Das, J.- The primary meaning of the 'Rule of Law' is that any action taken or any act done by which a right of a person is affected, that must be done according to law. The affected persons may always resort to the Court of law and if the le­gal pedigree is not found to be perfectly in order the Court will invalidate the act, which he can then safely disregard. The next important meaning of the 'Rule of Law' is that no one should be punished except for some legally defined crime. In Administrative Law natural justice is well-defined concept which comprises two fundamental rights of fair procedure; that a man may not be judge in his own cause, and that a man's, defence must always be fairly heard. In Courts of law and in Statutory Tribunals these Rules must be observed. They equa­lly apply to administrative power, and sometimes also to pow­ers created by contract. [See Wade's Administrative Law] 2. The supremacy of law demands that every citizen is entitled to have his rights adjudicated in the Court of law and to call any question in a Court of Law including the question of the legality of any act done by an administrative officer. Within the field of public law the scope of mandamus is wide and the Court may use it freely to prevent breach of duty and injustice but it is a discretionary remedy. Mandamus is often used as an adjunct to certiorari if a Tribunal or an authority acts in a matter where it is not fair to act at all, certiorari will quash the decision and the prohibition will prevent further unlawful proceedings. If there is power to act, but the power is abused by breach of natural justice or if there is an error on the face of the record, certiorari will quash and mandamus may issue simultaneously to recall a proper hear­ing. Defective decisions or orders are frequently quashed by an appropriate writ. Although the issuance of writs under Article 226 of the Constitution are discretionary remedies, the Courts' discretion must be limited by the basic rules of judicial control. 3. Defective decisions or orders are frequently quashed by an appropriate writ. Although the issuance of writs under Article 226 of the Constitution are discretionary remedies, the Courts' discretion must be limited by the basic rules of judicial control. 3. In this application the petitioner has prayed for issu­ance of a writ in the nature of mandamus and/or certiorari or any other writ or direction with a prayer to quash the order dated 25.2.86 and also the notice dated 26.2.86 as per Annexures-6 and 7 respectively appended to the writ petition. Though initially the petitioner challenged validity of the Act known as "United Khasi Jaintia Hills Autonomous Districts (Appointment and Succession of Chiefs and Headmen) Act, 1959 (U. K. J. Hills Act II of 1959) as amended" but in course of argument, the teamed counsel for the petitioner abandoned this challenge. Therefore, in this writ petition we are only called upon to decide about the validity and legality of the 2 (two) Annexure, na­mely, Annexures 6 and 7 dated 25.2.86 and 26.2.86 respective­ly. To take up this writ petition for our consideration we must look back to the history sheet of the case and to get the intrinsic facts given in the petition. 4. The writ petitioner belongs to the Scheduled Tribe in the State of Meghalaya and comes from Syiem clan of Mylliem Elaka. Prior to the commencement of the Constitution of India in the entire area comprising of Khasi Hills District barring few villages, there were 25 Syiemship with limited powers for some estates. Their succession was hereditary, but in most cases they were elected by an electoral college. But the election in many cases conferred to the members of certain families known as Chiefs families. But they had to get recognition of the British Government through Crown representatives before the Chef could exercise any power. The recognition was affected by means of Sandals (granted to the Chief). To control the Chief and in cases of misconduct, dereliction of duties or in case of oppre­ssion, the Chief could be removed and that power was reserved by the British Government through the Crown representative. But before taking such action, the custom that prevailed in a particular estate regarding the ascertainment of the wishes of the electoral college of the people was followed. The Chiefs were also under the control of the Deputy Commissioner of the Di­strict. But before taking such action, the custom that prevailed in a particular estate regarding the ascertainment of the wishes of the electoral college of the people was followed. The Chiefs were also under the control of the Deputy Commissioner of the Di­strict. After independence, a new relationship was established between those 25 chiefs and the Government of India by means of an instrument of accession as accepted by the then Gover­nor General of India. However, we may not require to go for a further detail of it's legislative history in this regard. We may now consider the position of the Chief after the commen­cement of the Constitution of India. The effect of commencement of Constitution, the states in the Khasi Hills got merged in the State of Assam. Thereafter, the states which were merged in the Khasi Hills, formed into autonomous District, namely, Uni­ted Khasi and Jaintia Hi PS for the purposes mentioned in the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India and that District Councils were formed. In exercise of the power under para 3of the Sixth Schedule, the District Council passed the Act known as "United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous Districts (Appoint­ment and Succession of Chief and Headmen) Act, 1959 (U.K.J. Hills Act II of 1959)" hereinafter called 'the Act', the Act recei­ved assent of the Governor of Assam on 16.10.1959 and publi­shed in Assam Gazette on 28.10.1959 in pursuance of para 11 of the Sixth Schedule 5. THE FACTS RELATING TO THE CASE OF THE PE­TITIONER : On or about 16.5.63, the petitioner was elected as Syiem of Mylliem. Election of the Syiemship of the electoral college was confirmed duly by the District Council. As in most of the Khasi Syiemship, the Chief or the Syiem of Mylliem is elected by electoral college consisting of the representatives of 48 clans of the Syiemship. These clans constitute the 'Khun Hajar' (Sons of Mylliem) of the Myilliem Elva. In this in-situation of Syiemship, its old customary rights and privileges were kept in tact as in the past. The Sixth Schedule of the Constitution provides the manner and authority for administrat­ion of Tribal Areas with a view to give recognition of age-old institution of the "Syiemships" and constitution of the District Councils empowering with legislative and executive powers. In this in-situation of Syiemship, its old customary rights and privileges were kept in tact as in the past. The Sixth Schedule of the Constitution provides the manner and authority for administrat­ion of Tribal Areas with a view to give recognition of age-old institution of the "Syiemships" and constitution of the District Councils empowering with legislative and executive powers. The petitioner as a Syiem of Mylliem Syiemship was in-charge of administration of Mylliem elaka and in discharging this fu­nction the petitioner was aided and assisted by the Dorbar co­nsisting of the said electoral college in accordance with the customary law prevailing in the elaka. The Chief when elected, normally holds the office for life or as long as he enjoys the confidence of the said electoral college/mysteries of the Dorbar. In some matters the Chief is to discharge judicial, religious and other customary functions besides administering the elaka. The administration of Khasi Hills Autonomous District vests in the District Council and the legislative powers of the District Councils are prescribed in paragraph 3 of the 6 h Schedule to the Constitution of India The legislative power of the Dist­rict Council are expressly limited by the provisions of the 6th Schedule, The 6th Schedule to the Constitution of India is virtually the creator of the District Councils and the District Councils are to carry out the functions within the limits of their power. 6. Before considering the other aspects of the matter rela­ting to the constitutional provisions including the powers, both executive and legislative, conferred to the District Councils by the provisions of the sixth Schedule to the Constitution, we shall now pursue the facts relating to the case of the petitio­ner giving rise to this petition. 7. The petitioner was elected on 16.5.63 as Syiem of Myiliem Syiemship which was approved by the District Council and since then the petitioner enjoyed the office of the Chief of the Mylliem Syiemship till the beginning of the current year. On 14.1.86 a complaint petition was filed by S. Marbaniang and others before the District Council complaining the alleged mis­deeds of the petitioner in discharging his duties and sought for an intervention by the competent authority of the District co­uncil. On 14.1.86 a complaint petition was filed by S. Marbaniang and others before the District Council complaining the alleged mis­deeds of the petitioner in discharging his duties and sought for an intervention by the competent authority of the District co­uncil. Chi receipt of the complaint, a notice under Memo No. DC/XXVII/Genl/4/86/2 dated 15.1.86 under signature of respon­dent No. 6, the Joint Secretary to the District Council was ser­ved upon the petitioner asking him to show cause as to why he should not be punished in accordance with law with a di­rection to submit his show cause reply within 20 days from the date of receipt of the notice. After receipt of the aforesaid no­tice accompanying the copy of the complaint petition, the pe­titioner submitted the applications on 27.1.86 to respondent No. 6. In one of the applications the petitioner prayed for a certi­fied copy of the complaint petition dated 14.1.86 filed by S. Marbaniang and others before the District Council with their full names along with the certified copy of the order passed on the said application, if any, by the Executive Committee of the District Council, which compelled the respondent No. 6 to is­sue the notice dated 15.1.86 upon the petitioner. In the second application the petitioner requested to grant further one mon­th's time expressing his inability to reply within 20 days. The extension of time was prayed on the ground that it was neces­sary for the petitioner to convene a "Durbar Pyllun" of the Syiem and Myntries and also for non-availability of all the documents including those from the office of the District Council. In reply the respondents expressed their inability to su­pply the certified copy of the order of the Executive Commi­ttee or of the Executive Member as because it could not be given as the same was related to administrative matters. However, the petitioner was granted extension of time to submit his show cause by another 10 days from 7.2.86. The copies of the replies dated 1.2.86 and 7.2.86 are annexed to this petition and marked as Annexures 3 & 4 respectively. However, the petitioner sub­mitted his show cause to the respondents wherein he, inter alia challenged the authority of the Executive Committee of the District Council and legality of the notice dated 15.1.86. The copies of the replies dated 1.2.86 and 7.2.86 are annexed to this petition and marked as Annexures 3 & 4 respectively. However, the petitioner sub­mitted his show cause to the respondents wherein he, inter alia challenged the authority of the Executive Committee of the District Council and legality of the notice dated 15.1.86. As the petitioner apprehended that the respondents are likely to suspend him, he instituted a civil suit being Title Suit No. 4 (T)/86 in the Court of the Assistant to the Deputy Commissioner, Shillong for a declaration that the notice dated 15.1.86 issued by the respondents under the signature of respondent No. 6 was void and inoperative in law with further prayer for granting permanent injunction. A separate application under Order 39 Rule 1 was also filed by the petitioner along with the plaint (which was registered as Misc. Case No. 22(T) 86 for issuance of interim injunction restraining respondent Nos. 1, 6 and 7 from taking any action in pursuance of the afore­said notice. On the said application the learned trial court issued an ad-interim injunction and fixed 26.2.86 for showing cause by the respondents. The respondents, however, appro­ached the High Court on 25.2.86 against the order of issu­ance of ad-interim injunction by a revision application under Rule 36 of the Administration of Justice and Police Rules in U. K. & J Hills and also filed a separate application for stay. The revision petition was numbered as Civil Revision No. 42/86 and the stay application as Misc. Case No. 66/86 in the High Court. A Rule was issued on the revision applica­tion and also in the Misc. Case and stayed the operation of the injunction order initially granted by the learned trial court in favour of the petitioner. On the same day i.e. 25.2.86 after the order of ad-interim injunction was stayed by the High Court, the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 passed an order in exercise of powers under sub-clause (ii) of 3rd proviso to Section 6 of the United Khasi Jaintia Hills (Appointment & Succession of Chiefs & Headmen) Act, 1959 (for short- 'the Act') and placed the petitioner under suspension with immediate effect and the order was communicated to the petitioner on 26.2.86. By ano­ther order/notification No. DC/XVII/Genl/4/36/15 dated 26.2.86 the respondent No. 8 Shri Armstrong Syiem was appointed as acting Syiem of the Mylliem Syiemship in place of the peti­tioner. By ano­ther order/notification No. DC/XVII/Genl/4/36/15 dated 26.2.86 the respondent No. 8 Shri Armstrong Syiem was appointed as acting Syiem of the Mylliem Syiemship in place of the peti­tioner. This was done in exercise of power under Section 11 of the Act. 8. With the above back-ground of the petitioner's case as narrated in the writ petition, it would be appropriate for us to look to the legislative history as to the appointment of Chiefs or Headmen and the legislative as well as executive powers of the District Council in this regard. 9. Legislative History-in Brief: It can be gathered from the scheme of the sixth Schedule that the District Council is an administrative as well as legisla­tive body. In 1951, the rules under Para 2 (6) known as Assam Autonomous District (Constitution of District Council) Rules, 1951 were framed. The rules provide that an Executive Com­mittee with the Chief Executive Member as its head and two other members were entrusted with the power to exercise the executive functions of the District Council. Though from time to time there were some modifications and S3me rules were framed relating to the District Council, ultimately in 1959, the Act known as "United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Appointment and Succession of Chiefs and Headmen) Act, 1959" (Act No. II of 1959) was enacted which came into force in October, 1959. The Act dealt with the appointment of Chiefs and Headmen as well as of their removal and sus­pension (as a punishment or otherwise) etc. Thereafter some pro­visions of the Act also had to be amended from time to time. Section 2 of the Act defines the various terms, namely, 'Chief, 'Deputy Chief", 'District Council', 'Executive Com­mittee', 'Headmen', etc. Under Section 2 (a) of the Act, 'Chief has been defined thus : 'Chief means a Siem, a Lyngdoh, a Dolloi, a Sirdar or a Wahdadar as case may be, of any Elaka". In Section 2 (c) of the Act Deputy Chief has been defined: “Deputy Chief means any persons appointed by the Chief and his Durbar with the previous approval of the District Council and includes a customary Siem Khynnah". Section 2 (a) defines the District Council, "District Council' means the District Council of the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District". In Section 2 (c) of the Act Deputy Chief has been defined: “Deputy Chief means any persons appointed by the Chief and his Durbar with the previous approval of the District Council and includes a customary Siem Khynnah". Section 2 (a) defines the District Council, "District Council' means the District Council of the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District". Under Section 2 (h) Executive Committee has been denned as "Executive Committee' means the Executive Committee of the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District Council." The procedure for election and appointment of Chief are prescribed in Section 3, 4 and 5 of the Act. Section 3 of the Act provides that sub­ject to the provisions of the Act and the Rules made there­ under, all elections or nominations and appointment of Chief and Headmen shall be in accordance with the existing custom prevailing in the Elaka concerned and/or in accordance with the orders as the Executive Committee may issue from time to time. The Secretary of the Executive Committee or any officer appointed by the Executive Committee in this behalf shall be the Returning Officer for all nominations or elections for the purpose of Section 3 of the Act. Section 5 deals with appointment of Chiefs. On the basis of the result of election as per Section 4 of the Act, the Executive Committee shall recommend the appointment of nominated or elected Chief to the next session of the Council and after approval of the Council, the Executive Committee shall forthwith issue appoint­ment order under such terms and conditions as the Executive Committee may provide. Therefore, on examination of the scheme of the Act and the relevant provisions for the appoint­ment of Chiefs and the Headmen, it is found that the power of appointment of Chief or Syiem has been subject to approval of the District Council itself. This position is clear from a bare reading of Section 5 of the Act. The recommendation as regards the appointment of nominated or elected Chief is to be made by the Executive Committee for approval of the Dis­trict Chuncil. Therefore, this power of appointment of the elec­ted or nominated Syiem or the Chief has been vested in the Executive Committee by the express provisions of Section 5 of the Act, On approval of the appointment, the Chief is entru­sted with the power by a Sanad issued by the District Council. Therefore, this power of appointment of the elec­ted or nominated Syiem or the Chief has been vested in the Executive Committee by the express provisions of Section 5 of the Act, On approval of the appointment, the Chief is entru­sted with the power by a Sanad issued by the District Council. Therefore it is clear that after the election of the Syiem or Chief, the election has to be approved and appointment has to be made by the District Council both in accordance with the age-old custom and under the provisions of the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills District (Appointment and Succession of Chiefs and Headmen) Act, 1959, as amended up-to-date without such approval and appointment, the Chief or the Syiem will not be an administrative officer under the District Council for the purpose of administration which is vested in the District Co­uncil under 6th Schedule to the Constitution. Likewise, the Chief also can be removed and suspended by the Executive Committee of the District Council as provided under Section 6 of the Act. Now the dispute as raised by the petitioner is confined to the provisions as laid down under Section 6 of the Act. The provisions of Section 6 of the Act runs as follows : 6. Likewise, the Chief also can be removed and suspended by the Executive Committee of the District Council as provided under Section 6 of the Act. Now the dispute as raised by the petitioner is confined to the provisions as laid down under Section 6 of the Act. The provisions of Section 6 of the Act runs as follows : 6. Removal and Suspension of Chiefs -Chief may be removed from office or suspended by the Executive Committee if in its opinion- (a) he violates any of the terms and conditions of his appointment; or (b) he violates any of the laws, regulations, rules and the resolutions passed by the Council; or (c) he refuses to carry out the orders and instructions issued by the Executive Committee; or (d) he is found to be mentally unfit to carry out his functions; or (e) has been incapable of carrying on the administra­tion to the satisfaction of the Executive Committee due to ill health, old age or habitual drunkeness; or (f) he violates any customary rights and practices prevai­ling in the Elaka concerned and duly approved by the Executive Committee; or (g) he has been convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude; or (h) has been oppressed the people of the Elaka and they have just cause for dissatisfaction with his mis­rule; or (i) he has lost the confidence of the majority of his electors or of the people of the Elaka; or (j) he is an undercharged insolvent; or (k) he does not reside within the Elaka; or (1) he has been conducting himself in a manner dero­gatory to this office or prejudicial to the interest of the Elaka or part thereof; or (m) has been conducting himself in a manner which may undermine the authority of the Executive Commi­ttee or of the District Council; Provided that every such case shall be placed before the Council in its next Session : Provided further that no Chief shall be removed from office or punished with suspension unless he is given an opportu­nity of being heard : Provided further that the requirements of the Second Pro­viso above shall not apply- (i) in the case where the order of removal or puni­shment of suspension is awarded on account of his being convicted of an offence involving moral turpitude; (ii) in the case of order of suspension pending in­quiry." 10. Discussion on Preliminary Objection as raised by res­pondents : Before we were led to consider the rival contentions of the parties relating to the proper issue, a preliminary point has been raised by Mr. D. N. Choudhury, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos. 2 to 7 as to the maintainability of this writ petition. The learned counsel has urged before us that since the matter in dispute is now sub-juice before the Civil Court in a Title Suit filed by the peti­tioner seeking redress, the present writ petition is not main­tainable and is liable to be dismissed. According to the lear­ned counsel for the respondents, the petitioner has already chosen a forum for his litigation, claiming proper redress in the Civil Court by instituting a civil suit, therefore, he can­not approach this Court for the purpose of issuance of a writ or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is sub­mitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that while the petitioner has already instituted a Title Suit in the Civil Court questioning the initial action of the District Council challenging the same notice dated 15.1.86 (Annexure-II to this writ petition), the present petition is liable to be rejected being not maintainable. Referring to case of Jai Singh vs. Union of India and others (as reported in AIR 1977 SC 898 ), the learned counsel has submitted that the law does not permit to pursue two parallel remedies in respect of the same and similar matter at the same time. It is true that the remedy provided for under Article 226 of the Constitution is a dis­cretionary remedy and the High Court can always exercise its discretion to refuse to grant any writ if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or efficacious remedy elsewhere. It is true that the remedy provided for under Article 226 of the Constitution is a dis­cretionary remedy and the High Court can always exercise its discretion to refuse to grant any writ if it is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or efficacious remedy elsewhere. The learned counsel has referred to us another deci­sion of the Supreme Court as reported in AIR 1970 SC I (Shankar Ramchandra Abhyankar vs. Krishnaji Dattatraya Bapat) wherein their Lordships observed "the writ petition ought not to have been entertains by the High Court when the respon­dent bad already chosen the remedy under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure." In this context the learned coun­sel for the respondents has submitted that as the petitioner has opted to take recourse to the Civil Courts which accor­ding to the petitioner is an appropriate forum to obtain the remedy sought for, he has lost the right to pray for any writ in this Court inasmuch as the doctrine of remedy pro­vides that if two or more remedies exist, the party will be bound to pursue the same by selecting any one.. The law does not want to pursue two parallel remedies in respect of the same or similar matters at the same time (Sec AIR 1977 SC 898 ). The second alternative submission of Mr. D. N. Choudhury, learned counsel for the respondents is that the Chief is under the administrative control of the District Council. The appointment and the terms of service of Chief is regu­lated by 1959 Act and the said Act ousted the jurisdiction of the Court by incorporating Section 16 to the Act. Section 16 of the amended provisions of the Act runs as follows: "16. Bar to Civil Suit-No suit or legal proceedings shall lie before any Court of Law against any order or action taken or anything done in good faith under any of the provisions of this Act." This provision has been incorporated by the Amendment Act of 1979 to the Khasi Hills Autonomous District (Appoint­ment and Succession of Chiefs and Headmen) (Fourth Amen­dment) Act, 1979. Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the respondents has further urged before us that the petitioner has challenged the jurisdiction of the District Council to issue the notice to show cause which has been challenged in the Civil Suit. Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the respondents has further urged before us that the petitioner has challenged the jurisdiction of the District Council to issue the notice to show cause which has been challenged in the Civil Suit. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, the peti­tioner is not entitled to avail both the remedies together. The prayer for issuance of a writ in exercise of writ jurisdic­tion is a discretionary remedy and it should not be made available to the petitioner in view of the fact that the peti­tioner his already chosen his forum in a Civil Court for the same relief. Referring to the case of K. S- Rashid and Son vs. Income-tax Investigation Commission and others (as reported in AIR 1954 SC 207 ), the learned counsel has submitted that remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution being a discre­tionary remedy, the High Court has always the discretion to refuse to grant any writ if the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere. On the basis of the above submissions Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the respon­dents has requested us to dismiss the writ application without entering into the merits. In reply to the above preliminary points raised by the respondents, Mr. J. P. Bhittacharjee, learned counsel for the petitioner has contended thus - (a) That Annexure-11 to the petition which is a letter/ notice dated 15.1.86 issued to the petitioner under the signature of the Joint Secretary, Khasi Hills District Council asking the petitioner to show cause was without jurisdiction and as such the same being invalid and inoperative is liable to be quashed. The issuance of such notice as Annexure-II is not contemplated nor authorised by or under the provisions of the Act. That being the position, the provision of Section 16 of the Act has no application as the purported notice was not issued under the provisions of the Act. (b) Referring to the prayer made in the writ petition, Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel has submitted that the peti­tioner has prayed for a writ for cancellation or otherwise forbearing from giving effect to the impugned order dated 25. 2. 86 issued by the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 suspending the petitioner and the order dated 26.2.86 appointing respondent No. 8 as acting Syiem as per Annexure-VI and Annexure-VII respectively. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel has submitted that the peti­tioner has prayed for a writ for cancellation or otherwise forbearing from giving effect to the impugned order dated 25. 2. 86 issued by the respondent Nos. 1 to 5 suspending the petitioner and the order dated 26.2.86 appointing respondent No. 8 as acting Syiem as per Annexure-VI and Annexure-VII respectively. These two impugned orders are not the subject-matter of the civil suit, wherein the Annexure-II dated 15.1.86 has been challenged whereby the petitioner has been asked to show cause as to why he should not be punished in accordance with law. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the petiti­oner that the declaration sought for by the petitioner in the civil suit is only as regards Annexure-II and not beyond that, whereas the remady sought for in this writ application is relating to the matters of subsequent event which gave rise to a different cause of action unconnected with the relief sought for in the suit. In the civil suit the petitioner has, also challenged the jurisdiction of the District Council to issue Annexure-II for contemplated punishment, Therefore, it is seen that the subject-matter of this writ petition amongst other ground; are the orders dated 25th February, 1986 in suspending the petitioner and the consequential order dated 26th February, 1986 appointing respondent No. 8 as acting Syiem in place of the petitioner. Admittedly, these two orders were passed immediately after passing of the order by this Court in Misc. Case No. 56/86 arising out of Civil Revision No. 42 of 1986 staying the injunction order granted by the trial court in favour of the petitioner. It relates to Annexure II annexed to this petition. It is very clear from the writ peti­tion- that the relief prayed for by the petitioner is different from those sought for in the civil suit. Therefore, according to- the learned counsel, the question of non-maintainability of this writ petition on the face of the pending civil suit does not arise at all inasmuch as the civil court has been app­roached by the petitioner only against the impugned notice as per Annexure-II and not for any subsequent event thereafter. 11. Therefore, according to- the learned counsel, the question of non-maintainability of this writ petition on the face of the pending civil suit does not arise at all inasmuch as the civil court has been app­roached by the petitioner only against the impugned notice as per Annexure-II and not for any subsequent event thereafter. 11. Now from the trend of rival contentions made by the learned counsel of both the parties can it be said that the petitioner has availed of the two different forums for the same remedy, namely one in the Civil Court and the other before this Court ? The answer to this question is apparently clear. The citation referred to us by the learned counsel may not come to aid of the respondents on the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is crystal clear that the subject matter of the Civil Suit is quite different and distinct from the sub­ject matter of the present writ application for which the peti­tioner has approached this court for redress. This being the factual position, it cannot be said that this writ petition suffers from infant casualties. Section 16 of the Act which has been incorporated by Amendment Act of 1979 cannot debar the writ petitioner to move this writ petition on the face of the facts and circumstances of the case. We may now deal with Section 16 of the Act keeping in" view the pending civil suit before the trial court arid the revision application in this Court. Section 16 of the Act bars suit or legal proceedings before any court of law against any order or action taken or anything done in good faith under any of the provisions of the Act. The annexures to the writ petition under challenge were issued by the authority acting under the provisions of this Act. Whe­ther those were issued in good faith or otherwise we, howe­ver, refrain ourselves from expressing any opinion in this regard on the basis of the materials before us. If Section 16 is read as a whole no challenge can be made nor it would be com­petent to approach the civil court against issuance of these two annexures. Therefore, we have no other alternative than to hold that even the amendment of the plaint in the pending civil suit cannot be done in view of the provisions of section 16 of the Act. Therefore, we have no other alternative than to hold that even the amendment of the plaint in the pending civil suit cannot be done in view of the provisions of section 16 of the Act. It has, however, been argued by Mr. Choudhury, learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner could move the civil court in the pending suit with a prayer for amendment of the plaint for inclusion of the annexures under challenge in this writ petition. This contention appears to be contradictory to what Mr. Choudhury has raised about non-main­tainability of the civil suit. Therefore, we de not find any alternative than to rule out the preliminary objection on the point of non-maintainability of the writ application Hence we reject the preliminary objection as raised by the res­pondents. 12. We shall now consider the contentions of the parties on the main subject. Though facts are many, arguments were lengthy, yet in our opinion, the matter in dispute lies in a narrow compass. Before we discuss the contentions of the learned counsel it would be necessary to refer to few relevant provisions of the Act. We have already said that the Assam Autonomous Districts (Constitution of District Councils) Rules, 1951 was framed under the 6th Schedule to the Constitution. The Autonomous District Council was constituted in Assam as well as in Meghalaya with the applicability of the same Rule in Assam as well as in Meghalaya known as "Assam and Megha­laya Autonomous Districts (Constitution of District Councils) Ru­les, 1951". Rule 19 of the Rule 5 speaks about the formation of the Executive Committee of the District Council. We would like to quote few relevant provision? of the Rules which are as follows :- 19. (1) There shall be an Executive Committee of the District Council, with the Chief Executive Member at the head, and two other members to exercise the func­tions hereinafter specified in Rules 28, 29, 30 and 31. (2) There shall be a Secretary to the Executive Com­mittee. The Secretary shall be appointed by the Chief Executive Member and shall not be a member of the District Council. 20. (2) There shall be a Secretary to the Executive Com­mittee. The Secretary shall be appointed by the Chief Executive Member and shall not be a member of the District Council. 20. (I) The Chief Executive Member shall be elected by the District Council and the other members shall-be appointed by the Governor on the advice of the Chief Executive Member from amongst the members of the District Council : Provided that the Challan and the Deputy Chairman of a District Council shall not be eligible to hold office either as Chief Executive Member or as a Member of the Executive Committee of the District Council. 28. (1) The Executive functions of the District Council shall the vested in the Executive Committee. (2) All orders or instruments made or executed by the Executive Committee shall be expressed to be made by or by order of the District Council. Every such order or instrument shall be signed by the Chief Executive Member or any other Members of the Executive Com­mittee authorised in writing by the Chief Executive Mem­ber in this behalf and such signature shall be deemed to be the proper authentication of such order or instrument. 29. (I) The Executive Committee shall dispose of all matters falling within its purview, except certain matters hereinafter specified, which shall be referred to the Dis­trict Council for final approval. (2) The matters excepted under sub-rule (1) are:- (a) cases involving any important change in the admi­nistrative system of the autonomous districts or any impor­tant departure from accepted policy or practice; (b) proposal for making regulations, rules or laws as authorised under the provisions of the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution; (c) cases which seriously effect or are likely to affect seriously, the peace or good government of any autono­mous district or likely to affect relations with any such area; (d) cases affecting the relations of Government with the autonomous district; (e) all correspondence of importance with the Gover­nment; (f) all important appointments. 30. 30. Notwithstanding anything contained in rule 29 :- (a) If at any time, except when the District Council is in session, an emergency arises which renders it nece­ssary for the Executive Committee to take immediate action in respect of any matter or matters specified in clauses (a), (b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) of sub-rule (2) of the rule, the Executive Committee of a District Council other than that of Mikir Hills or the North Cachar Hills may take such action thereon as the emergency appears to it to require, but every such case shall be laid before the District Council at its next session; (b) Every resolution adopted or decision taken by the District Council or the Executive Committee of the Dis­trict Council of the Mikir Hills or the North Cachar Hills in respect of any matter falling in its jurisdiction shall forthwith be submitted to the Deputy Commissioner or the Sub-divisional Officer, as the case may be, of the Mikir Hills and the North Cachar Hills, and until such resolution or decision is approved by him, no action shall be taken thereon. The Deputy Commissioner or the Sub-divisional Officer, as the case may be, shall have power for a period of six years after the first constitution of the District Council, subject to the control of the Gover­nor, to annul or modify any resolution or decision of the District Council or to issue such instructions to the District Council as he may consider appropriate, and the District Council shall comply with every such instruc­tion issued. 31. (1) Each member of the Executive Committee shall be entrusted with specific subjects, the allocation of the subjects being made by the Chief Executive Merited. The Executive Committee shall be collectively responsible for all executive orders issued in the name of the District Council in accordance with these rules, whether such or­ders are authorised by an individual member of the Exe­cutive Committee on a matter appertaining to his subject or as a result of discussion at a meeting of the Executive Committee, or howsoever otherwise. (2) One of the Members of the Executive Committee will be in charge of the District Fund, referred to in these rules as the meager-in-charge of the financial affairs of the District Council. (2) One of the Members of the Executive Committee will be in charge of the District Fund, referred to in these rules as the meager-in-charge of the financial affairs of the District Council. The functions of the member-in-charge of the financial affairs of the District Council shall be as follows : - (a) he shall generally advise on all matters touching receipts and expenditure of the District Council; (b) he shall be responsible for all matters relating to financial procedure and the application of the principles of sound finance; (c) he shall prepare the budget of the District Council and deal with all matters relating to budget procedure and the forms and contents of the financial statement; (d) he shall be responsible for the "ways and means" position of the District Fund." 13. On perusal of these Rules as quoted above it appears that the District Council is a legislative as well as executive body for the purpose of discharging the various functions as provided under the Act and the Rules. After coming into force of the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills Autonomous District (Appo­intment and Succession of Chiefs and Headmen) Act, 1959, as amended from time to time, the District Council has been em­powered to function in various matters. The preamble of the Act speaks- "Whereas it is necessary to make provisions in the Au­tonomous District of the United Khasi-Jaintia Hills with respect to the appointment and succession of Chiefs and Headmen, as is hereby enacted in the Tenth year of the Republic of India as follows .. It extends to the whole of the United Khasi-Jaintia Autonomous District. 14. We have said earlier about the provisions of election or nomination and appointment of Chiefs and Headmen as per section 3 of the Act. Section 5 of the Act speaks about appointment of Chiefs. Section 6 of the Act appears to be very relevant for the purpose of this case. It gives the power to the Executive Committee of the District Council to remove and suspend the Chiefs. 15. Mr. J.P. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the petitioner has once again referred to us the notice dated 15.1.86 (Annexure-II to the Petition). We would like to quote the relev­ant portion of Annexure-II which appears to be the root of the whole dispute :- "To Francis wall Syiem Syiem of Mylliem Elaka. Subject :-Objection against Francis wall Syiem, Syiem of Mylliem. Mr. J.P. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the petitioner has once again referred to us the notice dated 15.1.86 (Annexure-II to the Petition). We would like to quote the relev­ant portion of Annexure-II which appears to be the root of the whole dispute :- "To Francis wall Syiem Syiem of Mylliem Elaka. Subject :-Objection against Francis wall Syiem, Syiem of Mylliem. Reference :- Syiem. I am directed to send herewith copy of objection petition dated 14.1.1986 from U.S. Marbaniang and others for you to see and you are required to show cause as to why you should not be punished according to law. You are to take seriously to send your show cause re­ply to this office within twenty (20) days from the date of this letter. By order etc. Sd/- Joint Secretary, Khasi Hills District Council, Shillong." In this context the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that this notice is neither contemplated within the purview of the provisions of Section 6 nor under any other provisions of the Act. Before issue of any notice of this nature, the Executive Committee must form an opinion as regards violation of any of the clauses enumerated in clauses (a) to (m) of Section 6 of the Act. The formation of opinion is a pre-condition prior to issue of such notice. On bare pe­rusal of Annexure-II it is not possible to gather as to whether any such opinion was formed by the Executive Committee to issue such notice. The notice was issued on the basis of the petition dated 14.1.86 submitted by U.S. Marbaniang and others against the petitioner. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the case of the petitioner attracts the second proviso to Section 6 of the Act and the order of suspension being penal in nature and issued in terms of Annexure-II, the Executive Committee has no authority to pass such order without giving the petitioner an opportunity of being heard. Annexure-IV, the order of suspension dated 25th February, 1986 which has been impugned in this writ petition along with the consequential order dated 26.2.86 at Annexure-VII, shall BOW the dealt toy us to consider the next submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. Annexure-IV, the order of suspension dated 25th February, 1986 which has been impugned in this writ petition along with the consequential order dated 26.2.86 at Annexure-VII, shall BOW the dealt toy us to consider the next submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. By Annexure-VI the Executive Co­mmittee consisting of the Chief Executive Member and 3 others issued the order of suspension of the petitioner in purported exercise of their powers conferred under sub-clause (ii) of the 3rd proviso to Section 6 of the United-Khasi-Jaintia Hills Au­tonomous District (Appointment and Succession of Chiefs and Headmen) Act, 1959 (as amended). From the impugned order of suspension it appears that the Executive Committee observed that the petitioner has questioned the power and authority of the Executive Committee and the District Council to issue such show cause as being without jurisdiction and claiming the petitioner's office as an independent entity. It was also observed that the petitioner acted in a manner which appears to have undermined the authority of the District Council and Executive Memoirs of the District Council. The Executive Member of that order of suspension his necessary for the purpose of con­ducing just and impartial enquiry. On perusal of the order it leaves no doubt that the suspension order was passed for the purpose of conducting just and impartial enquiry and the order was issued in exercise of the powers conferred under sub-clause (ii) of 3rd proviso to Section 6 of the Act. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the impug­ned order dated 25th February, 1986 placing the petitioner under suspension suffers from various infirmities and illegalities and it is must incorrect to say that the petitioner ever acted in a manner which could be said to have undermined the authorizes of the District Council, Executive Committee and the Members. In his show cause reply the petitioner has only captained the notice dated 15.1.86 (Annexure-II) as void and inoperative inasmuch as the provisions of Section 6 of the Act was not complied with while the said notice was issued to the petitioner. The executive committee did not form any opinion a regards the violation of any of the clauses as enumerated in clauses (a) to (m) of section 6 of the Act. The executive committee did not form any opinion a regards the violation of any of the clauses as enumerated in clauses (a) to (m) of section 6 of the Act. As regards the applicability of second proviso to section 6, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the notice dated 15.1.86 could not have been issued under the second proviso to section 6 of the Act without giving an opportunity of being heard and as the petitioner was not given any opportunity of being hard before passing the suspension order dated 25th February, 1986 the order is void and is liable to be struck down. The next submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that sub-clause (ii) of the 3rd proviso to Section 6 refers to the order of suspension "pending enquiry". If an enquiry is pending for violation of any of the clause enumerated from clauses (a) to (m) of Section 6, of the Act, the order of suspension may be issued and in that case the second proviso to Section 6 in not attracted. But in this case if the impugned order of suspension dated 25th February, 1986 is read together with the notice to show cause dated 15th January, 1986 as submi­tted by the learned counsel, it appears that the order of sus­pension is by way of specialty for which the second proviso of Section 6 is attracted and if that be the position, no such penal action cm be taken without giving the petitioner any oppor­tunity of being heard. The next submission of Mr. Bhattacharjee is that Section 6 has not conferred any power to Executive Committee to pass any order of suspension in case of "con­templated enquiry". The order of removal or suspension of a Chief under Section 6 of the Act can be passed by the Exe­cutive Committee if an opinion is formed to do so relating to one or more matters as mentioned in clauses (m) of Sec­tion 6 of the Act. The order of removal or suspension of a Chief under Section 6 of the Act can be passed by the Exe­cutive Committee if an opinion is formed to do so relating to one or more matters as mentioned in clauses (m) of Sec­tion 6 of the Act. The learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn our attention to the provisions of Section 6 of the Assam Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1954 where it has been provided that the appointing authority or any authority to which he is subordinate or any other authority empowered by the Governor in that behalf may place a government ser­vant under suspension (a) where a disciplinary proceeding aga­inst him is contemplated or is pending, or (b) where a case against him it respect of any criminal offence involving moral-turpitude is under investigation or trial. A reference has also been made to the provisions of Rule 3 (1) of All India Services (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1969 where it has been provided that if having regard to the nature of the charges and the circumstances in any case, the Govt. which initiates any disciplinary proceedings is satisfied that it is necessary or desirable to place under suspension the member of the service against whom such proceedings are started, that government may-(a) if the member of the service is serving under it pass an order placing him under suspension (b) if the member of the service is serving under another govern­ment, request that government to place him under suspension. Reliance is placed to a decision of the Supreme Court as reported in AIR 1972 SC 554 (R.P. Nayak vs. Union of India) in this regard. We may not go too far relating to the present case of the petitioner as the question that has been posed before us can be determined with the aid of Assam and Meghalaya Autonomous Districts (Constitution of the District Councils) Rules, 1951 and the United Khasi-Jaintia Autonomous District (Appointment & Succession of Chiefs and Headmen) Act, 1951 as amended up to date. Referring to the show cause notice (Annexure-II dated 15th January, 1986 the learned counsel has submi­tted that when the suspension order was passed on 25.2.86 it was in pursuance of the terms as stated in Annexure-II and as such the order of suspension is a penal action. If that be the posi­tion, as submitted by Mr. Referring to the show cause notice (Annexure-II dated 15th January, 1986 the learned counsel has submi­tted that when the suspension order was passed on 25.2.86 it was in pursuance of the terms as stated in Annexure-II and as such the order of suspension is a penal action. If that be the posi­tion, as submitted by Mr. Bhattacharjee, that the second proviso to Section 6 is attracted and as no opportunity was afforded to the petitioner before issuing such an order of suspension, the order cannot stand. Referring to paragraph 8 of the affidavit-in-opposition the learned counsel has pin-pointed to us that the deponent directed the Joint Secretary to communicate the allegations to the petitioner after seeing the file note-sheet which was put up to him for necessary orders and on considering the seriousness of the allegations and also the note of the Member of the District Council from Umroi constituency, the deponent directed to issue the notice. There was no formation of any opinion of the Executive Committee of the District Council to the affect that the case of the petitioner comes within the purview of any of the clauses (a) to (m) as enumerated in Section 6 of the Act. The whole question in challenge is to consider as to whether the order of suspension of the peti­tioner from Chief of the Mylliem Syiemship was issued under sub-clauses (ii) to 3rd proviso or under the second proviso of Section 6 of the Act. Sub-clause (ii) of 3rd proviso to Section 6 is attracted in the case of pending enquiry against the peti­tioner. The affidavit-in-opposition filed by respondent Nos. 1 to 7 has also been referred to us by the learned counsel for the petitioner. In paragraph 6 of the affidavit-in-opposition it is stated- "..... I state and assert that the said order of suspen­sion was passed with a view to conclude the enquiry impar­tially and the enquiry contemplated cannot be concluded allowing the petitioner to remain in office. 1 deny the other statements made in para 7 of the petition. The deponent is in charge of Elaka Administration of the District Council and no opinion of the Executive Com­mittee is necessary to call for an explanation from its subordinate officer. 1 deny the other statements made in para 7 of the petition. The deponent is in charge of Elaka Administration of the District Council and no opinion of the Executive Com­mittee is necessary to call for an explanation from its subordinate officer. I say that only when the question of suspension and dismissal of Chief arises, the forma­tion of opinion of the Executive Committee is necessary and in the instant case, the requirement of law was duly complied as required by the first proviso of section 6 of the Act, 1959 as amended the Executive Committee has placed the matter of suspension before the Council in Session ending on 13.3.86 of the District Council." 16. In the context of the averments made in the affida­vit-in-opposition Mr. Bhattacharjee, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that as per provisions laid down under Section 6 of the Act the Executive Committee if desires to remove a Chief from the Office or suspend him, an opinion has to be formed relating to any act or action as enumerated in clauses (a) to (m) of Section 6 of the Act. The suspension may be by way of punishment for a temporary period but in any case the Executive Committee is to farm its opinion to do so. But in case of the order of suspension by way of punish­ment, the second proviso to Section 6 must be followed by affording an opportunity to the petitioner of being heard. In no case the Chief can be suspended by virtue of the provi­sions of sub-clause (ii) of 3rd proviso to Section 6 when there is no pending enquiry against him. Reliance is sought to be placed on the following decisions : 14 ILR Assam 139 (U Doley Singh vs. Executive Member, in-charge Rural Administration District Council, United Khasi & Jaintia Hills) AIR 1957 SC 503 (Asgarali Nazarali Singaporewalla vs. State of Bombay) (Paragraph 21) AIR 1959 SC 833 (Management of Ranipur Colliery under Mis Equitable Co. Ltd. vs. Bhubat Singh and others) AIR 1971 SC 1120 (Lt. Col. S.K. Kashyap and another vs. State of Rajasthan) AIR 1971 Aisam 12) (U.G. forms Singh Lyngdoh vs. Executive Committee, U.K.J. Hills District, Shillong and others) (Paragraph II) and MIR 1961 SC 276 (T. Case vs. U. Jormanik Stem and another). Ltd. vs. Bhubat Singh and others) AIR 1971 SC 1120 (Lt. Col. S.K. Kashyap and another vs. State of Rajasthan) AIR 1971 Aisam 12) (U.G. forms Singh Lyngdoh vs. Executive Committee, U.K.J. Hills District, Shillong and others) (Paragraph II) and MIR 1961 SC 276 (T. Case vs. U. Jormanik Stem and another). It is first that mended by the learned counsel for the peti­tioner that the records called for from the respondents could not show that there is any reference relating to proceeding for any pending Enquiry. There cannot be any order of suspen­sion for any contemplated enquiry as because the provisions of Section 6 do not say so. When it is not provided in the Act empowering the authority to pass any suspension order for the contemplated enquiry, the order of suspension must have been passed under second proviso to Section 6 of the Act. That being the position, as submitted by the learned counsel, the suspension order is liable to be quashed being issued in com­plete disregard and in violation of the second proviso to Section 6 of the Act. The last submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that if the order of suspension is removed, the consequential order passed on 26.2.86 appointing respondent No. 8 as acting Chief would automatically be of no effect. 17. Mr. D. N. Choudhury, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 1 to 7 submits that the office of the Syiem is under the administrative control of the District Council. Therefore, the Chief may be treated as a subordinate officer of the District Council. The administrative control of the Chief lies with the District Council. It is apparent from the provisions as laid down under Section 6 of the Act that the Executive Committee of the District Council can take any penal action against the Chief if the action or any act of the Chief falls within the category of any of the clauses enumerated in clauses (a) to (m) of Section 6 of the Act. On receipt of the complaint from several members of the public on 14.1.86, about the acts, deeds, omission and commission of the petitioner while discharging his duties as Syiem of Mylliem and the allegations being serious in nature it was verified by one of the Members of the Exe­cutive Committee and on being satisfied, the Executive Commi­ttee formed an opinion that the terms of the Sanad had been violated by the petitioner which brought the case of the petit­ioner under the terms of the clauses enumerated under Section 6 of the Act. Having found so, a show cause notice was is­sued to the petitioner along with a copy of the complaint pe­tition asking the petitioner to show cause within a time bound period. The Executive committee felt it necessary that the mat­ter should be enquired into without any delay. It has been further submitted by the learned counsel that the order of sus­pension was issued pending enquiry of those allegations made against the petitioner about his acts and deeds as Chief of Mylliem. The order of suspension dated 25th February. 1986 if read as a whole, it would be clear that for the purpose of holding an enquiry the order of suspension was passed so that there can be a fair and impartial enquiry relating to the material evidence that may be required for completion of the enquiry. By virtue of the order of suspension of the Chief, the office of the Chief could not be kept vacant and as such the respondent No.8 was ap­pointed as an acting Chief as a stop gap measure till election is held for appointment of Chief or until further orders. There­fore, according to the learned counsel for the respondents, the Executive Committee and the District Council acted within the ambit and power vested in them by virtue of the provisions of the Act and the Rules. There was no deviation or departure from any provisions of the law as laid down under the Act in take such an action against the petitioner. While confronted with the question as regards pending enquiry, Mr. There was no deviation or departure from any provisions of the law as laid down under the Act in take such an action against the petitioner. While confronted with the question as regards pending enquiry, Mr. Choudhury replied that the Executive Committee can adopt its own proc­edure as an administrative body to hold an enquiry and as the matter is under enquiry, and in view of the fact that two pro­ceedings are pending one in the Civil Court and another in this Court in Revision no specific records could be maintained relating to the progress of the enquiry till the matter in dispute which are sub-judice in the court of law would come to an end. 18. In course of the preceding we called for the records from the District Council. The records were produced at the time of hearing and that too at the time of nearing the com­pletion of argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner. However, we perused the records but we do not find the sus­pension order was passed "pending enquiry." If we take into account the affidavit-in-opposition filed by respondent Nos. I to 7, we cannot ignore paragraphs wherein the respondents have mentioned about the contemplated enquiry against the petitioner. It is stated : ".. I state and assert that the said order of suspe­nsion was passed with a view to conclude the enquiry im­partially and the enquiry contemplated cannot be concluded allowing the petitioner to remain in the office. [ Emphasis laid ] The provisions of the Act do not empower the authority of the District Council to pass an order of suspension in a contemplated enquiry, but it can issue an order of suspension in case of pending enquiry. Therefore, unless an enquiry is pending no order of suspension could be passed in the man­ner as has been done in this case. In this context, we also curvet ignore Annexure-II, the notice dated 15th January, 1986 whereby the petitioner was directed to show cause as to why he should not be punished in according to law. Considering the facts which could not be disputed as to the correctness of the annexures in its construction and the constructions of paragraph 6 of the affidavit in-opposition filed on behalf of respondent Nos. Considering the facts which could not be disputed as to the correctness of the annexures in its construction and the constructions of paragraph 6 of the affidavit in-opposition filed on behalf of respondent Nos. 1 to 7 it can be concluded without doubt that the order of suspens­ion was not issued under sub-clause (ii) of the 3rd proviso to section 6 of the Act. It does not appear from the records before us that the order of suspension was issued pending any enquiry against the petitioner, but it was issued for a con­templated enquiry. There is no such provision in the Act whe­reby a Chief can be suspended for a contemplated enquiry. It is stated on oath, in paragraph 6 of the affidavit-in-opposition that "the said order of suspension was passed with a view to conclude the enquiry impartially and the "enquiry contemplated" cannot be concluded allowing the petitioner to remain in the office'' and such statement on oath by respondents cannot be lost sight of. On the basis of the complaint against the petitioner a show cause notice was issued, but till then there was no pending enquiry or at least the Executive Committee of the District Council did not take up any enquiry but contemplated that an enquiry would be conducted. Though the learned counsel for the respondents has argued before us that the enquiry could not be completed due to pending litigations between the parties to this writ petition in courts of law, yet, we are unable to agree with the above contention as because there was no order of stay to the effect that no enquiry should take place till the litigations in court come to end. Therefore, we are unable to hold that the Executive Committee of the District Council ever took up any enquiry against the petitioner for which the order of suspension was to be issued. There is no doubt that the Exe­cutive Committee of the District Crucial can take up enquiry even now as there is no order of stay in the proceedings either in the civil court or in the revision application pending before this Court. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for respondent Nos. There is no doubt that the Exe­cutive Committee of the District Crucial can take up enquiry even now as there is no order of stay in the proceedings either in the civil court or in the revision application pending before this Court. Therefore, the contention of the learned counsel for respondent Nos. 1 to 7 to the effect that the order of su­spension of the petitioner issued by tie Executive Committee on 25 2.86 was in exerci5e of their power under sub-clause (ii) of third proviso to Section 6 of the Act cannot be accepted. That being the position, we are constrained to hold that the order of suspension dated 25.2.86 (Annexure-VI to the writ petition) suspending the petitioner from the office of the Syiem-ship is untenable, without jurisdiction and not in conformity with the provisions of Section 6 of the Act. Hence the order of suspension of the petitioner from the of be of the Syiem-ship vide Annexure-VI is liable to be quashed which we hereby do and in consequence thereof the order and/or notification dated 26.2.86 appointing respondent No. 8 as acting Chief in place of the petitioner has lost its force. 19. Though the petitioner has alleged malafide, but on the face of the records we do not express our opinion on this po­int due to obvious reason that the Executive Committee is em­powered by the Act to pass any order to take any action aga­inst the petitioner within the ambit of the provisions of the Act. 29. For the foregoing reasons the petition is allowed. Ho­wever, it is open for the Executive Committee of the District Council to take up the enquiry proceeding against the petitioner in compliance to the provisions of Section 6 of the Act if it desires to do so. Of the facts and circumstances of the case we, however, leave the parties to bear their own cost. The judgment could not be delivered earlier as were holding court in out-lying Benches.