Manisana, J,: - This is an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for issue of an appropriate writ of dire­ction quashing the order dated 5.8.1974 passed by the Inspector Central of Police, Nagaland, terminating the services of the peti­tioner. 2. The facts of the case may briefly be stated. The peti­tioner was appointed as a Constable Writer in the establishment of the Commandant, 2nd Battalion, Special Nagaland Armed Police, Mokokcbung with effect from 28.2.66 by Commandant of the aforesaid Battalion. The appointment was purely temporary and could be terminated at any time after giving a 30 days notice from either side. Before he was appointed as such, the petitio­ner was in the Indian Army. The petitioner was discharged from the Army in the year 1966 but no date of discharge is given in the petition. But in the counter of the respondents, it is stated that the date of discharge was 9.3.66. Be that as it may. The petitioner was serving as a Constable Writer with effect from 28.2.66 as stated above. The petitioner was again appointed as Havilder on 15.3.66 within a month of his appointment as the Constable Writer. Thereafter, on 21.1.70, the petitioner was appointed to the post of Sub-Inspector on promotion and was atta­ched to the 4th Nagaland Armed Police Battalion, Thizama. However, under an order dated 5.8.74, the Inspector General of Police terminated the service of the petitioner. The order of ter­mination runs as follows : Services of A.B. Sub Inspector Johan (sic) Lushai of 4th NAP Bn. are no longer required by this Department. His services will stand terminated on 3.9.74 (AN). Sd/-L.S. Varma, I.P.S. Inspector General of Police, Nagaland, Kohima.'' (emphasis added) It is stated at the bar that the petitioner was holding tempo­rarily the posts of Havilder and Sub-Inspector. In para 19 of the petition, it is stated : "he has not been confirmed in the post”. The counter of the respondents also shows that the peti­tioner was holding temporarily the said posts. 3. Shri N.N. Saikia, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the impugned order of termination was by way of punishment in violation of the Article 311 of the Cons­titution of India and the principles of natural justice and that the 30 days notice was not given to the petitioner as he received the notice dated 5.8.74. on 8.8.74. 4. on 8.8.74. 4. The learned Advocate General, Nagaland, has submitted that the impugned order was a termination simpliciter and as such, there was no violation of Article 311 of the Constitution and the principles of natural justice; and that the 30 days notice was not required to be given to the petitioner. 5. The question which arises for consideration is that whe­ther the impugned order of termination was by way of punish meat. In Anoop vs. Govt. of India, AIR 1984 SC 636 , the Sup­reme Court has held that where the form of the order is merely camouflage of an order of dismissal for misconduct, it is always open to the court before which the order is challenged to go behind the form and ascertain the true character of the order. In doing so, the circumstances preceding or attendant on the order of termination of service have to be examined in each case, the motive behind it being immaterial. 6. In Nepal Singh vs. State of U.P., AIR 1980 SC 1459 , the Supreme Court has held that an order terminating the ser­vices of a temporary Government servant and ex facio innocu­ous in that it does not cast any stigma on the Government servant or visits him with penal consequences must be regarded as affecting a termination simpliciter, but if it is discovered on the basis of material adduced that although innocent in its term an order was passed in fact with a view to punishing the Gove­rnment servant, it is punitive order which can be passed only after complying with Article 311. In each case, it is necessary to examine the entire range of the facts carefully and consi­der whether in the light of those facts the authority intended to punish the Government servant or, having regard to the character, conduct and suitability in relating to the post held by him it was intended simply to terminate his services. If the material against the Government servant on which the superior authority has acted and constitutes the motive and not the foun­dation of the order, the order is not passed by way of punishment and is merely an order of termination order simpliciter. 7. In the background of the above principles let us now examine the case in hand. The impugned order does not exaction disclose that it was passed by way of punishment. 7. In the background of the above principles let us now examine the case in hand. The impugned order does not exaction disclose that it was passed by way of punishment. The impugned order reveals that the services of the petitioner were no longer required. Sri Saikia has drawn our attention to the letter dated 3.9.74 (Annexure VI to the petitioner) issued from the office of the Inspector General of Police on behalf of the Inspector General of Police, Nagaland, addressed to the Comm­andant, 4th NAP, Thizama in order to show that the order was passed by way of punishment. The letter dated 3.9.74 rues : Sir, I am to refer to your letter No. IVBN ( - 23) 75/2494 dated 16.8.74 and to inform you that Sri John Lushai got himself enlisted in the Police Department by giving false particulars about his name and father's name. The Assistant Inspector General of Police, Mizoram has informed that there is no such person as John V. Lushai son of Shri Thenghunga Sailo from Lungchem village. In view of the above the Inspector General of Police has decided not to keep him in the Force and accor­dingly termination notice was served on him. Yours faithfully, Sd/ - for Inspector General of Police, Nagaland, Kohima. Mr. N. N. Saikia, learned counsel for the petitioner has sub­mitted that the letter shows that there is allegation or impu­tation to the effect that the petitioner got himself listed in the Police Department by giving false particulars about his father's name; and that the Assistant Inspector General of Police, Mizoram, after making an enquiry informed that there was no person as John V. Lushai son of Thenghunga Sailo in Lungohen village. 8. The next question which arises for consideration is whe­ther the Court will send for official records connected with the said letter dated 3.9.74 to examine whether the termination was by way of punishment or not. In this connection we refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Beerappa, AIR 1980 SC 42 in which the Supreme Court has held that there may be another kind of case where altho­ugh the termination of the services is intended by way of pu­nishment, the order is framed as a termination simpliciter. In this connection we refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Beerappa, AIR 1980 SC 42 in which the Supreme Court has held that there may be another kind of case where altho­ugh the termination of the services is intended by way of pu­nishment, the order is framed as a termination simpliciter. In such a case if the Government servant succeeds in making out a prima facie case that the order was by way of punishment but an attempt to rebut the case by the authorities may nece­ssitate sending for the official records for the purpose of deter­mining the truth. It is in such a case generally that the offi­cial records may be called for by the Court. It is not open to the Court to send for the official records on a mere allegation by the Government servant that the order is by way of punish­ment. For unless there is material on the record before the Court in support of that allegation, an attempt by the Court to find out from the record whether the termination of service is based on the unsuitability of the Government servant in-relation to the post held by him or is in reality an order by way of punishment will in effect be an unwarranted attempt to delve into the official records for the purpose of determining the nature of the order on the basis of a mere allegation of the Government servant. 9. In view of the above decision of the Supreme Court, we are to examine whether the letter dated 8.9.74 prima facie sho­ws that the order was passed by way of punishment. In Ramgopal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1970 SC 158 , the Sup­reme Court has held that it was immaterial that the order was-preceded by an informal inquiry into the conduct of the Govern­ment servant with a view to ascertain whether he should be retained in service. In the case before the Supreme Court, there were complaints that the Special Magistrate (Motor Vehicle) Gwalior was associating with a young girl named Kumari Laxmi. In the case before the Supreme Court, there were complaints that the Special Magistrate (Motor Vehicle) Gwalior was associating with a young girl named Kumari Laxmi. The Chief Justice of Madhya Pradesh made inquiries into the matter and on his return to Jabalpur the Chief Justice dictated note to the effect that the Magistrate was still maintaining the girl and he did not enjoy good reputation at the places where he was posted before his posting at Gwallior; and that the District Judge, Gwallior also informed the Chief Justice that the Magistrate was not honest and that in Collaboration with the Traffic Inspector he has taken money from accused persons in many cases under the Motor Vehicles Act. No charge sheet was served on the Magistrate nor was any departmental enquiry held against him. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh passed its resolution that the State Government should terminate the servi­ces of the Magistrate. Having regard to the resolution the State Government passed an order of termination simpliciter. In the context the Supreme Court has held as stated above. The Sup­reme Court, in Ramgopal (Supra) has further held that in such a case no question of following the principles of natural justice also arises. 10. The letter shows that it was written on the day of his retirement; and that it was sent to the Commandant; and that it was not written by the Inspector General of Police, Nagaland himself; and that the Inspector General of Police de­cided not to keep the petitioner in the Force; and that the let­ter shows that the enquiry was made by the Assistant Inspector General of Police, Mizoram, and not by any officer of Nagm-land. Therefore, it is concluded that the enquiry that was made by the Mizoram Police was an informal enquiry relating to the conduct in relation to post hild by him with a view to ascertain whether the petitioner would be retained in service and that the Inspector General of Police intended sim­ply to terminate his services; and that it cannot be said that the result of the enquiry was not the foundation for the termi­nation of the services of the petitioner in the light of the above discussion of the Supreme Court. In this view of the matter, the petitioner has failed to show prima facie that the order was passed by way of punishment. In this view of the matter, the petitioner has failed to show prima facie that the order was passed by way of punishment. Therefore, it is not required to 'end for connected records and no question of following the principles of natural justice arises in view of the above decisions of the Supreme Court. 11. The next question which arises for consideration is whe­ther a 30 days notice was required to be given to petitioner. The order of appointment to the post of Constable Writer (Annexure I to the counter of the respondents) runs : "Office Order Shri John Vanlala Lushai son of Panl Thuam Lushai is hereby appointed as Constable Writer in the establishment of the Commandant 2nd Battalion, Special Nagaland Armed Police, Mokokchung in the scale of pay of Rs. 100-2.50-110 3-131-4 155/- plus all other allowances admissible under the rules from time to time with effect from 28.2.1966 (F. N.) The appointment is purely temporary and may be ter­minated at any time after giving 30 days notice from either side. The appointment carries with it the liability to serve in any part of Nagaland. Sd/- Major, Commandant 2nd BN SNAP Mokokchung, Nagaland (Tirlok Singh)" The appointment order shows that the petitioner was appo­inted as a Constable Writer by the Commandant and that he could be terminated at any time after giving a 30 day notice from either side. The expression "either side'' meaning either the Commandant or the petitioner. His services could be termi­nated after the 30 day notice was one of the conditions of his service (hereinafter referred to as the "first conditions of service"), But at the relevant time, the petitioner was temporarily holding the post of Sub-Inspector. The service book of the petitioner shows that he was appointed by the Inspector General of Police. The question is whether the "first conditions of service” would apply to the case. The scale of pay, the administrative control and cadre and establishment have been changed. Under the "first conditions of Service'', termination could be made by the Commandant but the Commandant cannot terminate the services of the petitioner while he was holding the post of the Sub-Inspector. The question is whether the "first conditions of service” would apply to the case. The scale of pay, the administrative control and cadre and establishment have been changed. Under the "first conditions of Service'', termination could be made by the Commandant but the Commandant cannot terminate the services of the petitioner while he was holding the post of the Sub-Inspector. The appointment of the petitioner to the post of Havildar and Sub-Inspector in effect terminated the petitioner from his services of temporary Constable Writer, and the appointment to the post of Havildar or Sub-Inspector was made on fresh conditions of services. There­fore, the "first conditions of service" has become obsolete as the petitioner accepted appointment to the post of Havildar and/ or Sub-Inspector. In this view of the matter, the "first condi­tions of services" will not be applicable to the present case and the conditions of service provided for the Sub-Inspector will be applicable. In view of the discussion above the 30-day notice for termination of the service of the petitioner is not required. 12. The next question which arises for consideration is what is the conditions of services provided for termination of the ser­vices of the petitioner at the relevant time. The learned counsel on both sides have submitted at the bar that at the relevant time there was no rule in Nagaland for termination of services of a temporary Government servant of Nagaland particularly for the post of Sub-Inspector. The petitioner also has not shown any rule relating to the termination of such a temporary Government servant. The Supreme Court in Dhingra vs. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 , has held : (para 27) "If such a sonant was appointed to a post, permanent or temporary, either on probation or on an officiating ba­sis, then the very transitory character of the employment implies that the employment was terminable a any time on reasonable notice given by the Government." Therefore, in the absence of such rules, the implied term of such appointment was that it was terminable at any time on reaso­nable notice given by the competent authority. The petitioner received the notice dated 5 8-74 on 8-8 74. The submission of the petitioner is that there was shortage of 3 days. Even assuming that there was shortage of 3 days, about which we are not giving any opinion, the notice cannot be said to be unreasonable. The petitioner received the notice dated 5 8-74 on 8-8 74. The submission of the petitioner is that there was shortage of 3 days. Even assuming that there was shortage of 3 days, about which we are not giving any opinion, the notice cannot be said to be unreasonable. There­fore, the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner must fail and the petition is liable to be dismissed. 13. In view of the above discussions and conclusions we do not feel it necessary to discuss the other decisions cited before us. For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed. No costs.