JUDGMENT P. Singh, Member - This second appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated August 13, 1985 passed by Sri L.P. Singh, Additional Commissioner, Agra Division, Agra in Appeal No. 75 of 1984-85. 2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that Hasna son of Haider, resident of Iglas had filed a suit under Section 176 of U.P. Act I of 1951. The learned trial court decided the shares of the parties and allotted lot Nos. 1 to 5 to the plaintiff Bunda Khan, defendant Mota, defendants Babu Khan and others, defendant Ballo and defendants Om Prakash and others, respectively. An appeal was preferred against that order of the trial court before the learned Additional Commissioner. The appeal was dismissed by the learned Additional Commissioner holding that it was time-barred. 3. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that the order of the lower appellate court is patently illegal, arbitrary and perverse, that by an order dated August 11, 1985 all the appeals and revisions pending before the Additional Commissioner were transferred to the court of Shri Khan Additional Commissioner. Agra, by an administrative order of the Commissioner, and hence, Sri L.P. Singh had no jurisdiction to decide the case, that the appeal of the appellant before the first appellate court was well within time, that after excluding the period spent in obtaining the decree, that if the appeal was barred by limitation then there was sufficient cause for condoning the delay, and that the lower appellate court did not consider the provisions of Section 12 of the Limitation Act and Order XX Rule 6-A, C.P.C. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant relying on the case Bhagirath v. Bhagauti, 1984 R.D. 204, says that the delay should have been condoned by the lower appellate court. From the order of the learned Additional Commissioner it appears that the application for obtaining the copy of the order of the trial court dated October 30, 1984 was moved on November 30, 1984 and that the first appeal was filed on December 7, 1984. He has held that the appeal was filed with delay and no application supported with an affidavit for condoning the delay had been moved alongwith the memo of appeal. 5. Rule 3-A of Order XLI C.P.C. prescribes the procedure for moving an application for condonation of delay. He has held that the appeal was filed with delay and no application supported with an affidavit for condoning the delay had been moved alongwith the memo of appeal. 5. Rule 3-A of Order XLI C.P.C. prescribes the procedure for moving an application for condonation of delay. The said rule reads as under:- "Order 41, Rule 3-A. Application for condonation of delay. - (1) When an appeal is presented after the expiry of the period of limitation specified therefor. It shall be accompanied by an application supported by affidavit, setting forth the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy the Court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within such period." From this sub-rule (1) of Rule 3-A of Order XLI it is manifestly clear that when an appeal is presented after the expiry of period of limitation specified therefor, it shall be accompanied by an application supported by an affidavit stating the facts on which the appellant relies to satisfy the court that there was sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the prescribed period. In the instant case the order of the trial court was passed on October 30, 1984 and the appeal was filed on December 7, 1984, the application for obtaining the copy of the order of the trial court was filed on November 30, 1984. That shows that the application for obtaining copy was moved beyond the prescribed period of thirty days. The appeal was filed on December 7, 1984 whereas it should have been filed within thirty days. In the instant case the appeal was not filed within thirty days. In view of provisions of sub-rule (1) of Rule 3-A of Order XLI C.P.C. it was mandatory for the appellant to have filed an application supported by an affidavit stating the facts on the basis of which the delay was sought to be condoned. No such application as required by Rule 3-A was filed before the first appellate court. Thus the decision reported in 1984 R.D. 204 (supra) relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant is not applicable to the instant case. In that case the appeal was dismissed holding that it was incompetent, whereas in the instant case the appeal has been dismissed holding it to be time-barred as no application for condoning the delay was filed along with an affidavit. 6. In that case the appeal was dismissed holding that it was incompetent, whereas in the instant case the appeal has been dismissed holding it to be time-barred as no application for condoning the delay was filed along with an affidavit. 6. In a decision reported in A.I.R. 1984 Karnataka 40 it has been held as follows:- "In view of the mandatory provision of Order 41, Rule 3-A the application for condonation of delay shall be accompanied with the appeal memo, if the appeal is presented beyond time. There is no occasion for the court to say that the application for condonation of delay might be entertained later and there is no occasion for the appellant to request that such an application should be received even at the stage of second appeal in the interest of justice." The decision quoted above is fully applicable to the instant case. 7. The submission of the learned counsel is that the last paragraph of the judgment should have been treated as a decree. The learned lower appellate court has not dismissed the appeal on the ground that the copy of the decree was not filed but on the ground that the application for condonation of delay supported with an affidavit was not filed along with the memo of appeal. 8. The learned counsel has also stated in ground No. 2 of the memo of appeal that by an order dated August 11, 1985 the learned Additional Commissioner who decided the first appeal was not authorised to decide the first appeal. No such order has been filed by the learned counsel for the appellant that the leanred Additional Commissioner who decided the first appeal was not authorised to decide the appeal. 9. In view of the above, this appeal has no force and is dismissed summarily.