ORDER A.N. Dikshita, J. - The instant petition under Article 226 of the Constitution has been filed by the petitioner praying for issuing a writ of certiorari for quashing the judgment and order dated 21-1-1974 passed by the Judge, Small Causes, Etah, as well the judgment and order dated 18-2-1977 passed by the 1st Additional District Judge. Etah (annexures 2 and 3 to the petition). 2. Briefly stated the facts are : that the petitioner filed a suit for recovery of arrears of rent, ejectment and damages against Hakim Singh, Smt. Kalawati. Ram Singh and Sobaran Singh. Hakim Singh died during the pendency of the suit while Smt. Kalawati died during the pendency of the revision in the High Court and their heirs were brought on record. The suit was filed on the allegations that the tenants committed default in the payment of rent and also that they had made material alterations by constructing two Marhiyas on the road leading to the premises thus blocking the passage. The suit was contested by the defendants. The trial court, respondent No. 2, dismissed the suit vide judgment and order dated 21-1-1974. Aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 21-1-1974 the petitioner preferred a revision to the court of the District Judge, Etah, respondent No. 1 which was dismissed by respondent No. 1 vide judgment and order dated 18-2-1977. Thereafter the petitioner filed a revision before this Court against the order dated 18-2-1977 but it was dismissed by this Court as not maintainable. The petitioner then preferred the instant petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. 3. Counsel for the parties have been heard. The sole contention made on behalf of the petitioner is that both the courts below erred in appreciating the provisions of S. 3(1)(c) of the U.P. (Temporary) Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Act). Admittedly the constructions were made on the road blocking the passage. The only controversy which remains to be settled is whether such constructions of two Marhiyas constructed temporarily of mud would invite the application of S. 3(1)(c) of the Act. The Amin who had inspected the suit accommodation on 29-1-1970 had submitted a report which has been filed as Annexure-I to the writ petition but it does not disclose that the Marhiyas are of mud. The Amin who had inspected the suit accommodation on 29-1-1970 had submitted a report which has been filed as Annexure-I to the writ petition but it does not disclose that the Marhiyas are of mud. It has also not been mentioned in the report whether the Marhiyas are of a temporary nature or are permanent constructions. The contesting respondents while admitting the existence of the two Marhiyas submitted that by the mere construction of the two Marhiyas the provisions of S. 3(1)(c) of the Act would not be attracted. Respondent No. 1 however, came to the conclusion that the Marhiyas had been made at a distance of about 19 feet from the structure of the premises in question and were purely temporary in nature liable to be removed without damaging the front or the structure of the premises. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that both the courts below erred in law in applying the provisions of S. 3(1)(c) of the Act. It would thus be expedient to extract the provisions of sub-sec. (c) of S. 3(1) of the Act which reads : "(c) that the tenant has without the permission in writing of the landlord made or permitted to be made any such construction as, in the opinion of the Court, has materially altered the accommodation or is likely substantially to diminish its value." It is thus clear that no qualifying words have been attached to the word `construction' in sub-section (c) of S. 3(1) of the Act. It is no doubt clear that the construction must have some connection with the accommodation or the premises that has been leased. Such constructions may be inside the demised premises or outside or over it. The Supreme Court in Manmohan Dass Shah v. Bichun Das, AIR 1967 SC 643 held that the landlord was entitled to a decree for the eviction of the tenant under S. 3(l)(c) of the Act if he established that the constructions made by the tenant materially altered the accommodation and he was not required further to prove that the said constructions were likely to diminish substantially the value of the premises. It observed : "The expression `material alterations' in its ordinary meaning would mean important alterations, such as those which materially or substantially changed the front or the structure of the premises. It observed : "The expression `material alterations' in its ordinary meaning would mean important alterations, such as those which materially or substantially changed the front or the structure of the premises. It may be that such alterations in a given case might not cause damage to the premises or its value or might not amount to an unreasonable use of the leased premises or 'constitute a change in the purpose of the lease." The courts below found the constructions of the two Marhiyas. Respondent No. 1 went to the extent that the Marhiyas were temporary in nature and could be removed without damaging the front or the structure of the premises and thus concluded that the constructions were not at all substantial in nature. A Full Bench of this Court in Sita Ram Sharan v. Johri Mal, 1972 All LJ 301 : AIR 1972 All 317 observed : "The mere fact that the constructions can be removed does not alter the situation as almost any construction, permanent or temporary, can be removed. Whether a construction is permanent or temporary is only a question of the intention of the person making it. It does not affect the question whether the construction materially alters the accommodation or not." 4. In the instant case the courts below have failed to examine that with the construction of the two Marhiyas the contesting respondents have materially altered the accommodation. Similarly the other aspect that such a construction is likely substantially to diminish its value, has also not been gone into. There is no iota of evidence on record that the Marhiyas in dispute are of mud and are of a temporary nature liable to be removed without damaging the front or the structure of the premises. The conclusion of respondent No. 1 that the constructions are not at all substantial in nature is of no avail while appreciating the provisions enjoined in S. 3(1)(c) of the Act. It would have been appropriate for the courts below to have examined the two aspects, namely, whether the constructions had materially altered the accommodation or was likely substantially to diminish its value, but this apparently has not been done. Even the Marhiyas being made of mud bear a temporary nature is not borne out from the records before this Court. It would have been appropriate for the courts below to have examined the two aspects, namely, whether the constructions had materially altered the accommodation or was likely substantially to diminish its value, but this apparently has not been done. Even the Marhiyas being made of mud bear a temporary nature is not borne out from the records before this Court. In 'such cases it is expedient that an enquiry was made as regards the construction, whether temporary or permanent, so as to determine the controversy. Learned counsel for the petitioner thus submitted that the instant controversy requires extensive examination and scrutiny which both the courts below have failed to do. Such a controversy cannot be decided by this court in the exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, because evidence will have to be adduced and scanned by the court; the only appropriate relief which can be granted is to remand the case to respondent No. 2 to decide the suit afresh after the parties have adduced their evidence. Learned counsel for respondents Nos. 3 to 8 has no substantial objection to it. The petition, in view of the discussions above, deserves to be allowed. 5. In the result the petition is allowed and the orders passed by respondents Nos. 2 and 1 dated 21-1-1974 and 18-2-1977 respectively are hereby quashed. The case is remanded to the Court of Judge, Small Causes, Kasganj, Etah, for a de novo trial in the light of the provisions as contemplated by S. 3(1)(c) of the Act as well as the observations made above. No order as to costs.