ORDER 1. Haji Lal Mohammad had two sons - Haji Abdul Majeed and Haji Abdul Ghafoor, Haji Abdul Hameed was the son of Haji Majeed. Rafat Hameed is his son Haji Abdul Shakoor is the son of Haji Abdul Ghafoor. He is the petitioner in this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Rafat Hameed is respondent 6. 2. On Jan. 16, 1935 Haji Lal Mohammad executed a waqf deed in respect of his house property. Petitioner Abdul Shakoor is its Mutwalli since the year 1967. He has been recognised as such by the U. P. Sunni Central Board of Waqfs (herein after, the Board). In the year 1942 on March 14, another waqf deed was executed by Haji Lal Mohammad. This is in respect, inter alia, of the business of firm Haji Lal Mohammad Bidi Merchants. A copy of the waqf deed is Annexure `1' to the writ petition. Under it. the executant became Mutwalli of the Waqf Alalaulad created by the Deed and after his death his wife Mst. Noor Bibi alias Dnhoti Bibi was to be Mutwalli. The Deed also provided that after the death of Mst. Noor Bibi, from amongst his male lineal descendents Haji Abdul Majeed and Haji Abdul Ghafoor and likewise of their male descendants, a person who was capable of making proper arrangement and running the business and was good and noble, will be appointed as Mutwalli. In case, two or more persons of equal ability were available from amongst the male lineal descendants, the eldest in age amongst them will be chosen. 3. On Feb. 13, 1947 a settlement, a copy of which is Annexure 2 to the writ petition, took place between Haji Lal Mohammad Mst. Noor Bibi and petitioner Abdul Shakoor. Under it, Haji Abdul Hameed was to become the Mutwalli of the waqf created by the Deed dated Mar. 14, 1942, after the death of Haji Lal Mohammad. Petitioner Abdul Shakoor undertook not to interfere in the managment. Later, there was an agreement between Haji Abdul Hameed and petitioner Haji Abdul Shakoor on Sept. 15, 1955. This provided for payment of a stipulated amount to petitioner Abdul Shakoor, month by month, apart from some annual payment. Petitioner Abdul Shakoor gave up the right to require rendition of accounts. Petitioner Abdul Shakoor undertook not to interfere in the managment. Later, there was an agreement between Haji Abdul Hameed and petitioner Haji Abdul Shakoor on Sept. 15, 1955. This provided for payment of a stipulated amount to petitioner Abdul Shakoor, month by month, apart from some annual payment. Petitioner Abdul Shakoor gave up the right to require rendition of accounts. Annexure `3' to the writ petition is a copy of this document which also mentions that the petitioner is a person of independent attitude and that any offspring of his from a woman outside the family (Kisi Gair Kul Ki aurat ke vatan se) will not be able to claim any maintenance after his death. 4. Haji Abdul Hameed died on April 13, 1981, petitioner Abdul Shakoor, according to his case, assumed charge as Mutwalli of the waqf created by the Deed of Mar. 14, 1942 being the eldest member of the family that very day. The claim of assumption of charge by the petitioner as Mutwalli is, however, denied as false by Rafat Hammed in his counter affidavit who says that on April 21/23, 1981, he made an application before the Board (Annexure `6' to the writ petition) praying that he be appointed as Mutwalli of the waqf or else the unanimous decision taken by the beneficiaries in a meeting held on April 18, 1981 that he will act as Mutwalli in place of Haji Abdul Hameed be approved and recognised. It was further mentioned in this application that the express consent of Haji Abdul Shakoor (Petitioner) could not be obtained as he was not available in that meeting but the applicant (Rafat Hammed) believes that he had no objection to the appointment of the applicant as the next Mutwalli. This application was made under S. 48 read with S. 19(2)(e) of the U. P. Muslim Waqfs Act. On April 27, 1981 the president of the Board appointed Rafat Hameed as Mutwalli of the Waqf "for the time being till directed otherwise." The order was communicated through letter No. 450/49 Ex. II-Alld. dated April 27, 1981. Its copy is Annexure `6' to the writ petition. On April 27, 1981 the president of the Board appointed Rafat Hameed as Mutwalli of the Waqf "for the time being till directed otherwise." The order was communicated through letter No. 450/49 Ex. II-Alld. dated April 27, 1981. Its copy is Annexure `6' to the writ petition. Petitioner Abdul Shakoor filed an application dated July 24, 1981 (Annexure 7 to the writ petition) supported by an affidavit before the,Board saying that he had heard a rumour on July 17/18, 1981 spread by Rafat Hameed that he had been appointed as Mutwalli in respect of the waqf and an inquiry found that an ex parte order to that effect had been passed on April 27, 1981. This ex parte order was without jurisdiction and deserved to be set aside. The petitioner claimed that he had assumed office from after the death of Haji Abdul Hammed as Mutwalli in accordance with the terms contained in the Waqf Deeds dated Jan. 16, 1935 and Mar. 14, 1942 and that the impugned order dated April 27, 1981 had the effect of removing him from the office of Mutwalli without hearing him. Further, that the claim of Rafat Hameed that the beneficiaries had given their consent to Rafat Hammed being the Mutwalli was incorrect. A prayer for setting aside the ex parte order was made and it was also prayed that he be declared to be Mutwalli. 5. Rafat Hammed filed a counter affidavit in reply to the affidavit of the petitioner. He also filed a supplementary counter affidavit sworn by him on Sept. 16, 1981 containing replies to the rejoinder affidavit of petitioner Abdul Shakoor. Annexures `8' and `9' are copies of the counter and supplementary counter affidavit of Rafat Hammed. Annexure `11' to the writ petition is a copy of the rejoinder affidavit of petitioner Abdul Shakoor sworn on Sept. 11, 1981. By a notice, Sept. 10, 1981 was fixed as a date by the Board for hearing the matter. This was adjourned to Sept. 17, 1981 on an application made by Rafat Hameed. On that date, no hearing took place. Rafat Hameed filed a supplementary counter affidavit along with which some new documents were filed. The petitioner says that the President of the Board orally fixed Sept. 25, 1981 for hearing as was evidenced by a letter dated Nov. This was adjourned to Sept. 17, 1981 on an application made by Rafat Hameed. On that date, no hearing took place. Rafat Hameed filed a supplementary counter affidavit along with which some new documents were filed. The petitioner says that the President of the Board orally fixed Sept. 25, 1981 for hearing as was evidenced by a letter dated Nov. 9, 1981 sent by him to the Minister Incharge of Waqfs in the State Government (Annexure `12' to the writ petition). Sri Muzaffar Hussain was the President of the Board then. 6. The petitioner has made some allegations in the writ petition to the effect that on account of ulterior motive the file of the case was sent to the commissioner/ secretary, Muslim Sunni Waqf Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh on Sept. 22, 1981 and no hearing took place on Sept. 25, 1981 on that account. Further, that Rafat Hammeed filed nine documents on that date without giving copies thereof to the petitioner or his counsel. These included affidavits of some persons. Rafat Hammeed does not dispute the filing of these documents on Sept. 25, 1981 but says that copies thereof were given to the petitioner. The matter remained spending and on Dec. 17. 1981, before the file was sent back along with letter dated Dec. 23, 1981(Annexure `13' to the writ petition), U. P. Ordinance No. 28 of 1981 being the Uttar Pradesh Muslim Waqfs (Amendment) Ordinance, 1981 was promulgated. By it, a new S. 44-A, empowering ' the State Government to suspend the Board, was inserted in the U. P. Muslim Waqfs Act, 1960 and consequential amendments were made in S. 45 of the Act. On Dec. 19, 1981 a Notification (Annexure `16' to the writ petition) was issued in exercise of powers under S. 44-A(1) of the Act suspending the Board for a period of six months and appointing Sri Abdul Qayum as the Administrator of the Board for carrying on the function and duties of the Board under the Act. The file of the case was eventually sent back to the Administrator by the State Government who fixed Jan. 19, 1982 as a date for hearing in the matter. The petitioner says that his request for filing evidence in rebuttal of the evidence filed by Rafat Hameed on Sept. 25, 1981 after exchange of affidavits, was refused and show of hearing was made by the Administrator. 19, 1982 as a date for hearing in the matter. The petitioner says that his request for filing evidence in rebuttal of the evidence filed by Rafat Hameed on Sept. 25, 1981 after exchange of affidavits, was refused and show of hearing was made by the Administrator. By order dated Feb. 8, 1982 the application of the petitioner dated July 24, 1981 was rejected. The order (Annexure `19' to the writ petition) was sent to him with a covering letter dated February 10, 1982 (Annexure `18' to the writ petition) which was received by him on Feb. 16, 1981. He then came to this Court for redress through the present petition. 7. Earlier, writ petition No. 961 of 1982 had, been filed by Sri Muzaffar Hussain assailing the order suspending the Board and appointing an Administrator. In that writ petition an ad interim order was passed in favour of the petitioner. Eventually, the petition was allowed by this Court on May 24, 1982 and the order dated Dec. 19, 1981 was set aside. The judgment of this Court is reported as Muzaffar Hasan v. State of U. P., 1982 All LJ 909. The present petition was directed to be connected with that petition by the Bench while admitting it on April 28, 1982. However, the two were not heard together. In the present petition also several grounds have been raised assailing the validity of U. P. Ordinance No. 28 of 1981 and of the order dated Dec. 19, 1981. In addition, the order of Feb. 8, 1982 has been assailed on various grounds. 8. The judgment of the Division Bench dated May 24, 1982 in writ petition No. 961 of 1982 : (reported in 1982 All LJ 909) has been acquiesced in by the State Government which has not challenged it before the Supreme Court as stated by the learned Advocate General (Sri V. B. Upadhyaya) before me on Sept. 9, 1985. 9. In the petition aforesaid Muzaffar Hasan, the then President of the Sunni Central Board of Waqf, U. P. and Abbas Ali, who was a Member, challenged the order dated Dec. 19, 1981. 9, 1985. 9. In the petition aforesaid Muzaffar Hasan, the then President of the Sunni Central Board of Waqf, U. P. and Abbas Ali, who was a Member, challenged the order dated Dec. 19, 1981. The first submission which was made before, the Bench was that for action to be taken under S. 44-A, an opportunity of being heard was necessary and the power conferred by the provision for suspending the Board could be exercised only after compliance with the principle of audi alteram partem. The Bench noticed that it was an admitted case that no opportunity had been given to the Board or to the two petitioners of explaining any facts or circumstances on the basis of which the action had been taken. It held that there was no justification for the State Government in suspending the Board without wing opportunity of hearing to it. It negatived the submission made by the learned Advocate General, that the order suspending the Board may not be interfered with and instead direction be issued to the State Government grant a hearing to the Board, by saying that it could not uphold the impugned order having found it invalid on account of non - compliance of the principles of natural justice. In para 20, the Bench said, "....... we must find that the impugned order is void, the order suspending the Board stands set aside. It will be entitled to be reinstated. It will, however, be open to the State Government to take fresh action against the and which it considers fit and proper in accordance with law." 10. The judgment was delivered on May 24, 1982. The submission that has been made by Sri Shanti Bhushan, senior counsel who appeared for the 6th respondent, is that the effect of the judgment of the Division Bench is that the order dated Dec. 19, 1981 would be deemed to be valid till it was set aside on May 24, 1982 in so far as the actions taken by the Administrator in the intervening period are concerned. One such action being the passing of the order dated Feb. 8, 1982, the said order could not be assailed in the present petition on the ground that the appointment of the Administrator itself was invalid. One such action being the passing of the order dated Feb. 8, 1982, the said order could not be assailed in the present petition on the ground that the appointment of the Administrator itself was invalid. The reason, according to the submission, was that in view of the doctrine of factum valet, an attack on the appointment of the Administrator could not be permitted in a collateral proceeding like the present writ petition. He relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 1473 . In this case which was decided by the Bench of three Judges, the Supreme Court dealt with the (sic) of an appellant, against whom an order had been passed under S. 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act confiscating certain goods belonging to him, and who had filed an appeal which was heard by an Additional Sessions Judge (Sri G. Anjappa) who dismissed it. A revision against the order was dismissed by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. One of the questions raised before the Supreme Court was that the judgment delivered by Sri Anjappa was void as he had not been duly appointed as district Judge. It was also urged that there was no necessity to question his appointment as it had already been quashed by the Supreme Court. Further, that the attack on the appointment of Sri Anjappa was not a collateral attack as the question of jurisdiction can be raised at any stage in a criminal trial. No inconvenience, according to the submission, was likely to be caused by ordering a re-hearing of the appeal and that neither public policy nor necessity required that the judgment delivered by Sri Anjappa be not set aside. 11. The Supreme Court did not accept the submission aforesaid and observed (in para 4 of the report) that : "....... The doctrine is now well established that "the acts of the officers de facto performed by them within the scope of their assumed official authority, in the interest of the public or third persons and not for their own benefit, are generally as valid and binding, as if they were the acts of officers dejure........... The doctrine is founded on good sense, sound policy and practical experience. It is aimed at the prevention of public and private mischief and the protection of public and private interest......... The doctrine is founded on good sense, sound policy and practical experience. It is aimed at the prevention of public and private mischief and the protection of public and private interest......... An illegal appointment may be set aside and a proper appointment may be made but the acts of those who hold office de facto are not so easily undone and may have lasting repercussions and confusing sequels if attempted to be undone." Later (in paras 16 and 17) the Supreme Court observed that : "........ We are concerned with the effect of the invalidation upon the acts done by the Judge whose appointment has been invalidated. The de facto dectrine saves such acts........... The Judges who rejected the appeal in one case and convicted the accused in the other case were not mere usurpers or intruders but were persons who discharged the functions and duties of Judges under colour of lawful authority. We are concerned with the office that the Judges purported to hold. We are not concerned with the particular incumbents of the office. So long as the office was validly created. it matters not that the incumbent was not validly appointed.......... It would be a different matter if the constitution of the Court itself is under challenge." 12. The basic submission of Sri Shanti Bhushan is that where, as in the present case, there is no lack of qualification in the person appointed as Administrator for his appointment as such and the appointment of the Administrator was held by this Court to be invalid on account of the fact that opportunity had not been given to the Board to have its say before it was replaced by the Administrator, consideration of public policy requires that the actions taken by the Administrator under colour of the office, may not be disturbed and they be sustained by recourse to the de facto doctrine. There is substance in the submission. A view to the contrary may result in invalidating numerous actions which the Administrator took during the period between his appointment and the judgment of this Court on May 24, 1982. 13. The State of Haryana v. Haryana Co-operative Transport Ltd., AIR 1977 SC 237 was a case decided by two Judges of the Supreme Court. A view to the contrary may result in invalidating numerous actions which the Administrator took during the period between his appointment and the judgment of this Court on May 24, 1982. 13. The State of Haryana v. Haryana Co-operative Transport Ltd., AIR 1977 SC 237 was a case decided by two Judges of the Supreme Court. Speaking through Y.V. Chandrachud, J. (as he then was), the Supreme Court said that it was open, while assailing an award given by a person as presiding officer of a Labour Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, to question the appointment of the Presiding Officer and such a challenge cannot be treated to be a challenge in collateral proceedings nor could the award made by him be saved by recourse to de facto doctrine. It also said that the mere circumstance that a writ of quo warranto was not asked for in so many words in the writ petition, could not justify the argument that the appointment was being challenged collaterally in a proceeding taken to challenge an award. 14. Sri Rameshwari Prasad, who has appeared on behalf of the petitioner Abdul Shakoor urged with some emphasis that the present is a case similar to the one which was before the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana (Supra) and that the averments in the present petition, like those in the case which went to the Supreme Court, clearly contain a challenge to the appointment of the person whose decision was being assailed. He urged that the decision made by Sri Abdul Qayum, Administrator, could not be upheld by saying that he had given it under colour of office. 15. A perusal of the present writ petition shows that the appointment of Sri Abdul Qayum as Administrator is not challenged on any ground of his ineligibility. It is assailed on the grounds that there was no material before the State Government on the basis where of recourse could be had to the powers conferred upon it under S. 44-A, that the order of Dec. 19, 1981 did not contain any reason and appeared to have been passed without any application of mind in an arbitrary manner; that the conditions precedent for the exercise of power under S. 44-A were not present and that it had been passed in breach of principles of natural justice. 19, 1981 did not contain any reason and appeared to have been passed without any application of mind in an arbitrary manner; that the conditions precedent for the exercise of power under S. 44-A were not present and that it had been passed in breach of principles of natural justice. The motive for passing that order was said to be ulterior only with a view to remove the President of the Board. These are the grounds which were raised by Muzaffar Hasan also in writ petition No. 961 of 1982. 16. Sri Shanti Bhushan is right in his submission that in the case of State of Haryana v. Haryana Co-operative Transport Ltd., AIR 1977 SC 237 (Supra) the Supreme Court was dealing with the eligibility of the person who had been appointed as the presiding officer of the Labour Court. It found that the main and real attack on the award was the inability of Sri Hans Raj Gupta to occupy the post of a Judge of the Labour Court in which capacity the award had been rendered by him. The Supreme Court, after extracting a passage from Cooley's A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations "in regard to de facto doctrine, observed that the passage meant that the acts of officer de facto could not be suffered to be questioned for want of legal authority except by some direct proceeding and then said (in para 9 of the report) that : "..........The challenge to Sri Gupta's appointment having been made by a writ petition under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, to which Shri Gupta was impleaded as a party-respondent, the challenge was made directly in a substantive proceeding and not collaterally. The writ petition was filed mainly with a view to challenge Shri Gupta's appointment on the ground that he was not qualified to fill the post to which he was appointed. Having been impleaded to the writ petition he had a clear and rightful opportunity to defend his appointment. The proceedings by way of a writ petition were taken not collaterally for attacking an appointment to a judicial office in a proceeding primarily intended for challenging a so-called judicial decision but the proceeding was taken principally and predominantly for challenging the appointment itself." 17. The proceedings by way of a writ petition were taken not collaterally for attacking an appointment to a judicial office in a proceeding primarily intended for challenging a so-called judicial decision but the proceeding was taken principally and predominantly for challenging the appointment itself." 17. This decision of the Supreme Court undoubtedly recognises an exception to the de facto doctrine by holding that where a decision is challenged on the ground that it was rendered by a person who was not qualified to hold the office under the colour whereof he had rendered it, in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the challenge cannot be treated to be one made in collateral proceedings. But, the challenge in the present petition to the appointment of the Administrator is not on any such ground. The Supreme Court decision in the State of Haryana does not help the petitioner. The challenge to the order of Feb. 8, 1982 is not permissible on the ground that the Administrator who made it was not validly appointed. 18. Rafat Hameed was appointed by Sri Muzaffar Hasan, the President of the Waqf Board, as Mutawalli for the time being till directed otherwise by ex parte order (communicated through Annexure `6' to the writ petition) dated April 27, 1981. There was some dispute between the parties whether this order had been made by Sri Muzaffar Hasan. On Sept. 23, 1983 I directed production of the file (49-Ex-II-Allahabad) in which that order was made. The file was produced before me on Nov. 4, 1985 by Sri Bashir Khan Mukhtare-am, U. P. Sunni Central Board of Waqf, Lucknow. The relevant notings, which are in Urdu, were, read out to me and a Hindi translation thereof, certified by Mohd. Bashir Khan was placed on the record. It shows that a report was made to the secretary (of the Board) saying in substance that after the death of Haji Abdul Hameed on April 13, 1981 the office of Mutwalli had been rendered vacant. Rafat Hameed, the youngest son of Haji Abdul Hameed, had made an application for being appointed as Mutwalli. His three elder brothers had jointly proposed his appointment as Mutwalli. Haji Abdul Shakoor, cousin of the deceased Mutwalli and grandson of the Waqif, had relinquished his right of becoming Mutwalli through a document dated Sept. 5, 1955. Rafat Hameed, the youngest son of Haji Abdul Hameed, had made an application for being appointed as Mutwalli. His three elder brothers had jointly proposed his appointment as Mutwalli. Haji Abdul Shakoor, cousin of the deceased Mutwalli and grandson of the Waqif, had relinquished his right of becoming Mutwalli through a document dated Sept. 5, 1955. As such, Rafat Hameed could be appointed Mutwalli for the time being. This report was by the Circle Clerk with which the Superintendent (Javed Ahsan) agreed. Sartaj Hasan (secretary) reported to the President that he agreed with the proposal contained in the note of the Circle clerk as endorsed by the Superintendent. On April 17, 1981 Sri Muzaffar Hasan passed the aforesaid order. 19. One of the submissions founded upon the aforesaid appointment of Rafat Hameed by Muzaffar Hasan made by Sri Shanti Bhushan was that it ruled out the suggestion that Rafat Hameed was not preferable to Abdul Shakoor as Mutwalli. Also, that the Administrator was not in error in confirming the appointment of Rafat Hameed through the impugned order of February 8, 1982 since even Sri Muzaffar Hasan found Rafat Hameed a proper person to be appointed initially. There is no doubt that Rafat Hameed was initially appointed by Sri Muzaffar Hasan to discharge the function of Mutwalli for the time being till directed otherwise yet it is also clear that no consideration of comparative merit of Rafat Hameed and Abdul Shakoor was made while making that appointment. The appointment proceeded only on the basis of the report that Abdul Shakoor had relinquished his right through the document of September 5, 1955 and that the three elder brothers of Rafat Hameed. 20. The order of Feb. 8, 1982 shows that Rafat Hameed was an obvious choice from the point of view of competence and ability and experience of business. This conclusion follows after the inter se competence of Abdul Shakoor and Rafat Hameed had been considered by the Administrator. Various facts in this connection are mentioned in the order. The Administrator has also held that the earlier order appointing Rafat Hameed as Mutwalli was an ex parte one without giving any notice of the proceedings to Abdul Shakoor and it is after this finding that he proceeded to consider the case on merit. 21. Various facts in this connection are mentioned in the order. The Administrator has also held that the earlier order appointing Rafat Hameed as Mutwalli was an ex parte one without giving any notice of the proceedings to Abdul Shakoor and it is after this finding that he proceeded to consider the case on merit. 21. The sequence of events, leading to the order of February 8, 1982, noticed earlier in this judgment, shows that Abdul Shakoor was not given an effective hearing before passing of the order of February 8, 1982. A number of documents were filed on behalf of Rafat Hameed on September 25, 1981. Assuming, as asserted by Rafat Hameed, copies of the documents were given to the counsel appearing for Abdul Shakoor, the fact that an opportunity to rebut this evidence was not given to Abdul Shakoor is undisputed. What has been asserted by Rafat Hameed is that Abdul Shakoor did not make a request for any such opportunity. The fact that no hearing took place on September 25, 1981 is also not in dispute. These two circumstances appear from the averments contained in paragraphs 18, 19 and 39 of the writ petition and paragraphs 23, 24 and 43 of the counter- affidavit of Rafat Hameed. The affidavit sworn by one Najmul Hasan on behalf of respondent No. 4 (Qazi Mukhtar Ahmad Commissioner/Secretary, Muslim Sunni Waqf Department) and respondent No. 7 State of Uttar Pradesh) does not contain a reply to paras Nos. 18, 19 and 39 of the writ petition at all. The statement in para 40 of the writ petition, that the Administrator made a show of hearing and on account of interruption caused by the visit of one of his intimate friends without hearing the petitioner or his counsel directed him to go away and said that the judgment would be delivered within a week, on personal knowledge by petitioner Abdul Shakoor has not been controverted by the Administrator, U. P. Sunni Central Board of Waqfs, Lucknow (respondent 2) nor by Sri Abdul Qayyum (the Administrator) who has been impleaded as respondent 3 to the writ petition by filing any counter-affidavit. Only Rafat Hameed says in para 44 of his counter-affidavit that the petitioner had argued the case fully through his counsel and that after hearing them fully the judgment was delivered. 22. Only Rafat Hameed says in para 44 of his counter-affidavit that the petitioner had argued the case fully through his counsel and that after hearing them fully the judgment was delivered. 22. The submission on behalf of petitioner Abdul Shakoor has been that in relation to Rafat Hameed, he was a better person to be appointed as Mutwalli. His submission also is that in case proper opportunity had been afforded by the Administrator to him in the conduct of the proceedings, he would have established, on facts, that he was liable to be appointed as Mutawalli after the death of Haji Abdul Hameed in terms of the Deed of Waqf. Counsel for the petitioner sought the leave of the Court to establish on the basis of the material on the record of the writ petition itself, that each one of the reason which has been construed against the petitioner by the Administrator in the impugned order was factually without basis. This leave was, however, not given to him as it was felt that on the conclusion that effective hearing was not afforded to petitioner Abdul Shakoor by the Administrator before passing the impugned order, the matter should be gone into by the Administrator/ President of the Board in the first instance. More so, because the counsel for both the parties, namely, Sri S. P. Srivastava for the petitioner and Sri Shakeel Ahmad, for respondent Rafat Hameed, stated that a new President has since been elected in place of Muzaffar Hasan and that the matter will be dealt with by him in accordance with law if directed by this Court. 23. In view of the conclusion that effective opportunity of hearing was not given to petitioner Abdul Shakoor before the impugned order of Feb. 8, 1982 was passed on the application made by him on July 24, 1981, which was breach of the principles of natural justice, the order deserves to be quashed and the matter merits a fresh hearing. In this view, it is not necessary to consider the petitioner's submission that the impugned order was passed mala fide. 24. In consequence, the writ petition succeeds in part. The order dated Feb. 8, 1982 (Annexure `19' to the writ petition) is quashed. The President of the U. P. Sunni Central B and of Waqfs, Lucknow is directed to decide the application of petitioner Abdul Shakoor afresh in accordance with law. 24. In consequence, the writ petition succeeds in part. The order dated Feb. 8, 1982 (Annexure `19' to the writ petition) is quashed. The President of the U. P. Sunni Central B and of Waqfs, Lucknow is directed to decide the application of petitioner Abdul Shakoor afresh in accordance with law. 25. Parties shall bear their own costs.