JUDGMENT B.D. Agrawal, J. - The dispute in this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution lies within a narrow compass. The petitioner and the respondent no 3 both are teachers in the Panchayat Raj Higher Secondary School, Mokalpur, district Jaunpur The respondent was appointed on temporary basis by the Committee of Management with effect from August 25, 1965 and continued till July 31, 1966. The appointment of the petitioner who was then untrained was made on September, 1, 1965 on the basis of ?rd of the Grade pay. Upon advertisement being made to fill in the post on substantive basis, the petitioner and respondent both were selected by the Selection Committee constituted for the purpose on July 31, 1966. The District Inspector of Schools, Jaunpur accorded approval on Vth October, 1966. The petitioner is admittedly older in age. The question arose of granting Selection grade. In the order dated July 19, 1983 the District Inspector of Schools directed the respondent to be treated as Senior in comparison to the petitioner. The consequential order was passed by him thereafter on 11th August, 1983. Against these orders the petitioner represented on 6th October, 1983 which was rejected on March 13, 1985. Another representation made on 27th March, 1985 along the same lines also failed as appearing from the order dated 29th April, 1985. Aggrieved the petitioner has approached this court. 2. The sole question agitated is that of seniority between the petitioner and the respondent no. 3 inter It is not in controversy, as mentioned above, that both appeared before the selection committee for appointment against the substantive post on 31st July, 1966 and there was approval given by the District Inspector of Schools to their appointment under the common order made on 17th October, 1966. It is also admitted that in age the petitioner is elder to the respondent. For the petitioner reliance has been placed on Regulation 3 (1) (b) Chapter II of the Intermediate Education Act. This reads as under : "3. (1) (b). Seniority of teachers in a grade shall be determined on the basis of their substantive appointment in that grade. If two or more teachers were so appointed on the same date, Seniority shall be determined on the basis of age." 3. This reads as under : "3. (1) (b). Seniority of teachers in a grade shall be determined on the basis of their substantive appointment in that grade. If two or more teachers were so appointed on the same date, Seniority shall be determined on the basis of age." 3. Both the petitioner and the respondent were appointed in the L.T. Grade on the same date that is to say on August, I, 1966 and Since the petitioner is older in age, it is contended and, not without force in my opinion that the petitioner is senior in comparison to the respondent. In accordance with this regulation the determining factor is the date of substantive appointment with this rider that where the date of appointment is the same as in this case it is the age which counts. For the respondent, however, there is reference made to clause (a) of Regulation 3 (1) and the submission made is that in face thereof clause (b) is not relevant. Clause (a) provides :- "(a) The seniority list shall be prepared separately for each grade of teachers whether permanent or temporary, on and Substantive posts 4. Learned counsel made reference in this connection to the appointment given to the respondent on August 25, 1965 which continued up to July 31, 1966. It is argued that in case of the petitioner the appointment came later on September 1, 1965 and that be was not placed in the L.T. Grade since the pay directed to be paid to him was only ?rd of the grade pay. On this basis the seniority, it is submitted, should be determined in terms of Clause (a). In my opinion clause (a) does not assist the respondent in his claim. According to this clause, all that is provided for is that there have to be two separate lists of Seniority prepared grade wise irrespective of whether the appointment is permanent or temporary provided the post is sub-stative. This does not govern the determination of seniority inter se between the teachers placed in the same grade. For that we have to look to clause (b) The substantive appointment within the meaning of clause (b) came to be made for the first time in respect of both on August, 1, 1966 which was approved by the District Inspector of Schools. For that we have to look to clause (b) The substantive appointment within the meaning of clause (b) came to be made for the first time in respect of both on August, 1, 1966 which was approved by the District Inspector of Schools. The substantive capacity refers to the capacity in which a person holds the posts and not necessarily to the nature or character of the posts. A person is said to hold a post in a substantive capacity when he holds it for an indefinite period especially of long duration in contradistinction to a person who holds it for a definite or temporary period or holds it on probation subject to confirmation. (Vide : Baleshwar Dass and others etc. v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 1981 SC 41 ). The post was permanent no doubt but the appointment given to the respondent with effect from August 25, 1965 was not in substantive capacity, it was as a temporary measure awaiting regular selection through the prescribed medium and the approval by the authority competent in this behalf. The District Inspector of Schools was not right, therefore, in taking the period of August 25, 1965 to July 31, 1966 to the credit of respondent for the purpose of computation of seniority. This clearly runs counter to what is specifically provided for in Regulation 3 (1) (b) aforementioned. 5. For the respondent, learned counsel contended also that the determination of seniority had become final by order of the District Inspector of Schools made on July 19, 1983 and hence the representation which the petitioner made in April, 1985 was belated. This overlooked that the consequential order was passed by the District Inspector of Schools on 11th August, 1983 and is averred in paragraph B of the writ petition. This came to the knowledge of the petitioner on 6th October, 1983. There was no opportunity or notice given by him when the orders were made. On coming to know of the orders the petitioner lost no time in making the representation since that was done on 6th October, 1983 he followed this up with another representation on March 27, 1985. The petitioner may not, therefore, be said to guilty of laches in this behalf. 6. For the discussion made in the above, the petition succeeds and is allowed accordingly. The petitioner may not, therefore, be said to guilty of laches in this behalf. 6. For the discussion made in the above, the petition succeeds and is allowed accordingly. The orders made by the District Inspector of Schools dated April 26, 1985, March 13, 1985, August 11, 1985 and July 19, 1983 which are Annexures V, III,I-A and to the writ petition respectively are set aside. There will be no order as to costs.