Judgment :- The first respondent filed a petition before the Judicial I Class Magistrate's Court, Kunnamkulam alleging that the petitioner herein and two others have committed offences under Ss. 4, 5 and 6 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). That complaint was numbered by the Court as Crl.M.P. No. 1030/85. After conducting an enquiry, the learned Magistrate by his order dated 4-3-86 numbered it as S.T. No. 230/86, for offences under Ss. 4, 5 and 6 of the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929 as amended by the Act of 1978 and ordered the issue of summons to accused. The petitioner, the first accused, has filed this petition, under S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, seeking to quash all proceedings in S.T. No. 230/86. 2. The facts which lead to the complaint, in a nut-shell are as follows :- The first accused gave away in marriage his daughter to the second accused, the son of the third accused on 8-12-1984. On that day the bride was a child as defined in S. 2(a) of the Act. Hence the accused have committed offences under Ss. 4 to 6 of the Act. 3. First respondent filed the complaint on 11-3-1985. It was numbered as Cri.M.P. No. 1030/85. An enquiry was conducted by the learned Magistrate to find out whether the complaint is vexatious, frivolous or one meant to harass the accused. After conducting the enquiry, the learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that there is a prima facie case to be tried and accordingly numbered the petition as S.T. No. 230/86 and ordered the issue of summons to the accused. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner prays for quashing the proceedings before the Magistrate on the ground that the court took cognizance of the complaint only after the lapse of one year from the date of marriage and so it is not maintainable in view of the specific bar contained in S. 9 of the Act. The learned counsel proceeds to argue that the enquiry that it is contemplated by S. 10 of the Act must be one preceding the taking cognizance of the offence by the court. The learned counsel proceeds to argue that the enquiry that it is contemplated by S. 10 of the Act must be one preceding the taking cognizance of the offence by the court. In support of this contention the learned counsel relies on the decisions reported in Maidoo v. Mayan (1983 Ker LT 782) : (1984 Cri LJ 322) and in re Darapureddi Jaggu Naidu, AIR 1939 Mad 530 : (1939-40 Cri LJ 818). 4. Section 10 of the Act reads as follows : "Any court, on receipt of a complaint of an offence of which it is authorised to take cognizance, shall, unless it dismisses the complaint under S. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 either itself make an enquiry under S. 202 of that Code or direct a Magistrate subordinate to it to make such enquiry." A reading of that section shows that unless the court dismisses the complaint as provided by S. 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Court must make an enquiry under Section 202 of the Code. That enquiry under Section 202 of the Code can only be for finding out whether the complaint is one filed with the sole object of harassing the accused. The 'enquiry' that is contemplated by S. 10 of the Act and "taking cognizance of offence" as contemplated by S. 9 must be understood in the sense these words are used in the Code of Criminal Procedure. This is so because the said enquiry is to be one under S. 202 of the Code. Cognizance is taken when the Magistrate applies his mind to the facts alleged in the complaint. Cognizance is of the 'offence' and is not of the 'offender'. Once the Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence, it is his duty to find out whether he should proceed further in that matter by issuing process to the offender. That depends on his satisfaction as to whether the complaint is vexations, frivolous or one to harass the accused. For arriving at that satisfaction he may either enquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit. All these are for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. For arriving at that satisfaction he may either enquire into the case himself or direct an investigation to be made by a police officer or by such other person as he thinks fit. All these are for the purpose of deciding whether or not there is sufficient ground for proceeding. In other words, the enquiry contemplated by S. 10 of the Act, or that under S. 202 of the Code, is one conducted by the Magistrate after he had taken cognizance of the complaint. 5. In Moidoo v. Mayan 1983 Ker LT 782 : (1984 Cri LJ 322) the Magistrate issued process to the accused simply on the basis of the sworn statement given by the complainant. The action taken by the Magistrate in issuing process without holding an enquiry was challenged before the Court. This Court while dealing with that question observed :- "Section 10 being a special provision in relation to complaints in regard to offences under the Act, it has an overriding effect on the provisions of S. 202 of the Code which may be in conflict with it. There is a conflict because under the scheme of Ch. XV of the Code, it is open to a Magistrate to issue process even without conducting an enquiry or directing an investigation. Under S. 10 of the Act, the Magistrate cannot issue process unless he himself conducts an enquiry under S. 202 or direct a subordinate Magistrate to make such an enquiry. To the extent of the conflict, the provisions of S. 10 of the Act will override the provisions of Chapter XV of the Code." As I understand this decision this court was concerned only with the enquiry that is contemplated by S. 10 of the Act. Unlike in cases which strictly fall under the Code, this court held that before issuing process in a case to which S. 10 of the Act applies an enquiry must be conducted. In that decision this court had no occasion to consider whether in a proceeding initiated under the Act, the issuance of the process alone will amount to the court taking cognizance of the case. This court came to the conclusion that the enquiry that is contemplated by S. 10 is an enquiry under Section 202 of the Code and that without conducting such an enquiry the process should not be issued. This court came to the conclusion that the enquiry that is contemplated by S. 10 is an enquiry under Section 202 of the Code and that without conducting such an enquiry the process should not be issued. Now it is well settled by decisions of the Supreme Court that an enquiry under Section 202 takes place only after the court has taken cognizance of the offence or of the complaint. Viewed in this manner, I do not find anything in the said decision as laying down the proposition that only by issuing the process to the accused, can it be said that the court had taken cognizance of the offence. 6. The decision of the Madras High Court referred to by the learned counsel, AIR 1939 Mad 530 : (1939-40 Cri LJ 818) is a very short one and for a proper understanding of it I read the same. "This is a reference made by the Additional District Magistrate of Vizagapatam recommending that the issue of process by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Parvatipur, in C.C. No. 152 of 1938 on his file, a case under S. 8, Child Marriage Restraint Act, Act 19 of 1929, may be set aside on the ground that the process was issued without holding an enquiry as required by S. 10 of that Act. The position is indeed very clear that a preliminary enquiry is absolutely necessary before the Court can take cognizance of an offence under the Act. Section 10 is very clear on the point and the provisions of it are mandatory. The issue of process implies that cognizance was taken without any preliminary enquiry being held as required by Section 10. The issue of process is therefore unauthorized by law and must be set aside. It will now be open to the Joint Magistrate to hold the preliminary enquiry under Section 202, Criminal P.C." This only lays down the proposition that before issuing the process, the court must conduct an enquiry under Section 10 of the Act. The one sentence "the position is indeed very clear that a preliminary enquiry is absolutely necessary before the court can take cognizance of an offence under the Act," cannot be taken as laying down the proposition of law that a complaint under the Act will be deemed to have been taken cognizance of any court only after the enquiry contemplated by S. 10 is completed. The decision, according to me, states that an enquiry must be conducted under S. 10 of the act before process is issued to the accused. It did not deal with the point of time as to when the court takes cognizance of the offence under the Act. Thus this decision also according to me, does not go to help the petitioner in fixing the time as to the taking cognizance of the case by court. 7. As stated earlier, the marriage which is stated to have offended the provisions of the Act was solemnised on 8-12-1984. The complaint was filed by the first respondent before the Judicial I Class Magistrate, Kunnamkulam on 11-3-85. That complaint was entertained by the learned Magistrate as Crl.M.P. No. 1030/85 and an enquiry was conducted under S. 10 of the Act. That enquiry was ordered and was conducted by the learned Magistrate after applying his judicial mind to the complaint. When such an application of mind is discernible from the circumstances, I hold that the Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence. It was within one year from the date of marriage as contemplated by S. 9 of the Act. When once it is found that the Magistrate had taken cognizance of the complaint, subsequent order directing issue of process to the accused will not fall within the purview of S. 9 of the Act. Hence the contention of the petitioner that the court took cognizance of this case beyond one year of the marriage has only to be rejected and I do so. 8. The order passed by the learned Magistrate prima facie makes out an offence under Ss. 4 to 6 of the Act. When such an offence is made out, this court is not to quash the proceedings in exercise of the jurisdiction under S. 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, AIR 1983 SC 67 : (1983 Cri LJ 159) their Lordships observed :- "The test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code." (The petitioner has not produced even a copy of the complaint filed before the court below). The order that is sought to be quashed brings out the allegations in the complaint and from that it is evident that an offence under Ss. 4 to 6 of the Act is made out. Therefore the proceedings in S.T. No. 230/86 on the file of the Judicial I Class Magistrate's Court, Kunnamkulam are not to be quashed by this court. The result, therefore is, this Criminal M.C. fails. It is accordingly dismissed. Petition dismissed.