JUDGMENT 1. 1. In this writ petition the petitioner, Madhav Prasad, who was employed as a conductor with the Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (here-in-after referred to as the 'Corporation') has challenged the legality of the order (Annexure 4), dated 6th December, 1976, whereby his services were terminated. 2. The petitioner was appointed as conductor, with the Corporation by order (Annexure-1) dated 2nd September, 1975. In the said order it was mentioned that the appointment of the petitioner was on probation for a period of 6 months and it was subject to the conditions contained in the said order of appointment. In condition No. 2 it was further provided that in the event of the 6 months' period of probation not being completed satisfactorily, the period of probation could be extended. The petitioner was allowed to continue after the expiry of 6 months period of probation, but no order was passed either extending the period of probation or confirming the petitioner. A show cause notice (Annexure-2) dated 29th November, 1976 was served on the petitioner whereby the petitioner was informed that on 18th November, 1976 the petitioner was on duty on vehicle No. 3756 on Nagaur-Sikar route and that the said vehicle was checked at Daulatpur by the Inspectors and 25 passengers were found without tickets and that the said conduct of the petitioner amounted to a mis-conduct for which he could be removed from service. The petitioner was required to submit his explanation to the aforesaid charge of misconduct and produce the evidence, oral or documentary, before the Divisional Manager of the Corporation on 12th December, 1976. Before the expiry of the aforesaid period mentioned in the show cause notice the impugned order dated 6th December, 1976, was passed whereby the services of the petitioner were terminated. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid order the petitioner has filed this writ petition. 3. No reply to the writ petition has been filed by the respondents but Shri R. N. Munshi has appeared on behalf of the respondents to oppose the writ petition. 4. The first contention that was urged by Shri G. S. Singhvi, the learned counsel for the petitioner. 3. No reply to the writ petition has been filed by the respondents but Shri R. N. Munshi has appeared on behalf of the respondents to oppose the writ petition. 4. The first contention that was urged by Shri G. S. Singhvi, the learned counsel for the petitioner. was that under Standing Order No. 8 (ii) of the Rajasthan State Transport Workers and Work-shop Employees Standing Order, 1965 (herein- after referred to as the Standing Order) the period of probation that has been prescribed is 6 months, which can be extended by it specific time not exceeding 6 months. The submission of Shri Singhvi was that after the expiry of the period of one year from the date of his appointment the petitioner should be deemed to have been confirmed on the post of conductor and since he was it permanent employee of the Corporation on 6th Dec., 1976 the date of passing of the impugned order, his services should not be terminated without holding an enquiry into the charge of misconduct mentioned in the show cause notice (Annexure-2) dated 29.11.1976. In this connection, Shri Singhvi has also submitted that the provision of Standing Order 13 which makes provision of terminating the service of a permanent worker by notice in writing has been struck down by the Full Bench of this Court in Bhawarlal v. . R. S. R. T. C. and ors., 1984 RLR 619 . 5. In the matter of confirmation of a person employed on probation the position is well settled that in cases where no maximum period of probation is prescribed in the relevant rules an inference of confirmation by implication cannot be drawn but in cases where there is an express provision in the relevant rules providing for a maximum period of probation and also fixing tie maximum period upto which the period of probation may he extended and the employee is allowed to continue in service after the expiry of the maximum period, for which the probation can be extended, it can be implied that the employee has been confirmed on the post on which he was appointed on probation on the expiry of the maximum period of probation. (See : The State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210 ; Paramjit Singh and ors v. Ram Rakha and ors.. AIR 1979 SC 107) . (See : The State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh, AIR 1968 SC 1210 ; Paramjit Singh and ors v. Ram Rakha and ors.. AIR 1979 SC 107) . There may however the cases where the rules or the contract of service contain a provision requiring in express order of confirmation before an employee can be treated as confirmed and in such a case the employee cannot be treated to have teen confirmed by implication on the expiry of the period of probation State of Maharashtra v. Veerappa R. Saboji & another, AIR 1980 SC 42 . 6. In the present case, the relevant provision with regard to probation and confirmation is contained in clauses (ii) and (iii) of Standing Order No. 8, which read as under: "(ii) Period of probation:- The period of probation shall normally be six months unless the Corporation otherwise determine a different period of probation for a post or class of posts, or unless it is extended by a specified time not exceeding six months. Break, due to sicknessm accident, leave, lock-out strikes (not being illegal strikes) or involuntary closure of the establishment shall be included in the period of probation. (iii) Confirmation:-A probationer shall be confirmed in his appointment at the end of his period of probation if he has successfully passed the prescribed trade test or a prescribed departmental examination and if the appointing authority is satisfied that his Integrity is unquestionable and he is otherwise fit rise fit for confirmation." Standing Order No.9 further provides as under:- 9. Permanent Motor Transport Worker: (i) A worker shall acquire the status of a permanent worker from the date of his confirmation and appointment substantively. (ii) On substantive appointment to a permanent post worker shall acquire a lien on that post." 7. From a perusal of the above mentioned provisions in the Standing Orders it is evident that normal period of probation is 6 months, but it is open to the Corporation to prescribe a different period of probation for a post or class of posts'. The said provision also postulate that the period of probation can be extended but it fixes a maximum period of 6 months for which the said period can be extended. The said provision also postulate that the period of probation can be extended but it fixes a maximum period of 6 months for which the said period can be extended. Under clause (iii) of Standing Order No. 8 an obligation has been imposed that probationer shall be confirmed in his appointment at the end of his period of probation if he has successfully passed the prescribed test or prescribed departmental examination and the appointing authority is satisfied that he is fit for confirmation. Under Standing Order No. 9, a worker shall acquire the status of the permanent worker from the date of his confirmation and appointment substantively. 8. The aforesaid provisions thus show that the present case falls within the ambit of the rule laid down in The State of Punjab v. Dharam Singh (supra) and Paramjit Singh and ors. v. Ram Rakha and ors. (supra). In these cases, the relevant rules prescribed a period of probation and further provided that the said period of probation could be extended for a maximum period and the Supreme Court has held that the employee can be said to have been confirmed by implication after the expiry of the maximum period of probation. 9. Shri Munshi, the learned counsel for the Corporation, has placed reliance on clause (iii) of Standing Order No. 8 and clause (i) of Standing Order No. 9 and has submitted that the Standing Orders of the Corporation postulate the passing of an express order of confirmation before the employee can be treated to have been confirmed and in the absence of such an express order of confirmation. the employee cannot be deemed to have been confirmed by implication. The submission of Shri Munshi was that in the absence of an express order of confirmation the date of confirmation cannot he ascertained aid Standing Order No. 9 (i) cannot be given effect to. I am unable to agree with the aforesaid contention. the employee cannot be deemed to have been confirmed by implication. The submission of Shri Munshi was that in the absence of an express order of confirmation the date of confirmation cannot he ascertained aid Standing Order No. 9 (i) cannot be given effect to. I am unable to agree with the aforesaid contention. In my opinion, clause (ii) of Standing Order No. 8 prescribed the maximum period for which the probation of an employee may be extended and this means that on the expiry of the aforesaid maximum period of probation the employee cannot continue on probation and that either his services must be terminated on the expiry of the said period or if he is allowed to continue in service after the expiry of the maximum period of probation it must be implied that he has been confirmed on the post held by him even though there is no express order of confirmation. There is no difficulty in the application of Standing Order No. 9 in such a case because the date of confirmation of such an employee would be the date on which he has complied the maximum period of probation prescribed under clause (ii) of Sanding Order No. 8. 10. The next contention urged by Shri Munshi was that under clause (ii) of Standing Order No. 8, it is permissible for the Corporation to determine a different period of probation for a post or crass of posts and in a case where the Corporation determines a different period of probation for a post or class of posts the limitation with regard to maximum period of probation contained in clause (ii) of Standing Order No. 8 would not be applicable and in such a case it is open to the Corporation to fix any period of probation. In this connection Shri Munshi has placed reliance on the conditions containing the order of appointment of the petitioner (Annexure 1) wherein it is laid down that in the event of the 6 months period of probation being not completed satisfactorily the period of probation can be extended. In this connection Shri Munshi has placed reliance on the conditions containing the order of appointment of the petitioner (Annexure 1) wherein it is laid down that in the event of the 6 months period of probation being not completed satisfactorily the period of probation can be extended. Shri Munshi has urged that in view of this condition in the order of appointment the outer limit of 6 months, prescribed in clause (ii) of Standing Order No. 8 for extension of the period of probation is not applicable to the case of the petitioner and the petitioner cannot claim to have been confirmed on the expiry of the period of one year from the date of his appointment. In my view, the aforesaid contention of Shri Munshi cannot b accepted because in the order of appointment it is stated that the petitioner was being appointed on probation for a period of 6 months and in condition No. 2 contained in the said order of appointment it was provided that the period of probation may be extended in the event of 6 months period of probation not being completed satisfactorily. The aforesaid order of the appointment has been passed in accordance with the provision or Clause (ii) of Standing Order No. 8 and in my opinion the power for extension of the period of probation, as contained in condition No. 2 of the order of appointment, must be construed as being limited by the limit of the period of 6 months contained in clause (ii) of Standing Order No. 8. The position might have been different if in the order of appointment instead of 6 months probation as laid dawn in clause (ii) of Standing Order No. 8 a different period of probation had been not prescribed. But in the order of appointment the normal period of 6 months probation has been prescribed and a provision has been made for extension of the said period of probation in the event of non-completion of the said period of probation satisfactorily. In these circumstances condition No. 2, contained in the order of appointment can only be construed to mean that the extension of the period of probation cannot exceed the limit of 6 months, prescribed in clause (ii) of Standing Order No. 8. 11. In these circumstances condition No. 2, contained in the order of appointment can only be construed to mean that the extension of the period of probation cannot exceed the limit of 6 months, prescribed in clause (ii) of Standing Order No. 8. 11. Shri Munshi has invited my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Dhanji Bhai Ramji Bhai v. The State of Gujarat 1985 (2) SCC 5 . In that case the relevant rule prescribed a period of probation of two years and it further provided that the said period of probation may be extended in accordance with the Rules. The Supreme Court held that the fact that the appellant in that case was allowed to continue in service after the expiry of the period of probation would not mean that he should be deemed to be confirmed on the post on which he was appointed on probation. There is nothing in that said decision to show that a maximum limit was prescribed in the relevant rule for granting extension of the probation. The said decision, therefore, cannot be applied to the facts of the present case. 12. It must, therefore, be held that a maximum period of probation to which the period of probation of the petitioner could be extended was 6 months and that the initial period of probation of 6 months as well as the extended period of 6 months expired on 2nd September, 1976 and on 2nd September, 1976 the petitioner should be deemed have been confirmed on the post of conductor and he should be treated to have become a permanent employee of the Corporation on 2nd September, 1976. 13. Under the Standing Orders the services of a permanent employee of the Corporation could be terminated either under Standing Order No. 13 by giving one month' notice or under Standing Orders Nos. 35 and 36 on the ground of misconduct Sanding Order No. 13 which provides for termination of the services of a permanent employee by giving one month's notice has been held to he violative of thee provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution by a Full Bench of this Court in Bhanwarlal v. R.S.R.T.C . (supra). Thus, the only provision under which the services of a permanent employee could be terminated are those contained in Standing Orders Nos. 35 and 36, namely, for misconduct. (supra). Thus, the only provision under which the services of a permanent employee could be terminated are those contained in Standing Orders Nos. 35 and 36, namely, for misconduct. In the present case, the procedure laid down in the said Standing Orders was admittedly not followed before the passing of the impugned order. 14. Mr. Singhvi has also contended that even if it be assumed that the petitioner was not confirmed on the post of conductor on the date of the passing of the impugned order and he was holding the said post of conductor on probation, the impugned order cannot be regarded as an order of termination simpliciter but it is an order terminating the service, of the petitioner by way of punishment for the misconduct referred to in the show cause notice (Annexure-2) dated 29.11.1976. The submission of Shri Singhvi is that the said misconduct is the foundation for the impugned order and. therefore, the impugned order is an order passed by way of punishment and since it was passed without holding any enquiry into the charge referred to the show cause notice the said order cannot be sustained. Shri Munshi has refuted this contention of Shri Singhvi and has submitted that the impugned order is an order of termination simpliciter. In my opinion it is not possible to .inapt the contention of Shri Munshi, in as much as no return has been filed on behalf of the respondents to the writ petition and in the absence of the return to the writ petition the averments contained in the writ petition must be accepted as true. In the writ petition the petitioner has come forward with the case that the impugned order has been passed by way of punishment for the misconduct referred to in the show cause notice (Annexure 2) dated 29-11-76, in view of the fact that the impugned order was passed on 6th December, 1976 i.e. within a week of the issuance of the said show cause notice and no action was taken against the petitioner on the basis of the previous misconducts referred to in the said show cause notice. The misconducts alleged to have been committed by him on 18th November, 1976, and in respect of which the petitioner was required to submit his explanation under the show cause notice (Annexure-2) dated 29.11.1976 was thus the foundation of the impugned order terminating the service of the petitioner and the impugned order must therefore, be held to be an order passed by way of punishment for the misconduct alleged to have been committed by the petitioner on 18th December, 1976 and since it was passed before the petitioner could offer his explanation for the said misconduct, the said order cannot be sustained. 15. Shri Munshi has urged that the matter has been pending in this Court for nearly 9 years and that the petitioner was suitably employed elsewhere during this period and therefore, even if the order is set-aside the petitioner should not be awarded the salary for the period during which the writ petition is pending before this Court. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case I am of the opinion, that the ends of justice would be met if the petitioner is awarded half of the salary for the past period. 16. In the result, the writ petition is allowed and the order (Annexure 4) dated 6th December, 1976 terminating the services of the petitioner is set-aside and and it is declared that the petitioner would be entitled to be reinstated on the post of conductor, as a confirmed employee with consequential benefits to which he may be entitled as a result of the setting aside of the order dated 6th December, 1976. As regards the arrears of the salary the petitioner would be entitled 50% of salary for the period from 6th December, 1976 till the date of passing of this order. This order wall not preclude the respondent Corporation from taking action against the petitioner for the alleged misconduct referred to in the show cause notice (Annexure-2) dated 29.11.1976, in accordance with the Standing Orders. There will be no order as to costs.Petition allowed. *******