ORDER K.P. Singh, J. - This writ petition has been directed against the judgment of the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Sultanpur, dated 12-11-1974. 2. In the present writ petition the disputed Khatas are Nos. 177 and 321 as well as plots Nos. 348 and 1694. Over Khata No.177 Ganga Din and the petitioner No. 1 Ram Prasad were recorded in the basic year. Over Khata No. 321 Mst. Sukhdei, widow of Tahal is recorded and plots Nos. 348 and 1694 have been shown as Matruq in the basic year records. 3. In order to appreciate the controversy between the parties in the present writ petition it is necessary to have a glance at the following pedigree : 4. The petitioners claimed right in the disputed land on the basis of a will executed by Jaggu in their favour on 14-10-1943 whereas Ganga Din, contesting opposite party No. 4 in the present writ petition, had claimed right on the basis of a gift deed executed by Tahal in his favour on 7-9-1936. Since the disputed land was non-transferable tenancy on the dates when the will was executed in favour of the petitioners and Jaggu died as well as when Tahal executed a gift deed in favour of the contesting opposite party Ganga Din, a question arises what right accrued to the parties on the basis of the title deeds set up by them. 5. The Consolidation Officer through his judgment dated 1-2-1974, contained in Annex. IV attached with the writ petition, held that the petitioners and the contesting opposite party Ganga Din had ?rd share each in Khatas Nos. 177 and 321 and also held that the petitioners had share each in plots Nos. 348 and 1694. In appeal, the Settlement Officer of Consolidation through his judgment dated 24-4-1974, contained in Annex. V attached with the writ petition, modified the judgment of the Consolidation Officer and held that the petitioners had h share each in Khata No. 177 and upheld the judgment of the Consolidation Officer regarding Khata No. 321 and also negatived the claim of the petitioners in plots Nos. 348 and 1694 and gave those plots to Gaon Sabha. Aggrieved by the judgment of the appellate authority both the parties had preferred revision petitions which were dismissed and the revisional Court through the impugned judgment dated 12-11-1974 also negatived the claim of the parties even in khata No. 321. 348 and 1694 and gave those plots to Gaon Sabha. Aggrieved by the judgment of the appellate authority both the parties had preferred revision petitions which were dismissed and the revisional Court through the impugned judgment dated 12-11-1974 also negatived the claim of the parties even in khata No. 321. Now, the petitioners have approached this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. 6. The learned counsel for the petitioners has contended before me that "will" is not a transfer, hence the provisions of S. 33 of U.P. Tenancy Act were not at all attracted and the consolidation authorities have patently erred in negativing the claim of the petitioners in the disputed land. He has placed reliance on the ruling reported in 1966 All WR 142, Pitam v. Umrao Singh. He has also referred to the ruling reported in 1973 Rev Dec 444 : 1973 All LJ 599, Roop Narain v. Ram Chandra. 7. Second contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is that the Gaon Sabha had not filed any revision petition before the revisional Court and the revisional Court has patently erred in declaring Khata No. 321 as the property of Gaon Sabha. He has emphasised that the revisional Court did not give any notice to the petitioners that it was exercising suo motu powers, therefore, its judgment suffers from patent error of law and deserves to be quashed. The learned counsel for the petitioners invited my attention to the ruling reported in AIR 1971 SC 1045 , M/s D.N. Roy v. State of Bihar. 8. The learned counsel for the contesting opposite party has submitted in reply that the impugned judgment has done substantial justice between the parties, hence it should not be interfered with. Next submission made on behalf of the contesting opposite party is that the disputed land being non-transferable under the provisions of U.P. Tenancy Act, the claim of the petitioners based on the will was rightly negatived by the revisional court. Since the contesting opposite party had paid rent in respect of the disputed khata No. 177 and he has been in possession for more than statutory period, hence his claim was rightly recognised by the Appellate Authority to the extent of share in the disputed Khata. 9. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. Since the contesting opposite party had paid rent in respect of the disputed khata No. 177 and he has been in possession for more than statutory period, hence his claim was rightly recognised by the Appellate Authority to the extent of share in the disputed Khata. 9. I have considered the contentions raised on behalf of the parties. No doubt a "will" is not strictly transfer but while regulating devolution of the property it does involve transfer of interest to a person who is not legal heir if he has been given an interest in the disputed property. Therefore, a will with regard to non-transferable tenancy has not been recognised by Courts in this State since long. The ruling relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners and reported in 1966 All WR 142, Pitam v. Umrao Singh, only helps the petitioners' contention that will is not a transfer and only changes the mode of devolution but that ruling is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Here the disputed plots were non-transferable tenancy whereas in the reported ruling the property involved were Sir Plots. Therefore, I think that the learned counsel for the petitioners cannot succeed in contending that the petitioners acquired valid title through the will executed by Jaggu in their favour in the year 1943. The ruling relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners and reported in 1973 Rev Dec 444 : 1973 All LJ 599, Roop Narain v. Ram Chandra has no application to the facts and circumstances involved in the present case. Even on the date of death of Jaggu the disputed property had not become saleable, therefore, the aforesaid ruling is not at all relevant on the point under my consideration. The petitioners do not derive any benefit out of the latter ruling relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners. 10. To my mind. the ruling reported in 1968 All LJ 11, Kaniz Zohra v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Lucknow is a ruling relevant on the point under my consideration. A Division Bench of this court in the aforesaid ruling has made the following relevant observation at p. 13, Col. 10. To my mind. the ruling reported in 1968 All LJ 11, Kaniz Zohra v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Lucknow is a ruling relevant on the point under my consideration. A Division Bench of this court in the aforesaid ruling has made the following relevant observation at p. 13, Col. 2 in the first para :- "...........We think that the word 'transferable' is used in this sub-section as meaning not only a transfer inter vivos but also a transfer taking place after the death of the transferor. A will operates as a transfer of the testators, right on his death. That the word 'transferable' has been used in sub-sec. (2) of S. 9 in the broader sense is borne out by sub-sec. (1) of Section 44. Sub-section (1) of Section 44 provides that every transfer, other than a sub-lease. made by a tenant in contravention of the provisions of this Act shall he void. The word 'transfer' in this sub-section definitely includes a transfer by a will. It has been held consistently by this court that a will devising tenancy rights which are made non-transferable by the Act is void. In view of this consideration we are of opinion that a will devising Sir rights is invalid and ineffective." 11. In the present case the claim of the petitioners is based upon the will executed by Jaggu in their favour in the year 1943 with regard to non-transferable tenancy, hence the petitioners do not get any valid title to the disputed plots on the basis of the will. The petitioners according to Tenancy Law prevailing on the date of death of Jaggu are also not his heirs so they do not succeed to the tenancy of Jaggu on his death. It is also true that the contesting opposite party Ganga Din does not derive any valid title to the disputed land on the basis of a gift deed executed by Tahal in his favour regarding the disputed land. The claim of the contesting opposite party Ganga Din appears to have been accepted by the consolidation authorities on the ground of his possession and in view of the circumstances that he had paid rent in respect of the share in his possession. Therefore, I think that substantial justice has been done between the parties when they get share in Khata No. 177. Therefore, I think that substantial justice has been done between the parties when they get share in Khata No. 177. Under law none of the parties have got valid title to the disputed land on the basis of the title deeds set up by them if their claim has been accepted by the consolidation authorities on the basis of possession and payment of rent with regard to the disputed Khatas, I think that the petitioners cannot make any legitimate grievance against the impugned judgment. 12. As regards the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the revisional Court did not give any notice to the petitioners about its exercise of suo motu power as required by the ruling reported in AIR 1971 SC 1045 , M/s D.N. Roy v. State of Bihar, it is sufficient to observe that the petitioners have been heard by this Court and the learned counsel for the petitioners has not been able to satisfy me that the petitioners had acquired any valid title to the disputed land. If the claimants to the disputed khata No. 321 do not succeed in establishing their claim the net result would be that the aforesaid Khata would vest in the Gaon Sabha according to the law prevalent in this State. It is noteworthy that it is the duty of the Courts and Tribunals to safeguard the interest of Gaon Sabha despite the fact that the Gaon Sabha had not filed objections at relevant time. Viewed from this angle I do not find that the impugned judgment can successfully be challenged by the petitioners on the ground that the revisional Court did not apprise the petitioners about the exercise of suo motu powers. Moreover, in the circumstances of this case I have a feeling that both the contesting parties in the present writ petition had no claim to Khata No. 321; hence if their claim has not been recognised by the revisional Court, no manifest injustice has occurred to the petitioners. In my opinion, even on the last contention the petitioners do not succeed in attacking the impugned judgment despite technical error committed by the revisional Court. In my opinion, even on the last contention the petitioners do not succeed in attacking the impugned judgment despite technical error committed by the revisional Court. None of the parties can claim right over the disputed khata on the basis of their possession because on the death of Smt. Sukhdei after the date of vesting the disputed khata would vest in the Gaon Sabha and no trespasser can prescribe title to such land in view of the amended provisions of S. 210 of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act. 13. In the result, both the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners fail and the writ petition is accordingly dismissed but I make no order as to costs.