RAM PAL SINGH, J. ( 1 ) BY this criminal appeal, the appellant challenges his conviction under S. 324, Indian Penal Code, and sentence of 8 months' rigorous imprisonment thereunder, recorded by the Additional Sessions Judge, Guna, in Session Trial No. 144 of 1982 dt/-19-7-1983. The appellant in the trial was charged for having committed an offence punishable under S. 307, I. P. C. ( 2 ) PROSECUTION case during the trial was that on 17-10-1982 at or about 10. 30 a. m. at village Aron, when Deshraj was grazing his cattle near a well in company of one Lakhu, the appellant arrived at the spot after having armed himself with pharsa and knife and asked both of them to disrobe. Deshraj and Lakhu were compelled by the appellant to sit on the ground, and then the appellant said that he would kill them. The appellant, it is further alleged, attacked Deshraj with pharsa and knife and, thus, inflicted injury upon his head near the right ear and arm. At this stage, Lakhu fled away from the spot towards Police Station. The appellant also fled away at this stage. Deshraj was then taken to Police Station Aron where he lodged the first information report at 11. 25 a. m. ( 3 ) DURING the trial, Dr. P. K. Gupta (P. W. 4),who had examined the injuries of Deshraj, stated that Deshraj was aged 12 years and had the following injuries on his person : (1) Incised wound on right scalp 2 cm. above the ear and the injury was 10 cm. X 24 cm. X bone deep. The injury was semi-lunar in shape. (2) Incised wound, right fore-arm laterally, 6 cm. X 4 cm. X 2 cm. ; oblique. (3) Incised wound 1/2 cm. X 1/2 cm. X 1/4 cm. on right little finger. According to the Doctor, Deshraj was admitted in the hospital for observation. This witness further opined that these injuries could be caused by sharp-edged weapon like pharsa or knife but the injuries were neither dangerous to life nor were sufficient, in the ordinary course of nature, to cause death. ( 4 ) THE prosecution, during the trial to prove its case, examined Balwant Singh (P. W. 1), Lakhu (P. W. 2), Chhote Singh (P. W. 3), R. S. Tiwari (P. W. 5) and Deshraj Singh (P. W. 6 ). ( 4 ) THE prosecution, during the trial to prove its case, examined Balwant Singh (P. W. 1), Lakhu (P. W. 2), Chhote Singh (P. W. 3), R. S. Tiwari (P. W. 5) and Deshraj Singh (P. W. 6 ). The defence of the appellant, from the trend of cross-examination, appears to be that during and at the time of the incident he was insane and was thus, incapable of knowing that what he was doing was wrong or contrary to law. In his statement, recorded under S. 313, Criminal P. C. he took the stand that he has no knowledge about the facts asked. He also examined, to prove the factum of insanity, Imrat Singh Solanki (D. W. 1), Gajanand Sharma (D. W. 2) and Radheshyam (D. W. 3) in his defence. ( 5 ) THE learned trial Judge has held in the impugned judgment that the prosecution has proved its case beyond doubt and the defence failed to prove the factum of insanity. Hence it convicted the appellant for having committed the offence punishable under S. 324,i. P. C. , and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for 8 months. Entire evidence of the prosecution and that of the defence has been discussed in the impugned judgment, and the conclusions arrived at by the trial Court appear to be reasonable and correct. The defence plea, of insanity has been discussed in para 10 of the impugned judgment. The trial Court has held that the defence failed to prove that the accused at the time of the incident was incapable of knowing that what he was doing was wrong or contrary to law. ( 6 ) SHRI R. P. Johri, learned counsel for the appellant, has contended that the trial Court failed to appreciate the answers of the prosecution witnesses in cross-examination and also failed to evaluate correctly the defence evidence adduced at the trial. Shri Johri was very vocal on this contention but he was lukewarm as far as the correctness of the incident is concerned. Shri Johri was very vocal on this contention but he was lukewarm as far as the correctness of the incident is concerned. Without unnecessarily burdening this judgment, I propose to deal with the legal aspect of the contention of Shri Johri, but before I am in grip with the subject, I would like to mention that this Court during the arguments granted an opportunity to Shri Johri to get the appellant examined with regard to the factum of his mental health by a distinguished Specialist Dr. (Smt.) S. K. Malhotra, Superintendent of Mental Hospital, Gwalior. But, unfortunately, he failed in his efforts. It would also be relevant to mention that during the course of the trial also the appellant failed to examine any doctor or specialist for proving the factum of unsoundness of his mind. ( 7 ) THE provisions of S. 84 of the Penal Code were invoked by the appellant during the trial, unsuccessfully. It would be relevant to quote it for clarity :"84. Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. " (Emphasis supplied ). It is not in dispute that the burden of proof that the mental condition of the accused was, at the crucial point of time, such as described by this section, lies on the accused, who claims the benefit of this exception. Illustration (a) of S. 105 of the Evidence Act is being quoted for convenience : -"105. Burden of proving that case of accused comes within exceptions.- illustrations. (a) A, accused of murder, alleges that, by reason of unsoundness of mind, he did not know the nature of the act. The burden of proof is on A. " (Emphasis supplied ). Thus, the onus of proving circumstances which give the benefit of the general or special exception to an accused person, lies on him, and in the absence of evidence, the presumption is against the accused. The words "shall presume the absence of such circumstances", occurring in S. 105, require the Court to regard such absence as proved unless and until it is disproved. But S. 105, Evidence Act, does not, however, mean that the accused must lead evidence or prove his innocence. The words "shall presume the absence of such circumstances", occurring in S. 105, require the Court to regard such absence as proved unless and until it is disproved. But S. 105, Evidence Act, does not, however, mean that the accused must lead evidence or prove his innocence. Legal burden of proving guilt remains on prosecution throughout the case and it never shifts from it. What S. 105 provides is that the Court shall not presume existence of facts which may bring the case within exception. The burden to prove the exception is not so onerous on the accused. While the prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the accused need only prove by preponderance of probability. The accused is not required to prove his innocence. The burden of proof laid on the accused in such a case is such as rests upon a plaintiff or defendant who is required to prove an issue in a civil proceeding. ( 8 ) THEREFORE, all that S. 105 of the Evidence Act means is that it is the duty of the accused to introduce such evidence as will displace the presumption of the absence of circumstances bringing his case within any of the exceptions, and that will suffice to satisfy the Court that such circumstances may have existed. Despite what is stated in S. 105 as to the accused hearing the burden of bringing the case within the statutory exception the prosecution is not absolved from the burden laid on it under S. 102 of the Evidence Act. ( 9 ) KEEPING the herein above noted settled principles in mind, on examination it is found that the defence has brought out certain facts in cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses, and now the appellant urges that he has, by those answers and defence, made out a clear case of insanity. The learned trial Court after discussing those matters in great detail, has concluded in para 8 of the impugned judgment that the appellant wanted to commit sodomy with 12 years old boy Deshraj and 13 years old buy Lakhu, and that is why he exposed his male organ after sheding his inner garment. The learned trial Court after discussing those matters in great detail, has concluded in para 8 of the impugned judgment that the appellant wanted to commit sodomy with 12 years old boy Deshraj and 13 years old buy Lakhu, and that is why he exposed his male organ after sheding his inner garment. The defence evidence has been discussed threadbare in para 10 of that impugned judgment, and the conclusion of the trial court is that at the time of the incident the appellant was capable of knowing the nature of the act, and he knew that the act which he was doing, was wrong and contrary to law. These conclusions of the trial Court are based upon solid reasonings and cannot be branded as perverse. Learned counsel for the appellant has contended that at the time of, and before, the incident the appellant was in naked condition, and became insane because his wife was kept as a concubine by his own father. Appellant is of 32 years of age, which is a mature stage of life. To become naked or to flaunt penis in public place, is a clear sign that the appellant is an exhibitionist but not unsound in mind, so that he may be said to be incapable of understanding the nature of his act. Exhibitionism may be a disease of mind or a form of sexual perversity but by this act, it cannot be concluded that the appellant was of unsound mind at the time of the incident. ( 10 ) THE crux of the whole question is whether the appellant was of unsound mind at the time of commission of the crime. I recall the observation of Reading, CJ. , while dismissing the appeal in Henry Perry (1920) 14 Cri Ap Rep 48 and delivering the judgment in Court of Criminal Appeal in England :"every man is presumed to be same and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his acts unless the contrary is proved. I recall the observation of Reading, CJ. , while dismissing the appeal in Henry Perry (1920) 14 Cri Ap Rep 48 and delivering the judgment in Court of Criminal Appeal in England :"every man is presumed to be same and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his acts unless the contrary is proved. To establish insanity it must be clearly proved that at the time of committing the act the party is labouring under such defect of reason as not to know the nature and quality of the act which he is committing - that is, the physical nature and quality as distinguished from the moral - or, if he does know the nature and quality of the act he is committing, that he does not know that he is doing wrong,. . . . . . . it must be shown that the man was suffering from an epileptic seizure at the time when he committed the murders and that has not been proved. "thus, it has to be concluded that there was no basis for the plea of unsoundness of mind to stand during the trial for the Court to conclude that he was from unsoundness of mind incapable of knowing that what he was doing was wrong. It is not sufficient to prove only the fact that the appellant was behaving likean insane person if the accused was to get the benefit of the exception of S. 84, I. P. C. , but it has further to be proved that the appellant due to unsoundness of mind, at thetime of committing the act, wasincapable to know the nature of his act. ( 11 ) AN unsoundness of mind, which may amount to insanity from a medical point of view, will not necessarily be legal insanity for the purpose of S. 84 of the Penal Code, so as to confer immunity on the insane person from criminal liability for any act done by him while he is in that state of mind. The expression "incapable of knowing the nature of the act" will include the incapacity to know the consequences of the act. What may be termed legal insanity under S. 84 of the Penal Code, is not identical with medical insanity. A distinction must be made between insanity affecting the cognitive faculties of a man and that affecting the will or emotions. What may be termed legal insanity under S. 84 of the Penal Code, is not identical with medical insanity. A distinction must be made between insanity affecting the cognitive faculties of a man and that affecting the will or emotions. It is only the first type of insanity that is within the purview of S. 84 of the Penal Code. There are several types of mental ailments, but none is recognised in law, unless the requirements of S. 84 are satisfied. Where a person is not insane but is imbalanced and excited, and is probably labouring under some kind of obsession or hallucination, S. 84 cannot be of any help to him. Similarly, irresistible impulses, mental derangements of a partial type, mere aberrations of mind not amounting to insanity, eccentricity of behaviour, state of acute mental agitation, depression or despondency, moody, taciturn, etc. , do not come within the orbit of S. 84 of the Penal Code. Insanity of the accused even at the time of trial is immaterial. The crucial point of time, under this section, at which the insanity of the accused, in the sense of this section, must have existed, is the time when the alleged offence was committed. For the aforesaid reasons, this appeal has to be dismissed and is, therefore, dismissed. The bail and surety bonds of the appellant are cancelled. Appellant was rightly held to be guilty by the trial Court. The trial Court is directed to order the prison authorities, while sending the appellant to jail, that a watch be kept over the mental condition of the appellant, and if during incarceration he shows any sign of abnormality or insanity, then he be given suitable treatment in the Mental Hospital, Gwalior. Appeal dismissed. .