This is a petition under Section 115, CPC and is directed against the order dated 30th November, 1985, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, West Tripura at Agartala, in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 33 of 1985 by which the learned Court set aside the order granting temporary injunction by the learned Subordinate Judge, West Tripura at Agartala, in Title Suit No. 103 of 1985. 2. In order to appreciate the contentions raised on behalf of the parties, it is necessary to state the background leading to the filing of the present Title Suit. 3. Under the provisions of the Rules for the Regulation of Recruitment to the Clerical Services of the Civil Secretariat, Tripura, for short, the Rules, the names of defendant-opposite party no. 3 along with others were recommended for direct recruitment to the posts of Upper Division Assistants to the State Government by the Tripura Public Service Commission, for short 'TPSC'. It was alleged that as the defendant-opposite party no. 3 was not getting the appointment letter, he appro­ached the authorities and was informed that appointment on the basis of recommendation would take time and he was advised to apply for the post of Lower Division Assistant, which he did and accordingly, he was appointed. Apprehending that defendant-opposite party no. 3 may not be appointed directly to the said post and that the post may be filled up by promotion from the existing Lower Division Assistants he filed a suit being Title Suit No. 1 of 1981 before the learned Sadar Munsiff, West Tripura at Agartala (plaint at Annexure 2') against the State Government pray in for a declaration that be was entitled to be appointed to the post of Upper Division Assistant and also for a perpetual injunction. During the pen-do of the suit, on 7th May, 1981, the State Government a the Rules by exercising powers conferred by Article 309 of the Constitution and the said amendment was as follows; "On and from the 1st day of August, 1979 all recruit­ment to the posts of Upper Division Assistants in the Secretariat shall be made by promotion from the Lower Division Assistant-cum-Typist." On the prayer of defendant-opposite party no.3, the learned Munsiff amended the plaint and a new para was added stating that the amendment notified on 7th May, 1981, was arbitrary, liable to be struck down and declared to be void and inopera­tive and consequently the prayer was also amended. The pre­sent petitioner and the other Lower Division Assistants, who were appointed prior to the appointment of defendant-opposite party no.3, were not impleaded in the said suit. The learned trial court considered the notification dated 7th May, 1981, amending the Rules during the pendency of the suit and held that the said notification was illegal, malafide, unconstitutional, void and inapplicable of the plaintiffs. The learned trial court decreed the suit and directed the defendants, i.e., State Government, to issue appointment letter to the opposite party-defendant no. 5 within a month and to appoint him from a date prior to the date of issue of the said notification. It is interesting to note that though the trial court found the notification malafide, ille­gal, arbitrary, etc., no such declaration was made in the decree-Both the appeals preferred by the State Government before the learned Additional District Judge and also this Court were di­smissed on the ground of limitation. 4. As the above decree was put to execution and apprehe­nding that defendant-apposite party no. 3 was going to be appo­inted as Upper Division Assistant, the present suit was filed before the learned Subordinate Judge, Agartala, by the plaintiff-petitioner with the prayer for temporary injunction, which was granted by the trial court but set aside by the learned Addit­ional District Judge and hence the present petition. 5. On perusal of the judgment of the learned lower appel­late court, it appears that the learned court set aside the order of injunction granted by the trial court mainly on the ground that there was no prima facie case. 6. 5. On perusal of the judgment of the learned lower appel­late court, it appears that the learned court set aside the order of injunction granted by the trial court mainly on the ground that there was no prima facie case. 6. In United Commercial Bank, AIR 1981 SC 1426 , the Supreme Court reiterated the law that no injunction could be granted under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the C. P. C. unless the plaintiff establish that they had a prima facie case, mean­ing thereby that there was a bona fide contention between the parties or a serious question to be tried. It was also held that the question that must necessarily arise is whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, there is a prima facie case and, if so, as between whom ? 7. Admittedly, In the earlier suit, i.e., Title Suit No. 1 of 1981, the present plaintiff-petitioner and other Lower Divis­ion Assistants, who were appointed prior to the appointment of defendant-opposite party no. 3, were not made parties. The Rules were also amended under Article 309 of the Constitution, whereby direct recruitment to the post of Upper Division Assis­tant was discontinued with effect from 1.8.79 and the name of the present defendant-opposite party no. 3 was recommended subsequently by the TPSC on 13.5.80 for appointment as Upper Division Assistant. 8. The Rules framed under the proviso to Article 309 stand on the same footing as a law made by the Legislature, under the main provision of the Article, except that the Rules are liable to be changed by a statutory provision. I also respectfu­lly agree with the Full Bench decision of the Gujarat High Court in A. J. Patel, AIR 1965 Gujarat 23 that the power of the Governor of a State under Article 309 to make rules regu­lating the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appoin­ted to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of a State cannot be treated differently from the power of the legi­slature to do so by an Act under the said Article. As the power to make rules under the proviso to Article 309 is a legislative power, there is no dispute that the said power also includes power to make rules with retrospective effect. 9. As the power to make rules under the proviso to Article 309 is a legislative power, there is no dispute that the said power also includes power to make rules with retrospective effect. 9. Can a civil court come to a finding that rules made under Article 309 is ultra virus, illegal ? Can a civil court grant relief to any person in violation of the provisions of the rules framed under the said Article ? Will there be any suppression if the defendant-opposite party no. 3 is appointed as Upper Division Assistant ? In my view, these are serious que­stions to be tried by the trial court. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in United Commercial Bank (supra) I hold that in the instant case the plaintiff-petitioner has a prima facie case. However, I want to make it clear that the trial court shall not be guided by the observations and shall decide the suit on merit on the basis of the pleadings of the parties. 10. While dealing with irreparable loss and balance of convenience, the trial court specifically held that the plaintiff-petitioner and other senior Lower Division Assistants would su­ffer irreparable loss, if order of injunction is not passed and that the present defendant-opposite party no. 3 will only suffer financial loss 'for the time being' if the injunction order is passed and this financial loss would be made good if he succ­eeds in getting the present suit dismissed. But the learned lower appellate court rejected the contention with the following obse­rvation, namely :- "Had there been any chance of injury against the plaintiff-respondent it could have been said that the balance of convenience is in his favour. But from my earlier discussion it will be revealed that his right is in any way infrin­ged by the decree of Title Suit No. 1 of 1981." 11. In Tasmul AH, AIR 1978 Gau. 56 (F. B.), this Court held that the execution of a decree obtained by fraud or col­lusion or a decree arising out of a suit to which the plaintiff in the subsequent suit was not a party, and as such not bind­ing on him, amounts to injury within the meaning of sub rule (1) of Rule 2 of Order 39 of the CPC and an injunction in an appropriate case may be granted restraining the defendant from executing the decree. (Emphasis added). (Per Islam, J., as he then was). As the plaintiff-petitioner was not a party to the earlier suit, relying on the above decision of this Court, I am of the opinion that the execution of a decree will amount to injury and the learned trial court was justified in granting the injunction. 12. In Bindeshwar Narayan Singh, AIR 1932 Gau. 69, it was also held that the power of the appellate court in the matter of injunction is rather circumscribed and the court would he slow to interfere with the exercise of discretion and would normally not be justified in interfering solely on the ground that if it hid considered the matter at tie trial stage it may have come to a contrary conclusion. As stated earlier, the lear­ned lower appellate court without assigning any reason rejected the findings of the learned trial court regarding balance of conve­nience and irreparable loss. After going through the judgment of the learned trial court, I do not find that the learned court acted unreasonably or capriciously or ignored relevant facts. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the findings of the learned lower appellate court regarding balance of convenience and irreparable loss cannot stand. 13. From what has been stated above, I am of the opinion that this is a case where the plaintiff-petitioner has made out all the three essential ingredients for granting an injunction under Order 39, CPC and that the learned trial court was justified in allowing the prayer of injunction. 14. However, the fate of this case krill depend on the applicability of Section 41 (b) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and the said clause (b) runs as follows : - "An injunction cannot be granted (a) (b) to restrain any person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in a court not subordinate to that from which the injunction is sought; (c) ……. 15. Mr. Kundu, learned Advocate-General urged that in view of specific provision contained in Part III of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, more particularly Section 37, the above clause (b) of Section 41 is not applicable in case of temporary injunction, As rightly pointed out by Mr. 15. Mr. Kundu, learned Advocate-General urged that in view of specific provision contained in Part III of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, more particularly Section 37, the above clause (b) of Section 41 is not applicable in case of temporary injunction, As rightly pointed out by Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel for the defendant-opposite party No. 3, the law on this print has been settled by the Summit Court in Cotton Corporation of India Limited, AIR 1983 SC 1272 , wherein their Lordship, held that the expression 'injunction' in Section 41 (b) is not qualified by an adjective and, therefore, it would comprehend both interim and perpetual injunction. The contention of Mr. Kundu has no force. 16. Only point that needs a decision is whether the court of Munsiff is subordinate to the court of Subordinate Judge. To substantiate his contention that Munsiff is not subordinate to the Subordinate Judge, Mr. Bhowmik, learned counsel placed reliance on Ladli Parshad Jaiswal, AIR 1963 C1279 and Durga Prasad and another, AIR 1963 SC 1322 and Narayan Misra, AIR 1972 Orissa 115. 17. In Durga Prasad (supra), Ladli Parshad (supra) was also considered and the point for consideration before the Supreme Court was the expression 'court immediately below' occurring in Article 133 (1) of the Constitution, as it stood prior to the Forty Fourth Amendment Act of the Constitution. In my opi­nion, as in the case in hand I have to examine the meaning of the words 'court not subordinate to' occurring in Section 41 (b) of the Specific Relief Act, the above two decisions of the Apex Court may not help Mr. Bhowmik. 18. In my opi­nion, as in the case in hand I have to examine the meaning of the words 'court not subordinate to' occurring in Section 41 (b) of the Specific Relief Act, the above two decisions of the Apex Court may not help Mr. Bhowmik. 18. In Narayan Misra (supra), Orissa High Court specifically considered whether the court of Munsiff is subordinate to the Court of Subordinate Judge with reference to Section 41 (b) of the Specific Relief Act and held that though Munsiff is inferior in rank, it does not mean that the said court is subordinate to the court of Subordinate Judge- The Court came to the above finding on the grounds that the Subordinate Judge does not exercise any administrative control over a Munsiff, that a Subordinate Judge as of right does not hear any appeal from the judgment of a Munsiff unless the District Judge before whom the appeal has been filed transfers the same and that there is nothing to indicate in Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act that a 'court subordinate' means mere judicial subordination. While arriving at the above decision, the Court inside red the provisions of Section 3, CPC and Section 9 of the Bengal, Agra and Assam Civil Courts Act, 1887, hereinafter referred to as the 'Civil Courts Act'. It may be mentioned that the Civil Courts Act is also applicable to the State of Assam and also some parts of other States, which are within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. Of course, there is a specific law, namely, Tripura (Courts) Order, 1950, made under the Extra Provincial-Jurisdiction Act, 1947, for creation, etc. of the civil courts in the State of Tripura. While considering the matter in ques­tion, I propose to refer to both the Tripura (Courts) Order, 1953 and the Civil Courts Act, as both the laws are relevant for the purpose of detaining the question in respect of subor­dinate judiciary under the control of this Court. 19. In Narayan Misra (supra), the Orissa High Court considered mainly whether Munsiff is subordinate to Subordi­nate Judge administratively or not and did not consider judi­cial subordination. 19. In Narayan Misra (supra), the Orissa High Court considered mainly whether Munsiff is subordinate to Subordi­nate Judge administratively or not and did not consider judi­cial subordination. There can be no doubt that in view of the provisions of Section 3, CPC and Section 9 of the Civil Courts Act, 1887, administratively not only Munsiff but even the Subordinate Judge is subordinate to the District Judge, Granting of injunction is a judicial act and I am of the opi­nion that it is necessary to consider whether Munsiff is sub­ordinate judicially to Subordinate Judge or not. I am, there-fore unable with respect to accept the above findings of the Orissa High Court. 29. The word 'subordinate' has not been defined in the Specific Relief Act, 1963 and I have to go by the dictionary meaning. According to Black's Law Dictionary (5th Edition, page 1278), "Subordinate" : Placed in a lower order, class, or, rank; occupying a 'owner position in a regular descending series; inferior in order, nature, dignity, power, importance, or the like : .... According to Concise Oxford Dictionary (New 7th Edition, Page 10621, the word "Subordinate" means : In of inferior importance or rank, secondary, subservient, (to); 2. a, person working under another's control or orders. 21. Both under Tripura Courts) Order, 1950 and Civil Courts Act, there are following classes of Courts, namely, (1) District Judge, (2) Additional District Judge, (3) Subordi­nate Jude and (4) Munsiff. It may be stated that in some States, within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, Sub­ordinate Judge has been predestinated as Assistant District Judge. From the above order of the civil courts, it is clear that Munsiff is subordinate to Subordinate/Assistant Distract Judge. If I go by the dictionary moaning, I find that the court of Munsiff is a court subordinate to the court of Subordinate Judge Assistant District Judge. 22. Sub-section (4) of Section 21 of the Civil Courts Act empowers the High Court to allow Subordinate Judge/ Assistant District Judge to entertain appeals against the decrees and orders of Munsiff. Paragraph 3 of the Tripura (Courts) Order, 1950, also empowers the High Court to allow appeals against the orders of Munsiff' to be heard by Subordinate Judge. This enabling provision also substantiates the argument that judicially Munsiff is subordinate to Subordinate Judge/ Assistant District Judge. 23. Paragraph 3 of the Tripura (Courts) Order, 1950, also empowers the High Court to allow appeals against the orders of Munsiff' to be heard by Subordinate Judge. This enabling provision also substantiates the argument that judicially Munsiff is subordinate to Subordinate Judge/ Assistant District Judge. 23. According to Section 10 of the Civil Courts Act, in the event of death, resignation, etc. of a District Judge, a senior most Subordinate Judge may assume the charge of the office of the District Judge. I find similar provision in para­graph 37 of the Tripura (Courts) Order but under Section 5 or under paragraph 37, Munsiff can not be empowered to dis­charge the functions of a District Judge. This legal provision also fortifies the submission that Munsiff is subordinate to the Subordinate Judge/Assistant District Judge. 24. The admitted position is that both the learned courts of Munsiff and the Subordinate Judge/Assistant District Judge are the original courts, though Munsiff has got limited pe­cuniary jurisdiction. The Subordinate Judge/Assistant District Judge has got unlimited pecuniary jurisdiction. District Judge is the principal court of original jurisdiction but Section 15, CPC provides that every suit shall be instituted in the court of the lowest grade competent to try it. Injunction is granted in a suit and such suit has to be filed either before the Munsiff or Subordi­nate Judge/Assistant District Judge in view of Section 15, CPC. If such a suit is filed before the District Judge, he will be within his right to return the plaint for filing it before the court of the lowest grade. In Cotton Corporation of In Ha (Supra) it was held that at any rate the court is precluded by a statutory provision (Section 41 (b) of the Specific Relief Act, from granting an injunction restraining a person from instituting or prosecuting a proceeding in a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction or superior jurisdiction. In Cotton Corporation of In Ha (Supra) it was held that at any rate the court is precluded by a statutory provision (Section 41 (b) of the Specific Relief Act, from granting an injunction restraining a person from instituting or prosecuting a proceeding in a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction or superior jurisdiction. Their Lordships further observed "There is an unresolved controversy whether a court can grant an injunction against a person from instituting or prosecuting a proceeding before itself, but that is not relevant in the present circumstances and we do not propose to enlarge the area of controversy." Thus, the law is not clear if the Munsiff can grant an injunction restraining a person from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in his court and 1 also do not want to examine this point at this stage as it is not relevant for the purpose of the instant case. If it is also held that the court of Munsiff is not subordinate to the court of Subordinate Judge/Assistant Judge, there may not be any scope for granting such injunction, which in my opinion, is not the intention of the legislature. For this reason also I am constrained to hold that the court of Munsiff is sub­ordinate to the court of Subordinate Judge/Assistant District Judge. 25. From what has been stated above, I hold that the court of Munsiff shall be deemed to be a court subordinate to the court of Subordinate Judge/Assistant District Judge, under whose territorial jurisdiction the said court of Munsiff is located, for the purpose of clause (b) of Section 41 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. 26. The last contention of Mr. Bhowmick was that this is not a fit case for exercising revisional jurisdiction. Following the law laid down by the Apex Court in Manick Chandra Nand AIR 1986 SC 446 , I find no force in the contention of Mr. Bhowmik, as the learned lower appellate court failed to exer­cise its jurisdiction by not deciding the case properly and acc­ording to law. 27. In the result, I am of the opinion that the present petition is liable to be allowed, which I hereby do. The order dated 30th November, 1985, passed by the learned Additional District Judge. Agartala, in Civil Misc. 27. In the result, I am of the opinion that the present petition is liable to be allowed, which I hereby do. The order dated 30th November, 1985, passed by the learned Additional District Judge. Agartala, in Civil Misc. Appeal No. 43 of 1985 is hereby set aside and the order granting injunction by the learned Subordinate Judge, Agartala, in Title Suit No. 103 of 1985 is restored. No costs.