Judgment :- 1. Chellamma, concededly contributed to the cleanliness of the toddy shop. That is admitted by the petitioner-contractor of the toddy shop; for, even according to his statement in the appeal, she is "sweeping and cleaning" the shop. Yet she is not an employee under the Kerala Toddy Workers Welfare Fund Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') is the contention of the petitioner. 2. The toddy trade does not appear to have shown any discrimination grounded on sex. The tradition would have it that women used to climb the palms in ancient Kerala. A female figure is associated with toddy vending, in olden days and in the present times; and she is, as such, described in ancient Sanskrit stanzas and modern literary lyrics. These considerations are, however, irrelevant when the Court handles the question: Is she an 'employee' under the Act? The question has necessarily to be answered with reference to the scheme of the Act, and the definition of the term 'employee'. That term is defined in S.2(d) in the following words: "2(d) "employee" means any person who is employed for wages in connection with the tapping, manufacture, transport or sale of toddy and who gets his wages directly or indirectly from the employer and includes any person employed by or through a contractor or through an agent in or in connection with the tapping, manufacture, transport or sale of toddy." (emphasis supplied) The earlier portions of the definition, no doubt, do not apply to the worker in this case. She does not climb the palm, tap its flowery spike, chip its tip, mount the pot, draw the toddy and bring it down. There is no case that she is taking to the transport of the toddy, either. Her claim, as found acceptance by the Welfare Inspector, and by the Government in appeal, is that she is employed in connection with the sale of toddy. 3. According to the petitioner, she has no part to play in the actual sale. She does not measure the toddy; nor hand over the glass or bottle to the eager customer. Nor does she receive the cash when it is paid. This contention of the petitioner is based on a limited and narrow understanding of the term "connected with the sale." The approach is indeed that of a lay man and not of a law man. Nor does she receive the cash when it is paid. This contention of the petitioner is based on a limited and narrow understanding of the term "connected with the sale." The approach is indeed that of a lay man and not of a law man. Similar attempts at restricted interpretation of a meaningful social legislation have been discountenanced in this country and elsewhere, many years back. It is unnecessary to burden this judgment with the catena of judicial decisions, where, cognate occupations have been brought within the vortex of the 'workman' definition. 4. More than two decades back, the Supreme Court indicated the approach, and undertook an analysis of a similar statutory scheme the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in J. K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. L. A. Tribunal of India, A. I. R.1964 S. C. 737. The Court frowned against a literal construction of the term'employed in any industry'. It held that the term "must take in employees who are employed in connection with operations incidental to the main industry " Gajendragadkar, J. (whose contribution to the industrial jurisprudence of the country is massive and monumental), speaking for the Court, preferred an illustration of the 'Sweepers' themselves, in that context. The following passage, clearly and forcefully brings out the logic and conclusion: "It is, of course, not very easy to decide what is the field of employment included by the principle of incidental relationship, and what would be the limitations of the said principle? If sweepers are employed by the appellant to clean the premises of the Mills, that clearly would be work incidental to the main industry itself, because though the work of the sweepers has no direct relation either with the spinning or weaving, it is so manifestly necessary for the efficient functioning of the industry itself that it would be irrational to exclude sweepers from the purview of S.2 (s)." Counsel in that case attempted to argue that though sweepers who sweep the premises of the factory may be called workmen, sweepers who sweep the area around the factory may not be included under S.2(s). Counsel contended: "Sweeping the area outside the factory may be incidentally connected with the main industry, but the incidental connection is indirect and remote, and so, this class of employees must be excluded from the definition." Dealing with the above contention, the Supreme Court emphatically and pointedly stated: "We are not prepared to accept this argument. In our opinion, an employee who is engaged in any work or operation which is incidentally connected with the main industry of the employer would be a workman provided the other requirements of S.2(s) are satisfied." This conclusion, was based on a comprehensive concept of the 'industry' itself. The court noted that in the modern world industrial operations have become complex and complicated and that for the efficient and successful functioning of any industry, several incidental operations are called in aid and that it is the totality of all these operations that ultimately constitute the industry as a whole, and observed: "Wherever it is shown that the industry has employed an employee to assist one or the other operation incidental to the main industrial operation, it would be unreasonable to deny such an employee the status of a workman on the ground that his work is not directly concerned with the main work or operation of the industry." It is sufficient to point out that this approach of the Supreme Court has been adopted in later decisions also. (vide Ahmedabad Mfg. & Calico Ptg. Co. v. Ramtehel, A.I.R. 1972 SC. 1598, Saraspur Mills Co. v. Romanlal, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 2297, Chairman, Board of Mining Examination v. Ramjee, (1977) 2 S.C.C. 256 and B. Prabhakar Rao v. State of A.P., A.I.R. 1986 S.C. 210.) 5. Though in a different context, a similar approach was made by the Court of Appeal in Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Scottish and Newcastle Breweries Ltd., (1982) 2 All E.R. 230. That case dealt with the question as to what constituted the hotelier's trade. Should the actual process be strictly confined to the serving of food and drink and providing accommodation in a limited sense? That case dealt with the question as to what constituted the hotelier's trade. Should the actual process be strictly confined to the serving of food and drink and providing accommodation in a limited sense? Lord Lowry referred to that restricted approach, as fallacious and observed : "one of the trade functions of a hotelier is to make the interior attractive to customers:" It may be that there is not much in common with the atmosphere in a posh hotel with its lighting and decor, with its dazzling ornaments and attractive china and cutlery, and that of a toddy shop. Even then, keeping the premises clean and tidy, would indeed be an integral and incidental activity connected with the sale of toddy. An interpretation which overlooks that aspect, will be one giving more prominence to the letter than to the spirit of the statute. That is not permissible, even in the setting of the Toddy Workers Welfare Fund Act. There cannot be any doubt that she, who sweeps and cleans the shop is an important cog in the wheel of the toddy trade. 6. In the light of the above discussion, I have no hesitation whatever to hold that Chellamma is an employee as defined under the Act and that she is entitled to be reckoned for the purpose of the remittances towards welfare fund as provided under the Act. 7. The writ petition probably could have been disposed of on shorter grounds, such as the omission of the petitioner to raise a pointed contention before the statutory authority; for the year 1981-82, the only contention of the petitioner, as is discernible from Ext. P1, was that she was not a regular employee in the shop. That contention was obviously untenable. She had obtained the registration card, with No. Q 8/27. During previous year, the contractor bad paid the welfare fund dues on her behalf. It is so indicated in the appellate order of the Government. 8. The contention that she is not entitled to the benefit of the Act for the reason that she is running a pan shop and that "she is receiving the widow pension" is only to be stated to be rejected. Her other activities or other sources of income, have no bearing on the question whether she is an employee under the Act. Her other activities or other sources of income, have no bearing on the question whether she is an employee under the Act. That question has to be decided on an evaluation of the duties discharged by her, and the important content of the statutory definition. 9. As for the year 1982-83, the petitioner has not exhausted his remedies under the Act. Omission to pursue the statutory remedies can be ordinarily put against a person invoking the writ jurisdiction under Art.226 of the Constitution. 10. It was, however, felt that the question was one which has not received judicial consideration by this Court. The petitioner himself would indicate that such a claim is being put forward by such a worker for the first time in the Quilon Range. It is unnecessary to enquire whether such a situation was due to the recognition of such workers as employees under the Act in other ranges and by other contractors. It is sufficient to note that the question has not been authoritatively decided by a decision of this Court. 11. In the light of the above conclusion, the original petition has to be and is hereby dismissed. 12. Ordinarily, I would have awarded to the worker her costs, substantial costs, taking note of the fact that a comparatively poor woman worker has been drawn to this Court to fight a litigation, even for the safeguarding of a statutory benefit. I have desisted from awarding the costs, for the reason that the petitioner might have had some justification in entertaining a bonafide misapprehension regarding the scope of the statute. Dismissed.