged between the parties. The Official Liquidator challenged the jurisdiction of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in making the allotment order. It is asserted that no jurisdiction could be assumed without prior permission of the High Court as M/s. K. T. Financiers Private Ltd., was in liquidation and an Official Liquidator had been appointed. The case put forth by Sri Jitendra Singh is that after the premises had been vacated by M/s. K. T. Financiers Private Ltd., (in liquidation) he entered into the tenancy of the said shop and there was contract of tenancy between him and the landlord Begum Zahida Khatoon. It was, therefore, asserted that in view of S. 14 of the Act his occupation stands regularised. The facts so far as they are inconsistent to his case have been denied and it is asserted that the order impugned in the writ petition is legal, just and proper and calls for no interference by this Court in exercise of Article 226 of the Constitution. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the averments and cross-averments made by the respective parties. The learned Addl. District Judge, Lucknow, while setting aside the order of allotment has emphasised primarily three points, namely, that the allotment order had been passed before the expiry of three days from the date of notification of the vacancy and thus the provision of rule 8(2) of the Rules framed under the Act had been violated. Secondly, Sri Jitendra Singh had not been issued notice of hearing so as to explain how he was in unauthorised occupation of the shop in dispute. Thirdly, that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had not followed the principle of `first come first served' as provided in clause (1) of rule 11 of the Rules i.e. he while making the allotment order ignored the claim of Raghunandan Nath Arora who had submitted his application earlier in point of time than Ganesh Misra. 5. Thirdly, that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer had not followed the principle of `first come first served' as provided in clause (1) of rule 11 of the Rules i.e. he while making the allotment order ignored the claim of Raghunandan Nath Arora who had submitted his application earlier in point of time than Ganesh Misra. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently urged that the learned Addl. District Judge had fallen into error by observing that R. 8(2) had been violated. He pointed out that the vacancy had been notified admittedly on 30-11-1973 and the allotment was made on 3-12-1973. He, therefore, urged that there was a gap of three clear days while making allotment in favour of the petitioner. I am unable to subscribe to this view. The relevant rule reads as under : "8(2). The inspection of the building, so far as possible, shall be made in the presence of the landlord and the tenant or any other occupant. The facts mentioned in the report should wherever practicable, be elicited from at least two respectable persons in locality and the conclusion of the inspection report shall be posted on the notice board of the office of the District Magistrate for the information of the general public, and an order of allotment may be passed not before the expiration of three days from the date of such posting, and if in the meantime any objection is received not before the disposal of objections." In this rule it has specifically been provided that an order of allotment may be passed not before the expiration of three days from the date of such posting (emphasis has been provided by me). The question that arises for consideration is whether the date on which a vacancy is notified on the notice board of office of the District Magistrate is to be excluded for purposes of computing expiration of three days provided under the rule or that date is included for purposes of computation of said three days. The learned counsel has not been able to substantiate his argument regarding inclusion of the date on which the vacancy is notified on the notice board. In my opinion rule for exclusion of that date is provided in the words "from the date of such posting". The learned counsel has not been able to substantiate his argument regarding inclusion of the date on which the vacancy is notified on the notice board. In my opinion rule for exclusion of that date is provided in the words "from the date of such posting". The Legislature in the wisdom has used the word "from" which indicates that the expiry period shall commence to run after the vacancy had been notified on the notice Board. In interpreting the period one can safely rely on clause 9 of the U. P. General Clauses Act. It is, therefore, amply borne out that the date on which the vacancy was notified has to be excluded. If this is done then obviously three days not having expired the allotment order would fall short of the requirement provided in clause (2) of rule 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner in order to give strength to his argument made a feeble attempt to convince the Court that the Legislature had used the word "may" after "allotment" so as to make it directory and not mandatory. In advancing this argument learned counsel lost sight of the facts specifically provided in the sentence "not before the expiration of three days". In my opinion violated in making the allotment order. The contrary submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner in my opinion is devoid of merit. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioner next urged that the learned Addl. District Judge erred in placing reliance on clause (1) of rule 11. He pointed out that this provision was applicable with respect to allotment of residential buildings and not with respect to other allotment such as for commercial purposes. Be that as it may, sub-rule (4) has been substituted by U. P. Urban Buildings (Second Amendment) Rules, 1977 which came into effect on 25-5-1977. Obviously it was in operation when the impugned order dated 27-5-1977 had been passed by the Addl. District Judge, Lucknow. Be that as it may, sub-rule (4) has been substituted by U. P. Urban Buildings (Second Amendment) Rules, 1977 which came into effect on 25-5-1977. Obviously it was in operation when the impugned order dated 27-5-1977 had been passed by the Addl. District Judge, Lucknow. Sub-rule (4) of rule l l reads : "Notwithstanding anything in sub-rules (1), (2) and (3) the District Magistrate may, for adequate and exceptional reasons to be recorded in writing, depart from the principle "first come, first served" and make allotment of any building out of turn to any person." I, would further like to mention that such a contingency of first come first served is only a rule of caution and not a rule of law. Therefore, it was inappropriate for the learned Addl. District Judge to have laid stress on this aspect in his judgment. Moreover, I find that reasons had been recorded for giving preference to the petitioner and, therefore, I do not think that any illegality on that score had been committed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer. 7. Lastly, the learned counsel raised a lot of controversy with respect to Sri Jitendra Singh being tenant of the premises and in this connection he drew my attention to the objections made by M/s. K. T. Financiers Private Ltd. (in liquidation). I do not think it is necessary to go into the factual quibbling raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for Sri Jitendra Singh since I am inclined to accept the remand order passed by the Addl. District Judge. I would therefore leave this point open to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to decide after properly sifting the evidence led by the parties. 8. On giving any anxious consideration to the entire facts and circumstances of the case I concur with the learned Addl. District Judge that the authority will determine the question whether the premises in question has fallen vacant and in this connection he will hear all the parties who are respondents in this writ petition. After determining that question I would further direct that the Prescribed Authority will proceed to make the allotment order after duly notifying the vacancy from amongst the parties to these proceedings alone. It is clarified that on fresh notification of vacancy no outsiders will be allowed to compete. After determining that question I would further direct that the Prescribed Authority will proceed to make the allotment order after duly notifying the vacancy from amongst the parties to these proceedings alone. It is clarified that on fresh notification of vacancy no outsiders will be allowed to compete. I would further observe that since the marathon race has gone on for years the authority will dispose of the dispute by 31-12-1985. The parties present in Court are directed to appear before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer on 17-10-1985. It is further ordered that even if communication from this Court has not been received a certified copy of the order will enable the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to assume jurisdiction to decide the dispute. Thus, the impugned order is upheld with the modifications mentioned above. 9. In the light of observations made above the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed. I direct the parties to bear their own costs. 10. Copy of the order will be issued by 14-10-1985.