A. M. AHMADI, J. ( 1 ) PUNJABHAI Devabhai Rathod preferred these two petitions against the order of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal dated 9/03/1979. By that common order the Tribunal disposed of two Revision Applications in which common questions of fact and law arose for consideration. Punjabhai has since expired and his legal representatives have been brought on the record of these petitions. The facts giving rise to these petitions briefly stated are as under. ( 2 ) PUNJABHAI was a protected tenant in respect of Survey Nos. 868 2 Acres 33 Gunthas and 870 3 Acres 25 Gunthas situate in village Pariej taluka Matar district Kaira. In about March or April 1976 as his possession in regard to these two Survey Numbers was threatened he filed two separate applications under sec. 70 (b) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act 1948 (hereinafter called the Act) for a declaration that he was the tenant in respect of the aforesaid Survey Numbers. Those Applications were rejected by the Mamlatdar on 28/09/1976. The tenant preferred appeals against the rejection of his applications and the Assistant Collector Nadiad by his order dated 15/05/1978 allowed the appeals and remanded the matters for a fresh decision to the Mamlatdar. It may at this stage be mentioned that before the mamlatdar the applications wore contested on the plea that the tenant had surrendered the possession of the said two Survey Numbers voluntarily some time in 1956-57 and since then Maniben the landlady was in actual possession thereof. The defence was that the tenant had informed the Mamlatdar in writing on 21/12/1956 that he desired to terminate the tenancy and surrender his interest therein in favour of the landlady under sec. 15 of the Act. That application was disposed of by the Mamlatdar in exercise of power conferred by sec. 15/29 of the Act on 23/03/1957 It was therefore contended on behalf of the land-owner in the said two applications that the tenant having surrendered his interest in the two Survey Numbers in 1956-57 could not maintain the applications under sec. 70 (b) of the Act and no declaration as such could be made in his favour. The Mamlatdar considered the entire evidence on record and came to the conclusion that the tenant had surrendered his interest in the two Survey Numbers and the landlady had been put in actual possession thereof under sec. 70 (b) of the Act and no declaration as such could be made in his favour. The Mamlatdar considered the entire evidence on record and came to the conclusion that the tenant had surrendered his interest in the two Survey Numbers and the landlady had been put in actual possession thereof under sec. 15 read with sec. 29 of the Act. He therefore rejected both the applications but when the appeals were heard by the Assistant Collector he entertained a doubt as regards the genuineness of the proceedings initiated under sec. 15/29 of the Act. This doubt was on the basis of a statement made by the tenant to the effect that he is literate and normally signs his name whereas the application for surrender bears a thumb mark which according to him was not his. In other words according to him the surrender application was sham and bogus and did not offer a valid defence to the landlord. The Assistant Collector entertained some doubt regarding the genuineness of the surrender application and therefore he thought it necessary to remand the cases to the Mamlatdar so that he may inquire into the genuineness of the surrender proceedings. Against the order passed by the Assistant Collector in the two appeals before him the landlords preferred two separate Revision Applications challenging the order of remand. Both these Revision Applications were disposed of by a common judgment dated 9/03/1979 The Revenue Tribunal considered the entire matter at length and came to the conclusion that the order of remand passed by the Assistant Collector was not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case. However with regard to the order pertaining to the two dwelling houses and a cattle shed standing on Survey No. 870 the Tribunal held that the tenant would be entitled to purchase the land over which the superstructures stood by virtue of sec. 17-B of the Act and remanded the matter to the Mamlatdar/agricultural Lands Tribunal for fixation of the price. In other words the Tribunal upheld the order of the Mamlatdar with the modification insofar as the dwelling houses and cattle shed were concerned. It is against this order of the Tribunal that the present two petitions have been preferred under Art. 227 of the Constitution. As common question of law and fact arise in both these petitions I propose to dispose them of by this common judgment. It is against this order of the Tribunal that the present two petitions have been preferred under Art. 227 of the Constitution. As common question of law and fact arise in both these petitions I propose to dispose them of by this common judgment. ( 3 ) AT the hearing of these two petitions Mr. A. M. Bukhari the learned advocate for the petitioners formulated three points for this Courts consideration namely: (1) The jurisdiction or power of the Tribunal under sec. 76 (1) of the Act is circumscribed and does not extend to a re-assessment or re-appreciation of the evidence on record; (2) Even if the Tribunal had such power or jurisdiction it ought not to have interfered with the innocuous and discretionary order passed by the Assistant Collector in the appeals; and (3) On merits the alleged surrender of tenancy rights having not been shown to be in conformity with the provisions of the Act was invalid and ineffective and ought to have been ignored by the Tribunali will deal with these contentions in the order in which I have set them out. ( 4 ) SECTION 76 (1) of the Act reads as under:76 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Bombay Revenue Tribunal Act 1957 an application for revision may be made to the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal constituted under the said Act against any order of the Collector except an order under sec. 32p or an order in appeal against an order under sub-sec. (4) of sec. 32g on the following grounds only : (a) that the order of the Collector was contrary to law; (b) that the Collector failed to determine some material issue of law or (c) that there was a substantial defect in following the procedure provided by this; Act or that there has been failure to take evidence or error in appreciating important evidence which has resulted in the miscarriage of justice. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 5 ) MR. Bukhari the learned advocate for the petitioners contended that in exercising power under sec. 76 of the Act the Revenue Tribunal had transgressed the jurisdiction conferred on it by the stature. In support of this contention my attention was invited to the decision of the Supreme Court in Maruti Bala Raut v. Dashrath AIR 1974 SC 2051 In that case the Supreme Court while interpreting section 76 of the Act as applicable to Maharashtra observed that it was not open to the Revenue Tribunal in revision to go into the re-assessment of the entire evidence for setting aside the decision of the lower revenue authority. Sec. 76 of the Act as applicable to that State has been reproduced in paragraph 4 of the judgment. On a perusal of that provision it would appear that sec. 76 (1) and clauses (a) and (b) thereof are substantially the same as found in our Act. However so far as clause (c) is concerned it has undergone a change so far as our Act is concerned in that the words or that there has been failure to take evidence or error in appreciating important evidence came to be inserted by Gujarat Act 16 of 1961 sec. 21 which words are totally absent in clause (c) of the Act applicable to Maharashtra as reproduced in paragraph 4 of the judgment of the Supreme Court She insertion of the aforesaid words an clause (c) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 76 of our Act has clearly widened the scope of the jurisdiction of the Revenue Tribunal and the Revenue Tribunal is entitled because of the insertion of those words to interfere if there has been an error in appreciating important evidence which has resulted in the miscarriage of justice. (1) of sec. 76 of our Act has clearly widened the scope of the jurisdiction of the Revenue Tribunal and the Revenue Tribunal is entitled because of the insertion of those words to interfere if there has been an error in appreciating important evidence which has resulted in the miscarriage of justice. In the instant case the Tribunal found that the Assistant Collector totally overlooked certain vital and important pieces of evidence namely the fact of the confirmation of the surrender by the tenant on 1/04/1959 the deletion of the name of the tenant from the revenue records and the silence maintained by the tenant all these years and the fact that the landlord had filed criminal proceedings for theft of Tuver crop from the field which were indicative of the fact that the landlord was in possession of the lands in question. It cannot be gainsaid that the fact that the tenant had confirmed the surrender on 1/04/1959 under his signature and had not taken steps after the deletion of his name from the revenue records were vital and important pieces of evidence which could not be brushed aside and so also the fact that about five years before the institution of the proceedings when there was theft of Tuver Crop from the field it was the landlord petitioner who had filed criminal proceedings and not the applicant who claims to be in possession of the lands. Since these vital and important pieces of evidence came to be totally ignored by the Assistant Collector the Tribunal thought that it could interfere under sec. 76 (1) (c) of the Act as amended by Gujarat Act 16 of 1961. The language of clause (c) of sec. 76 (1) of our Act not being in pari materia with sec. 76 (1) (c) as applicable to Maharashtra the decision of the Supreme Court on which reliance is placed cannot apply with all force as contended by Mr. Bukhari. It is well-settled that observations made with reference to the construction of one statute cannot be applied with reference to another statute which is not in pari materia with the statute which forms the subject matter of a previous decision. Bukhari. It is well-settled that observations made with reference to the construction of one statute cannot be applied with reference to another statute which is not in pari materia with the statute which forms the subject matter of a previous decision. Since the language of clause (c) is not identical with that applicable in the State of Maharashtra the ratio of the Supreme Court decision on which reliance is placed cannot apply in the facts and circumstances of this case. ( 6 ) RELIANCE was next placed on the decision of this Court in Raj Madhavsang v. Ranchhodbhai (1976) 17 GLR 689. In paragraph 8 of the judgment the following observations are found:the Mamlatdar and the Deputy Collector appreciated the evidence and came to the conclusion that the tenants had not shown that they had at any time. in the past cultivated it. According to them therefore they had not proved that they were tenants in respect of that land and that they were therefore entitled to the possession of that land. The Revenue Tribunal re-appreciated the entire evidence and recorded a contrary conclusion. I have carefully gone through the judgment recorded by the Revenue Tribunal and it appears very clear to me that what the Revenue Tribunal has done is simply to re-appreciate the evidence. The jurisdiction of the Revenue Tribunal under sub-sec. (1) of sec. 76 is inter alia confined to the correction of an error in appreciating important evidence which has resulted to the miscarriage of justice. Correction of an error in appreciating important evidence which has resulted in the miscarriage of justice cannot to equated with the power to re-appreciate the entire evidence. If the Revenue Tribunal had found that there was some important evidence which the Mamlatdar and the Deputy Collector had not appreciated or had wrongly appreciated and which had led to the miscarriage of justice and if it had recorded the finding accordingly probably there would have been good reason for it to interfere with the order made by the Deputy Collector. ( 7 ) MR. Bukhari submitted relying on these observations that this was also a case of reappreciation of the evidence by the Revenue Tribunal which was not permissible under sec. 76 (1) of the Act. This with respect is not a correct reading of the Tribunals judgment. ( 7 ) MR. Bukhari submitted relying on these observations that this was also a case of reappreciation of the evidence by the Revenue Tribunal which was not permissible under sec. 76 (1) of the Act. This with respect is not a correct reading of the Tribunals judgment. The Tribunal interfered because it found that the Assistant Collector had overturned tic Mamlatdars judgment on a mere doubt based on the single circumstance that the petitioner was literate and yet the surrender application bore a thumb mark which circumstance the Mamlatdar had considered and negatived on the strength of certain pieces of evidence which were totally ignored by the Assistant Collector. The Tribunal therefore came to the conclusion that important and vital evidence both documentary and circumstantial had been ignored in appeal which had resulted in miscarriage of justice. In the circumstances it is not possible to agree with Mr. Bukhari that what the Tribunal had done in the present case was to merely reappreciate the evidence. If it were a case of simple reappreciation of evidence Mr. Bukharis contention would have carried weight but in the instant case we find that important pieces of evidence had been totally ignored which if appreciated would have given rise to certain inferences which would have dispelled the doubt or suspicion as regard the genuineness of the surrender proceedings. ( 8 ) MR. Bukhari then submitted that the order passed by the Assistant Collector was a discretionary order and the Revenue Tribunal in exercise of its powers under sec. 76 (1) of the Act should not have interfered with that discretion. In the backdrop of the circumstances of this case the submission is nothing but begging the question. If the discretion had been exercised after weighing the totality of circumstances Mr. Bukhari would perhaps have been right in urging that the Tribunal ought not to have interfered with the discretion. But in the present case the Assistant Collector while exercising the discretion ignored and failed to appreciate certain vital pieces of evidence which necessitated interference under the widened scope of sec. 76 (1) (c) of the Act. I am therefore of the opinion that this contention urged by Mr. Bukhari cannot be entertained. ( 9 ) MR. But in the present case the Assistant Collector while exercising the discretion ignored and failed to appreciate certain vital pieces of evidence which necessitated interference under the widened scope of sec. 76 (1) (c) of the Act. I am therefore of the opinion that this contention urged by Mr. Bukhari cannot be entertained. ( 9 ) MR. Bukhari then submitted that on merits it is not shown that the surrender was in conformity with the provisions of the Act and hence the Tribunal was not justified in emphasising the same. In support of this contention he invited my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramchandra v. Govind AIR 1975 SC 915 in that case an application for surrender of tenancy of certain lands situate in village Haripur was made on 8/09/1953 The landlord prayed that the surrender in his favour should be verified under sec. 5 (3 ). A letter of surrender bearing the thumb impression of the tenant had been appended to that application. The Mamlatdar did not verify the surrender or pass any final order but when the landlords application came before the Circle Officer Miraj he after recording the statements of the tenant and the landlord made an order the first part of which merely reproduced what the tenant had stated in his statement recorded by the Circle Officer. On the basis of that statement the Circle Officer ordered that the possession of the land should be handed over to the landlord with the crops and the right as protected tenant should be deleted. After this order a panchnama regarding the delivery of possession was effected and mutation entry was also made showing the landlord as the Kabjedar. The landlord then sold the land. Thereafter the tenant made an application against the landlord and the transferees for a declaration that he was the tenant in possession of the land in dispute and claimed actual possession by way of an alternative relief. In the said proceedings one of the contentions raised was that the alleged surrender was a nullity as there was non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of sec. 5 (3) read with Rule 2-A insofar as the verification of the surrender was concerned. After reproducing sec. In the said proceedings one of the contentions raised was that the alleged surrender was a nullity as there was non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of sec. 5 (3) read with Rule 2-A insofar as the verification of the surrender was concerned. After reproducing sec. 5 of the Act and Rule 2-A which enjoined upon the Mamlatdar to satisfy himself that the tenant understood the nature and consequences of the surrender and that it was voluntary and only thereafter endorse his findings upon the document of surrender the Supreme Court in paragraph 12 set out the requirements of the provisions in regard to surrender as: (1) It must be in writings (2) It must be verified before the Mamlatdar (3) While making such verification the Mamlatdar must satisfy himself in regard to two things namely (a) that the tenant understands the nature and consequences of the surrender and (b) that it is voluntary and (4) The Mamlatdar must endorse his findings as to such satisfaction upon the document of surrender. Holding that the provisions were mandatory and failure to comply with the requirements thereof would vitiate the surrender and render it non est the Supreme Court found that the order was not made by Mamlatdar but was made by the Circle Officer who was not competent to record surrender and secondly the Circle Officer did not state that he was satisfied that the tenant had voluntarily made the surrender after understanding its nature and consequences much less did he endorse his satisfaction on the tenants deed of surrender as required by Rule 2-A. On these findings the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that there was total disregard of the statutory provisions and hence the surrender was of no consequence whatsoever. It will appear from the above decision of the Supreme Court that the surrender was recorded by an officer other than the Mamlatdar on whom jurisdiction was conferred. In other words the officer who recorded the surrender had no inherent jurisdiction to do so. That is not the argument before me. Secondly the Supreme Court found as a fact that the surrender was not in conformity with the requirements of the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules. In the present case Mr. In other words the officer who recorded the surrender had no inherent jurisdiction to do so. That is not the argument before me. Secondly the Supreme Court found as a fact that the surrender was not in conformity with the requirements of the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules. In the present case Mr. Bukhari attempted to urge that there is no material on record to come to the conclusion that the surrender was in conformity with the provisions of the Act and the Rules. Now it must be realised that at no stage the applicant who preferred the applications under sec. 70 (b) of the Act questioned the surrender on the ground that the mandatory requirements of the provisions of the Act had not been complied with. That question is sought to be raised for the first time before this Court. The necessary material which would be required to be examined to answer this contention one way or the other is not on the record of this petition. In the absence of evidence relevant to the determination of this question it is difficult for this Court to come to the conclusion that the surrender was not in conformity with the mandatory requirements of law. Such a contention cannot be permitted to be raised for the first time in a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution for the simple reason that in the absence of the relevant material which both sides would have placed had the contention been raised at the appropriate stage this Court is handicapped to go into it. This contention raised by Mr. Bukhari cannot therefore be entertained but I must make it clear that I am not adjudicating on the validity or otherwise of the surrender order and any observations made herein must be read to have been made for the limited purpose of disposing of the contention and should not be understood to mean that this Court upholds the surrender as being one in conformity with the provisions of the statute and the Rules. If there is any remedy available to the original applicant in this behalf what I have stated earlier will not preclude or debar him from taking recourse thereto. ( 10 ) THESE were the only contentions urged before me by Mr. Bukhari. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . If there is any remedy available to the original applicant in this behalf what I have stated earlier will not preclude or debar him from taking recourse thereto. ( 10 ) THESE were the only contentions urged before me by Mr. Bukhari. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 11 ) FOR the above reasons the rule is discharged in both the petitions with no order as to costs. Rule discharged. .