ORDER V.K. Mehrotra, J. - Chhotey Lal, the third respondent, filed a suit in the Court of Judge, Small Causes Court, Bulandshahar against petitioner Islam Uddin and one Inayat Ullah, who is respondent No. 4 in this writ petition. The suit was numbered as Suit No. 32 of 1975. The case, which Chhotey Lal set up, was that he was the owner of the disputed shop which he had constructed in the year 1969 and had let it out to Islam and Inayat on a rent of Rs. 50/,- per month. These tenants made default in payment of rent. Their tenancy was, therefore, terminated by a notice dated August 13, 14, 1975. The suit had to be filed when the tenants did not respond to the notice. Another relief sought in the suit was for ejectment of the tenants. 2. Inayat Ullah did not contest the suit. Islam, the petitioner, filed a written statement. He disputed the claim of Chhotey Lal that he was owner of the property or that he had let out the premises to Islam. It was asserted that the property belonged to a mosque and the relationship of landlord and tenant did not exist between Chhotey Lal and the two defendants. It was also pleaded that the shop was not constructed in the year 1969 and was governed by the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. The notice, according to the defence plea, was invalid. 3. Chhotey Lal's son, Ram Kishan, who claims to be the pairokar of Chhotey Lal, appeared as a witness at the trial. He appeared as P.W. 3, Chhotey Lal did not appear in the witness-box because, according to Ram Kishan, he was a very old man and was unable to do so. Two other persons were produced as witnesses by plaintiff Chhotey LaL Petitioner Islam appeared himself as a witness. He also produced some other witnesses including a hand-writing expert. 4. The trial Judge dismissed the suit. He held, firstly, that it was not proved that Chhotey Lal was the owner of the disputed shop having purchased it through sale-deed (Ex. 1) secondly, that the rent-note (Ex. He also produced some other witnesses including a hand-writing expert. 4. The trial Judge dismissed the suit. He held, firstly, that it was not proved that Chhotey Lal was the owner of the disputed shop having purchased it through sale-deed (Ex. 1) secondly, that the rent-note (Ex. 3) produced by the plaintiff was not admissible in evidence as it was not a registered document, so that the relationship of landlord and tenant was not established between the plaintiff and Islam, the defendant and that the oral evidence was not such which could be believed in that respect. The trial Judge also found that the disputed shop was constructed long before the year 1969 and it was, therefore, covered by the protective provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972. Further, the notice (Ex. 7) was invalid because it did not terminate the tenancy of Islam. 5. Chhotey Lal assailed the decision of the trial Judge in a revision under S. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. That revision was allowed by the II Addl. District Judge, Buland Shahr by an order dated April 23, 1980. The case has been remanded to the trial Judge for fresh disposal in accordance with law. It is this decision which has been assailed by Islam in the present writ petition. 6. Sri S. A. Shah, appearing for petitioner Islam, has urged that it was not open to the Addl. District Judge to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the trial Judge while hearing the matter under S. 25, as had been done by him. Further, that the decision of the trial Judge on the question whether the relationship of landlord and tenant existed between Chhotey Lal and petitioner Islam, was essentially a finding of fact on the question having been answered in favour of Islam was not open to scrutiny in revision by the Addl. District Judge. 7. A certified copy of the judgment of the Addl. District Judge had been filed along with the writ petition. A perusal thereof shows that the learned Judge has not himself reappraise the evidence on record nor has he reversed any conclusion, allegedly based on appreciation of evidence, recorded by the trial Judge. What the learned Addl. District Judge. 7. A certified copy of the judgment of the Addl. District Judge had been filed along with the writ petition. A perusal thereof shows that the learned Judge has not himself reappraise the evidence on record nor has he reversed any conclusion, allegedly based on appreciation of evidence, recorded by the trial Judge. What the learned Addl. District Judge has done is to mention some errors of law from which, according to him, the decision of the trial Judge suffered and has then directed the matter to be redetermined by the trial Judge in accordance with law. 8. In Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, AIR 1963 SC 698 , the Supreme Court, while dealing with the scope of S. 35 of Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, quoted with approval the observation of Beaumont, C.J. in Bell and Company Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj, AIR 1938 Born 223 in regard to S. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. In substance, the observations are to the effect that the decision, if given according to law, would not be interfered with except on certain errors of law some of which have been pointed out in those observations. In the case before the Supreme Court, the learned single Judge of the Punjab High Court had substituted his own decision for the concurrent determination of the two courts below on the question as to when the sub-tenancy of one Dr. Jain had commenced. The same observations were quoted by the Supreme Court in paragraph 7 of their judgment in M.A. Naicker v. Seth Meghraj Udhavdas, AIR 1969 SC 1344 while considering the scope of the powers contemplated by the first proviso to S. 75(1) of the Provincial Insolvency Act. 9. In Laxmi Kishore v. Har Prasad Shukla, 1979 All WC 746 a Division Bench of this court, speaking through Satish Chandra, C.J. after referring to the Supreme Court decision in Hari Shankar's case ( AIR 1963 SC 698 ), extracted a part of the observations made by Beaumont, Chief Justice in Bell and Companies case (AIR 1938 Bom 223). Eventually, the Division Bench observed in paragraph 18 that the court deciding a revision under Section 25. Eventually, the Division Bench observed in paragraph 18 that the court deciding a revision under Section 25. Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, had to satisfy itself that the trial court's decree or order was according to law and that a wrong decision on facts was also a decision according to law. Later. in paragraph 20, it observed that "where the revisional court finds that a particular finding of fact is vitiated by an error of law, it has power to pass such order as the justice of the case requires, but it has no jurisdiction to reassess or reappraise the evidence in order to determine an issue of fact for itself. Further, if it cannot dispose of the case adequately without a finding on a particular issue of fact it should send the case back after laying down proper guidelines." 10. The principle laid down in these cases is, by now fairly settled and in every case the question that is to be examined is whether in recording its decision the revisional court has transgressed the limits set for it. The fact that the trial court had recorded a finding upon an erroneous impression about the true legal position or by not taking into consideration material evidence on record, entitles the revisional court to set aside that finding and require the trial court to go into the matter afresh in accordance with law. This principle was accepted by this court in Janardan Pandey v. 1st Addl. District Judge, Nainital, (1983) 1 All Rent Cas 640 and by the Supreme Court in Jagdish Prasad v. Smt. Angoori Devi, (1984) 1 All Rent Cas 679 : 1984 All LI 379. 11. The Addl. District Judge found that while discussing the question of the relationship of landlord and tenant between Chhotey Lal and petitioner the trial Judge had given no reason whatsoever for discarding oral evidence produced by the plaintiff. It appears from the decision of the trial Judge, of which a certified copy has been filed-along with the writ petition, that after taking the view that the rent-note could not be taken into consideration as it was an unregistered document, the trial Judge proceeded to hold that the oral evidence in the case was not enough to establish the case of Chhotey Lal that Islam was his tenant. Why was the oral evidence not sufficient for that conclusion has not been indicated in the judgment by the trial Judge. What he says is that plaintiff Chhotey Lal did not appear in the witness box. Apparently, an adverse inference was drawn by the trial Judge. Sri Sharma is right in his submission that the son of Chhotey Lal, namely, Ram Kishan, who appeared as a witness in the case. clearly stated about the reason why Chhotey Lal was not produced as a witness in the case. This reason was not considered by the trial Judge at all. In fact, apart from a reference to Ram Kishan being P.W. 3 in the case, there is hardly any discussion of this evidence to be found in the judgment of the trial Judge. It was open to the trial Judge to have refused to accept the testimony of Ram Kishan but it was necessary, for his decision to be in accordance with law, that he should have considered his evidence. That the evidence of Ram Kishan was a material piece of evidence on the record of the c4se cannot be doubted. Its non-consideration clearly amounts to the plaintiff not receiving a fair trial at the hands of the trial Judge. 12. The trial Judge held that on account of non-registration, the rent-note (Ex. 3) could not be looked into at all. This too was a mistaken impression about the legal position. The rent-note, which is not compulsorily registrable under S. 107 of the T.P. Act, can still be looked into for collateral purposes like determination of the nature of possession of a person said to be a tenant. This legal position is not in doubt and if authority is needed it can easily be found in a recent Division Bench decision of this Court in Zarif Ahmad v. Satish Kumar, AIR 1983 All 164 . In it are referred to a large number of earlier decisions of this Court and of the Supreme Court. 13. It was strenuously contended by Sri Shah that after the trial Judge had recorded a clear finding that plaintiff Chhotey Lal was not the owner of the property, legal error, if any, in the finding about the relationship of landlord and tenant between him and petitioner Islam was of no consequence. The direction for remand of the case was, therefore, wholly unjustified. The direction for remand of the case was, therefore, wholly unjustified. This submission overlooks that in recording a conclusion about the ownership of the property, which the trial court could do only incidentally, the statement of P.W. 3 Ram Kishan has been completely overlooked. It is not necessary for me to refer to those portions of his statement which relate to the question of ownership as I am inclined to uphold the order of remand and any observation made by me may result in prejudice to either party. The evidence may not have found favour with the trial Judge, who has, in the course of his conclusion on the question of the ownership, drawn heavily on the circumstance that the name of the vendee in this sale deed was shown as Rajendra Prakash and that it was not established that the sale deed related to the shop in dispute. If the trial Judge had only cared to go through the statement of P.W. 3, Ram Kishan and that of P.W. 2, Anand Swaroop, Photographer, he could have, inter alia, found that Rajendra Prakash was the son of Ram Kishan and that there was material connecting the sale deed with the shop in dispute. He may not have accepted the evidence but there was no justification for him not to have considered the oral evidence which was clearly relevant. 14. The decision recorded by the trial Judge, in the aforesaid circumstances, was rightly held by the Addl. District Judge to be not in accordance with law for purposes of S. 25 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. The Addl. District Judge committed no manifest error of law in setting aside the decree and directing reconsideration of the case by the trial Judge in accordance with law. 15. In conclusion, the petition fails and is dismissed, but the parties are directed to bear their own costs of this Court.