This application by judgment-debtor/defendant, that is, the "State of Tripura under section 115 C.P.C. is directed against the orders of the learned Munsiff, Sadar, Agirtala, dated 10th and 21st January, 1986 in Execution Case No. 11. EX (T)/1984. 2 As there was a provision for direct recruitment of 25% posts of Upper Division Assistants in the Civil Secretariat, Tripura, under the Rules for the Regulation of Recruitment to Clerical Services of Civil Secretariat, for short, 'the Rules', the decree-holder/plaintiff along with others applied for the posts through Tripura Public Service Commission, for short, TPSC, and their names were duly recommended to the State Government. As appointments were not issued within a reaso­nable time, the decree-holder approached the State Government and he was advised to apply for the post of Lower Division Assistant as the appointment as recommended by the TPSC may take some time and accordingly the decree-holder applied for the post and he was appointed as Lower Division Assistant. 3. However, the decree-holder filed a civil suit before the learned Sadar Munsiff, Tripura, which was registered as Title Suit No. 1 of 1981 praying for a declaration that he was entit­led to be appointed to the past of Upper Division Assistant and also to a perpetual injunction. During the pendency of the suit, on 7th May, 1981, the Rules were amended by the judgment-debtor by exercising powers under Article 309 of the Constitution and the rule was as follows: -On and from the 1st day of August, 1979 all recruit­ment to the posts of Upper Division Assistants in the Secretariat shall be made by promotion from the Lower Division Assistant-cum-Typist. In spite of the above amendment the learned trial court on contest decreed the suit. The appeals filed by the judgment-debtor before the learned lower appellate court and this Court were dismissed on the ground that these two appeals were not fifed within time. 4. While deciding issue No. 4 the learned trial court came to the finding that the amended rule was unjust, malafide, arbitrary, illegal and inapplicable to the decree-holder, but in the final decree (Annexure-4) no such declaration was made. 4. While deciding issue No. 4 the learned trial court came to the finding that the amended rule was unjust, malafide, arbitrary, illegal and inapplicable to the decree-holder, but in the final decree (Annexure-4) no such declaration was made. However, by the aforesaid decree the judgment-debtor was direc­ted to issue appointment letter in favour of the decree-holder within one month from the date of the decree in the post of Upper Division Assistant and to appoint him 'with effect from a date prior to the date of issue of the Notification dated 7.5.1981 by which the provisions of direct recruitment was abolished'. 5. Some lower Division Assistants who were appointed be­fore decree-holder and who were not parties to the instant suit filed a separate suit before the learned Subordinate Judge, Agartala praying, inter alia, for setting aside the decree dated 15.12.1983 passed in the instant suit and also for a perpetual injunction restraining the judgment-debtor from appointing the decree-holder as Upper Division Assistant. The said suit is still pending for adjudication. 6. On 3.7.84 the decree-holder filed an application for execution of the decree, but the execution was stayed by this Court On 21.5.85 the learned executing court, after the stay was vacated passed an order for issue of writ" of attachment, but on next day i.e. on 22.5.85 the learned court suo muto recalled the warrant of attachment and directed that the notice to show cause may be issued on the judgment-debtor. On 24.6.85 the judgment-debtor appeared through the learned counsel and stated, inter alia, that no notice was received and prayed for a direction to the decree-holder to comply with the orders of the Court dated 22.5.85. The learned court did not pass any order on the petition filed by the judgment-debtor. Again on 8.1.86 ano­ther petition was filed on behalf of the judgment-debtor and the fact of filing the suit by some senior Lower Division As­sistants and that the suit was pending was brought to the notice of the learned executing court. The learned court, howe­ver, refused to adjourn or stay the execution proceeding, but allowed five days time to the judgment-debtor to comply with the decree. On 13.1.86 the present petition under section 47 C. P. C. (Annexure-13) was filed and the learned court after hearing the parties dismissed the petition by the impugned order dated 20.1.86. Hence the present petition. 7. Mr. On 13.1.86 the present petition under section 47 C. P. C. (Annexure-13) was filed and the learned court after hearing the parties dismissed the petition by the impugned order dated 20.1.86. Hence the present petition. 7. Mr. Bhowmick, learned counsel for the decree-holder, strenuously contended that the present petition is barred by the principle of res judicata and in support he has placed reliance on two decisions namely, (1) Smt. Puspha v. Ganpat singh & Others, AIR 1977 Rajasthan 216 and (2) Ramrup Rai, AIR 1980Patna, 197. Mr. Kundu, learned Advocate General submitted that the above decisions are not applicable as the facts are different. Relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in The Regional Manager & Another v. Pdwan Kumar Dubey, AIR 1976 SC 1766 , Mr. Kundu submitted that one additional or different fact can make a world of difference between conclusions in two cases even when the same principles are applied in each case to similar facts. 8. By the amending Act of 1976, Section 11 C. P. C. was amended and the Explanation VII was added by which the principle of res judicata as contained in Section 11 C.P. C. was made applicable to a proceeding for the execution of a decree. So there is no dispute that the principle of res judicata shall apply to the instant proceeding. 9. In Smt. Puspha (supra) four different petitions under section 47 C.P.C. were filed on different dates and the Court held that the judgment-debtor not having taken objection in the earliest in his first objection petition he is precluded from taking such objection on the principle of constructive res judicata inasmuch as it was incumbent upon him to raise all the objec­tions when the first objection was filed. In Ramrup (supra) the petition under section 47 C.P.C. was filed after the decree-holder was directed to deposit the traveling allowance of the Nazir and also to file processes for effecting delivery of posse­ssion and in view of the above facts the Court held that the has the force of law and can be given retrospective effect. Though rules have not yet been declared uhra vires by ' any competent court, the decree was passed by the learned trial court directing the judgment-debtor to appoint the decree-holder directly as Upper Division Assistant in contravention of the Rules. 13. Though rules have not yet been declared uhra vires by ' any competent court, the decree was passed by the learned trial court directing the judgment-debtor to appoint the decree-holder directly as Upper Division Assistant in contravention of the Rules. 13. In Nagindas Ramdas vs. Dalpatran Iccharam, AIR 1974 SC 471 the Supreme Court held that the Rent Court under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act is not competent to pass a decree for possession either in invitum or with the consent of the parties on a ground which Js tows the Act. Smt. Kausfiafya Devi vs. K.L. Bhansal. AIR 1970 SC 838 , it was held that the decree which was in contravention of section 13 of the Delhi and "Ajmer Rent Con­trol Act was a nullity and cannot be executed. In Sunder Das (supra) their Lordships considered proviso to Section 3 of Delhi Rent Control Act, which was introduced with retrospec­tive effect and held that in view of the said amendment it must be concluded that the Civil Court had no inherent juris­diction to entertain the suit and the decree for eviction passed by the Court was a nullity. 14. Any decree which is against the law is a nullity and is not executable. As the present decree was pissed in viola­tion of the statutory rules abolishing direct recruitment to the post of Upper Division Assistant, it is a nullity and is not executable. Mr. Baowmick, learned counsel submitted that the suit was filed by the decree-holder prior to the amendment of the Rules and as no provision was made regarding pending proceeding while amending the rules, the said amendment shall not apply to the present decree. In support of this Mr. Bromwich has placed reliance on A.A. Calton v. The Director of Education & Another, 1983(1) SLJ 454. As the facts of the case are different and the law which was applicable to the above case, namely A.A. Carton (supra) was not given retros­pective effect, I am of the opinion that the said decision of the Apex Court is not applicable to the instant case. 15. Mr. Kundu, learned Advocate-General submitted that the decree in question is vague, not definite and inconclusive and as such cannot be executed. This submission needs no consideration as I have already held that the decree is a nullity. That apart, the contention of Mr. 15. Mr. Kundu, learned Advocate-General submitted that the decree in question is vague, not definite and inconclusive and as such cannot be executed. This submission needs no consideration as I have already held that the decree is a nullity. That apart, the contention of Mr. Kundu that the exact date on which the appointment to the decree-holder has to issued has not been stated clearly in the decree. I sea no force in the submission as in the decree it has been mentioned that appointment has to be given prior to the data mentioned in the decree. 16. The last contention of Mr. Bhowmick was that this is not a fit case for exercising revisional jurisdiction under se­ction 115 C. P. C. as the learned executing court did not commit any irregularity in exercising its jurisdiction. In Monti Chandra Nandy v. Debdas Naidy, AIR 1986 SC 446 the Apex Court while laying down the principle exercising revisional ju­risdiction held that in determining the correctness of the decision reached by the subordinate Court, the High Court may at times have to go into a jurisdictional question of law or fact, that is, it may have to decide collateral questions upon the as­certainment of which the decision as to jurisdiction depends. I have already held that the present decree is a nullity. In Sunder Dass (supra) it was held that its nullity can be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon and even at the stage of execution as the decree-holder is trying to execute a decree which is a nullity and not execu­table. I am of the opinion that the executing court exceeded its jurisdiction by ordering execution of the decree which is a nullity. The contention of Mr. Bhowmick is liable to the rejected. 17. From what has been stated above, I hold that as the present decree is a nullity, it cannot be executed by any court and the learned executing court committed an error by reject­ing the petition filed by the judgment-debtor under section 47 C. P. C.. 18. In the result, the present petition is allowed by sett­ing aside the orders of the learned executing court, that is, the learned Munsiff, Agartala, dated 20th and 21st January. 1986 passed in Case No.11 EX.(T) of 1934. 18. In the result, the present petition is allowed by sett­ing aside the orders of the learned executing court, that is, the learned Munsiff, Agartala, dated 20th and 21st January. 1986 passed in Case No.11 EX.(T) of 1934. I, hereby, also set aside the entire execution proceeding as the decree being a nullity cannot be executed. The rule is made absolute. No Costs.