Manisana, J.- These three appeals, M.A. (F) Nos. 36/78,37/78 and 38/78, arise from a common order dated 2.11.77 passed by the Ad-Hoc Claims Commissioner, 13 UP Tezpur Express Acci­dent, refusing to grant compensation under Section 82A of the Indian Railways Act. The appeals can be disposed of by a common judgment. 2. The facts of the case may briefly be stated. On 29.5.1977 Moniza Begum, Moshaddique Ali, Mustaque Ali and Shaminay-E-Yasmin were travelling by train, 13 UP Tezpur Express, from Gauhati. On the night of 29.5.1977 the train met with a acci­dent in between Udalguri and Rowta Stations. Moniza Begum, Moshaddique Ali, Mostaque Ali and Shaminay-E-Yasmin died in the accident. At the time of the accident, Moniza was aged 32, Mosaddique was and about 14, Mostaque Ali was aged 9 and Yasmin was aged 5. Shaukat Ali, husband of Moniza Begum and father of the three minor passengers, in persuance of the notice from the Commissioner filed four- claim cases viz. Case Nos. 58, 59, 60 and 61 of 1977. The case No. 58/77 was for the death of Moniza. The case No. 59, 60 and 61 of 1977 were for the death of Mustaque, Moshaddique and Yasmin respectively. After hearing the parties, in Case No. 58 of 1977, a compensation of Rs. 68,915.00 was ordered to be paid to the claimant Shaukat Ali. In case No. 59, 60 and 61 of 1977, the Commissioner refused to grant compensation on the ground that cases were not maintainable. Therefore, the appeals are in this Court. 3. In these appeals, it is not disputed that the three deceased minor passengers were travelling by the Train, 13 UP Tezpur Express, and died in the Railway accident, and that under Section 82A Railway Administration is liable to pay compen­sation for loss occasioned by the death of the three minor passen­gers caused due to the railway accident. The learned Commi­ssioner has held that the minor passengers had no income, and/or father (claimant) was not dependant on any earnings of the deceased, therefore, father could not make the application for compensation under section 82C. 4. We have perused the evidence on records. There is no evidence to show that the claimant (father) was dependant on the earnings of the deceased, or that any of the children were earning. Mr. 4. We have perused the evidence on records. There is no evidence to show that the claimant (father) was dependant on the earnings of the deceased, or that any of the children were earning. Mr. D. N. Choudhury, the learned counsel for the appellant, has also not seriously challenged the finding of facts. He has submitted that the expression ' dependant of the decea­sed" used in section 82C has to be liberally interpreted as to include„ 'father' as an heir or a legal representative without any condition or restriction in the spirit of section 110A (1) (b) of the Motor Vehicles Act and section 5 of the Carriage by Air Act. He has referred us to the decisions of the Supreme Co­urt in Maharajah Singh v. State of UP, (1977) 1 SCC 155 ; State of Punjab v. Amar Singh, (1974) 2 SCC 70 ; Motor Owner's Insurance v. Jedorji, AIP 1981 SC 2059, Union of India v. B. N,. Prasad, (1978) 2 SCC 462 and Union of India v. Sunil Kumar, AIR 1984 SC 1737 in support of his contentions. 5. Mr. P. P. Duara, the learned counsel for the responde­nts, has submitted that on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the claimant was not a competent per-son to make the application under section 82C. Mr. Duara has relied on a decision of the Allahabad High Court as reported in G. N. Bandari v. Railway Administration, AIR 1983 All 150 (DB). 6. The question then is-Whether the claimant Shaukat Ali could claim the compensation under section 82A read with 82C ? The relevant provisions of section 82C are as follows :- "(1) An application for compensation under section 82A arising out of any accident of the nature specified there­in may be made to the Claims Commissioner. (a) by the person who has sustained the injury or suffered any loss, or (b) by any agent duly authorised by such person in this behalf, or (c) where such person is a minor, by his guardian, and (d) where death has resulted from the accident, by any dependant of the deceased. (a) by the person who has sustained the injury or suffered any loss, or (b) by any agent duly authorised by such person in this behalf, or (c) where such person is a minor, by his guardian, and (d) where death has resulted from the accident, by any dependant of the deceased. (2) (3) Explanation :-In this section, and section 82HH, the word 'dependant' has the meaning assigned to it in clause (d) of section 2 of the Workmen's Compensat­ion Act, 1923 (VIII of 1923)." (emphasis added) The words "clause (d) of section 2" appearing in the ex­planation is to be read as clause (d) of sub-section (1) of section 2, for short the "clause (d)" as there are no clauses in other sub­sections of section 2. The original clause (d) was written -as :- " 'dependent' means any of the following relatives of deceased workman, namely, a wife, husband, parent, minor son, unmarried daughter, married daughter who is a minor, minor brother or unmarried sister, and includes the minor children of a deceased son of the workmen and, where no parent of the workman is alive, a paternal grand­parent." (emphasis added) 7. This Clause (d) was substituted by Workmen's Compen­sation (Amendment) Act, 1933 Clause (d)-was further amend­ed by the workmen's Compensation (Amendment) Act, 1938. After the amendments, the relevant provisions under Clause (d) were :- " 'dependent' means any of the following relatives of a deceased workman, namely :- (i) a widow, minor legitimate son, and unmarried le­gitimate daughter, or a widowed mother : and (ii) if wholly or in part dependent on the earnings of the workman at the time of his death, a husband, a parent other than a widowed mother, a minor legitimate son, ........." (emphasis added) 4. Clause (d) was once more substituted by the Workmen's Compensation (Amendment) Act, 1959 w. e. f, 1.6.1959. Clause (d) was once more substituted by the Workmen's Compensation (Amendment) Act, 1959 w. e. f, 1.6.1959. The relevant provisions of the present clause (d), that is after the amendment in 1959 are as follows :- "dependent” means any of the following relatives of a deceased workman, namely : (i) a widow, a minor legitimate son, an unmarried legitimate daughter, or a widowed mother; and (ii) if wholly dependent, on the earnings of the wor­kman at the time of his death, a son or a dau­ghter who has attained the age of 18 years and who is infirm; (iii) if wholly or in part dependent on the earnings of the workman at the time of his death; (a) widower, (b) a parent other than a widowed mother, (emphasis added) A close reading of clause (d) (ii) before the amendment and Clause (d) (iii) after the amendment shows that as regards father, no change has been made by the Amending Act of 1959. 9. However, in Clause (d), the expression "deceased wor­kmen" has been used. The Workmen's Compensation Act rela­tes to the liability of the employer to pay compensation in connection with an accident arising out of and in the course of the employment. Section 82C relates to the deceased "pas­senger". The passenger may be workman or may not be workman. Therefore, we are of the view that the provisions of the for­mer clause (d) are incorporated only so far they are not inconsistent with the Indian Railways Act, and that the Indian Railways Act modifies the word "workman'' so as to mean 'passenger'. Section 82C relates to the deceased "pas­senger". The passenger may be workman or may not be workman. Therefore, we are of the view that the provisions of the for­mer clause (d) are incorporated only so far they are not inconsistent with the Indian Railways Act, and that the Indian Railways Act modifies the word "workman'' so as to mean 'passenger'. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn, at page 544, it has been summed up, thus :- "When it is expressly provided that two statutes are to be read together or construed as one, every part of each of them must be construed as if it had been con­tained in one statute unless there is some manifest dis­crepancy : if so, and there is an ambiguity in the earlier statute, it may be necessary to hold that the later statute has to some extent modified something in the earlier statute." In this view of the above discussion, the word "workman" used in clause (d) is to be read as 'passenger' while dealing with the section 82C of the Indian Railways Act, and in the context of the present case and under section 82C read with clause (d), 'father' is 'dependent of the deceased' if he is who­lly or in part dependent on the earnings of the passenger at the time of his death. 10. Section 82A was inserted by the Indian Railway (Ame­ndment) Act, 1943 which came into force on 26.3.43. Sections 82B to 82J were inserted by the Indian Railway (Amendment) Act, 1949 with effect from 31.1.1950. Therefore, clause (d) in­corporated into the Indian Railways Act was not the original clause (d), but the amended clause (d) under the Amending Acts of 1933 and 1938. No change has been made by the Amend­ing Act of 1959 so far as 'father' is concerned. In this view of the matter, we are not expressing our opinion whether the present clause (d) will be read automatically into the adopting statute viz., Indian Railways Act. 11. In the original clause (d), there was no division or class or groups of relatives. A 'father' without any condition or restriction was within the meaning of 'dependent'. The Ame­nding Act of 1933 has made a change in Clause (d). 11. In the original clause (d), there was no division or class or groups of relatives. A 'father' without any condition or restriction was within the meaning of 'dependent'. The Ame­nding Act of 1933 has made a change in Clause (d). By the Amending Act of 1933, the relatives of the deceased mention­ed in the original Clause (d), has been divided into two cate­gories, namely, Clause (d)(i) and Clause (d)(ii). In Clause (d)(i), 'father' has not included. However, 'father' has been included in Clause (d)(ii) with a condition. A 'father' is within the meaning of 'dependent', if wholly or in part dependent on the earnings of the deceased. This position of 'father' has also not been changed by the Amending Act of 1959, as already stated. 12. Under the former Clause (d) or under the present Cla­use (d), the meaning of the word "dependent" is given by setting out clear description of relatives. In such a situation, we have no opportunity to interpret the word 'father' or the word "dependent" in the light of the submission made by Mr. Choudhury. Therefore, we are not interpreting the provisions of the Indian Railways Act and/or Workmen's Compensation Act as the meaning of the expression "dependent of the de­ceased", but applying the provisions of the relevant laws. In this view of the matter, the decisions of the Supreme Court cited by Mr. Choudhury for liberal construction or interpreta­tion, does not help the appellant. 13. As already stated, there is no evidence or material at all to show that Shaukat was dependent on the earnings of his deceased children at the time of their death. There is also no evidence to show that the deceased minor passengers had any income. In this view of the matter, Shaukat was/is not entitled to claim the compensation. A similar view has been taken by the Allahabad High Court, in G. N. Bhandary vs. the Railway Administration, AIR 1983 All 150 (DB), holding that where the father claimed compensation on the death of his son in a train accident, the claim would not be maintai­nable where there was no material on record to show that the claimant was dependent on the earnings of his deceased son at the time of his death. 14. Mr. Choudhury has further referred us to a decision of the Lahore High Court as reported in Mt. 14. Mr. Choudhury has further referred us to a decision of the Lahore High Court as reported in Mt. Moti Bai vs. Agent, N. W. Railways, AIR 1932 Lahore 1. The decision in Lahore case was under the original Clause (d) aforesaid. There­fore, the decision is not applicable to the present case in view of the above discussions. 15. For the foregoing reasons, there is no material to in­terfere with the findings of the Commissioner. The appeals are accordingly dismissed. No costs. Before parting with the case, we feel to express that one of us (Manisana, J.) was away from the principal seat at Gauhati for holding Court at Agartala circuit-town. This de­layed the delivery of the judgment. Saikia, J.-I have profitably perused the judgment prepa­red by my learned brother and I agree. With concurrence I add the following lines to express that in such cases a deci­sion 'ex rigore Juris'-according to rigour and strictness of the law may appear to be 'ex lege" but not ' ex acquitate'. The wife and three minor children of the appellant died in the accident of 31 Up Tezpur Express train on the night of 29.5.77. The appellant's application for compensation for the death of the three children has been found to be not main­tainable by the Ad-Hoc Claims commissioner and we in app­eal found no legal infirmity in the decision. This is because of the basis of liability of the railways for death of passen­gers in train accident. 2. The law relating to Indian railways is generally based on the English law on the subject. Economic history of Eng­land records the evolution of private railways and their ass­umption of liability for injury on death to their passengers under the common law. The railway undertaker was in gene­ral free to limit by special contract their liability as carriers, and a railway passenger was owed whatever duty was expre­ssed or was to be implied in the contract for his carriage. Railway undertakers were not needed to be common carriers of passengers and they might choose whether they would or would not carry passengers. When they did carry, they were to provide all reasonable facilities in their power for this traffic. There were no statutory terms and conditions for the carriage of passengers. Gradually the railways became common carriers whose responsibility according to the common law was that of an insurer. When they did carry, they were to provide all reasonable facilities in their power for this traffic. There were no statutory terms and conditions for the carriage of passengers. Gradually the railways became common carriers whose responsibility according to the common law was that of an insurer. The English common carrier was liable not only for the negligence of himself or of his servants, but also cases where he had used all reasonable care and forethought. From this responsibility as an insurer, a common carrier could only claim exemption by two important things, namely, the act of God and the act of the King's enemies. The statute has gradually intervened in this relationship. But in case of passengers railways were not insurers. As carriers of passengers the railways were bound to carry them, if they were in a fit condition to be carried, if there was sufficient accommodation in the train and if they were ready to pay the fare for such carriage. Under the Indian Railways Act, 1890, in India rail­ways were not only not insurers of the safe carriage of goods, but they were also not insurers of the safe carriage of passengers; they were not also baileys in respect of such Suspenders. The position in England was not much different. In B. Rail­way vs. Kalidas Mukherjee, 1901 A. C. 396 (403) it was held that there was no obligation on the part of the railways to carry passengers safely. The duty was only to carry them with reasonable care and diligence and to afford them reasonable accomodation. In Jeewan Ram Khettry vs. E.J. Railway, 51 Cal 861, it was held that if the railway omitted to use such care and forethought it would be liable for negligence. There was, however, no warranty that the carriage in which passengers were carried should be in all respects perfect for its purpose, i. e. free from all defects likely to cause peril, although the defects were such that no skill, care or foresight could have detected their existence. 3. The duty of a railway administration to use a high degree of care in respect of its passengers did not necessarily depend on any contract with the passengers. It was bound not to in­jure by negligence any person lawfully on its railway, whether such person had made a contract with it or not. 3. The duty of a railway administration to use a high degree of care in respect of its passengers did not necessarily depend on any contract with the passengers. It was bound not to in­jure by negligence any person lawfully on its railway, whether such person had made a contract with it or not. As was held In Taylor vs. Md S.L. Rly Co. (1895) 1 Q.B 134 (141) the liability of the railway was founded upon tort or negligence. The liability in respect of death caused by railway accidents, etc., however, was regulated by the Indian Fatal Accidents Act (XII of 1855). The action contemplated by the Fatal Accidents Act was an action for the benefit of the wife and children of the deceased and the right of the deceased's family to ob­tain compensation was quite independent of the right which the deceased would have had in case he had survived. The concept of economic dependence was not a criterion for eligi­bility to receive compensation. 4. S. 82-A of the Railways Act, which was inserted by S. 2 of Act 3 of 1943, provides for liability of railway adminis­tration for loss occasioned by death of a passenger dying as a result of a railway accident and for personal injury and loss of property whether or not there has been any wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the railway administra­tion. S. 82-A applied only when the death is of a passenger travelling by train and meeting with an accident. The liabi­lity of the railway administration is notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary and it is only for loss occa­sioned by the death of a passenger dying as a result of such accident. The liability is limited by the sub-section (2), now to fifth thousand rupees in respect of one person. So the basis of the liability is "only for loss occasioned by death of a passenger". Is this loss to be confined only to economic loss directly and immediately caused by the death ? Thus S. 82-A only provides an alternative remedy to that under the law of torts. The words "notwithstanding any other law to the contrary" refer clearly to the law" of torts. This section only provides a cheaper and more expeditious remedy but it is limi­ted remedy. Thus S. 82-A only provides an alternative remedy to that under the law of torts. The words "notwithstanding any other law to the contrary" refer clearly to the law" of torts. This section only provides a cheaper and more expeditious remedy but it is limi­ted remedy. As was held in Shreenath Singh vs. East India Railway Administration, AIR 1952 Pat 466 (468), Section 82-A indicates that the liability imposed by it is independent of any wrongful act, neglect or default on the part of the railway administration, such as would entitle a person, who has been injured or suffered a loss, to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof. This was reiterated in Ram Chandra Rjasad Sinha vs. Union of India, AIR 1959 Pat 316 (318). Sr. 82-A makes the railway Administration liable to pay compensa­tion for loss occasioned by the death of the passenger. The scheme of the group of Sections 82-A to 82-J is different from that of Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, where it is expressly provi­ded that every action under that Act shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, if any, of the person whose death has been caused. Even under the Workmen's Com­pensation Act, 1923 there is express provision in S. 8 that on the deposit of any money as compensation in respect of a deceased workman, the Commissioner under that Act shall take steps for determining the distribution of the amount of compensation and the compensation shall be apportioned amongst the dependents of the deceased workman. There can, therefore, be no bar to claiming and receiving compensation under any other law for death of a passenger in a train accident, where no compensation is paid under S. 82-A of the Act. 5. Section 82-C of the Act deals with application for compensation. An application for compensation under Section & 2-A arising out of any accident of the nature specified therein may be made "(d) where death has resulted from the accident, by any dependant of the deceased." The Explanation to the Section says that the word "dependant" has the meaning assig­ned to it in clause (d) of Section 2 of the Workmen's Com­pensation Act, 1923 (8 of 1923). This section was added by Section 13 of Act 55 of 1949. 6. The explanation as to the meaning of the word "depen­dant" is an instance of legislation by incorporation. This section was added by Section 13 of Act 55 of 1949. 6. The explanation as to the meaning of the word "depen­dant" is an instance of legislation by incorporation. The mea­ning assigned in clause (d) of Section 2 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 has been incorporated by reference. It is, however, not stated what is the year of the Workmen's Compensation Act, which has been incorporated by reference. We are, therefore, to take the definition as it stood at the time of inserting the Explanation to S. 82-C. However, the subsequent amendments of the definition in the Workmen's Com­pensation Act will not be applicable unless it is otherwise made applicable by the Railways Act itself. It appears the Work­men's Compensation Act, 1923 had clause 2(1) (d) and not simply 2(d) as referred to in the Explanation to S. 82-C. In clause 2(1) (d) the concept of economic dependence was originally not present. The original clause 2(1) (d) defined 'dependant' as follows : "(d) 'dependant' means any of the following relatives-of a deceased workman namely a wife, husband, parent minor son, unmarried daughter, married daughter who is a minor, minor brother or unmarried sister and includes the minor children of a deceased son of the workman and where no parent of the workman is alive, a pater­nal grand parent." Interpreting this clause in Re Jamadar Munshi Ram, AIR 1931 Lahore 399, it was observed that there was no analysis of economic dependence. The relatives included in the defini­tion were treated as dependants. Similarly, in Re Karim Dad, AIR 1930 Lahore 657, the question of economic dependence was not considered at all. In Mt. Moti Bai vs. Agent, N.W. Rfy, AIR 1932 Lahore 1, it was held that the actual dependence on the deceased workman was not the criterion for judging whether compensation should be paid to the persons mentioned in the definition or to any of them, and the mere proof of the specified relationship would entitle the person concerned to com­pensation. The intention of the legislature was to compensate those whom the deceased was, having regard to customs and ide­as of the people, ordinarily expected to maintain. 7. The intention of the legislature was to compensate those whom the deceased was, having regard to customs and ide­as of the people, ordinarily expected to maintain. 7. The Workmen's Compensation Act was passed on the 5th March, 1923, but came into force on the 1st July, 1924" It still forms the basis of the Indian law on the subject but has been substantially amended from time to time. The first amendment was made by Act VII of 1924 when certain minor changes were made in sections 10, 15 and 28. Major changes were made by Act XV of 1933 which altered many sections and also the Schedules in the line recommended by the Royal Commission on Labour in India in 1931. Further changes made by Act XXXVII of 1935. Among other changes were the alteration and enlargement of the definition of "dependant". Amendments were also made in 1937, 1938 and in 1946. The Adaptation of (Central Act and Ordinances) Orders 1947 and 1948 changed certain words in the Act. The aforesaid original definition of "dependant' was amended in 1933 to the following effect : "(d) "dependant" means any of the following relatives of a deceased workman, namely :-(i) a widow, minor legitimate son and unmarried legitimate daughter, or a widowed mother; and (ii) if wholly or in part dependent on the earnings of the workman at the time of his death, a widower, a parent other than a widowed mother, a minor illegitimate son, an unmarried illegitimate daughter, a daughter legi­timate or illegitimate if married and a minor or if widowed, a minor brother, an unmarried or widowed sister, a wido­wed daughter in law, a minor child of a deceased son, a minor child of a deceased daughter where no parent of the child is alive, or, where DO parent of the work­man is alive, a paternal grand parent". The definition was further amended by Act 8 of 1959 with effect from 1.6.1959 as follows :- "(d) "dependent" means any of the following relatives of a deceased workman, namely, (i) a widow, a minor legitimate son, an unmarried legi­timate daughter, or a widowed mother; and (ii) if wholly dependent on the earnings of the workm­an at the time of his death, a son or a daughter who has attained the age of 18 years and who is infirm; (iii) if wholly or in part dependent on the earning of the workman at the time of his death, (a) a widower, (b) a parent other than a widowed mother, (c) a minor illegitimate son, an unmarried illegitim­ate daughter or a daughter legitimate or illegitimate if married and a minor if widowed and a minor; (d) a minor brother or an unmarried sister or a wido­wed sister if a minor; (e) a widowed daughter -in- law; (f) a minor child of a pre-deceased son, (g) a minor child of a pre-deceased daughter where no parent of the child is alive, or (h) a paternal grand parent if no parent of the wor­kman is alive." 8. The Workmen's Compensation Act is based on the con­cept of compensation payable to workmen. A workmen implies wages or earnings and also the capacity to work. All these factors need not necessarily be present in case of a passenger killed in a train accident. The loss of income or economic loss. therefore, need not necessarily result from death of a passenger. Strict application of the concept of economic dependence may, in appropriate cases, result in denial of any compensation for the death of a passenger. While amending the Workmen's Co­mpensation Act the legislature was not expected to envisage its effects on liability of Railway to pay compensation for death of passengers in train accident. The foundation of carrier's liability to compensation on the death of a travelling passenger cannot be said to be exactly the same as the foundation of liability of employers to pay compensation on death of their workmen- While interpreting the word 'dependent' for the pur­pose of Section 82-A of the Act, this aspect may be necessary to be borne in mind. A rigorous principle of economic depen­dence as a criterion for paying compensation for death of children in train accident in the Indian society may appear to be contrary to natural love and affection of the parents. If an entire children's special train were to be destroyed in an accident so that the entire children perished, even then no co­mpensation could be claimed by their parents. The strict app­lication of the criterion of 'dependent' may, therefore, result in a judgment 'ex lege' according to law, but 'ex acquitate'-according to equity. However, it is a matter for the legislature to consider. We are to render justice according to law and I accordingly agree with my learned brother.