Judgment :- 1. The common revision petitioner in these two C.R.Ps. is the landlord of a line building having three apartments. The respondents herein are the tenants of two of such apartments. The landlord filed separate petitions for eviction of these tenants on two grounds, namely, (1) for her own occupation and (2) arrears of rent. All the authorities below held against her on ground No.l and eviction was ordered only on the second ground. 2. Rent Control Petition No. 186 of 1978, before the Rent Controller, Cannanore, from which C.R.P.No.3626 of 1981 arises is in respect of room No.516. That Rent Control Petition was disposed of on 11th December, 1978. While discussing the question of bona fide need of the landlord the Rent Control Court observed that the landlord herself has not given evidence and only her husband is examined as P.W.1. The Rent Control Court treated this as an important circumstance against the landlord. Another ground on which the Rent Control Court rejected the ground of bona fide need of the landlord, is that there was a prior Rent Control Petition for eviction of the third apartment in this line building. Although by Ext.A-6 order eviction was allowed, that apartment was again let out to the wife of the original tenant under Ext.A-7 for an enhanced rent. 3. The other Rent Control Petition, namely, R.C.P.No.185 of 1978 before the same Rent Controller from which C.R.P.No.3621 of 1981 arises which is in respect of room No.517, was disposed of subsequently on 6th January 1979. In that order the Rent Control Court practically adopted the very same reasoning and dismissed that petition also. In the appeals filed by the landlord, the Appellate Authority also adopted the very same reasoning. The Revisional Court confirmed these orders by a common order. 4. The first ground on which the claim of bona fide need of landlord is rejected is that the landlord herself is not examined. The learned counsel for the tenants placed reliance on Nandlal Goverdhandas & Co. v. Samratbai (A.I.R.1981 Bombay 1), where it was held as follows: 1122 The bona fide requirement is in the first place a stale of mind though it may be something more. It must, therefore, be deposed to by the person who is requiring the premises under S.13(1) (g) namely, the landlord. v. Samratbai (A.I.R.1981 Bombay 1), where it was held as follows: 1122 The bona fide requirement is in the first place a stale of mind though it may be something more. It must, therefore, be deposed to by the person who is requiring the premises under S.13(1) (g) namely, the landlord. If the landlord does not step into the witness-box to bring before the court legal evidence for proving bis requirement, then it cannot be said that he reasonably and bona fide requires the premises as mentioned in S.13(1) (g). The landlord can delegate the authority to conduct a case but he cannot delegate the duty to depose. 23 The respondent, who is the landlady, has not been examined in support of her case nor has she been examined as a witness on commission. On this ground alone the suit of the respondent ought to have been dismissed because the bona fide requirement which, as I have mentioned above is a state of mind and something more must be proved in this case. Ramanlal. the respondent's son, is said to be her constituted attorney but that could only be for the purpose of conducting the case but bis evidence cannot be substituted for the legal evidence of the landlady herself." 5. However, the learned counsel for the landlord contended that it is not necessary that the landlord should go to the witness-box and depose about his bona fide requirement and that he can prove the landlord's requirement in any manner allowed by law. In support of this contention he relied on the following judgments. 6. In Narasimhachari v. Kanakasabapathi (1964) IM.L.J. 256) the Madras High Court held as follows: "When we consider the question whether the landlord requires the building bonafide for his own use, we have to bear in mind whether the premises may be required reasonably and bona fide. It is the duty of the Court to see whether the premises are required both reasonably and bona fide. Bona fides may be proved in an ordinary way like any other fact. There is no such rule of law that bona fides being the subject-matter, can only be proved by the petitioner stepping into the witness-box. It is the duty of the Court to see whether the premises are required both reasonably and bona fide. Bona fides may be proved in an ordinary way like any other fact. There is no such rule of law that bona fides being the subject-matter, can only be proved by the petitioner stepping into the witness-box. It depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case." In Palaniappa Chettiar v. Simon George (1983) II M.L.J. 354) the Madras High Court again considered the same question and held as follows: "It is not necessary that the landlord alone should go into the box and depose about the bona fide requirement. Even his own agent or anybody on his behalf whose evidence is cogent, convincing and trustworthy can be taken on its face value either for upholding or for rejecting the case of the landlord. Under the circumstances, the failure on the part of the landlord to go into the box and examine himself cannot be taken as a ground for not upholding his claim or bona fide requirement of the demised premises." In another case, namely, V. R. Shah & another v. N. Visalakshi (1983 (2) R.C.J 610) the Madras High Court has reiterated the above position. 7. My learned brother, Sukumaran, J. in Bhaskaran v. Unni (1984 K.L.T. 1016) considered this question and relying on the decision of the Madras High Court in V. R. Shah's case (1983 (2) R.C.J. 610) held as follows: "It is not an inflexible requirement of law that the landlord should necessarily enter the witness box to give the evidence. It would depend upon the facts of each case." 8. S.11 (3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, is as follows: 11 (3). A landlord may apply to the Rent Control Court for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building if he bona fide needs the building for his own occupation or for the occupation by any member of his family dependent on him;" (provisos omitted) Therefore, what the landlord is to establish is that he bona fide needs the building. This can be proved in any manner provided under the Evidence Act, namely, by adducing oral or documentary evidence. In this case the landlord is a Muslim Pardanishan lady. Her husband has given evidence in the Rent Control Petitions. This can be proved in any manner provided under the Evidence Act, namely, by adducing oral or documentary evidence. In this case the landlord is a Muslim Pardanishan lady. Her husband has given evidence in the Rent Control Petitions. He has stated that his wife is a Pardanishan lady and does not usually go to public offices. He has also spoken about the need of the landlord for the buildings. However, the courts below have examined the question on the assumption that the petitioner herself ought to have been examined. The landlord's husband, P.W. 1, was fully competent to swear to the material facts to prove the bona fide need of the landlord. In a sense he is more competent to speak about the material facts than the landlord herself, since it has come out in evidence that he is attending to all such matters on her behalf. To insist that even in such a case the landlady herself should appear in court and give evidence is totally unreasonable. The orders of the courts below are vitiated by the assumption that the landlady herself ought to have been examined. This has caused considerable prejudice to her. I am in respectful agreement with the rulings of the Madras High Court and this Court to the effect that it is not essential that the landlord himself should go to the witness box to prove his bona fide requirement and hold accordingly. 9. The second ground relied on by the courts below is that one apartment was vacated as per Ext.A-6 order and it was again let out to the wife of the very same tenant. However, the courts below have not considered the evidence that at that time the petition for eviction was filed only on the ground of arrears of rent. There was no prayer for eviction on the ground of bonafide need. The courts below assumed wrongly that in case there was need for own occupation, that apartment would not have been let out as per Ext.A-7. Ext.A-6 order (in R.C.P. No. 185 of 1978) was passed on 18-1-1975 in a petition filed in 1974. The present rent control petitions were filed in 1978. The courts below assumed wrongly that in case there was need for own occupation, that apartment would not have been let out as per Ext.A-7. Ext.A-6 order (in R.C.P. No. 185 of 1978) was passed on 18-1-1975 in a petition filed in 1974. The present rent control petitions were filed in 1978. The courts below have not at all adverted to the evidence to the effect that certain persons intervened and mediated and it was under those circumstances that the apartment was again let out to the wife of the original tenant. It may also be noticed that in case the arrears of rent were paid, the order of eviction was liable to be vacated under S.11 (2) (c) of the Act. The courts below have erred in the exercise of their jurisdiction in not adverting to the relevant evidence. The evidence as a whole ought to have bean considered before deciding the question whether the need set up by the landlord is bona fide or not. 10. It is contended by the learned counsel for the tenant that even so this Court may not interfere under S.115 of the C. P. C. since there is no jurisdictional error in the orders of the courts below. He also relied on the following passage in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sri. Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy (AIR 1980 S.C.1253): 114 Merely to hold that a question is a mixed question of fact and law is not sufficient to warrant the exercise of revisional power. It must however, be shown that there was a taint of such unreasonableness resulting in a miscarriage of justice. A concurrent finding, based on evidence, that the landlord did not bona fide require the premises for his own use and occupation is not in our view a finding which can be touched by the High Court exercising jurisdiction under S.25 of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Central) Act, 1960." 11. So if the orders of the courts below are "tainted with such unreasonableness resulting in a miscarriage of justice" or if the concurrent finding is not "based on evidence" this dictum will not apply. As stated above it is not reasonable to ignore the evidence of the husband of a pardanishan landlady on the ground that she herself was not examined. This has resulted in miscarriage of justice. As stated above it is not reasonable to ignore the evidence of the husband of a pardanishan landlady on the ground that she herself was not examined. This has resulted in miscarriage of justice. So also it cannot be said that the concurrent findings of the courts below are "based on evidence", in that the courts below have not considered the evidence of P.W.1 and also the evidence of Exts. A-6 and A-7 properly. 12. Mathew, J in M. L. Sethi v. R. P. Kapur (A. I. R.1972 S. C. 2379) after describing the word jurisdiction as a "verbal cast of many colours" referred to Anisminde Ltd., (1969)2 A C 147), and held as follows: 11. The dicta of the majority of the House of Lords in the above case would show the extent to which 'lack' and 'excess' of jurisdiction have been assimilated or, in other words, the extent to which we have moved away from the traditional concept of "jurisdiction". The effect of the dicta in that case is to reduce the difference between jurisdictional error and error of law within jurisdiction almost to vanishing point The practical effect of the decision is that any error of law can be reckoned as jurisdictional. This comes perilously close, to saying that there is jurisdiction if the decision is right in law but none if it is wrong. Almost any misconstruction of a statute can be represented as "basing their decision on a matter with which they have no right to deal," "imposing an unwarranted condition" or "addressing themselves to a wrong question". The majority opinion in the case leaves a court or Tribunal with virtually no margin of legal error. Whether there is excess of jurisdiction or merely error within jurisdiction can be determined only by construing the empowering statute which will give little guidance. It is really a question of how much latitude the Court is prepared to allow In the end it can only be a value judgment (See H.W.R. Wade, "Constitutional and Administrative Aspects of the Anismenic case", Law Quarterly Review, Vol. 85,1969, p. 198). Why is it that a wrong decision on a question of limitation or res judicata was treated as a jurisdictional error and liable to be interfered with in revision? 85,1969, p. 198). Why is it that a wrong decision on a question of limitation or res judicata was treated as a jurisdictional error and liable to be interfered with in revision? It is a bit difficult to understand how an erroneous decision on a question of limitation or res judicata would oust the jurisdiction of the Court in the primitive sense of the term and render the decision or a decree embodying the decision or a nullity liable to collateral attack. The reason can only be that error of law was considered as vital by the Court. And there is no yardstick to determine the magnitude of the error other than the opinion of the Court." 13. S.115 C.P.C. contemplates three cases in which the revisional powers of the High Court may be exercised: (1) the assumption by the lower court of a jurisdiction which it does not possess (2) its failure to exercise jurisdiction which it does possess and (3) where there is exercise of jurisdiction which the court possesses but the exercise has been in a manner which is illegal or materially irregular. 14. In the present case, it is clear that the courts below have failed to consider the case on its merits as it was bound to. Thus the courts below have exercised jurisdiction illegally and with material irregularity. In the result, these Civil Revision Petitions are allowed, the orders of the courts below are set aside and the Rent Control Petitions are remanded to the Rent Control Court for fresh consideration and disposal in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this order. Parties are at liberty to adduce fresh evidence, if so advised. Parties are directed to appear before the Rent Control Court on 3-3-1986.