Judgment :- The 4th accused in C.C. 1781/83 on the file of the Judicial II Class Magistrate II. Trivandrum is the petitioner in Cri. M.C. 319/83. Third accused in the said case has preferred Cri. M.C. 320/83. These petitions are for quashing the complaint in the said case. 2. The material averments made by the petitioners in these petitions, in a nutshell, are as follows:- The petitioner in M.C. 319/83 is working as Security Officer, Government Secretariat, having lien as Circle Inspector of Police, S.A.P. - C - Company, Trivandrum. The petitioner in Crl. M.C. 320/83 is Circle Inspector of Police working in Trivandrum District. Petitioners were deployed for duty in the Legislative Assembly to assist the Watch and Ward of the Kerala Legislative Assembly which was subjected to serious law and order situation within the Assembly premises. The petitioners had been specifically instructed to prevent the unlawful entry of others into the Legislative Assembly Hall to maintain law and order situation. Petitioners were to carry out the directions given by the Hon'ble Speaker. The petitioners were engaged in such official duties detailed by their superior officers in connection with the implementation of the orders of the Hon'ble Speaker. The only complaint levelled against the petitioners is that they prevented first respondent-complainant from entering into the Assembly Hall. The petitioners prevented the first respondent from entering the Assembly Hall in compliance with the instructions given by superior officers in consultation with the Hon'ble Speaker. They have not committed any offence much less offence punishable under S. 323, 249(b), 341 and 325 read with Section 34, I.P.C. Hence they pray for quashing the complaint. 3. A copy of the complaint is produced along with Crl. M.C. 320/83. It contains the following averments. The complainant is a member of the Kerala Legislative Assembly. On 30-2-83 he reached the Assembly parlour at about 8.20 a.m. When he was about to enter the door of Assembly parlour, he was prevented by accused 1 to 4. The accused were accompanied by a contingent of watch and ward and policemen in mufty numbering about 200. The first accused caught hold of the complainant and began to inflict blows. First accused turned aside his finger causing dislocation of the bone of the middle finger of the left hand. The accused were accompanied by a contingent of watch and ward and policemen in mufty numbering about 200. The first accused caught hold of the complainant and began to inflict blows. First accused turned aside his finger causing dislocation of the bone of the middle finger of the left hand. The other accused accompanied by security staff began to encircle the complainant and did not allow him to proceed further. The accused prevented other M.L.As. also from entering the Assembly Hall Complainant was forcibly removed by the first and second accused to the press room. A3 and A4 assisted them. The first accused kicked the complainant and abused him in filthy language. First accused again threatened to beat the complainant with chappals. He also threatened to kill the complaint if he dared to move and thereby wrongfully restrained him. Thereafter the complaint fell unconscious. At about 4 p.m. he found himself lying on a bed in the General Hospital, Trivandrum. He was treated as an inpatient off the evening of 4-4-83. The complainant is entitled to enter the Assembly Hall for attending the session. The accused have no right to prevent him from entering the Assembly Hall. They have inflicted bodily injuries on the complainant without any provision. Accused 3 and 4 have no right to be at the place of occurrence. Their mere presence at the scene of occurrence. Hence the accused have committed offence punishable under Ss. 323, 294(b), 341, 324 and 447 read with S. 34. I.P.C. 4. The main argument advanced by the counsel appearing for the petitioners is that the accused were discharging the duties assigned to them by the Hon'ble Speaker of Legislative Assembly, that they were maintaining Law and Order in the Legislature and that it cannot be made subject to the jurisdiction of any Court. There is a constitutional inhibition in favour of the petitioners. Article 212(2) and Art. 194 of the Constitution of India bars Courts from taking cognizance of any incident that had taken place in the Legislative Assembly. The very same question as is involved in the complaint, had been placed for consideration before the Privileges Committee of the House. Thus the jurisdiction exclusively vests in the House and no Court has any jurisdiction to try this case and take any action against the petitioners. The very same question as is involved in the complaint, had been placed for consideration before the Privileges Committee of the House. Thus the jurisdiction exclusively vests in the House and no Court has any jurisdiction to try this case and take any action against the petitioners. No action will lie against the officer for using necessary force to carry out the orders of the House. The complaint concerns a matter relating to the internal management of the procedure of the Assembly and therefore the Court has no power to interfere. The petitioners cannot be considered as trespassers within the precincts of the Assembly because they were put on duty there and were discharging official duties as public servants. The complaint is not maintainable for the further reason that it has not complied with the mandatory provisions contained in S. 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The complaint is only an abuse of process of Court. 5. Petitioners in these criminal M.Cs. are officers belonging to the police force. They were deployed in the Legislative Assembly on 30-3-83 for maintaining the Law and Order situation. The petitioners were discharging the duties assigned to them by their superiors in consultation with the Hon'ble Speaker for the said purpose. The complaint does not contain any allegation to the effect that these petitioners have committed any offence punishable under the Penal Code, other than stating that they encircled the complainant and did not allow him to proceed further. In other words the only overt act alleged against the petitioners is that they did not allow the complainant to enter the Assembly Hall. The question that is to be looked into is whether the petitioners' action in preventing the complainant from entering the Assembly Hall will constitute an offence which will be subject to the jurisdiction of any Court. The House and the Speaker have got the right to prevent the entry of any person into the Assembly Hall. In other words, the Speaker can regulate the entry into the Assembly Hall. If the petitioners were carrying out the directions of the Speaker, are they not absolutely protected ? The answer will depend on the privileges of the House and of the Speaker. If the complainant was prevented entering into the Hall by these petitioners, without the sanction from the Speaker, the Speaker or the House can take appropriate action against these petitioner. The answer will depend on the privileges of the House and of the Speaker. If the complainant was prevented entering into the Hall by these petitioners, without the sanction from the Speaker, the Speaker or the House can take appropriate action against these petitioner. It will be a matter outside the jurisdiction of ordinary Courts. 6. The powers, privileges and immunities of the House of Legislature in India are those that were claimed by the House of Commons in England on 26-1-1950 and which were recognized by the English Courts. The Supreme Court In re, Under Art. 143, Constitution of India, AIR 1965 SC 745, their Lordships, while dealing with the privileges under Article 194 of the Constitution observed : "It will thus be seen that all the four clauses of Art. 194 are not in terms made subject to the provisions contained in Part III. In fact, Clause (2) is couched in such wide terms that in exercising the rights conferred on them by Cl. (1), if the legislators by their speeches contravene any of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III, they would not be liable for any action in any Court. Nevertheless, if for other valid considerations, it appears that the contents of Cl. (3) may not exclude the applicability of certain relevant provisions of the Constitution, it would not be reasonable to suggest that those provisions must be ignored just because the said clause does not open with the words "subject to the other provisions of the Constitution". In dealing with the effect of the provisions contained in Cl. (3) of Art. 194, wherever it appears that there is a conflict between the said provisions and the provisions pertaining to fundamental rights, an attempt will have to be made to resolve the said conflict by the adoption of the rule of harmonious construction." Their Lordships further stated that whenever there is a conflict between the provisions of Art. 194 and any of the provisions of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III, Art. 19(1)(a) would not apply, but Art. 21 would. 7. In State of Kerala v. Sudarsan Babu, 1983 Ker LT 764 : (AIR 1984 Ker 1) a Full Bench of this Court enunciated the principles deducible from the various decisions of the Supreme Court as follows :- 1. 7. In State of Kerala v. Sudarsan Babu, 1983 Ker LT 764 : (AIR 1984 Ker 1) a Full Bench of this Court enunciated the principles deducible from the various decisions of the Supreme Court as follows :- 1. A petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would be maintainable even against the Legislature of the State as such Legislature is within the definition of the term 'State' in Art. 12 of the Constitution. 2. The freedom of speech in the Legislature of every State is absolute and it is not controlled by Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. It is unfettered or absolute subject to the limitation in Article 211 of the Constitution, which provision insulates Judges of the High Courts and Supreme Court acting in the discharge of their duties, against discussion by the Legislature. 3. The Law made by the Legislature under Article 194(3) of the Constitution defining the powers, privileges and immunities of a House of the Legislature, of the members and the Committees of the House of such legislature cannot contravene fundamental rights. It is open to the Court to examine the validity of plea that such laws are void to the extent they infringe the fundamental rights of the citizens. 4. The rules framed under Art. 208 of the Constitution for regulating the procedure of a House of the Legislature and the conduct of its business are liable to judicial review if there is a case of infringement of the fundamental rights. 5. Till the legislature frames laws to define powers, privileges and immunities those asserted and recognised in the House of Commons in the United Kingdom as on the 26th January, 1950 will be in force. 6. In regard to such powers, privileges and immunities as are mentioned in (5) above it cannot be said that whenever there is a conflict between them and the fundamental rights in Part III of the Constitution the latter will yield to the former. An examination may be called for in respects of each of such fundamental rights asserted to determine whether it will survive against such powers, privileges and immunities. 7. The fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution will not so survive, but fundamental rights secured to citizens under Articles 20 and 21 will survive. 8. An examination may be called for in respects of each of such fundamental rights asserted to determine whether it will survive against such powers, privileges and immunities. 7. The fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(a) of the Constitution will not so survive, but fundamental rights secured to citizens under Articles 20 and 21 will survive. 8. The immunity envisaged in Art. 212(1) of the Constitution is restricted to a case where the complaint is no more than that the procedure was irregular. If the impugned proceedings are challenged as illegal or unconstitutional such proceedings would be open to scrutiny in a Court of law. 9. It would be futile to contend that a citizen cannot move the High Courts or the Supreme Court to invoke their jurisdiction in cases where his fundamental rights have been violated. The existence of judicial power in that behalf must necessarily and inevitably postulate the existence of a right in the citizen to move the Court in that behalf. 8. In Erskine May's Parliamentary Practice 19th Edn. at page 90 it is observed : It is probably true, as a general rule, that a criminal act done in the House is not outside the course of criminal justice. But this rule is not without exception and both the rule and the exception will be found to depend upon whether the particular act can or cannot be regarded as a proceeding in Parliament. In Bradlaugh v. Erskine, (1883 (47) LT 618) the Deputy Sergeant-at-Arms was held to be justified in committing the assault with which he was charged, since it was committed in Parliament, in pursuance of the order of the House, to exclude Bradlaugh from the House. Just as Members in debating and voting the order would, as taking part in proceeding in Parliament, not be amenable to the Courts, so an officer in carrying out an order within the precincts of the House is taking part in a proceeding in Parliament, and is in the same position with regard to the Courts as the Members who voted the order. As Lord Coleridge said. "The Houses cannot act by themselves as a body; they must act by officers." (1884) 12 QBD 271, 276. 9. In Bradlaugh v. Gossett, (1884) 12 QBD 271 an elected member of the House of Commons was prevented from entering the Hall by Sergeant-at-Arms. As Lord Coleridge said. "The Houses cannot act by themselves as a body; they must act by officers." (1884) 12 QBD 271, 276. 9. In Bradlaugh v. Gossett, (1884) 12 QBD 271 an elected member of the House of Commons was prevented from entering the Hall by Sergeant-at-Arms. The elected member prayed for injunction to restrain the sergeant from carrying out the direction of the House. The Court held "this being a matter relating to the internal management of the procedure of the House of Commons, the Court to Queen's Bench had no power to interfere." 10. Article 212(2) of the Constitution of India reads as follows :- (2) "No officer or member of the Legislature of a State in whom powers are vested by or under this Constitution for regulating procedure or the conduct of business, or for maintaining order, in the Legislature shall be subject to the jurisdiction of any Court in respect of the exercise by him of those powers." This provisions excludes the jurisdiction of ordinary Courts over the actions taken by officers of the Legislature for regulating the procedure or conduct of business or maintaining order in the legislature. The question as to who all will come under the category of 'Officer' contemplated by this provision, came up for consideration in the Full Bench decision referred to above. Without deciding thus issue their Lordship quoted the following observation in Jai Singh Rathi v. State of Haryana, AIR 1970 Punj & Har 379 (FB). "Article 227 gives superintendence to this Court over all Courts and Tribunals within its territorial jurisdiction, but the Haryana Legislature Assembly is neither Court nor a Tribunal subordinate to this Court over which it has jurisdiction of superintendence according to that article. The power of Mr. Speaker to regulate the procedure or the conduct of business in the House or for maintaining order in it is immune from the jurisdiction of this Court under Clause (2) of Article 212. Same or similar immunity is also available to other officers of a State Legislature, such as its Secretary. So Mr. Speaker and the Secretary of the Haryana Legislative Assembly are unnecessary parties to this petition." This shows that the term "officer" in Art. 212(2) must be taken to have the same meaning as it is understood in common parlance. Same or similar immunity is also available to other officers of a State Legislature, such as its Secretary. So Mr. Speaker and the Secretary of the Haryana Legislative Assembly are unnecessary parties to this petition." This shows that the term "officer" in Art. 212(2) must be taken to have the same meaning as it is understood in common parlance. If so understood, persons deployed by the Speaker for maintaining Law and Order in the Assembly are Officers coming within the purview of Art. 212(2) of the Constitution. They were engaged in maintaining Law and Order in the legislature. The House and the Speaker can only act through these officers. In the complaint it is specifically stated that the petitioners prevented the complainant when he was about to enter the door of the Assembly Parlour. This means that the accused were just at the doors of the Assembly Hall. An officer carrying out the orders of the Speaker within the precincts of the House is protected by the provisions contained in the Constitution. Such actions are beyond the cognizance of ordinary Courts. 11. As stated earlier, the complaint does not go to show that the petitioners in these two criminal M.Cs have used any criminal force against the first respondent. The force, as per the complaint, was used only by the first accused. The overt act attributed to the petitioners is only prevention of entry of the complainant into the Assembly Hall. That prevention can be taken cognizance of only by the House and the Speaker. It is not for the Criminal Court to enquire into. In view of what has been stated above, it is abundantly clear that the petitioners in these two criminal M.Cs were carrying out the directions of the Speaker and they are protected by the provision contained in Art. 212(2) of the Constitution of India. It therefore follows that the complaint against the petitioners is not maintainable. It has to be quashed and I do so. The result, therefore is these petitions are allowed. Proceedings in C.C. No. 1781/83 on the file of the Judicial II Class Magistrate II, Trivandrum are quashed in so far as it relates to the petitioners in these Criminal Miscellaneous Cases. Petition allowed.