JUDGMENT S.D. Agarwaia, J. - This is a petition Under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Opposite party No. 1 Sri Krishna obtained a money decree for Rs. 2230/- against the father of the Petitioner Mansoor Khan. When the decree was put in execution, the judgment-debtor filed an objection on the ground that he was a marginal farmer and as such the decree could not be executed against him and he should be deemed to have been discharged under the provisions of U.P. Debt Relief Act, 1977. The executing court initially by an order dated 7-11-1973 allowed the objection. The decree-holder went up in revision. The revision was allowed and the trial court set aside the order of the executing court dated 7.11.1973 and remanded the matter to the executing court for a fresh determination. After remand the executing court by an order dated 31.3.79 held that the judgment debtor was not a marginal farmer and hence the objections u/s 47 of the CPC were rejected. Aggrieved by that order a revision was filed by the judgment-debtor. That revision was also dismissed by the revisional court by an order dated 26.11.1979. It is this order which has been impugned in the present petition. 2. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties. The trial court on remand examined the entire oral and documentary evidence and recorded a finding that the judgment debtor had more than 2 hectares of unirrigated land with him and as such he was not a marginal farmer. Having recorded this finding, the objections of the judgment-debtor were rejected. 3. Section 4 of the U.P. Debt Relief Act, 1977 hereinafter referred to as the Act, provides for relief to debtors. In case the judgment-debtor is a debtor within the meaning of the Act, he would be entitled to the relief. ' Debtor ' has been defined in Section 2(6) of the Act which reads as follows; 2. Definitions In this Act (1) to (5)(6) " debtor " means a landless agriculture, labourer a marginal farmer, a rural artisan or an urban worker who owes a debt, but does net include a small farmer ; 4. Under the definition, therefore, if it was found as a fact that the petitioner was a marginal farmer then he would be entitled to the benefit of Section 4 of the Act. Under the definition, therefore, if it was found as a fact that the petitioner was a marginal farmer then he would be entitled to the benefit of Section 4 of the Act. "Marginal farmer " has been defined as follows: (9) " marginal farmer " means a person residing in a village who on the date of commencement of this Act, holds agricultural land not exceeding one hectare of unirrigated land and whose principal means of livelihood is income from agricultural land or by manual labour on such land, and includes a person cultivating land as an asami or as a share-cropper. 5. A marginal fawner under the definition mentioned above, could only be a person who holds agricultural land not exceeding one hectare of unirrigated land. Since a categorical finding was recorded that the Petitioner holds more than two hectares of unirrigated land, he could not be a marginal farmer. In the circumstances, he was not entitled to the benefit of Section 4 of the Act. The view taken by the court below consequently is in accordance with law. 6. The other question raised was as to whether if the Petitioner was a small farmer, he would be entitled to the benefit of Section 4 of the Act. This argument is also fallacious. It is only a debtor as mentioned in Section 4 of the Act who is entitled to the benefit of that provision. From the definition of the word 'debtor' a small farmer has been specifically excluded. In the circumstances, even if the Petitioner was a small farmer, he could not get the benefit of section 4 of the Act. 7. There is one more aspect of the matter. The Petitioner did not raise the question before the trial court that he was a small farmer. This question depends upon facts. The revisional court rightly did not permit the Petitioner to raise this question in revision. Consequently, I uo not find any error in the judgment of the court below. The petition is, accordingly dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are directed to bear their own costs. The interim order dated 15.09.1960 is hereby discharged.