Judgment :- Kochu Thommen J The petitioners are employees of this Court working on the clerical side. Petitioners I and 2 are Senior Grade Assistants in category ]A of Division II of the High Court Service Rules, 1970 (the "rules"). The 3rd petitioner is an Assistant Grade I in category 8 of Division II of the Rules These two are feeder categories for promotion to the post of Court Officer. All the three petitioners are law graduates and have acquired the necessary test qualifications. They are thus fully qualified to be appointed as Court Officers. They challenge Ext P2 which is a notification, dated 14th June 1984 published in Kerala Gazette No. 30, dated 24th July 1984, Part III, Judicial Department. By this notification Rule 16(d) was amended by the substitution of a new provision. The petitioners contend that they are aggrieved by the amendment as their chances of promotion as Court Officers are jeopardised by reason of the quota introduced by the amended provision for promotion of non-law graduates as Court Officers. They apprehend supersession in the matter of promotion by non-law graduates who are juniors to them. 2. Respondents 1 and 2 respectively are the Chief Justice and the Registrar of this Court and the additional respondents 4 to 11 are the persons who are directly benefited by the impugned amendment. 3 Before we deal with the amendment, we shall briefly refer to the relevant provisions of the Rules. In exercise of the powers vested in him under Article 229 of the Constitution of India, the Chief Justice made the Rules in 1970 to regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of the members of the Kerala High Court Service. They came into force on 19th January 1971. Part II of the Rules refers to the various divisions of the High Court Service. Division I has several categories of which Section Officer, Court Officer and Court Fee Examiner are categories 5, 6A and 6B respectively (see Rule 4). The Chief Justice is the appointing authority for all the categories, but the Registrar may, subject to the control of the Chief justice, make appointments to certain lower categories (see Rule 5). Division I has several categories of which Section Officer, Court Officer and Court Fee Examiner are categories 5, 6A and 6B respectively (see Rule 4). The Chief Justice is the appointing authority for all the categories, but the Registrar may, subject to the control of the Chief justice, make appointments to certain lower categories (see Rule 5). Without prejudice to the power of the Chief Justice to borrow the services of an officer belonging to any other service under a State or the Central Government or the Supreme Court or a High Court, rule 6 has prescribed the method of appointment to the High Court Service. 4. To the post of Section Officer (Division I, category 5), appointment is made either by transfer from among Court Officers (Division I, category 6A) or by promotion from Division II, categories 1, 1A, 3,4 and 8, provided that, subject to certain conditions, two posts of Section Officers may be filled up by promotion of "suitable and qualified" persons in category IB or 7 or 10 who are Shorthand Writers (see column 3 against category 5 of Division I in the table under rule 6). The minimum general and educational qualification for appointment as Section Officer is a degree in Arts or Science or Commerce, apart from the prescribed special qualifications, although non-graduates who were members of the service on 15th March 1960 are, in terms of rule 16(c), also eligible to be appointed to that post. A degree is not imperative for appointment to categories IB, 7 and 10, but only the graduates among them, apart from those vanishing class of non-graduates coming within rule 16(c), are eligible to be further promoted as Section Officers in the two posts provided for Shorthand Writers. However, category 4 of Division II ceased to be a feeder category as from 6th November 1971 without prejudice to the rights of persons appointed to that category prior to that date 5 Court Officers who belong to category 6A in Division I are qualified to be transferred as Section Officers. By such transfer they no doubt gain supervisory status and experience, but do not get any advantage in the matter of salary. By such transfer they no doubt gain supervisory status and experience, but do not get any advantage in the matter of salary. Nor do they gain' any advantage in the matter of promotion to the next higher post, for along with the Section Officers, the Court Officers are also included among the feeder categories for promotion to the post of Assistant Registrar which is category 3, Division I. Court Off ices are appointed either by promotion, or by transfer from category 6B (Court Fee Examiners), or by direct recruitment. 6. The feeder categories for promotion to the post of Court Officer are categories 1, 1A, IB, and 3 to in Division II. However category 4 ceased to be a feeder category as from 7th February 1979 without prejudice to the rights of persons appointed to that category prior to that date. 7. Court Fee Examiners who belong to category 6B in Division I are appointed either by promotion or by transfer or direct recruitment. For promotion to this category, the feeder categories are the same as in the case of Court Officers, namely, 1, 1A, IB and 3 to 10 in Division II. However category 4 ceased to be a feeder category as from 7th February 1979 without prejudice to the rights of persons appointed to that category prior to that date. The salary of a Court Fee Examiner is the same as that of a Section Officer or a Court Officer, but unlike the Court Officer, the Court Fee Examiner cannot be transferred to the post of Section Officer. Nor is he in a feeder category for promotion as Section Officer. He can only be transferred to the post of Court Officer. 8. Priorto the impugned amendment, the minimum educational qualification for appointment as a Court Officer in category 6A or a Court Fee Examiner in category 6B was "A law degree of a University in the Indian Union or a law degree of any other University which is recognised as an equivalent degree by the Kerala University". [In addition to this, the special qualification of Account Test (Lower) is also requited ]. This is still the position with regard to the Court Fee Examiners. However, by the impugned amendment, a quota has been provided for promotion of "non-law graduates" working in the feeder categories (1, 1A, IB and 3 to 10 in Div. [In addition to this, the special qualification of Account Test (Lower) is also requited ]. This is still the position with regard to the Court Fee Examiners. However, by the impugned amendment, a quota has been provided for promotion of "non-law graduates" working in the feeder categories (1, 1A, IB and 3 to 10 in Div. II) for promotion to the post of Court Officer. 9. The minimum educational qualifications prescribed under Annexure I to the Rules in respect of these feeder categories vary. A degree is essential for categories I,170 A, 4, 4A and 8. On the other hand, as respects category IB non-graduates with certain higher technical qualification are also eligible for promotion, and, as respects categories 3 and 10 non-graduates can be appointed in certain specified circumstances. In respect of categories 5, 6 and 9, S.S.L C. or E.S.L.C. is the minimum academic qualification in addition to the technical qualification in typewriting. For category 7 a degree is required in addition to the technical qualification in shorthand and typewriting, provided non-graduate shorthand writers Gr. II with higher qualification in shorthand and typewriting will also be eligible for appointment by promotion. 10. Rule 15 says that the seniority of a member in any category is determined, unless he has been reduced to a lower rank as a punishment, by the date of his regular appointment to that category. Rule 15, however, provides that where a member has been transferred from one category to another his service in the former shall also be reckoned. 11. Rule 16 provides that promotion to categories 1 to 7 in Div. land categories 1, 3 and 5 in Div. II has to be made by selection. Rule 16 further provides that for the purpose of filling up the vacancies in category 5 in Div. I (Section Officers), category 6A in Div. I (Court Officers) and categories I, IA, 3, 4 and 8 in Div. II will, subject to the 2nd proviso in column 3 against category 5 in the table under Rule 6. be regarded as one category and seniority in 'that common category has to be determined in accordance with Rule 15. Likewise for the purpose of promotion to the post of Assistant Registrar (Div. I, category 3), categories 4, 5, 6, 6A and 7 in Div. be regarded as one category and seniority in 'that common category has to be determined in accordance with Rule 15. Likewise for the purpose of promotion to the post of Assistant Registrar (Div. I, category 3), categories 4, 5, 6, 6A and 7 in Div. I will be regarded as one category and the seniority in this common category has to be determined with reference to the date of commencement of service in any one of the concerned categories. However, in respect of Court Officers (category 6A), it is specifically provided that their seniority for the purpose of promotion can be reckoned only as from 15th July 1974 which was the date on which their scale of pay was equated to that of Section Officers. 12. Sub-rule (c) of rule 16 reads: "(e) Subject to the provisions of sub-rules (f) non-graduates who were members of the service on 15th March 1960 will be eligible for promotion to the post of Section Officer, if considered efficient and fit by the Chief Justice and not to higher posts." Sub-rule (e), prior to the amendment which came into force on 22nd September 1980, read as follows: "(e) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (f) of this rule, non-graduates who were in the service on 15th March 1960 shall be eligible for promotion as Assistants Grade I and as Senior Grade Assistants." The underlined words were however deleted as from 22nd September 1980. The sub-rule now reads as follows: ('(e) Subject to the provisions of sub-rule (f) of this rule, non-graduates shall be eligible for promotion as Assistants Grade I and as Senior Grade Assistants." Sub-rule (f) of rule 16 reads: "(0 To the extent that suitable and qualified hands are available, half the vacancies in the categories of Section Officers, Senior Grade Assistants and Assistants Grade I shall be filled by the promotion of non-graduates eligible for such promotion under sub-rules (c) and (e), graduates and non-graduates being appointed alternately as far as possible": Provided that a graduate who is senior to a non-graduate will not be superseded by the application of this sub-rule: X X X" 13. Sub-rule (c) provides for the promotion of a non-graduate to the post of Section Officer, if he was a member of the service on 15th March 1960 and is considered to be efficient and fit by the Chief Justice, but without any right for promotion to higher posts. This provision is subject to what is provided under sub-rule (f) as regards the 50 per cent limit and the principle of non-supersession of a senior graduate by a junior non-graduate. Similarly sub-rule (e) provides that, subject to the provisions of sub-rule (f), a non-graduate is eligible for promotion as Assistant Grade I and as Senior Grade Assistant. This means that in these three specified categories of posts, namely, Section Officers, Senior Grade Assistants and Assistant Grade I, non-graduates eligible for promotion under sub-rules (c) and (e) can be promoted upto 50 per cent of the total number of available posts, graduates and non-graduates being appointed alternately as far as possible, provided that a non-graduate will not be allowed to supersede a graduate who is senior to him 14 In addition to the avenues opened up for promotion of non-graduate under sub-rules (c) and (f) to the post of Section Officer, and under sub-rules (e) and (f) to the post of Senior Grade Assistant or Assistant Grade I, as the case may be, sub-rule (d) of Rule 16, as it stood prior to the impugned amendment, provided for promotion of a vanishing class of non-law graduates as Court Officers. This sub-rule, prior to the amendment, read as follows: '16 (d). Assistants who were attached to the Bench Section on or before the 15th March 1960 but are not law graduates will be eligible for promotion as Court Officers subject to the following conditions: (i) they are Assistant Gr. I at the time of promotion; (ii) their capacity for bench work is certified by the Registrar; (iii) their promotion shall be in the proportion 1:1 as between them and the law graduates, eligible for promotion; (iv) a law graduate who is senior to a non-law graduate at the time of the filling up of the vacancy will not be superseded by the application of the above ratio". By virtue of sub-rule (d), those Assistants on the clerical side who had been attached to the Bench Section on or before 15th March 1960, but who had no law degree, were eligible for promotion as Court Officers, subject to the conditions mentioned in the said sub-rule. These Officers, had been attached to the Bench Section and had thus acquired sufficient experience in that branch of work, and the Registrar certified their capacity for bench work. In view of the fact that this was a small diminishing group of experienced persons, although without law degree, a special provision was made for their promotion as Court Officers in the proportion of 1:1 between them and the law graduates. This was, however, subject to the condition that a law graduate who was senior to a non-law graduate at the time of filling up the vacancy could not be superseded by the latter by the application of the ratio. The present seniority of the members in the feeder category was thus recognised as the criterion for promotion to the next higher post. It is the substitution of this sub-rule by the impugned provision that has caused the alleged grievance of the petitioners. 15. Before we deal with the impugned provision, we must refer to sub-rule (a) of rule 16 which provides for appointment of certain categories of non-graduates as Assistants Grade II (category 11, Division II), subject to the prescribed conditions. This sub-rule, as it stood prior to its amendment, dated 22nd September 1980, read as follows: "(g) Typist-Copyists and Copyists who were members of the service on 15th March 1960 will be eligible for promotion as Assistant Grade II if they have passed the SSLC. or ESLC. Examination and are considered as suitable by the Registrar." (emphasis supplied) This shows that the original intention of the rule making authority was to extend the benefit of the sub-rule only to those experienced non-graduates in the two specified categories who had been members of the service on and since 15th March 1960. In this respect this sub-rule was originally intended to be akin to sub-rule (c), or sub-rule (e) (as it stood before it was amended on 22nd September 1980). In this respect this sub-rule was originally intended to be akin to sub-rule (c), or sub-rule (e) (as it stood before it was amended on 22nd September 1980). However, as in the case of sub-rule (e), this sub-rule was also amended so as to extend its benefit to all non-graduates of certain specified categories, whether or not they initially joined the service on or before 15th March 1960 16. Rule 16 (g), as it now stands after various amendments, reads as follows: "(g) Shorthand Writers Grade II, Typists Grade II, Typist-Copyist Grade II (English), Typist-Copyists Grade II (Malayalam), Telephone Operators, Library Assistants; Copyists and Clerical Assistants shall be eligible for appointments as Assistants Grade II if they have passed the S.S.L.C. or E; S.11. C. Examination or examination equivalent thereto and if they are considered suitable by the Registrar for such appointment, subject to the following conditions: (1) they should have completed either 12 years' service in all in the High Court or, in the case of direct recruits to these categories, seven years' service in any of the said category or categories (2) total length of regular service in the said categories shall alone be considered for such appointment. (3) as between the aforesaid categories appointment shall be on the basis of length of regular service. (4) there shall be a ratio 1:2 as between appointments made under these clauses and direct recruitment or recruitment by transfer. (5) on such appointment as Assistant Grade II, notwithstanding anything contained in these rules, they shall cease to be eligible for further promotion from the categories from which they came as Assistant Grade II. (6) the suitability shall be determined on the basis of a proper test to be conducted by the Registrar". 17. Sub-rule (g) thus opens up an avenue for the non-graduates, who satisfy the prescribed conditions, to enter category 11, Division II (Assistants Grade II) which is a feeder category for promotion to category 8 in Division II (Assistants Grade I), which itself is a feeder category for further promotion as Senior Grade Assistants (category 1A, Division II), or Court Fee Examiners (category 6B, Division I), or Court Officers (category 6A, Division I) or Section Officers (category 5, Division I). Subject to sub-rules (c), (e) and (f) of Rule 16, a degree is however the minimum academic qualification for appointment as Assistants Grade I or Senior Grade Assistants or Section Officers, and subject to sub-rule (d) of rule 16, a law degree is the minimum qualification for appointment as Court Officers. A law degree is without exception the minimum qualification for appointment as Court Fee Examiner. 18. There is therefore a fairly wide passage for non-graduates to rise to the level of Senior Grade Assistants (category 1A, Division II), because of the initial opening under sub-rule (g) of rule 16, and the subsequent opening provided under sub-rule (e) after its amendment on 22nd September 1980, whereby the restriction, which formerly existed to the effect that the sub-rule applied only to those non-graduates "who were in the service on 15th March 1960", was removed. This opening under sub-rule (e) is still subject to the restrictions under sub-rule (f) regarding the 50 per cent limit and the rule of seniority. On the other hand, the opening provided under sub-rule (d) for non-law graduates to become Court Officers was a special concession applicable only to a limited and vanishing group of persons attached to the Bench Section on or before 15th March 1960. That opening is not therefore applicable to the non-law graduates generally. Likewise the opening under sub-rule (c) for the promotion of non-graduates as Section Officers is also limited to a diminishing class of persons appointed to the High Court Service on or before 15th March 1960. In other words, non-graduates are generally shut out of posts higher than that of Senior Grade Assistant (category 1A, Division II). The non-law graduates were also shut out of the post of Court Officer, and they were, aid still are, completely shut out of the post of Court Fee Examiner. 19. The position has now changed considerably in regard to the Court Officers by reason of the impugned amendment under which, as stated earlier, a quota has been fixed for promotion of non-law graduates. 20. 19. The position has now changed considerably in regard to the Court Officers by reason of the impugned amendment under which, as stated earlier, a quota has been fixed for promotion of non-law graduates. 20. We shall now read the impugned sub-rule (d) of rule 16: "16 (d) Not more than eight posts of Court Officers (category 6A in Division II) may be filled by promotion of non-law graduates working in the feeder categories (categories 1,1A, IB and 3 to 10 in Division II) subject to the following conditions: (i) they must have completed 50 years of age or 20 years' of total service, the service being calculated after taking into account the service from the date of appointment as Assistant Grade II, Typist Grade II and Shorthand Writer Grade II, as the case may be. (ii) they must be willing to be appointed as Court Officers. (iii) their capacity for bench work must be certified by a Committee consisting of the Registrar, the Joint Registrar and the Deputy Registrar (Judl.). (iv) all the non-law graduates in the feeder categories will together form a separate class. As between the qualified law-graduates and the non-law graduates forming the separate class there shall be a ratio of 1.1 for promotion to the post subject to what is stated in clause (v) below. (v) a law graduate who is senior to a non-law graduate coming within the separate class at the time of filling up of the vacancy will not be superseded by the application of the ratio. The seniority as between the law graduate and the non-law graduate will be determined with reference to the total length of service in the manner indicated in clause (i) above. (vi) promotion from among the non-law graduates shall be on the basis of their total length of service. It shall be calculated in the same manner as total service is calculated under clause (i) above. (vii) non-law graduates promoted as Court Officers shall not be eligible for any other promotion based only on their promotion following the above provisions." 21. The amendment has made a fundamental deviation from the original position in regard to Court Officers. It shall be calculated in the same manner as total service is calculated under clause (i) above. (vii) non-law graduates promoted as Court Officers shall not be eligible for any other promotion based only on their promotion following the above provisions." 21. The amendment has made a fundamental deviation from the original position in regard to Court Officers. Whereas the minimum general educational qualification prescribed for the Court Officer prior to the amendment was a law degree, eight posts are now reserved for promotion of non-law graduates from the feeder categories, provided they have completed 50 years of age or 20 years of total service as reckoned in terms of clause (i) of the new sub-rule. These persons roust be willing to be appointed and their capacity for bench work must be certified by a committee consisting of the Registrar, the Joint Registrar and the Deputy Registrar (Judicial). These non-law graduates will be appointed to these eight posts in the proportion of 1:1 between themselves and the law graduates, subject to the condition that a law graduate will not be superseded by a non law graduate who is relatively junior when his total length of service is reckoned in the manner prescribed in clause (i). A non-law graduate is not entitled to any further promotion on the basis of his appointment as a Court Officer. 22. Apart from the relaxation of educational qualification, the special features of the amendment are: (1) A quota has been fixed for the non-law graduates; (2) The total length of service of the non-law graduates for assessing their seniority vis-a-vis the law graduates is reckoned not solely with reference to the service of the former in the respective feeder categories, but with reference to the dates of entry on initial appointment as Assistants Grade II (category 11) or Typists Grade II (category 13) or Shorthand Writers Grade II (category 10) as the case may be; (3) The capacity for bench work of the concerned non-law graduate has to be certified by the Committee before he is appointed as a Court Officer; and (4) The non-law graduate so appointed as Court Officer has no chance of further promotion on the basis of such appointment. 23. This means that a non-law graduate, albeit on a quota basis, is treated as qualified to be appointed as Court Officer. 23. This means that a non-law graduate, albeit on a quota basis, is treated as qualified to be appointed as Court Officer. Furthermore, unlike the Shorthand Writers, who belong to the feeder category 10, the clerical staff and the typists get the advantage of their service in category H or category 13, as the case may be, being added to their service in the respective feeder category (category 8 or 9) for the purpose of reckoning the total length of service to determine their relative seniority vis-a-vis law graduates. The non-law graduates are thus placed at a considerable advantage in comparison to the law graduates. This involves a fundamental change. We shall presently revert to this aspect. 24. It is significant that, while under the unamended sub-rule (d), the non-law graduates were promoted as Court Officers only where they had been attached to the Bench Section on or prior to 15th March 1960 and their capacity for bench work had been certified by the Registrar, under the amended provision, the non-law graduates, who did not work for a single day as Court Officer, but in totally unconnected fields, can be suddenly promoted to that post, if certified by a Committee consisting of the Registrar, the Joint Registrar and the Deputy Registrar (Judl.) that the officer has the necessary capacity for bench work. This means that, unlike under the old provision, the assessment by the Committee will be with reference to the work done by the non-law graduates until then, and not with reference to any work connected with the Bench. It is therefore not only possible, but also probable, that the assessment will be made solely on totally extraneous con> sudation, and not with reference to the nature and condition of the work of a Court Officer and the special responsibilities and technical expertise involved in such work Furthermore it is quite possible that, as the relevant rules now stand, the Committee would not consist of a single person, who has bad even a day's experience either as a practising advocate or as a judicial officer. Such assessment will necessarily lack the requisite quality and objectivity for a proper evaluation of the work of a person. Particularly in such circumstances, the law degree is the only minimum guarantee of a person's capacity and competence for this very important post. 25. Such assessment will necessarily lack the requisite quality and objectivity for a proper evaluation of the work of a person. Particularly in such circumstances, the law degree is the only minimum guarantee of a person's capacity and competence for this very important post. 25. The scheme of the rules is to select the ablest and the most suitable persons for appointment to the various posts in the High Court Service, especially at the higher levels. In such selection, the interest of the institution and the exigency of the administration are warranted by the public interest to be the dominant criterion. While a law degree is laid down as the minimum general educational qualification for the posts of Registrar, Joint Registrar, Deputy Registrar, Assistant Registrars, Court Officers, Court Fee Examiners and Librarians, a professional degree of that nature is not required for other posts. The Librarians must not only be law graduates, but must also be holders of degree or diploma in Library Science, provided that this extra qualification maybe dispensed with by the Chief Justice. A Section Officer is invariably a graduate, although exceptionally a non-graduate can be appointed to that post [see rule 16 (c)]. The Personal Assistant to the Chief Justice is a graduate who is a qualified Shorthand Writer. The Additional Personal Assistant to the Chief Justice on the other band need not necessarily be a graduate. The minimum qualification for appointment to categories 1, 1A, 4, 4A, 8 and 11 in Division II is also a degree, although, as seen above, non-graduates can also enter those categories by reason of the exceptional provisions contained in rule 16(e), (f) and (g). On the other hand, at the other levels of Division TI and at all levels in the divisions below, a degree is not required. Division IA is a Vigilance Cell manned by the police. These provisions show that the dominant object of the rules is to appoint persons having the requisite qualifications and competence in consonance with, and having due regard to, the nature of the duties and responsibilities of the concerned posts. 26. These educational requirements are laid down under the rules for the sake of maintaining a high degree of efficiency. These provisions show that the dominant object of the rules is to appoint persons having the requisite qualifications and competence in consonance with, and having due regard to, the nature of the duties and responsibilities of the concerned posts. 26. These educational requirements are laid down under the rules for the sake of maintaining a high degree of efficiency. It is futile in this respect to compare the service under the High Court to that under the executive branch of the Government or other organisations The High Court, as the highest judicial authority in the State, has to function with a view to discharging its special constitutional responsibilities in the administration of justice. Its requirements are peculiar to its special nature and not necessarily identical to those in the executive branch. The dominant object of the rules is to promote maximum efficiency, with the special constitutional responsibility in view, and at the same time, consistently and 'in harmony with the dominant object, to improve to the maximum extent possible the conditions of service of its employees, particularly those at the lower levels. It is therefore the constitutional responsibility of the rule making authority to view the ideal of efficiency and competence and the competing interest of the employees in their proper perspective and balance them harmoniously, having due regard to the constitutional mandate. To tilt the balance against efficiency and competence inconsistently with the fundamental object of the grant of power is to act irrationally, unreasonably and unconstitutionally. It is true, as pointed out by the rule making authority, "absence of academic qualification should not alone be a hindrance to the holding of gazetted posts in the High Court", but to throw open the gazetted posts de hors the fundamental object of the constitutional grant of power and the very important public interest requiring the High Court to maintain the highest degree of efficiency, would be to act in excess of power. 27. In fact this principle is fully adhered to in respect of the post of Section Officer which i? unaffected by the amendment and where, except for the special provision contained in rule 16(c) protecting the non-graduates appointed to the service on or before 15th March 1960, like respondents 4 to 10, a degree is the minimum educational qualification. 27. In fact this principle is fully adhered to in respect of the post of Section Officer which i? unaffected by the amendment and where, except for the special provision contained in rule 16(c) protecting the non-graduates appointed to the service on or before 15th March 1960, like respondents 4 to 10, a degree is the minimum educational qualification. It is only in respect of the post of Court Officer that, by the impugned amendment, the basic educational requirements have been thrown overboard. 28. The Bench work was always handled by persons having specialised knowledge and experience. Although law qualification was fixed for the first time in 1960 for appointment as Court Officer, even before that date only persons who had the necessary experience in the Bench Section were appointed as Bench Clerks. In 1960 a degree in law was made compulsory for the Court Officer, although protection was granted in 1971 under the un-amended sub-rule (d) to those vanishing group of non-law graduate Assistants who were attached to the Bench Section on or before 15th March 1960. This was because of their long experience in that branch of work. 29. A degree in law was made essential for appointment as a Court Officer because of the highly specialised nature of his work. He is directly concerned with the machinery of justice. Without him its wheels will not easily move, and on him to a large extent the Bench and the Bar depend for speedy and efficient disposal of the cases. He. must, owing to the specialised nature of the work, necessarily have a law degree, apart from experience in the feeder categories, or at the Bar in the case of direct recruits. This was the consideration for the amendment of the Rules in 1960 to make law degree the minimum qualification for appointment as a Court Officer, and this has been the position ever since until the impugned amendment. Have the circumstances now changed making law degree unnecessary for the Court Officer? We have looked in vain for an answer in the counter-affidavit of the 2nd respondent. 30. Have the circumstances now changed making law degree unnecessary for the Court Officer? We have looked in vain for an answer in the counter-affidavit of the 2nd respondent. 30. Shri Abdul Gafoor in his extremely well prepared and able arguments submits that the rule making authority has acted unreasonably and arbitrarily in so far as he has made the impugned amendment without due regard to the relevant matters, such as the object of the power conferred on him under the Constitution, and the importance, significance and the specialised nature of the work and responsibilities entrusted with the Court Officer. On the other hand, counsel says, the authority has taken into account irrelevant matters such as those highlighted by the second respondent in his counter-affidavit. Counsel points out that the impugned amendment has done immeasurable damage to the High Court by seeking to dilute the high standard that is required of a Court Officer in the administration of justice. Counsel submits that the quota and the requirement of minimum age or length of service, as provided under the amended provision, for the promotion of non-law graduates as Court Officers, after integrating graduates with non-graduates in the respective feeder categories, will attract the vice pointed out by the Supreme Court in Mohd. Shujat Alt V. Union of India, AIR. 1974 SC. 1631 and by this Court in Velappan v. Chandran, 1975 KLT. 801 and subsequent decisions, so much so that the quota system and other restrictions will be successfully challenged, thereby leading to a position when persons without a law degree, or any degree at all, would begin to monopolise the majority of the vacancies arising in the future in the category of Court Officer. Such eventuality will be most detrimental to the interest of the institution. He further points out that the amendment, apart from the vice highlighted by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision, is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution on account of the law graduates being subjected to hostile discrimination vis-a-vis the non-law graduates in the divergent reckoning of the respective seniority of these groups and 31. He further points out that the amendment, apart from the vice highlighted by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision, is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution on account of the law graduates being subjected to hostile discrimination vis-a-vis the non-law graduates in the divergent reckoning of the respective seniority of these groups and 31. The Advocate General appearing for respondents 1 and 2 submits that the Chief Justice is the Authority entrusted under the Constitution with the power to make rules and, subject to any law made by the legislature of the State, and the provisions of the Constitution, he is entitled to make such rules as he deems necessary to regulate the conditions of service of the officers and servants of the High Court. He therefore submits that unless these rules conflict with the Constitutional or statutory provisions they are not liable to be impeached in these proceedings. 32. Shri Kelu Nambiar and Sri Avirah appearing for some of the additional respondents adopt the arguments of the Advocate General. They point out that the impugned amendment was made with a view to improving the conditions of service of a section of the undergraduate employees of this Court whose chances of promotion as Section Officers were otherwise far too remote. They do not agree that the principle stated in Mohd. Shujat All v. Union of India (AIR. 1974 SC. 1631) is violated by the amended sub-rule. 33. We shall now examine the raison deter of the amendment. Various representations had been made to the Chief Justice by the non-graduate errnployees and their association requesting for better promotional opportunities for them to rise to the post of Section Officer. The fundamental grievance of the non-graduates has been that, of the 23 posts of Section Officers, they are not in a position to secure anywhere near the 50 per cent limit prescribed under rule 16(c) and (f) for experienced non-graduates, who were appointed to the service on or before 15th March 1960, on account of the restriction that a graduate who is senior to a non-graduate should not be superseded by the latter. The non-graduates therefore submitted to the Chief Justice that their progress to the higher category of Section Officer is unduly restricted by the above said rule of seniority and that ways should be found for them for quicker ascent to that office. The non-graduates therefore submitted to the Chief Justice that their progress to the higher category of Section Officer is unduly restricted by the above said rule of seniority and that ways should be found for them for quicker ascent to that office. All this is clear from the representations filed by or on behalf of respondents 4 to 10 who are non-graduates appointed to the service on or before 15th March 1960 and therefore eligible to be appointed as Section Officers in terms of rule 16(c). 34. There were various other demands also, such as reservation of 25 per cent of the vacancies in the High Court for the dependents of the members of the High Court staff, removal of the requirement of second class degree for such dependants, the need to observe strictly the ratio between direct recruits and promotees for appointment to the post of Assistants Grade II, amendment of the rule concerning special qualification prescribed for the post of Assistants Grade II, etc. It was also one of the demands that non-graduates maybe appointed as Court Fee Examiners and Court Officers. But the question which loomed large in the minds of those who made the demands, as seen from the relevant files, was one for better promotional opportunities for the experienced non-graduates appointed to the service on or before 15th March 1960, to rise to the post of Section Officer. The demand that these non-graduates may also be appointed as Court Fee Examiners and Court Officers was only an additional or supplementary demand to support their main demand for promotion as Section Officers. Becoming Court Fee Examiners, from which post they could only be transferred as Court Officers, and not promoted to any higher post, or becoming Court Officers, from which post, as non-graduates, they could only be transferred as Section Officers, and not promoted to any higher post, was therefore not the real object of the demand, but only as a step towards the post of Section Officer. A section of the employees, namely, the Typists belonging to categories 5, 6, 9 and 13 in Division II, are aggrieved because, unlike the shorthand writers, there is no provision in column 3 against category 5 of Division I under Rule 6 for appointment of suitable and qualified Typists as Section Officers. A section of the employees, namely, the Typists belonging to categories 5, 6, 9 and 13 in Division II, are aggrieved because, unlike the shorthand writers, there is no provision in column 3 against category 5 of Division I under Rule 6 for appointment of suitable and qualified Typists as Section Officers. That this has been the true nature of the demand is clear from the concerned files which have been placed before us and also from the averments contained in the counter-affidavit sworn by the second respondent. 35. Of the various demands made by the non-graduates, the rule making authority has conceded but two. As already stated the existing protection of the graduate against being superseded by a relatively junior neh-igraduate has been considerably diluted and a quota of eight posts of Court Offteets has been created for the non-graduates. No other demand has been conceded under the amendment (Ext. P-2). 36. The amendment has not directly dealt with the existing protection enjoyed by the graduates against being superseded by the junior non-graduates, but it has watered down that principle to a considerable extent so much so that it has been in substance done away with in so far as the former Assistants Grade II and Typists Grade II are concerned. The amendment has made a fundamental deviation from the principle hitherto followed under the Rules, or, in respect of the Government employees, under the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, where seniority for the purpose of promotion to a higher post is, unless reduced to a lower rank as a punishment determined with reference to the date of first appointment to the feeder category. This is still the position under rule ,15 or sub-rule (f) of rule 16, This was also the position under the unatnended sub-rule (d) of rule 16 where protection was given to the law graduate against being superseded by a non-law graduate who was junior to him at the time of filling up the vacancy. 37. This is still the position under rule ,15 or sub-rule (f) of rule 16, This was also the position under the unatnended sub-rule (d) of rule 16 where protection was given to the law graduate against being superseded by a non-law graduate who was junior to him at the time of filling up the vacancy. 37. That a senior should not be superseded by a junior, where promotion is by selection, except when the junior is demonstrably superior, or, where promotion is based on seniority, except when the senior is unfit or unsuitable, is so cardinal a principle of service jurisprudence, based on justice, equity and good conscience, that any intention to deviate from it cannot be lightly imputed to a rule making authority : a graduate is senior not because he is a graduate, but because he has longer service in the relevant category. Yet that is what has been accomplished by the impugned amendment in so far as the former Assistants Grade II and Typists Grade II are concerned. That was indeed one of the most repeatedly pressed demands of the non-graduates. They were dissatisfied with the limit of 50 per cent envisaged under Rule 16 (f), particularly because that sub-rule also upholds the principle of seniority when it says "provided that a graduate who is senior to a non graduate will not be superseded by the application of this sub-rule". The relative seniority mentioned under that proviso is a seniority as reckoned under rule 15. It is the length of service in the feeder category that determines the relative seniority for the purpose of promotion. The complaint of the non-graduates, like respondents 4 to 10, has been that notwithstanding the provision for filling up half the vacancies in the category of Section Officer from among non-graduates eligible for promotion to the extent that suitable and qualified hands are available, their chances of promotion are few and far between as those vacancies are often filled up by graduates who happen to be senior to them in the respective feeder category. Their demand has therefore been to reserve the 50 per cent quota exclusively for themselves and not to let in any graduate, however senior within that quota. Their demand has therefore been to reserve the 50 per cent quota exclusively for themselves and not to let in any graduate, however senior within that quota. That has not been directly conceded by the amendment for the purpose of promotion as Section Officer, but indirectly conceded for promotion as Court Officer in so far as sub-rule (d) of rule 16, as amended, provides that the length of service of the non-graduates will be calculated not only with reference to the service in the feeder categories immediately below that of the Court Officer but also with reference to the service in categories below such feeder categories, such as that of Assistants Grade II and Typists Grade II. 38. The striking anomaly of this incongruous provision is that, while in the case of law graduates their seniority will be reckoned with reference to rule 15, in the case of non-law graduates their seniority will be reckoned :With reference to Rule 1<5;(d) (i). That this special method of reckoning seniority applies only to non-law graduates, and not to law graduate, sfsis clear from clause (v) which refers to clause (i). That clause deals only with non-law graduates. 39. The divergent modes introduced by the amendment in reckoning the relative seniority of law graduates and non-law graduates for promotion as Court Officers place the non-law graduates at considerable advantage over the law graduates. This distinction cannot be supported by any rule of justice, equity or good conscience. It is indeed an unreasonable and unfair classification having no rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. It is, in our view, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of" the Constitution. 40. This distinction cannot be supported by any rule of justice, equity or good conscience. It is indeed an unreasonable and unfair classification having no rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved. It is, in our view, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 16 of" the Constitution. 40. Assuming that the amended sub-rule can be so read as to apply to law graduates and non-law graduates alike and thus avoid the divergent reckoning of seniority as between these two groups, it would then mean that a law graduate who was promoted as Assistant Grade I prior to 22nd September 1980, in supersession of a non-graduate who was senior to him in the category next below, but not protected by sub-rule (e) of rule 16 which then applied only to non-graduates "who were in the service on 15th March 1960" and therefore not qualified for promotion, would now be superseded by the non-graduate, who entered category 8 as Assistant Grade I subsequent to 22nd September 1980 when that sub-rule was amended to delete the words "who were in the service on 15th March, 1960". Thus a "non-law graduate", - meaning even a mere S.S.L.C., as it is now understood by the appointing authority - who is junior to a "law graduate" in the feeder category 8 (Assistant Grade I) would, by reckoning his total service in that category as well as in the category next below, supersede the law graduate for promotion. Thus a person having acquired a right on the strength of the then existing Rules is suddenly deprived of that right and made junior to a person who was until the impugned amendment junior to him in the relevant feeder category. This implicit retrospective deprivation of the acquired right of the law graduate and the conferment of a special right on the non-law graduate at the expense of the former is unreasonable and unfair. It is based on an arbitrary classification having no rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved It is contrary to the principle of equality enshrined in Arts.14 and 16 of the Constitution. 41. Significantly the rule making authority has failed to take note of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Mohamed Shujat Alt v. Union of India, (AIR. 1974 SC. 1631) and followed by this Court in Velappan v. Chandran (1975 KLT. 801>. 41. Significantly the rule making authority has failed to take note of the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Mohamed Shujat Alt v. Union of India, (AIR. 1974 SC. 1631) and followed by this Court in Velappan v. Chandran (1975 KLT. 801>. While it is open to the authority to provide that non-graduates are not entitled to be promoted to the higher posts, although they are integrated with the graduates in the feeder categories and treated alike, it would not be legitimate to prescribe a quota for the promotion of non-graduates or to impose other restrictions on them, for such preferential treatment of graduates vis-a-vis non-graduates would be discriminatory. The Supreme Court stated in Mohamed Shujat Ali v. Union of India (AIR. 1974 SC. 1631 at 1655). "Now, there are three decisions of this Court where educational qualifications have been recognised as forming a valid basis for classification The test of reasonable classification has to be applied in each case on its peculiar facts and circumstances. It may be perfectly legitimate for the administration to say that having regard to the nature of the functions and duties attached to the post, for the purpose of achieving efficiency in public service, only degree holders in engineering shall be eligible for promotion and not diploma or certificate holders But where graduates and non-graduates are both regarded as fit and, therefore, eligible for promotion, it is difficult to see how, consistently with the claim for equal opportunity, any Differentiation can be made between them by laying down a quota of promotion for each and giving preferential treatment to graduates over non-graduates in the matter of fixation of such quota. The result of fixation of quota of promotion for each of the two categories of Supervisors would be that when a vacancy arises in the post of Assistant Engineer, which, according to the quota is reserved for graduate supervisors, a non-graduate supervisor cannot be promoted to that vacancy, even if he is senior to all other graduate supervisors and more suitable than they. His opportunity for promotion would be limited only to vacancies available for non-graduate supervisors. That would clearly amount to denial of equal opportunity to him. When there is a vacancy earmarked for graduate supervisors, a non-graduate supervisor would be entitled to ask: 'I am senior to the graduate supervisors, who is intended to be promoted. His opportunity for promotion would be limited only to vacancies available for non-graduate supervisors. That would clearly amount to denial of equal opportunity to him. When there is a vacancy earmarked for graduate supervisors, a non-graduate supervisor would be entitled to ask: 'I am senior to the graduate supervisors, who is intended to be promoted. I am more suitable than he is. It is no doubt true that I am anon-graduate, but my not being a graduate has not been branded as a disqualification. I am equally eligible for being promoted. My technical equipment supplemented by experience is considered adequate for discharging the functions of Assistant Engineer. Then why am I being denied the opportunity for promotion and the graduate supervisor is preferred. There can.be no satisfactory answer to this question." 42. The vice of discrimination based on the quota rule, as enunciated by the Supreme Court, in respect of persons already integrated in the feeder categories, invalidates the impugned amendment. In a number of categories, such as Senior Grade Assistants (category 1A in Division II), Selection Grade Shorthand Writers (category IB in Division II), Shorthand Writers Grade I (category 7 in Division II), Assistants Grade I (category 8 in Division II) and Shorthand Writers Grade II (category 10 in Division II), the graduates and the non-graduates are merged under the existing Rules. They are treated alike for discharging the duties of those posts. There were 115 posts, as on 11th July 1983, under those categories. While it is perfectly legitimate to shut out the non-law graduates for further promotion as Court Officers, to provide a quota for promotion of non-law graduates, which is what has been done by the amendment, is to strike at the very root of the principle of equality in the matter of promotion as enunciated by the Supreme Court. Shri Gafoor is therefore perfectly right in pointing out that the natural consequence of this amendment would be to throw open the posts of Court Officers to all the law graduates and non-law graduates alike without any quota or other restrictions about age or experience. Shri Gafoor is therefore perfectly right in pointing out that the natural consequence of this amendment would be to throw open the posts of Court Officers to all the law graduates and non-law graduates alike without any quota or other restrictions about age or experience. That would mean that the non-law graduates will soon monopolise the post of Court Officer-especially if the "non-law graduate" is construed to include even an S.S L.C, as appears to be the stand of the appointing authority, - as a result of which the character of that office will radically change to the detriment of the public interest and the efficiency of this Court. 43. The rule making authority was apparently not unaware of the principle stated by the Supreme Court in Mohamed ShujatAli V. Union of India (AIR. 1974 SC. 1631) for in the counter-affidavit an assertion has been made by the second respondent that the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohamed Shujat AH v. Union of India (AIR.1974 SC 1631) has no application to the facts of this case. That shows that the true state of affairs, in the light of the relevant law, has not been correctly appreciated by the rule making authority. 44. There is no statement in the counter-affidavit to indicate that the rule making authority had seriously applied bas mind to the question whether the vice pointed out by the Supreme Court in Mohammed Shujat AH v. Union of India (AIR. 1974 SC. 1631) would be attracted by the amendment so as to jeopardise the quota and throw open all the posts to mere matriculates, as the expression "non-law graduates" has been understood and acted upon by the appointing authority. There is no whisper in the counter affidavit whether such an eventuality had been seriously thought of by the rule making authority and whether he had come to the conclusion that the consequences would not be contrary to the public interest or impair the efficiency of the office or adversely affect the institution. 45. The amendment speaks of "law graduates" and "non-law graduates". We should have thought that, these two groups being in concept the converse of each other, the latter is still a graduate without a law degree, add not a mere matriculate. 45. The amendment speaks of "law graduates" and "non-law graduates". We should have thought that, these two groups being in concept the converse of each other, the latter is still a graduate without a law degree, add not a mere matriculate. However respondents 1 and 2 seem to have understood "non-law graduate" as a mere S.S.L.C. or E.S.L.C. We are told that subsequent to this amendment and under the protection of the interim order, persons without any degree have been promoted as Court Officers. We are indeed surprised to hear that even during the hearing of this case a non-graduate has been appointed. Whatever be the propriety of such appointment, we do not express any final view as to the meaning of "non-law graduate". 46. It may be true that in the light of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mohd. Shujat Alt v. Union of India AIR 1974 SC. 1631, the fifty per cent outer limit prescribed under sub-rule (f) of rule 16 for promotion of non-graduates as Assistants Grade I or as Senior Grade Assistants in terms of sub-rule (e) may, in theory, prove to be unsustainable; but then, the removal of that limit will not benefit the non-graduates because their initial entry as Assistants Grade II under sub-rule (g) is limited to persons having either a total service of 12 years in the High Court or 7 years in the specified feeder categories; the non-graduates and graduates being appointed as Assistants Grade II only in the ratio of 1:2. This means that only 1/3rd of the posts in the category of Assistants Grade II are reserved for non-graduates having the requisite experience, and these non-graduates will not therefore be in a position to occupy more than 1/3rd of the posts available in the categories next above. This is where it pinches the non-graduates and not sub-rule (f). But it is unavoidable and inescapable so long as the non-graduates remain non-graduates. 47. The ratio provided for the initial appointment of non-graduates vis-a-vis graduates as Assistants Grade II (category 11, Division II) is perfectly valid and consistent with the well recognised principles: see Mohd Shujat Ali v Union of India (AIR. 1974 SC. 1631). But it is unavoidable and inescapable so long as the non-graduates remain non-graduates. 47. The ratio provided for the initial appointment of non-graduates vis-a-vis graduates as Assistants Grade II (category 11, Division II) is perfectly valid and consistent with the well recognised principles: see Mohd Shujat Ali v Union of India (AIR. 1974 SC. 1631). So is the requirement regarding the length of service to enable a non-graduate to become eligible to come within the ratio for the initial entry into category 11, Division II (Assistants Grade II) which, but for sub-rule (g) of Rule 16, is open only to graduates. These restrictions for the initial entry of non-graduates as Assistants Grade II are warranted by the paramount public interest to maintain and promote efficiency, competence and quality of the service in consonance with the constitutional obligations of the High Court. As we have already indicated, sub-rule (c) of rule 16, [as was the unamended sub-rule (d)], is perfectly valid, as it is a special provision for the benefit of an experienced, but dwindling class of non-graduates appointed to the service on or before 15th March 1960. The same was the case with sub-rule (g) of rule 16, as it originally stood, when it applied only to Typist-Copyists and Copyists who were members of the service on 15th March 1960. We say all this only because of, what we call, the needless apprehension expressed at the bar as to the validity of the limit prescribed under sub-rule (f) of rule 16. 48. We find no justification in thinking, as respondents 1 and 2 seem to do, that the unamended sub rule (d) which protected the non-graduates who had been attached to the Bench Section on or before 15th March 1960 was any justification for extending that principle to non-law graduates appointed subsequently. By relying on the principle of the unamended sub-rule (d), applicable to a vanishing class of persons to whom protection was granted because of their past experience in the Bench Section, the rule making authority has taken into account a totally irrelevant matter in providing a quota for the non-law graduates generally. 49. There is no statement in the counter-affidavit to indicate that the rule making authority had taken into account the unique character of the office of the Court Officers. 49. There is no statement in the counter-affidavit to indicate that the rule making authority had taken into account the unique character of the office of the Court Officers. It is not stated that in the opinion of the rule making authority it is unnecessary for the Court Officer to be a law graduate. That question does not seem to have been seriously considered at all. AH that weighed with the authority was the demand of the non-graduates for better opportunities for promotion as Section Officers. But it is stated in the counter-affidavit "In the words of the Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice 'absence of academic qualification should not alone be a hindrance to the holding of gazetted posts in the High Court' ". The reference was to the gazetted posts which in the context of the demand meant the posts of Section Officers and not Court Officers. Assuming that the rule making authority believes that academic qualification should be relaxed for the Court Officers, it is not stated on what material that belief has come to be entertained. What are the reasons for thinking that it is unnecessary for the Court Officer to be a law graduate, one is not told, apart from a reference to the position of those non-graduates who had been attached to the Bench Section prior to 15th March 1960 which, as we have pointed out, is an irrelevant consideration. 50. A perusal of the counter-affidavit gives one the impression that the consequences of the amendment were not seriously considered by the rule making authority. The counter-affidavit gives one the impression that the amendment was thought of as a mere short-cut in the context of the larger demand of the non-graduates for further opportunities for promotion as Section Officers. The amendment, in our view, is not the result of an objective evaluation of the relevant factors. 51. None of the persons who made representations stated to what extent the appointment of non-graduates fell short of the outer limit prescribed under Rule 16. The rule making authority does not seem to have applied his mind to that vital question. The relevant statistics do not appear to have been adverted to. The figures could have been examined and remedial action, if necessary, could have been taken by recourse to the power nunnery sub-rules (c) and (e), but subject to the other provisions of rule 16. 52. The relevant statistics do not appear to have been adverted to. The figures could have been examined and remedial action, if necessary, could have been taken by recourse to the power nunnery sub-rules (c) and (e), but subject to the other provisions of rule 16. 52. In a case where the validity of a statutory instrument is in question, the court must necessarily examine the nature, objects and scheme of the instrument as a whole, and, on the basis of that examination, it must consider what exactly was the area over which, and the purpose for which, power has been granted by the Constitution or the governing Act. 53. There is of course a higher degree of presumption of constitutionality in favour of statutory instruments than there is in the case of administrative orders. This is particularly so where, as in the present case, rules have been made by virtue of constitutional grant of power Rules made directly under the Constitution are of greater legislative efficacy than those made under a statute. Within the field demarcated by the Constitution, the former can, if so provided, operate retrospectively: K. Nagaraj v. State of A. P. (1985) 1 SCC. 523, 551, Raj Kumar v. Union of India (1975) 4 SCC. 13,14 and B. S Vader v. Union of India AIR. 1969 SC. 118, These rules are, however, as in the case of all statutory instruments, controlled by the Constitution and the laws. 54. These are rules and do not therefore partake of the character of ordinances which are legislation in the true sense for the limited period of their operation: K Nagaraj v State of A. P. (1985) 1 SCC. 523, 551, A K. Roy v. Union of India (1982) I SCC 271, 286 and, R. K. Garg v Union of India (1981) 4 SCC. 675, 687. While ordinances cannot be questioned on any ground which is not relevant to the validity of legislation, rules made by virtue of power granted under the Constitution are liable to be declared void for any of the reasons for which orders made under Acts of Parliament can be declared void. Rules made, whether under the Constitution or a statute, must be intra vires the parent law under which power has been delegated. They must also be in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution and other laws. Rules made, whether under the Constitution or a statute, must be intra vires the parent law under which power has been delegated. They must also be in harmony with the provisions of the Constitution and other laws. If they do not tend in some degree to the accomplishment of the objects for which power has been conferred upon the authority, courts will declare them to be unreasonable and, therefore, void. 55. Statutory instruments are liable to be declared invalid if they are manifestly unjust or oppressive or outrageous or directed to an unauthorised and or violative of the general principles of the law of the land or so vague that it cannot be predicated with certainty as to what is prohibited by them or so unreasonable that they cannot be attributed to the power delegated or otherwise disclose bad faith. If they involved such oppressive or gratuitous interference with the rights of those subject to them as could find no justification in the minds of reasonable men. the Court might well say, "Parliament never intended to give authority to make such rules; they are unreasonable and ultra vires": per Lord Russell of Killeen, C. J. in Kruse v. Johnson (1898) 2 Q B. 91, 99. 56 In S. I Syndicate Ltd v. Union of 1ndia AIR. 1975 SC. 460, the Supreme Court stated: "Reasonableness, for purposes of judging whether there was an 'excess of power' or an 'arbitrary' exercise of it, is really the demonstration of a reasonable nexus between the matters which are taken into account in exercising a power and the purposes of exercise of that power." 1n P. C S Mills v. Union of India AIR. 1973 SC. 537, the Supreme Court, referring to statutory fixation of fair price, stated: "But this does not mean that Government can fix any arbitrary price, or a price fixed on extraneous considerations or such that it does not secure a reasonable return on the capital employed in the industry. Such a fixation would at once evoke a challenge, both on the ground of its being inconsistent with the guidelines built in the sub-section and its being in contravention of Arts.19(1)(f) and (g)" See also observation to the same effect in Shree Meenakshi Mills v. Union of India (AIR. 1974 SC. 366). 57. Such a fixation would at once evoke a challenge, both on the ground of its being inconsistent with the guidelines built in the sub-section and its being in contravention of Arts.19(1)(f) and (g)" See also observation to the same effect in Shree Meenakshi Mills v. Union of India (AIR. 1974 SC. 366). 57. Any arbitrary exercise of power by a public authority, whether or not it is in the nature of subordinate legislation, is liable to be condemned as violative of Art. 14. As stated by the Supreme Court in E. P. Roy appa v. State of Tamil Nadu (AIR. 1974 SC 555). '.....equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch " See also Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (AIR. 1978 SC. 597), Ajay Hasia v, Khalid Mujib (AIR. 1981 SC. 485) and D. S. Ankara v. Union of 1ndia (AIR. 1983 SC. 126). 58. An act is ultra vires either because the authority has acted in excess of its power in the narrow sense, or because it has abused its power by acting in bad faith or for an inadmissible purpose or on irrelevant grounds or without regard to relevant considerations or with gross unreasonableness: see the principle stated by Lord Greene M R in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation ((!947) 2 A11.E R.680, 685). Power is exercised in bad faith where its repository is motivated by personal animosity towards those who are directly affected by its exercise. Power is no less abused even when it is exercised in good faith, but for an unauthorised purpose or on irrelevant grounds, etc. A stated by Lord Macnaghten in Westminster Corporation v. London and North Western Railwav ((1905) AC. 426, 430) ...It is well settled that a public body invested with statutory powers such as those conferred upon the Corporation must take care not to exceed or abuse its powers. It must keep within the limits of the authority committed toil. It must act in good faith. And it must act reasonably, The last proposition is involved in the second, if not in the first" This principle was approved by the Supreme Court in Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board (AIR. 1967 SC. It must keep within the limits of the authority committed toil. It must act in good faith. And it must act reasonably, The last proposition is involved in the second, if not in the first" This principle was approved by the Supreme Court in Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board (AIR. 1967 SC. 295) ".....Even if (the statutory order) is passed in good faith and with the best of intention to further the purpose of the legislation which confers the powers, since the Authority has to act in accordance with and within the limits of that legislation, its order can also be challenged if it is beyond those limits or is passed on grounds extraneous to the legislation or if there are no grounds at all for passing it or if the grounds are such that no one can reasonably arrive at the opinion or satisfaction requisite under the legislation. In any one of these situations it can well be said that the authority did not honestly form its opinion or that in forming it, it did not apply its mind to the relevant facts." 59. The true position thus appears to be that, just as is the case of an administrative action, so in the case of a statutory instrument, its validity is open to question if it is ultra vires the governing Act or repugnant to constitutional principles or opposed to other laws of the land or it is so arbitrary or unreasonable that no fair minded authority could ever have made it. It must, therefore, satisfy the test adopted by Lord Russell in Kruse v. Johnson ((1898) 2 Q.B. 91) and by Lord Greene M. R. in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corporation ((1948) 1 K.B. 223). See also Mixnam Properties Ltd. v. Chertsey U.D C ((1965) AC. 735); Commissioners of Customs and Excise v. Cure and Deeley Ltd. ((1962)1 Q B. 340); Macldowney v Forde ((1971) AC. 632); Carltona Ltd. v. Commissioners of Works and others (1943)2 All E.R.560.564; Point of Ayr. Collieries Ltd v. Lloyd George (1943)2 All E.R.546; Scott v. Glasgow Corporation (1899) A.C. 470,492; Robert Baird L. D. and others v. City of Glasgow (1936) A.C. 32,42 and Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner (1936) 297 U.S.129.134. 60. 632); Carltona Ltd. v. Commissioners of Works and others (1943)2 All E.R.560.564; Point of Ayr. Collieries Ltd v. Lloyd George (1943)2 All E.R.546; Scott v. Glasgow Corporation (1899) A.C. 470,492; Robert Baird L. D. and others v. City of Glasgow (1936) A.C. 32,42 and Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Commissioner (1936) 297 U.S.129.134. 60. Even if it were to be assumed that rules made by virtue of power granted under a provision of the constitution are of such legislative efficacy and amplitude that they cannot be questioned on grounds ordinarily sufficient to invalidate statutory instruments, they are nevertheless liable to be struck down if found to be intrinsically arbitrary or based on an irrational classification or otherwise repugnant to constitutional principles. In the words of the Supreme Court in E. P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (AIR. 1974 SC. 555). "Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14. and if it affects any matter relating to public employment, it is also violative of Article 16. Articles 14 and 16 strike at arbitrariness in State action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. They require that State action must be based on valid relevant principles applicable alike to all similarly situate and it must not be guided by any extraneous or irrelevant considerations because that would be denial of equality. Where the operative reason for State action, as distinguished from motive inducing from the antechamber of the mind, is not legitimate and relevant but is extraneous and outside the area of permissible considerations, it would amount to mala fide exercise of power and that is bit by Articles 14 and 16. Mala fide exercise of power and arbitrariness are different lethal radiations emanating from the same vice; in fact the latter comprehends the former. Both are inhibited by Articles 14 and 16." 61. We hold, for the reasons already stated, that the impugned amendment is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is discriminatory, irrational and arbitrary. For this reason alone it is ultra vires the constitutional grant of power. 62. It is the vital interest of the public that the High Court functions most efficiently. Its efficiency would to a large extent depend upon the excellence and quality of the service rendered by its employees. It is discriminatory, irrational and arbitrary. For this reason alone it is ultra vires the constitutional grant of power. 62. It is the vital interest of the public that the High Court functions most efficiently. Its efficiency would to a large extent depend upon the excellence and quality of the service rendered by its employees. The duties and responsibilities of the Court Officer are such that expertise is an essential requirement for appointment to that post. A degree in law is a minimum guarantee that a person recruited directly with experience at the bar or promoted from the feeder categories would have the necessary skill and ability to discharge his duties effectively. To dilute these requirements is to weaken the institution permanently and thus defeat the vital public interest to promote the rule of law. We are not satisfied that these considerations weighed with the rule making authority. On the other hand, the relevant files and the pleadings disclose that the rule making authority has not only failed to take these matters into account, but has positively ignored them, as indi-;cated by the casual reference to the academic qualification being a hindrance to the holding of gazetted posts. We are of opinion that the various complications resulting from the impugned amendment and the resultant illegality by reason of clash with the constitutional principles have, as already stated, been totally ignored by the rule making authority. It has on the other hand acted on totally irrelevant grounds, such as the special benefit conferred by the unamended sub-rule (d) of rule 16 on the diminishing group of non-law graduates attached to the Bench Section on or before 15th March 1960; the diverse demands of different sections of employees on matters unconnected with the post of Court Officer; and the like. It was not the intention of the Constitution makers to confer power on the authority to make rules otherwise than on a due consideration of exclusively relevant matters. 63. Accordingly we hold that the impugned amendment is null and void, illegal and of no effect; and so are all the appointments made in terms of Ext. P-2. They are so declared. 64. 63. Accordingly we hold that the impugned amendment is null and void, illegal and of no effect; and so are all the appointments made in terms of Ext. P-2. They are so declared. 64. In any view of the matter, even assuming that the amendment is valid, the appointment of non-graduates, like respondents 4, 5, 6 and 7, as Court Officers to vacancies which arose prior to the date of publication of the amended provision (Ext. P2) was invalid. The appointment had to be made in accordance with the rules in force at the time of the occurrence of the vacancies. Admittedly these vacancies arose prior to 14th June 1984. These respondents were appointed on 19th July 1984 The dat? of publication of Ext. P2 in the Kerala Gazette, as required under Rule 1, was only on 24th July 1984 which was the date on which Ext P2 came into force The respondents have no case that the rules came into force retrospectively. Any appointment to any vacancy, which arose prior to the date on which the amendment came into force, had to be made in accordance with the unamended provisions: See James Thomas v. Chief Justice 1977 KLT. 622 (FB.) Varghese v. State of Kerala 1981 KLT. 458 (FB ) Gracy v State of Kerala 1972 KLT. 141 and R K. V Motors and Timbers v. R TO. 1982 KLT. 166 (FB ) Viewed also in this light, all appointments made otherwise than in accordance with the unamended provisions to the vacancies which arose prior to 14th June 1984 are null and void and of no effect. They are so declared. 65. Before we part with this case, we must point out that the Typists, in our view, are justified in complaining that they are unreasonably denied the same protection as the Shorthand Writers enjoy under column 3 against category 5 in the table under Rule 6 We have no doubt that this matter will be considered by the rule making authority In the light of what we have stated, the Original Petition is allowed. The parties will, however, bear their respective costs.