JUDGMENT P.R. Vyas Bhiman, Chairman - The main point which arises in this case of mutation referred to this court by the Additional Commissioner, Agra, is whether a compromise entered into by the contesting claimants can be acted upon. The secondary point which arises is whether in this particular case the trial court gave sufficient opportunity to the mutation applicant to produce evidence and whether it was later justified in throwing out the mutation application on the ground that no evidence has been given. 2. The undisputed facts are that the deceased Sheoraj Singh, Revisionist Srichand and opposite party Raj Pal Singh are all sons of the same father and the dispute arose on the death of the said Sheoraj Singh. The Supervisor Kanungo acting under Section 33-A of the U.P. Land Revenue Act had recorded the names of both the contestants as they were brothers of the deceased. The opposite party, however, filed a mutation application on the basis of an unregistered will according to which he would become the sole heir. In one of the written statements to the trial court he had stated that the said will was shown to the Supervisor Kanungo but the latter disregarded it in passing the order. To continue, objection to the mutation was made by the present revisionist who stated that mutation had already been made u/Section 33-A, the Will was fake and nothing remained to be done by the Court. The order sheet shows the following position:- On February 9, 1979, Proclamation was ordered to be issued, returnable on March 19, 1979. Objection on behalf of the revisionist was filed on March 19, 1979 and March 30, 1979 was fixed for reply to the objection. The reply to the objection was accordingly filed on March 30, 1979 and April 7, 1979 was fixed for the evidence of the mutation applicant i.e. of the present opposite party. On that day the presiding officer was not present and the case stood adjourned to April 18, 1979. On April 18, 1979 a compromise was filed signed by both the parties and was also verified on the reverse by the Presiding Officer. It was ordered that the Lekhpal be summoned for evidence on April 30, 1979. On that day the presiding officer was not present and the case stood adjourned to April 18, 1979. On April 18, 1979 a compromise was filed signed by both the parties and was also verified on the reverse by the Presiding Officer. It was ordered that the Lekhpal be summoned for evidence on April 30, 1979. On that date the Lekhpal did not turn up and according to the order sheet May 10, 1979 was fixed for evidence of the mutation applicant and also for again summoning the lekhpal. On May 10, 1979 the lekhpal was present but his statement could not be taken and according to the order sheet May 23, 1979 was fixed for the evidence on behalf of the mutation applicant. However, on May 23, 1979 the statement of the lekhpal was taken which was to the effect that Sheoraj Singh had died and the contestants were his brothers. The case was then fixed for order on May 30, 1979. Since the judgment was not ready on that date it was adjourned to June 16, 1979 on which date the trial court rejected the mutation application stating that the applicant instead of producing evidence had filed a compromise giving effect to which would entail partition. The judgment went on to say that the names of both the contestants had already been entered by the Supervisor Kanungo and Aamaldaramad had also been done. With these observations the application was rejected. The S.D.O. in his appellate order dated August 1, 1981 has remarked that if in the opinion of the trial court the compromise could not be acted upon then he should have given an opportunity to both the parties to lead evidence. It also said that the trial court should have given a definite finding on the Will. On these considerations he remanded the case to the trial court. The Additional Commissioner in his referring order has however, taken the view that sufficient time had been given to the mutation applicant to produce his evidence. According to him the compromise could not be legally acted upon. Therefore, in his view the order of the trial court was just and proper and the order of the remand was bad. He has made a recommendation to that effect. 3. In arguments before me learned counsel for the revisionist points out that the compromise gives unequal shares to the two contestants. Therefore, in his view the order of the trial court was just and proper and the order of the remand was bad. He has made a recommendation to that effect. 3. In arguments before me learned counsel for the revisionist points out that the compromise gives unequal shares to the two contestants. He has also said that though dates were given to the mutation applicant to lead evidence he did not do so. Relying on the ruling given by Sri J.D. Shukla, the then Chairman, in Smt. Kalsoom Begum v. Amjad Alid, 1971 R.D. 262 he supports the view that the compromise could not be acted upon. He argued that the compromise of April 18, 1979 could not be called a family settlement because if it was a family settlement reduced to writing it should be registered. My attention has also been drawn to the majority judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Punjab and others v. Amar Singh and others, 1983 (1) Luck. Civil Decisions 65 in which it has been held that by consent of an agreement parties cannot achieve what is contrary to law and a decree merely based on such agreement cannot furnish a judicial amulet against statutory violation, as well as to a judgment of the Hon'ble Allahabad High Court in Rameshwar Singh and others v. Dy. Director of Consolidation, Lucknow Civil Decisions 1983 (Vol. 1) page 66 where it has been held that if the agreement itself is void, the seal of the court super-added to it without any adjudication on merits, cannot cure the compromise or agreement of its invalidity. 4. Learned counsel for the opposite party on the other hand relies on the ruling of Sri S.N. Mehrotra, the then Member, in Ram Murat v. Hargend, 1971 R.D. 431. It states that a family settlement does not amount a transfer under the Transfer of Property Act and can be given effect to, a judgment of the Hon'ble High Court, Allahabad, in Qabool Singh v. Board of Revenue and others, 1972 R.D. 342 and the ruling of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Krishna Behari Lal v. Gulab Chand, AIR 1971 SC 1041 . He also argues that Paragraph 60 of the Revenue Court Manual makes order 23 Rule 3 of the C.P.C. applicable to proceedings under the U.P. Land Revenue Act and, therefore, the Court has no option but to act on the compromise if it is not illegal. 5. I have gone through the record of the case and considered the above arguments. Various rulings referred to make the position quite clearly. No compromise which has effect of defeating the law can be acted upon and the parties cannot achieve under the guise of the compromise what they cannot do legally otherwise. On the other hand the provisions of Order 23 Rule 3 which have been applied to the proceedings under the Land Revenue Act make it clear that a compromise if not unlawful has to be acted upon. In the ruling given by Sri J.D. Shukla the contestants were the alleged widow and the alleged nephew. The alleged nephew had denied the relationship of the widow with the deceased and while it is not clear whether his own relationship was denied it seems to be based on shaky grounds because in the alternative the nephew claimed on the basis of survivor-ship. The court had observed that Z.A. and L.R. Act makes each preferential heir exclude the less preferential heir and, therefore, the widow and the nephew cannot be combined. In view of the denial of relationship it appears that the court also felt that perhaps none of them had valid claims because it further ordered while remanding the case that the Gaon Samaj should also be notified about the hearing of the case. The facts of this case are clearly distinguishable because both the contestants are claimants of the same category and the relationship is admitted to both the parties. The only effect of the compromise is that instead of each brother getting an exact half share the one who has set up an exclusive claim on the basis of the will gets a bigger share. I do not see that this is a transaction which cannot be achieved through order means because both are Bhumidahrs and both get transferable rights under the law. If in order to avoid costly ruinous litigation they arrive at a compromise it cannot be called illegal or designed to circumvent the law of the land. I do not see that this is a transaction which cannot be achieved through order means because both are Bhumidahrs and both get transferable rights under the law. If in order to avoid costly ruinous litigation they arrive at a compromise it cannot be called illegal or designed to circumvent the law of the land. There is no suggestion of fraud about the compromise which has been verified by the Presiding Officer in one court. It is true that when pressed on the point learned counsel for the revisionist stated that he reviled from the compromise but even at that stage no suggestion of fraud was made. In view of the above discussion and the clear provision of Order 23 Rule 3 C.P.C. it is not necessary to discuss whether this is itself a family settlement reduced in writing or it merely records a family settlement previously arrived at in which case no registration i needed. 6. It is not necessary to discuss further whether sufficient opportunity was given to the mutation applicant to lead his evidence through it may be remarked in passing that I find myself in agreement with the appellate court that if the Tahsildar was inclined to reject the compromise he should have stated so clearly as otherwise no dispute existed between the parties and no evidence had to be led. 7. In view of the above discussion, I discharge the reference but I also set aside the orders of both the trial and the appellate courts and order that mutation shall be effected in terms of the compromise which shall form part of this order.