A. P. RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) THIS civil revision application provides an illustration as to what happens when civil courts pass orders (ad-interim or interim) without taking into consideration the natural and ordinary consequences flowing therefrom. The case on hand illustrates what a chaotic situation is created in public admi- nistration and public finance and how the working of the State/public sector undertaking is paralysed and what an immense damage is done to the party who is really affected and yet not joined in the suit merely because the lower courts failed to take little more care at the initial stage. Therefore. the ques- tion arises in certain type of cases should the civil courts issue even ex-parte ad interim orders without putting the plaintiff to any terms ? Should the litiga- tion which can be indulged into without any risk and which is likely to cause public damage be encouraged would it not be proper if the lower courts be little more careful and circumspect while passing orders (ad interim or interim) even at the initial stage in matters which are likely to have wider ramifications in the realm of public administration and public finances? ( 2 ) THE facts in brief leading to this revision application are as follows: the Gujarat Electricity Board by advertisement dated 13/07/1984 invited tenders for sale of 700 m. t. of iron scrap lying at Ukai. Serveral parties filed in tenders. The tenders were to be opened on 1/09/1984 There is no dispute with regard to the fact that there were 21 tenderers including the petitioner and the tender filled in by the petitioner was also held to have been submitted within time. It is an admitted position that the petitioner-plaintiff quoted the rate of Rs 2331/- per m. t. and also stipulated further condition to the effect that the payment will be made in five instalments and delivery shall be taken in five instalments each instalment being of no days duration. Respondent No. 5 herein had quoted the rate of Rs. 2304. 00 per m. t. but had stipulated no condition for instalments. It appeals that respondent No. 5 wrote a letter dated September 24 1984 and raised its offer to Rs. 2365. 00 per mt. Respondent No. 5 herein had quoted the rate of Rs. 2304. 00 per m. t. but had stipulated no condition for instalments. It appeals that respondent No. 5 wrote a letter dated September 24 1984 and raised its offer to Rs. 2365. 00 per mt. The Board informed the petitioner by its letter dated 19/10/1984 that the offer made by the petitioner has not been considered and therefore the petitioner was requested to send duly stamped receipt for the refund of the earnest money paid by the petition. On the same day the Board informed respondent No. 5 that the tender filled in by it was accepted. Before the contract could be executeed by respondent No. 5 and the Board. the petitioner tiled the suit on 5/11/1984. The petitioner contended that the lender filled in by the petitioner was the highest and that the petitioners tender ought in to have been accepted by the Board. The petitioner further contended that against the terms of auction respondent No. 5 revised its offer within the validity period and thereby disqualified itself from being considered and therefore the Board could not have accepted the tender of respondent No. 5. Be it noted that the petitioner did not join respondent No. 5 in the suit and made aforesaid prayers. Respondent No. 5 has been joined in civil revision application as per the direction given by this Court. ( 3 ) IN the suit the Board appeared and contended that the acceptance of the tender of respondent No. 5 was perfectly legal and valid and there was nothing unlawful or illegal. It was also submitted that if the offers made by the petitioner (Rs. 2331/- per m. t.) were properly scrutinised and it was not the highest offer but it as next to the highest. this was so because the petitioner had stipulated the condition to take delivery within 100 days and the petitioner was to make payment by five instalments each instalment being of 20 days duration. If the loss of interest at the rate of 18% per annum for 100 days is taken into consideration it would come to little over Rs. 64000. 00 and the total net price which may be realised by the Board would be around Rs. If the loss of interest at the rate of 18% per annum for 100 days is taken into consideration it would come to little over Rs. 64000. 00 and the total net price which may be realised by the Board would be around Rs. 15 67 0 On the offer hand as per the offer of respondent No. 5 the amount that may be realised on cash basis at the rate of Rs. 2304. 00 per m. t. would be in the vicinity of Rs. 16 13 0 The trial court accepted the defence put forth by the Board and rejected application Exh. 5. The lower appellate court also dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioner-plaintiff. In these proceedings the period of about six months has elapsed. It may he noted that the value of iron scrap put up for sale was any where between Rs. 15 to Rs. 20. 00 lakhs. ( 4 ) IN this revision application directed against the orders passed by the lower courts. the petitioner contends that the lower courts cught to have held that respondent No 5 has acted in contravention of clause 19 of the terms and conditions of the tenders and therefore respondent No. 5 was disqualified and its tender should not have been accepted it is also contended that the petitioners offer was the highest and therefore it was not open to the Beard to accept the offer of respondent No. 5 which was lower than that of the petitioner. Lastly it is contended that at any rate. if the Board thought it fit to enter into negotiations with respondent No. 5 then in that case. the petitioner also should have been invited for further negotiations and should have been given an opportunity to raise its offer. ( 5 ) BEFORE examining the contentions raised by the petitioner at this stage it would be proper to 300k at the course of the litigation and the complications created on account of the orders passed by the lower courts. The trial court as well as the lower appellate court restrained the Board from selling the iron scrap worth about Rs. 15. 00 to Rs. 20. 00 lakhs to any person whomsoever. Both the lower courts did not impose any terms nr conditions on the petitioner and granted blanket stay as prayed for. The trial court as well as the lower appellate court restrained the Board from selling the iron scrap worth about Rs. 15. 00 to Rs. 20. 00 lakhs to any person whomsoever. Both the lower courts did not impose any terms nr conditions on the petitioner and granted blanket stay as prayed for. The lower court failed to take into consideration the far reaching financial and administrative consequences which were to ensue from their orders. It would not require any managerial on entrepreneurial skill to visualise as to what will be the consequences of the order by which the sale of iron scrap in huge quantity as stated above is stayed. The natural consequences which will ensue and with little application of mind it can be visualised by any man of ordinary prudence are as follows:1 The Board would be deprived of its liquid funds till the party whose tender is accepted (and who has not been made party to the suit and appeal before the lower courts) makes payment of the goods sold who in turn would not be in a position to pay nor the Board will be in a position to accept. 2 The Board will be required to keep the goods with it though as per the terms and conditions of the contract the successful bidder could have been asked to clear the same within 45 days from the date of acceptance of the tender. 3 The Board would not be in a position to accept the sale price from the successful bidder. Similarly the successful bidder would not be in a position to pay the same. The successful bidder also will have to keep the funds ready for payment and therefore it will not be possible for the successful bidder to invest or spend the huge amount of about Rs. 16 to Rs. lakhs for any other purpose. 4 Uncertainly would prevail amongst the members of business community. No one can be sure about the outcome of the litigation. Consequently. businessmen would he slow to come and bid at the auction held by the State and public undertakings which are considered State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. 5 The entire working of the State or the public undertakings would be disturbed. No one can be sure about the outcome of the litigation. Consequently. businessmen would he slow to come and bid at the auction held by the State and public undertakings which are considered State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. 5 The entire working of the State or the public undertakings would be disturbed. This would result into demoralisation of the administration and also result into escalation of cost the cost which will have to be ultimately borne by the society at large. 6 this type of litigations as it has happened in this case also the party parties affected is/are ordinarily not joined. In the present case also the plaintiff did not join respondent No 5 as defendant in the suit though the bid of respondent No. 5 was considered to be highest. In revision application as per the directions given by the Court respondent No. 5 has been jointed. Hence on account of the order passed by the court the parties who are not before the court are being adversely affected. This happens without even notice to them leaving aside the rant of opportunity of being heard. ( 6 ) THE aforesaid consequences can be visualized by any man of ordinary prudence and understanding. One should only take little mental exercise and examine the question in proper perspective and should ponder over the probable consequences of the order that is prayed for and that is being granted In such cases even temporary order can cause havoc and bring about a stalemate or chaotic situation. Even so it appears to have become a routine for to lower courts to grant ex parte ad interim orders affecting day-to-day business activity of the State and/or public sector undertaking and that too in the sphere of business where delay of on or two days also may cause irreparable loss either to the State or public sector undertaking or to the successful bidder. It appears that such order are being passed mechanically and mostly Must for asking. Though in the instant case the lower court passed the ultimate orders correctly but unfortunately failed to take into consideration the far reaching ramifications of their temporary orders. It appears that such order are being passed mechanically and mostly Must for asking. Though in the instant case the lower court passed the ultimate orders correctly but unfortunately failed to take into consideration the far reaching ramifications of their temporary orders. Simply because the State and public sector undertaking which are held to be State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution are subjected to constitutional restraints flowing from Chapter III of the Constitution it does not mean that they are not required to act on business principles and that they are not free to act in pragmatic and businesslike manner. Even for temporary period if the freedom of managers of public sector undertakings is curtailed it would lead to chaotic situations. The court should be slow to interfere with the action of the State and the public sector undertaking where even the temporary order that may be passed by the court are likely to have far reaching financial and administrative consequences. Before exercising the powers of judicial review one is required to ask the question: Is the decision of the State/public sector authority illegal and/or tainted with fraud? ones it is shown that there is no illegality no mala fides or no frauds the working of the state/public sector undertaking ordinarily cannot and should not be interfered with lightly as is being done by civil courts and as it has happened in this case. It may also be released that on mere allegations in the plaint or aberrance arbitrariness illegality fraud and/or mala fides are not to be taken as proved. It is often said that allegations of mala fides are easy to be made but difficult to be proved. It is much more so when the actions of public sector undertaking are challenged by rival businessmen. Recently the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the question of interim relief being. granted against public authorities and the Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Collector C. E. Chandan Nagar v. Dunlop India Ltd AIR 1985 SC 83 (1) has observed as follows:. ". . . Recently the Supreme Court had an occasion to consider the question of interim relief being. granted against public authorities and the Supreme Court in the case of Assistant Collector C. E. Chandan Nagar v. Dunlop India Ltd AIR 1985 SC 83 (1) has observed as follows:. ". . . BUT since the law presumes that public authorities function properly and bona fide with due regard to the public interest a court must be circumspect in granting interim orders of far reaching dimensions or orders causing administrative burden some inconvenience or orders preventing collection of public revenue for no better reason than that the parties have come to the Court alleging prejudice inconvenience or harm and that a prima facie case has been shown. There can be and there are no hard and fast rules. But prudence. discretion and circumspection are called for. There are several other vital considerations apart from the existence of a prima facie case. There is the question of balance of convenience. There is the question of irreparable injury. There is the question of public interest. There are many such factors worthy of consideration. . . ". Over and above the aforesaid considerations laid down by the Supreme Court it must be borne in mind that the functioning of the public authorities is like an open book. The managers of the public sector undertakings are constantly in the public graze. They are subjected to open criticisms by the Press and by the Representatives of the public on the floor of Assembly or Parliament as the case may be. They are again subjected to supervision either by the public Accounts Committee of the State Legislature or by the Estimate Committee of the Parliament. public authorities are again subjected to the restrictions imposed upon them under the relevant statute and their actions are subject to supervision and control of the proper authority of the Government also. The public authorities do not work for private gains. Interference in the day-to-day working of the public authorities and much more in the sphere of business world where the financial and administrative consequences are likely to be far reaching should be resorted to as a last resort. The public authorities do not work for private gains. Interference in the day-to-day working of the public authorities and much more in the sphere of business world where the financial and administrative consequences are likely to be far reaching should be resorted to as a last resort. Interference by way of judicial review should he considered an extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly rather than wielding it lightly just for asking at the request of a busy body or a rival businessman who merely takes chance without ignoring any risk whatsoever. ( 7 ) IN A Abhayrajs case (20 (2) GLR 306) this Court (Coram: M. P. Thakkaar. J. as he then was) had an occasion to prescribe certain dos and donts for public sector undertaking they can be summarized as follows:1 It must be released that the public sector undertakings cannot be prevented from showing enterprise or charting out a bold or new course or from taking initiative or from making experiments research or innovations in the sphere of their business activities if the public sector is to service and succeed. In fact they must be encouraged to do so and to benefit by the trial and error method. To say that it must not act arbitrarily or unreasonably is not to say that the aforesaid course is denied to them. 2 What is to be guarded against is the temptation to succumb to favouritism nepotism or patronage for oblique considerations. Subject to this restraint the public sector is not shackled by any constraints in The matter of enterprise or innovation so long as it is acting in good faith and so long as it is not indulging in hospital discrimination between citizens. 3 The question has to be viewed pragmatically from the perspective of day-to-day business operation. The public sector undertaking can certainly se its goods thorough agents like other private sector concerns. No doubt the selection of agents must not he on arbitrary and urinal Guernseys and it must on business principals. So long as people are not excluded or preferred on grounds which would offend Article 14 or the rationality test so long as decisions are taken in good faith and not for any oblique purpose a public sector undertaking would have full freedom to act. 4 In decisions pertaining to business affairs the freedom of public sector undertaking is not truncated beyond the aforesaid limitations. 4 In decisions pertaining to business affairs the freedom of public sector undertaking is not truncated beyond the aforesaid limitations. For instance if a vast stock of goods has accumulated and finances are needed urgently or if purchases of raw materials have to be effected urgently a public sector undertaking can bona fide act like any other businessman on business principles. Hamlet like vacillation need not be concealed and cannot be forced on it and its enterprise and intiative cannot and need not be killed merely because it is a public undertaking. ( 8 ) NOW let us revert back to the case on hand. As the lower courts granted temporary orders which rambled in force for a period of about six months the respondent-Board could not realism the price of the goods sold by it. The total amount of sale was little over Rs. 16 lakhs. If calculation is made at the market rate of interest for advances (i. e. 20%) the interest alone for the aforesaid amount of Rs. 16. 00 lakhs for a period of six months would be Rs. 1 60 0 that is to say the interest per day would be about Rs. 888/. Add to this charges for storage maintenance payment of salary watch and ward etc. the amount may go to anywhere beyond Rs. 1000. 00 per day. This is a question of simple arithmetic. It ought to have occurred to the lower courts that on account of their temporary orders the public sector undertaking meaning there- by the society at large could not should not have been put to recurring loss of Rs. 1000. 00 per day. The courts have power to impose terms and conditions while granting another refusing interim relief under the provisions of Order 39 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Even if the lower courts thought that there was a prima facie case in favor of the plaintiff (in the instant case there was none) the lower courts out to have put the plaintiff to terms. In a case like this the court should have tried to protect the interests of the defendant-Board and that of till respondent No. 5 which was not even a party to the suit. Had the lower courts directed petitioner to deposit Rs. In a case like this the court should have tried to protect the interests of the defendant-Board and that of till respondent No. 5 which was not even a party to the suit. Had the lower courts directed petitioner to deposit Rs. 1000 per day for the entire period during which the interim order operated and further directed that the amount so deposited may be ordered to be paid to the respondent-Board or to any other defendant if the plaintiff ultimately failed. the lower courts would have been perfectly justified in imposing such terms. On the contrary by not doing so the lower courts have failed in discharge of their duties and inadvertent caused loss to the respondent-Board and to respondent No. 5 which was not even party before the lower courts. ( 9 ) ORDINARILY I would not have entertained this revision application at all. But in view of the failure to exercise jurisdiction by the lower courts and in view of the fact that even temporary orders have brought about a chaotic situation and have caused enormous loss to the Board and respondent No. 5 and therefore with a view to make an attempt to set right the things and with a View to undo the wrong which has been caused to the Board and to responddent No. 5 it was considered proper to entertain the. revision application and to direct the petitioner to add respondent No. 5 the successful bidder. as party here in the revision application. Thereafter as per order dated 15/04/1985 the Board was directed to call all the tenders and to hold a meeting for negotiation with them. The negotiation took place on 30/04/1985 in which all the tender were called. However only four of in remained present. The petitioner-plaintiff raised its offer to Rs. 2641 per m. t. Its earlier offer was Rs. 2331 per m. t. The other two tenders namely Amee Steel and Gujarat Steel raised their offers to Rs. 2605. 00 per m. t. (its earlier offer being Rs. 1987. 00 per m. t.) and Rs. 2630. 00 per m. t. (its earlier offer being Rs. 1887. 00 per m. t.) respectively. 2331 per m. t. The other two tenders namely Amee Steel and Gujarat Steel raised their offers to Rs. 2605. 00 per m. t. (its earlier offer being Rs. 1987. 00 per m. t.) and Rs. 2630. 00 per m. t. (its earlier offer being Rs. 1887. 00 per m. t.) respectively. Respondent No. 5 remained present at the time of negotiations but did not make any bid under the impression that by making the bid it may lose its right as according to it a concluded contact has already come into existence between respondent No. 5 and the Board. Thus on 30/04/1985 when the negotiations took place the highest bid was of Rs. 2641. 00 per m. t. and that was that of the petitioner. On this basis the difference in the total net realization by sales of iron scrap at the rate of Rs. 2641. 00 per m. t. would be Rs. 1 93 200 during the course of six months (date of tender was 1/09/1984 and the further negotiations took place as per the order of the Court on 30/04/1985 The suit was field on 5/11/1984 and the temporary order was issued by trial court on N 5/11/1984 the difference in the net sale consideration likely to be required piled up to the extent of Rs. 2 lakes. The counsel for respondent No. 5 has conceded that on account of the apprehension in the mind of the respondent No. 5 about the loss of right which had accrued in its favor it has not made any offer but respondent No. 5 was prepared to pay anything more than Rs. 2641. 00 per m. t. as may be suggested by the Court. At this stage further discussion with regard to the course proposed to be adopted by this Court may be deferred for a while. ( 10 ) NOW the contentions raised by the petitioner in this revision application be examined. The petitioner contends that its offer was the highest and it was perfectly legal an valid. Hence the same should have been accepted by the Board. This contention is factually not correct and hence cannot be accepts ed. The petitioner quoted the price of Rs. 2331. 00 per m. t. i. e. the total sale price would be Rs. The petitioner contends that its offer was the highest and it was perfectly legal an valid. Hence the same should have been accepted by the Board. This contention is factually not correct and hence cannot be accepts ed. The petitioner quoted the price of Rs. 2331. 00 per m. t. i. e. the total sale price would be Rs. 16 31 700 But the petitioner also stipulated the condition that it would take delivery of the scrap in five installments and make payment in five installments ranging over 100 days. On simple arithmetic calculation it can be found that the interest loss calculated at the rate of 18% would be Rs. 64 372 and therefore the total amount of sale price wool be Rs. 15. 67 328 Hence even on the basis of the original office of respondent No. 5 which was Rs- 2304/- per m. t. the offer made by it was the highest because the total amount of sale price at the rate of Rs. 2304. 00 per m. t. would be Rs. 16 12 800 It must be noted that the terms and conditions on the basis of which the sale was to be made were known to all. It is not the case or the petitioner that it did not know the terms and conditions and on account of ignorance it has stipulated certain conditions in the lender. the petitioner submitted the offer with the condition as aforesaid. This would mean that the offer of sale by cash was not acceptable to the petitioner. On account of such conditional offer only the petitioner put itself out of the arena of consideration. Even if the Board has not considered its offer and straightway rejected its offer the Board would have Been completely justified. Moreover the lower appellate court was also justified in following the decision of this High Court the case of Prabhudas Bhikhabhai v. State 22 GLR 570 wherein it is held that the contract given by the State can be quashed and set aside only provided it is established that the decision was arbitrary and discriminatory so as to attract Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Merely because the lowest bid is not accepted it cannot he said that the decision was rendered arbitrarily. ( 11 ) BE it noted that till the petitioner plaintiff filed. Merely because the lowest bid is not accepted it cannot he said that the decision was rendered arbitrarily. ( 11 ) BE it noted that till the petitioner plaintiff filed. the suit and till the filing of the revision application nowhere it is stated that the petitioner-plaintiff has withdrawn the conditions or that it was prepared to withdraw the conditions. True after the ad interim order was passed by this Court on account of the directions given by this Court fresh negotiations took place. At this stage only the petitioner-plaintiff came out with revised offers which was raised up to Rs. 2641. 00 per m. t. from its earlier offer of Rs. 9331. 00 per m. t. together with the conditions. In above view of the matter it is very clear that the offer made by the petitioner was not on the basis of the terms and conditions for sale made known to all by the respondent-Board Therefore the offer made by the petitioner was not a valid offer at all. Moreover as shown here in above it was not even the highest offer. Hence the contention that the offer made by the petitioner was valid and was the highest offer has got to be rejected. ( 12 ) THE petitioner contends that the Board made negotiations with respendant No. 5 during the validity period of 60 days and therefore respondent No. 5 has been disqualified and therefore the offer made by respondent No. 5 should not have been accepted. Clause 19 of the terms and conditions may be looked at. It reads as follows:"19 Allure opening of the tender no revision of the offer will be entertained within the validity period and the Board will also discontinue further business with such tenders who revise their offer after opening of the tenders within the validity of their offers". As stated here in above even as per the original rates the highest offer was that of respondent No. 5. In the facts and circumstances of the case at the worst it may be said that even though the offer of respondent No. 5 was the highest it has subsequently during the validity period. has raised its quotation and offered something more to the respondent-Board. The earlier offer of respendent No. 5 was Rs. 2304. In the facts and circumstances of the case at the worst it may be said that even though the offer of respondent No. 5 was the highest it has subsequently during the validity period. has raised its quotation and offered something more to the respondent-Board. The earlier offer of respendent No. 5 was Rs. 2304. 00 per m. t. and by subsequent letter dated 28/09/1984 respondent No. 5 raised the same to Rs. 2365. 00 per m. t. Strictly speaking respondent No. 5 could have insisted that its offer of Rs 2304/- per m. t. On proper calculation being the highest and there being no valid offer by the petitioner the offer made by respondent No. 5 must be accepted by the Board. The Board if actins legally and without ulterior motives would have no other choice but to accept the offer of Rs. 2304. 00 per m. t. made by respondent No. 5 In the instant case. respondent No. 5 either on account of the prevailing market situation or on account of some fear either well-founded or apprehended for whatsoever reason ma de the offer of Rs. 2365. 00 per nut which was higher than its earlier offer of Rs. 2304. 00 per m. t. ( 13 ) WHEN the Board has entertained the subsequent offer made respondent No. 5 and has allowed it to raise it offer from Rs. 2304. 00 per m. t. to Rs. 2365. 00 per m. t it has got to be looked into from the point of view of the tests laid down by this Court in Abhayrajs case (supra) regarding the functioning of the public sector undertakings. Clause 19 of the terms and conditions referred to here in above has get to be construed interpreted and understood in the background of the tests laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decision. Can it be said that respondent No. 5 had misconducted itself and therefore disqualified itself from being considered for the sale of the goods in question. The underlying idea behind Clause 19 appears to be that once the order are opened and the parties new about the rate liked in by the rival businessman there should not be any unhealthy competition the there sleuthed not be any scramble for influencing the authorities of the Board. The underlying idea behind Clause 19 appears to be that once the order are opened and the parties new about the rate liked in by the rival businessman there should not be any unhealthy competition the there sleuthed not be any scramble for influencing the authorities of the Board. If a person whose bid is lower does any such thing he will be guilty of such misconduct. But if a parasol who is otherwise entitled to get the contract on his own voluntarily officer Higher rate how can it be said that it would amount to misconduct? Would it not be proper for the public sector undertaking to enter into negotiation with the highest bidder so that the interests of the public ate large is not affected. Clause 19 cannot be interpreted in such a manner that it may work against the interests of public at large and it may truncate the freedom of the managers-s of the public sector undertakings from acting in pragmatic and businesslike manner By acting in the manner as tizzy have done in this case the authorities of the respondent-Buckle have done sometime book in favor of the Board. Therefore interpreting Clause 19 in the background of the principle laid down in Abhayrajs case (supra) what has been done by respondent No. 5 and the Board would not disentitle respondent No 5 from being considered for the sale of the goods in question. Hence the contention raised on the basis of clause 19 also fails. ( 14 ) THE last contention that since The Board authorities considered the further offer made by respondent No. 5 they should have given an opportunity to the petitioner-plaintiff also may be examined. Assuming for a moment that the Board authorities should have given such opportunity to all the tenderers even so this convention Coolant be accepted at the instance of the petitioner for the simple reason that there was no valid Outer made by the petitioner. When the petitioner stipulated conditions regarding payment and delivery of goods the petitioner dragged itself out of the arena of consideration. Such a grievance if at all can be made that can be made by any other person who had made valid offer. When the petitioner stipulated conditions regarding payment and delivery of goods the petitioner dragged itself out of the arena of consideration. Such a grievance if at all can be made that can be made by any other person who had made valid offer. In the instant case as the offer made by the petitioner was not valid one it was not at all necessary for the Board to have called the petitioner either at the initial stage or at the subsequent stages. ( 15 ) THE aforesaid argument that the opportunity to negotiate should have been given to all including the petitioner plaintiff cannot be accepted for another reason also. As stated here in above the public sector undertakings must have freedom to act so long as they act in good faith and not for any oblique reasons. In the instant case what the authorities have done is to see that the sale proceeds of the goods in question are augmented and the interests of the Board are not japer laced. Once the persons who get out of the arena of consideration and when there is only one person who legally can insist upon his right and say that I am not prepared to pay a pie more and the Board must sell the goods in questions to me at the price quoted by me and with that person if the Board negotiates and if the Board is in a position to get something more then it cannot be said that the Board has acted without good faith and for oblique reasons. Therefore also this contention also has got to be rejected. ( 16 ) NORMALLY this should have brought is matter to an end and the judgment must have ended here. But in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and on account of the failure of the lower cords to take into consideration the financial and administrative consequences of their orders this Court was required to give ad interim direction dated 15/04/1985 as a result of which the Board entered into negotiations with the tenderers on 30/04/1985 and at the end of the negotiations the price of the iron scrap to be sold was raised to Rs. 2641. 00 per m. t meaning thereby there would be difference of Rs. 1 93 200 if the iron scrap is permitted to be sold at this rate. 2641. 00 per m. t meaning thereby there would be difference of Rs. 1 93 200 if the iron scrap is permitted to be sold at this rate. ( 17 ) IT is good and it must be said to the Credit of the Gujarat Electricity Board that like 3 good businessman be has stuck to the principle and it has stuck to its word. Simply because the Court gave ad interim direction and by Collating out the same even though it would get about Rs. 2 lakes more the respondent-Board was not inclined to deviate from its business principles. The Board has made it clear that what is more important for it is the principle in the world of business. Similarly respondent No. 5 has also acted as an honest businessman and it also does not want to take an undue advantage which could have been secured by it on account of the mistake committed by the lower courts. Counsel for respondent No. 5 stated that he is prepared to pay anything more than Rs. 2641 per m. t. as may be suggested by the court. ( 18 ) IN some other case I might have ventured to make some suggestions but in the facts and circumstances of the case and particularly in view of the fact that both the purities. respondent No. 5 as sell as the respondent Boards have shown the fairness and the keenness to under to the correct business principles I leave it to their good senses and it will be open to the respondent Board to make further negotiations with respondent No. 5 and I hope that respondent No. 5 would not back out frill the assurance gave to this Court. The Board and respondent No. 5 will be laborite to enter into negotiation and enter into contract of sale of iron scrap in question. I hope that they will do so latest before 8/05/1985 ( 19 ) COUNSEL for the petitioner states that the offer made by him also should be considered. As stated here in above ax found by me the offer made by the petitioner could hang been rejected at the outset and it could have been kept out of the arena of consideration right from beginning; Therefore he cannot be given any chance at this stage. Therefore the proposal made by him before this Court is rejected. As stated here in above ax found by me the offer made by the petitioner could hang been rejected at the outset and it could have been kept out of the arena of consideration right from beginning; Therefore he cannot be given any chance at this stage. Therefore the proposal made by him before this Court is rejected. ( 20 ) SUBJECT to the aforesaid observations and direction. the revision ap plication is rejected. The discharged with no order as to costs. Interrelate relief stands vacated. . ( 21 ) BEFORE I signed his judgment I am told by the counsel for the respondent-Board that the respondent No 5 has agreed to purchase the iron scrap at the race of Rs. 2649. 00 per m. t. Thus the Board has realised Rs. 1 98 800 Crore than what it would have otherwise received. it must be said that the mistake committed by the lover courts could be circuited because the respondent Board and the respondent No. 5 both adopted an eminently fair and reasonable attitude. ( 22 ) COUNSEL for the Petitioner requests that the operation of the order be stayed for a period of four weeks. In the facts and circumstances of the case and particularly in view of the fact that the transaction in question is suscep tible to market fluctuations and several complications are likely to arise as have arisen even on account of the temporary orders passed by the lower courts the request made by the counsel for the petitioner to stay this order cannot be granted. furthermore if the petitioner succeeds. it can be compensated in terms of money. Therefor the sale by the respondent-Board in favor of respondent No. 5 cannot be restrained. Hence the request is rejected. (KMV) petition dismissed. .