MAJMUDAR, J. ( 1 ) THESE proceedings arise from a reference received from the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Bharuch who by his order dated 19-9-1985 has sent relevant papers with the submission that public news item which appeared in Lok Satta on 7-8-1984 amounts to contempt of court and that proper action is required to be taken against the respondent herein who has published the said news item. The papers with the covering letter of the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Bharuch were received by the office of this court somewhere in the last week of Dec. 1985. After the papers were processed, the reference was registered as Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 1065 of 1986 and it was placed before this court for orders on 17-6-1986. On that date, this court issued rule to the respondent-alleged contemner and made it returnable on 8-7-1986. The rule has reached final hearing before us today. ( 2 ) MR. Shethna who appears for the respondent has raised a preliminary contention about maintainability of those proceedings. Placing reliance on S. 20 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, he has submitted that the alleged contempt is said to have been committed on 7-8-1984 when the said publication was made. For the first time, this court issued Rule on 17-6-1986 which was obviously more than one year after the date of commission of the alleged contempt and hence, the present proceedings are barred by limitation. It is obvious that if this contention is upheld, no occasion would survive for us for looking into the merits of the controversy posed for our consideration. ( 3 ) IN order to appreciate the preliminary objection about maintainability of those proceedings, it is necessary to note a few relevant introductory facts. One Ikramul Hak Ali Mohmed and others of village Kantharia in Bharuch taluka had applied to the Sub-divisional Magistrate, Bharuch to transfer chapter case No. 268 of 1984 which was pending under S. 107 of the Criminal P. C. in the Court of the Executive Magistrate, Bharuch to any other executive Magistrates Court. In the said transfer application, the respondent herein was shown as opponent. The Sub-divisional Magistrate, after hearing the concerned parties, decided to transfer the case to the Court of Executive Magistrate, Amod. That order was passed on 1-8-1984. In the said transfer application, the respondent herein was shown as opponent. The Sub-divisional Magistrate, after hearing the concerned parties, decided to transfer the case to the Court of Executive Magistrate, Amod. That order was passed on 1-8-1984. Thereafter, a news item appeared in Lok Satta daily newspaper on 7-8-1984 stating that decision of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was given under political pressure and it is this news item which has given rise to the present contempt proceedings. Applicants of the transfer application viz. Ikramul Hak Ali Mohmed and others submitted a miscellaneous application before the District Magistrate, Bharuch for taking action for contempt of court against the present respondent who had published the said item. This miscellaneous application was dated 31-8-1984. It was received in the office of the District Magistrate on 1-9-1984. Thereafter, it appears that the said application was processed and dealt with by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bharuch who heard both the parties and ultimately came to the conclusion by his order dated 12-3-1985 that a prima facie case for contempt of court did exist against the respondent who had published the news item on 7-8-1984. Under these circumstances, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate referred the matter to this court by the communication dated 19-9-1985 as mentioned above. The aforesaid chronology of events clearly shows that the alleged contempt which was committed on 7-8-1984 when the news item was published is for the first time taken cognizance of by this court which is the competent court under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, only on 17-6-1986 when Rule was issued by this court. Thus, the cognizance of the alleged contempt is taken more than one year after the commission of the said contempt. These proceedings, therefore, clearly appear to be barred by limitation. S. 20 of the said Act reads as under :-"no court shall initiate any proceedings for contempt, either on its own motion or otherwise, after the expiry of a period of one year from the date on which the contempt is alleged to have been committeed". The Division Bench of this court to which one of us (S. B. Majmudar, J.) was a party, in its decision in the case of Dineshbhai v. Kripalu Co-op. The Division Bench of this court to which one of us (S. B. Majmudar, J.) was a party, in its decision in the case of Dineshbhai v. Kripalu Co-op. Housing, Society, 22 Guj LR 165 : ( AIR 1980 Guj 194 ) has taken the view that the High Court will have no jurisdiction to initiate contempt proceedings after expiry of one year from the date on which alleged contempt was committed by a contemner unless the contempt is of a continuing nature. In the present case, moment the offending publication saw the light of the day, the contempt became complete. Thus, contempt can be said to have been committed as early as on 7-8-1984. This court could have taken cognizance of the same within one year thereof. It is interesting to note that when the papers were received by this courts office in Sept. 1985, one year period was already over. Thus, these proceedings obviously became abortive and an exercise in futility. Mr. Shethna also invited our attention to a decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. J. V. Patil, (1976) 78 Bom LR 116. In that decision, the Division Bench was concerned with identical question wherein a reference was received from the subordinate court for taking action for its contempt against the alleged contemner. After the reference was received in the High Court, Rule was issued after a period of one year from the date of the alleged contempt. In these circumstances, the contempt proceedings were held to be time barred. In this connection, Bhole, J. speaking for the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court made the following partinent observation -"under S. 20 read with S. 15 (2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, the date on which the matter is placed before the Division Bench of the High Court and on which date the rule is granted is the date when contempt proceedings can be said to be initiated in the court. Neither the date when reference is made by the subordinate court under S. 15 (2) of the Act nor the date of the administrative order of the Administrative Judge of the High Court can be said to be the beginning of contempt proceedings". Neither the date when reference is made by the subordinate court under S. 15 (2) of the Act nor the date of the administrative order of the Administrative Judge of the High Court can be said to be the beginning of contempt proceedings". In the present case also, Rule was issued for the first time by one Division Bench of this court on 17-6-1986. Prior thereto, neither rule nor notice was ever issued to the respondent to show cause as to why he should not be proceeded with under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 for the offending publication of the news item on 7-8-1984. It must therefore, be held that the present proceedings are barred by limitation. We uphold the preliminary objection canvassed by Mr. Shethna for the respondent. ( 4 ) BEFORE parting with this matter, we may take into consideration one grievance made by Mr. Shethna for the respondent. In the present case, the respondent is alleged to have committed criminal contempt as defined by S. 2 (c) of the Act which contemplates publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which- (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any Court or; (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner; while under sub-s. (2) of S. 15, it is provided that in the case of any criminal contempt of a subordinate Court the High Court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate Court or on a motion made by the Advocate General or, in relation to a Union Territory, by such law officer as the Central Government may, by notification in the official gazette, specify in this behalf. In the present case, cognizance of criminal contempt was taken on a reference by the subordinate Court as per S. 15 (2 ). Section 17 of the Act lays down the procedure after the cognizance and provides that notice of every proceeding under S. 15 shall be served personally on the person charged, unless the Court for reasons to be recorded directs otherwise. Section 17 of the Act lays down the procedure after the cognizance and provides that notice of every proceeding under S. 15 shall be served personally on the person charged, unless the Court for reasons to be recorded directs otherwise. It is not in dispute that notice of the present proceedings was personally served on the respondent. That was due compliance with S. 17 (1 ). However, Mr. Shethnas grievance centres round S. 17 (2) which lays down that the notice shall be accompanied (a) in the case of proceedings commenced on a motion, by a copy of the motion as also copies of the affidavits, if any, on which such motion is founded; and (b) in the case of proceedings commenced on a reference by a subordinate Court, by a copy of the reference. As the present proceedings are commenced on a reference by a subordinate Court, submits Mr. Shethna, the notice served on the respondent should have been accompanied by a copy of the reference. But in the present case, no such copy was made available to the respondent along with the notice of the proceedings. This grievance of Mr. Shethna is well founded. It has to be kept in view that when any notice is to be served on the alleged contemner as per S. 17 (1), that notice has to be accompanied by requisite documents as laid down by S. 17 (2) (a) or (b), as the case may be. In the present case, it was incumbent for the office of this Court to serve the notice on the respondent along with a copy of the reference. It goes without saying that without such copy of the reference, the respondent could not get any idea at the time of service of the notice as to for which type of contempt he is called upon to answer. Thus, the requirements of the provisions of S. 17 (1) has to be strictly complied with by the office in every case. It is not necessary for us to dilate on this matter any further as we have closed these proceedings as time barred. However, the aforesaid grievance of Mr. Shethna which is well sustained has to be kept in view by the office for its future guidance. It is not necessary for us to dilate on this matter any further as we have closed these proceedings as time barred. However, the aforesaid grievance of Mr. Shethna which is well sustained has to be kept in view by the office for its future guidance. ( 5 ) IN this view of the matter, nothing further is required to be done and no discussion on merits is called for. Rule issued in this application is, therefore, discharged. Petition dismissed. .