JUDGMENT S.K. Dhaon, J. - The Petitioner, a judgment-debtor, has revoked the jurisdiction of this Court Under Article 226 of the Constitution with a view to get a decision that the execution proceedings are barred by time. 2. The University of Allahabad is the decree-holder. Its plaint case was that the Petitioner had illegally and without any right or title encroached upon some vacant land around and outside the boundary walls of one of its hostels, namely, Sir P.C. Banerjee Hostel. It was also the case of the University that the Petitioner had made some constructions over the vacant land. The Petitioner's defence was that the University had no title to the land in dispute. He had been in possession over the same for more than 12 years and in the alternative he set up a case of adverse possession. 3. The trial court negatives the pleas of the Petitioner and held that the University had the title to the land in dispute. It, therefore, decreed the suit. The Petitioner lost in appeal before the First Appellate Court and his second appeal too was dismissed by this Court. The operative portion of the order of the trial court was: This suit is decreed for demolition and possession in respect of the land in suit shown by letters A B C D and K M on the plaint map 82A with proportionate costs. The Defendant is herewith directed to remove the construction from the land A B C D and K M within 15 days and deliver possession of land to the Plaintiff failing which the Plaintiff shall be entitled to get the same done through court at the cost and risk of Defendant. The suit stands dismissed in other respects, paper No. 96A, that is, the plaint map shall form part of decree. 4. The second appeal was dismissed on 5th May 1970 and an execution application was given by and on behalf of the University on 31st July 1972, which was dismissed in default on 27th July, 1975. No steps were taken for the revival of this application. Another application for execution of the decree was made on 28th April, 1978. The Executing court upheld the objection preferred by the Petitioner u/s 47 of the CPC (hereinafter referred to as the Code) and rejected the application as barred by time. No steps were taken for the revival of this application. Another application for execution of the decree was made on 28th April, 1978. The Executing court upheld the objection preferred by the Petitioner u/s 47 of the CPC (hereinafter referred to as the Code) and rejected the application as barred by time. The IVth Additional District Judge (hereinafter referred to as the Revisional Court) on 2nd September, 1983 set aside the order of the Executing court and held the execution application within time. The order of the Revisional Court is being impugned in this Court. 5. The Petitioner's case is that in substance, the University has made an application for the enforcement of a decree granting a mandatory injunction and, therefore, the application for execution made on 28th April, 1978, is patently barred by time as envisaged in Article 135 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The view taken by the Revisional court is that the decree passed by the trial court is in two parts. The first part concerning the demolition of the constructions may have become in executable but the second part regarding the delivery of possession is still executable in view of Article 136 of the Act. 6. The Petitioner has been found to be a trespasser. He made a wrongful and unwarranted entry upon the land of the University. He did not acquire any juridical or juristic possession of the property. Such a possession did not create in the Petitioner any interest which the law could recognise. The University, therefore, maintained an action of ejectment against the Petitioner. It could, upon proof of title, oust the Petitioners and recover possession. It succeeded in proving its title and, therefore, a decree for the recovery of possession has been passed in its favour. 7. The English law as comprised in the maxim "quic quid plantatur solo, solo cedit" (whatever is affixed to the soil belongs to the soil) is not applicable to this country. Had it not been so, the Petitioner could not lay any claim on the super structures raised by him over the land in dispute. In AIR 1929 163 (Privy Council) the Judicial Committee quoted with approval the judgment given by Barnes Peacec, CJ in Thakoor Chunder Poramanick v. Ram Bhene Buttacharjee (1866) 6 WR 228. Had it not been so, the Petitioner could not lay any claim on the super structures raised by him over the land in dispute. In AIR 1929 163 (Privy Council) the Judicial Committee quoted with approval the judgment given by Barnes Peacec, CJ in Thakoor Chunder Poramanick v. Ram Bhene Buttacharjee (1866) 6 WR 228. In that case the learned Judge took the view that there was nothing in the laws and customs of this country to indicate the existence of an absolute rule of law that whatever is affixed or built on the soil becomes a part of it, and is subjected to the same rights of property as the soil itself. The learned Judge in Thakoor Chunder's case added that according to the usages and customs of this country, buildings and other such improvements made on land do not, by the accident of their attachment to the soil becomes the property of the owner of the soil. According to the learned Judge it is a general rule that, if he who makes the improvement is not a mere trespasser, but is in possession under any bona fide title or claim of title, he is entitled either to remove the materials, restoring the land to the state in which it was before the improvement was made, or to obtain compensation for the value of the building if it is allowed to remain for the benefit of the owner of the soil. The Judicial Committee posed the question as to what is meant by " mere trespasser " as contradistinguish able from possession under " any bonafkle title or claim of title ". Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee answered this question by quoting from a decision in Govind Paramanik v. Gooroo Churn Dutt (1865) 3 WR 71. According to their Lordships the learned Judge in the aforementioned case stated the law as follows: But in the present case, we have a trespasser who has tortuously entered upon the land of another and built a house thereon. Without going so far as to say under no circumstances could acquiescence by the party injured in the act of the injury done, be inferred, we are clearly of opinion that no such acquiescence was cither pleaded or proved in the present case. Without going so far as to say under no circumstances could acquiescence by the party injured in the act of the injury done, be inferred, we are clearly of opinion that no such acquiescence was cither pleaded or proved in the present case. We, therefore, think the Plaintiff is clearly entitled as against the Defendant, a trespasser, to possession of his land, leaving the Defendant at liberty to remove the bricks of his house. 8. The University has been granted the relief of the delivery of possession of the land as well as of mandatory injunction. The land belongs to the University. Upon it, the Petitioner has raised structures and, therefore, the University is entitled to stand upon its strict rights. The Court has no discretion to refuse the relief for delivery of possession as if. has in the case of the relief of mandatory injunction. From the statement of the law in Govind Paramanik's case (Supra) as approved by the Privy Council in Yolandas case (Supra) coupled with the legal position that as against a trespasser a Plaintiff is entitled to enforce his right of taking back the possession and the court has no discretion to refuse such a relief, it is apparent that the University could have instituted a suit for possession of land without seeking any relief of a mandatory injunction. The Court could not insist that the relief of mandatory injunction should have also been claimed. The decree for possession of land could be executed. Of course, the Petitioner would have been permitted to remove the super structures. 9. Order Xxi Rule 35 of the Code provides for the execution of a decree with respect to the Immovable property. Sub-rule (1) of the said provision provides that where a decree is for delivery of any Immovable properly, possession thereof shall be delivered to the party to whom it has been adjudged, or to such person as he may appoint to receive delivery on his behalf, and, if necessary, by removing any person bound by the decree who refuses to vacate the property. We are concerned with the execution of a decree for the delivery of Immovable property in the possession of a trespasser. There is nothing in Sub-rule (1) to prevent the execution of the decree for the delivery of possession of the land in dispute to the University. 10. We are concerned with the execution of a decree for the delivery of Immovable property in the possession of a trespasser. There is nothing in Sub-rule (1) to prevent the execution of the decree for the delivery of possession of the land in dispute to the University. 10. In Radha Gobind Shaha v. Brijendra Coomar Roy Chowdhari (1872) 18 WR 527 (Cal) demolition of the constructions made before the institution of the suit, was not ordered but it was said that it was a matter for the decree holder to consider after he had obtained possession. At the same time the judgment-debtor was allowed two months' time within which he could, if he so desired, vacate the land and carry away the materials of the building. 11. In Mohd. Ismail v. Ashiq Hussain AIR 1970 AII. 648 this Court held that where it appears to the executing court that the costs of removal or demolition of the constructions would exceed the costs of material to be fetched after the demolition and the decree holder is willing to let the construction stand on the land, the rule laid down in (1872) 18 WR 527 (Cal) (Supra) can be adopted, namely, that it can be left open to the decree-holder to decide what he shall do with the constructions after he is given actual possession of the land along with the constructions standing thereon. Thereby the judgment-debtor would not be put to any additional expenses. But if costs of demolition shall not exceed the costs of the materials and the judgment-debtor is willing to release the materials in favour of the decree-holder free of charge, and the decree-holder is willing to accept the constructions, the executing court need not direct the demolition of the constructions, the ownership of which would automatically pass to the decree-holder. 12. Learned Counsel for- the Petitioner has contended that the failure of the University to execute the decree for mandatory injunction within the time specified in Article 135 of the Act has rendered the whole decree in executable. According to him even the decree for the delivery of possession of the land cannot be executed even though Article 136 prescribes a period of 12 years, for the execution of such a decree. According to him even the decree for the delivery of possession of the land cannot be executed even though Article 136 prescribes a period of 12 years, for the execution of such a decree. He submits that the law laid down by tins Court in Nanwa v. Maulana Abdul Mughani AIR 1981 AII 143 that in a situation where a decree for the delivery of possession and mandatory injunction are passed in a suit, the former decree is executable within the period prescribed by Article 136 and the latter decree is executable within the period prescribed by Article 135 does not lay down a good law. He further contends that the learned Single Judge while deciding this case has not given any reasons in support of his conclusion. It will be noticed that it is not clear from a reading of the said decision whether the Defendant there was a trespasser. Confining myself to the case of a trespasser, I respectfully agree with the conclusion of the learned Judge. 13. In First Appeal From Order No. 38 of 1974 Ramautar v. Radhey Shyam, decided on 9th January, 1980 a suit for a mandatory injunction directing the Defendants to remove the constructions erected by them on a certain land and also a relief of a prohibitory injunction restraining the Defendants from interfering with the Plaintiffs right to use the land as a passage was instituted, The suit was decreed and a mandatory injunction was issued directing the Defendants to remove the constructions from the land in dispute within 40 days of the decree. It was also ordered that in case the Defendants failed to do so, the decree-holder would get the constructions removed through Court on the expenses of the judgment-debtors. This Court held that Under Article 135 of the Act the period of limitation for filing an application for execution in respect of mandatory injunction is three years from the date of the issue of the mandatory injunction (plus 40 days). There can be no quarrel with this proposition. This was not a case where a relief for the delivery of possession had been granted under the same decree. In this case it has not been held that decree for the delivery of possession against a trespasser would become in executable if a decree for mandatory injunction has not been executed within the time prescribed. This case is not apposite. In this case it has not been held that decree for the delivery of possession against a trespasser would become in executable if a decree for mandatory injunction has not been executed within the time prescribed. This case is not apposite. 14. To sum up, the decree for the delivery of possession in favour of the University has not become either in fructuous or in executable merely because the proceedings for the execution of the decree with respect to the mandatory injunction are barred by limitation (Article 135). 15. Affidavits have been exchanged between the parties. Though the writ petition has not formally admitted yet with the consent of the parties I heard the same on the footing that the same will be disposed of finally. 16. This petition lacks merit. It is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.