JUDGMENT N.N. Sharma, J. - This is a defendants appeal directed against judgment and decree dated 21-9-1973 recorded by Sri Jang Bahadur Singh, learned Additional Civil Judge, Bulandshahr who dismissed Civil Appeal No. 179 of 1973 and affirmed the judgment of learned trial court dated 9-2-1973 in Original Suit No. 279 of 1966 by which the plaintiffs suit was decreed with costs. Defendant was restrained by means of a perpetual injunction from interfering in the ownership and possession of plaintiff over the land in suit indicated by letters A B C D E F in which towards south, a well and abadi is constructed. 2. The area or length or width of the land in dispute was not detailed in the plaint but it was alleged to lie well within plot No. 1214 within the municipal limits of Bulandshahr City. Plaintiff alleged to be in possession over the disputed land. He averred that the abadi and the well lying in the southern portion of this plot belonged to him. 3. However, Murari Lal defendant. who is no more and his widow Smt. Leelawati is appellant now initiated proceedings in the revenue court for demarcation of his plot No. 1215/1, measuring 19 biswas adjoining the disputed land towards south. On measurement, qanoongo submitted a report in favour of defendant. It is on the strength of the demarcation proceeding that the defendant and subsequently his widow were interfering with the possession of plaintiff over the said abadi and the well sunk in that plot. Plaintiff asserted his title and possession over the disputed holding for over 40 years. He further maintained that the order of revenue court in that connection was incorrect. 4. Defence was that the defendant was owner in possession over plot No. 1215/1 measuring 19 biswas situated in village Kala Asm, Bulandshahr and the disputed abadi lay well within his plot No. 1215/1. The well was the ancestral property of defendant and plaintiff had no concern with it. 5. During demarcation proceedings, plaintiff wanted to erect a pucca Dukariya on that land and wanted to alter the site. Plaintiff did not acquire any title or possession over the disputed land. The disputed land was not within plot No. 1214 belonging to plaintiff measuring 1 bigha and 15 biswas. 5. During demarcation proceedings, plaintiff wanted to erect a pucca Dukariya on that land and wanted to alter the site. Plaintiff did not acquire any title or possession over the disputed land. The disputed land was not within plot No. 1214 belonging to plaintiff measuring 1 bigha and 15 biswas. It was further maintained that no injunction suit could have to torpedo the finding of the revenue court which was binding on civil court which has no jurisdiction to try the suit. Other allegations of estoppel, etc., were also raised which are not essential to be detailed for the disposal of this appeal. 6. Issue No. 1, which related to jurisdiction, was answered in favour of plaintiff by learned trial court on 19-2-1968. That finding was affirmed in appeal. 7. As regards the plaintiffs possession over the land in suit, it was held that the location of the land is disputed though a map to scale was not possible but the oral evidence and entries in the revenue record help the claim of plaintiff. In the result, the claim was allowed and the relief sought was awarded, as given above. 8. I have heard learned counsel for parties and perused the record. 9. On behalf of appellant, it was argued that the civil court had no jurisdiction in the matter. There is no dispute that plaintiff was owner of plot No. 1214, area 1 bigha 15 biswas but it has not been admitted that the disputed land lay within that plot. It was a portion of plot No. 1215 which was adjoining plot No. 1214 towards south. Issue No. 1 related to the jurisdiction and was answered in favour of plaintiff on 19-2-1968 wrongly. When it could not be established through a map to scale as to what was the area of the disputed land nor its dimensions were laid in the plaint nor plaintiff Soosa Ram was definite about the extent of encroachment which was admittedly found in his holding, no suit in civil court could have lain merely on the basis of the relief claimed in the suit. In this connection reference was made to Mohd. Umar Khan v. Idris Mohd. In this connection reference was made to Mohd. Umar Khan v. Idris Mohd. Ghani, reported in AIR 1980 All 89 where it was held that the pith and substance of the allegations made in the plaint will have to be scrutinised and if on those allegations some adequate or satisfactory relief can be obtained from the revenue Court, notwithstanding that the relief has been so modulated that it falls outside the purview of the revenue Court, the suit was triable by revenue Court. 10. It appears that there was a dispute between joint grove-holders. The suit was brought by joint grove-holder against the other joint holder for mandatory injunction restraining him from interfering with his possession. It was held that the suit was triable by revenue Court. 11. The next authority in support of this assertion is reported in Smt. Bishni Devi v. Bahadur Singh, AIR 1980 All 209 . The facts in that case were as follows :- "B, a married daughter of deceased tenure- holder claiming to be in cultivatory possession of agricultural land got her name mutated as tenure holder in the place of her deceased father. She filed suit for perpetual injunction restraining her own brother S from interfering with her possession." It was held : "The grant of relief of injunction is in the discretion of the Court. It is well known that under the revenue law, a married daughter is postponed to a son in the matter of succession to agricultural land. If, for some reason, S did not file a suit for declaration or possession immediately after the death of his father, it cannot be said that B could have taken advantage of the same by obtaining perpetual injunction restraining S from interfering with her possession. Moreover, in every case before getting injunction, Court can go into the question of plaintiffs title to property. The Court has jurisdiction to come to the finding that B had no right to the land in face of the fact that her brother S had survived his father to whom the land admittedly belonged. The lower Appellate Court was under the circumstances fully justified to come to such a finding and in refusing to grant the injunction." 12. Sri S. K. Singh. The lower Appellate Court was under the circumstances fully justified to come to such a finding and in refusing to grant the injunction." 12. Sri S. K. Singh. learned Advocate for respondent, pointed out that the plea of jurisdiction was not raised in the lower appellate court and so it was not open to the appellant to raise this contention now. 13. This contention is ruled out for the simple reason that in the memo of appeal, paper No. 146/12A/1 appellant specifically raised this plea of want of jurisdiction in the civil court. It is a different matter that learned lower appellate court did not accept that plea. So this objection of respondent is not weighty. This point is a legal point which goes to the root of the matter and is arguable in this appeal. 14. Learned Advocate for respondent relied upon Bhola Nath v. Baba Damodar Das, reported in 1981 All LJ 1309 in which the suit was filed for injunction about the bhumidhari plot which was proved his bhumidhari land. Pending the suit, encroachment by the defendant was sought to be removed by a relief for possession. It was held that the main relief in the suit was for injunction and so the mere fact that the relief for possession was added later on would not oust the jurisdiction of the civil court. This case followed a decision of a Full Bench of this court in the case of Ram Awalamh v. Jata Shanker, 1968 All LJ 1108 : AIR 1969 All 526 . 15. The next authority relied upon has been reported is Raj Bahadur Singh v. Smt. Gaura, 1977 All WC 165 : AIR 1977 NOC 149. It was a suit for permanent injunction restraining defendant from interfering with plaintiffs possession over certain plots. It was held that when plaintiffs possession over those plots was established, a suit in civil court was maintainable. 16. These authorities are not in point for the simple reason that it was never admitted by the defendant that the disputed land lay within plot No. 1214/1. His contention was that this disputed land was a portion of his holding of plot No. 1215/1 and the suit was filed pending the demarcation, proceedings in the revenue court in order to checkmate the action of defendant through an injunctive relief. A mere look at S. 41 of U.P. Land Revenue Act. His contention was that this disputed land was a portion of his holding of plot No. 1215/1 and the suit was filed pending the demarcation, proceedings in the revenue court in order to checkmate the action of defendant through an injunctive relief. A mere look at S. 41 of U.P. Land Revenue Act. 1901 shall go to disclose that such settlement of boundary dispute was within the exclusive domain of the revenue court and not the civil court. As the land lay within the municipal limits, so S. 41 of the aforesaid Act was fully applicable and the jurisdiction of revenue court could not be ousted merely by modulating the relief for injunction. The pith and substance of the allegations made in the plaint is such in respect of which an adequate relief can be granted by a revenue Court. So I find that both the courts below have erred on this legal point. 17. The next contention was that the relief for perpetual injunction should not have been awarded in this case simply to circumvent the fundamental right of defendant to get demarcation of his holding by the competent revenue court which was admittedly pending at the time of institution of this suit. 18. S. 41 sub-cl. (b) of Specific Relief Act, 1963, specifically provides that an injunction could not be granted in such cases when the object of injunction was to cause such hardship to defendant as to restrain him from prosecuting his proceeding in relation to his fundamental right in the revenue court about demarcation of holding. While issuing an injunction, the court has to exercise judicial discretion in a way as to prevent the defendant from doing a wrongful act. It is not to he issued even if the case is not covered by S. 41 of Civil Procedure Code, if it resulted in hardship to defendant. In the instant case, the object of the suit was simply to prevent the defendant from asserting his legitimate right in a competent revenue court about an alleged encroachment on his holding by plaintiff. The revenue court has not been restrained but only the defendant has been restrained. The restraint imposed on defendant is tantamount to obstruction to his prosecution of a judicial proceeding. 19. The revenue court has not been restrained but only the defendant has been restrained. The restraint imposed on defendant is tantamount to obstruction to his prosecution of a judicial proceeding. 19. So having regard to the well established principles on which an injunction can be issued, it is obvious that the inconvenience caused to defendant by issuing such injunction is greater than the convenience caused to the plaintiff if it is refused. It is a different matter that in demarcation proceeding inter parties plaintiff would have been successful. 20. The next contention was that the land in dispute has not been located through a map to scale. The dimensions of the land in dispute were not laid in the plaint. Even its area was not noted therein. The sketch map laid at the foot of the plaint was not ordered to form part of the decree. Soosa Ram plaintiff (P.W.1) conceded in his statement that the boundary wall constructed by him was beyond the limits of his plot to the extent of ten to twenty yards. According to the defence. this encroachment was the subject matter of the litigation in the revenue court as is obvious from the documentary evidence filed in defence. Again and again, in his cross-examination, plaintiff Soosa Ram conceded that he had encroached upon the holding beyond his plot. He was confronted with his earlier deposition recorded in the revenue court on 9-3-1965 when he testified before the S.D.O. Bulandshahr in demarcation proceedings that he constructed that boundary wall two years prior to his deposition.. He has encroached on municipal road also. He could not explain away his earlier admissions. The revenue court decided the case against him and the matter was pending disposal as is obvious from the documents Exts. A1 to A5 filed in defence per list 44/C1. It appears that this entire cogent documentary evidence has been ignored by both the courts below who issued an injunction to safeguard the interest of plaintiff about portion of land on which he had no right or claim. All these admissions were sufficient to have disentitled him to the award of equitable relief sought by him. I have carefully perused the statements of Soosa Ram (P.W.1) and Horam (P.W.2) examined by plaintiff and Ram Gopal (D.W.1), Munim of Smt. Leelawati. All these admissions were sufficient to have disentitled him to the award of equitable relief sought by him. I have carefully perused the statements of Soosa Ram (P.W.1) and Horam (P.W.2) examined by plaintiff and Ram Gopal (D.W.1), Munim of Smt. Leelawati. The testimony of D.W.1 was wrongly discarded on the ground that the lady herself did not enter the witness box. It is obvious that the lady might not have been conversant with the forensic affairs and thus examined her Munim who supported her allegations and fully corroborated the defence that the plaintiff had annexed a portion of her holding as well. 21. Learned courts below went by the entries in Khasras Exts. 1, 2 and 3 but ignored the surrender deed dated 7-1-1941 and extract of khasra of 1323F Ext. 4 and copy of decree Ext. 5 filed in defence. 22. Both the courts below wrongly found that although plaintiff failed to get the land in dispute located through a map to scale yet the defendant could not successfully establish his ownership or title over the well and the alleged portion in dispute. I have carefully perused the three reports of the Amin and of Commissioner which left the matter in the lurch. There was no map to scale to fix the identity of the land in dispute. It was not possible to identify the land in dispute through its area and boundaries in the circumstances of. the case. 23. In a case of a boundary dispute, or when there is any possible doubt about the identity of the land in suit, it is essential that a good plan of the land should be put in vide Po Gyi v. Maung Paw, (1909) 2 Ind Cas 347 : 5 LBR 1 it was the duty of the Court to pass only an executable decree. Under S. 83 of the Indian Evidence Act, it was obligatory to establish the accuracy of the map prepared by the Amin or Commissioner. That has not been done. No location of the land in dispute was possible by the report of the Amin and Commissioner. The burden of proof lay on plaintiff to establish his case to the hilt. He could not take advantage of any weakness in defence. 24. That has not been done. No location of the land in dispute was possible by the report of the Amin and Commissioner. The burden of proof lay on plaintiff to establish his case to the hilt. He could not take advantage of any weakness in defence. 24. Learned counsel for the respondent referred to Chandrapal v. Roop Rama, reported in 1979 All LJ 55 which provided that it was open to the court to interfere even though a Commissioner's report has been confirmed. 25. The next authority relied upon by him has been reported in Rangayya Kanantha v. Govinda Chatra, AIR 1970 Mys 314. In that case, a local investigation was made by the Commissioner under O. 26, R. 9 of Code of Civil Procedure to estimate the value of improvements made on that land. It was held that the Court should consider about the valuation of improvements taking into account the evidence on record and the circumstances of the case. 26. Both the authorities are wide of the mark. When the identity or dimension of land A B C D E F remained unidentified, it is not possible to execute any decree on such a vague description as awarded in the suit. Since it has been observed that no better proof was possible and a map to scale could not be drawn by the Commissioner or Amin, so the claim should not have been decreed. 27. On a careful perusal of the entire oral and documentary evidence on record, I find that although this Court sparingly interferes in second appeal yet when the entire evidence on record has been ignored and the legal principles have not been considered resulting in injustice to a party this Court is bound to interfere. 28. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and decree are set aside. Plaintiffs suit is dismissed with costs throughout.