( 1 ) THIS is an unfortunate litigation between two real brothers over a two room quarter in Delhi. ( 2 ) THE Government of India, Department of Rehabilitation had allotted a two room quarter No. I-II/2 Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi to Shri Brij Lal Kapur, father of the petitioner and his elder brother respondent No. 3 Vidya Sagar Kapur. ( 3 ) SHRI Brij Lal Kapur died on 18th December, 1963. It appears that he was living in this quarter and the petitioner was also living with him. Respondent No. 3 was, however, living at Alwar. ( 4 ) THE petitioner then wrote to the Rehabilitation Authorities informing them about the death of the father. He also wrote that the name of respondent No. 3 be substituted in place of the father. Letters to this effect were written by the petitioner on 25th March, 1964 and 25th April, 1964. ( 5 ) NO action was taken by the Rehabilitation Authorities. On 17th August, 1964 the petitioner altered his position and now requested the Rehabilitation Authorities that his name should be substituted in place of his father and the name of V. S. Kapur. According to the petitioner the father was only a Benamidar and the entire payment had in fact been made by the petitioner himself. Subsequently on 25th January, 1965 the petitioner claimed to be the owner of the said quarter on the basis of a will dated 10th November, 1963. Litigation went on between the parties before the Rehabilitation Authorities as to whether the name of the petitioner could be substituted in place of his father as an allottee of the said quarter. It is not necessary to refer to all the orders which were passed in this connection. ( 6 ) ON 14th September, 1968 the Settlement Officer/managing Officer held that the will which was being propounded by the petitioner was suspicious document and as both the parties had refused to give their own statements or to produce evidence de novo the said officer was not in a position to give a judgment. It was further observed that intricate matters of law regarding the execution, genuineness, admissibility etc. of the will were involved and, therefore, it was a fit case for a thorough judicial probe by a civil Court. It was further observed that intricate matters of law regarding the execution, genuineness, admissibility etc. of the will were involved and, therefore, it was a fit case for a thorough judicial probe by a civil Court. Reference was accordingly made by the Settlement Officer/managing Officer to the District Judge, Delhi under proviso to S. 9 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954. The aforesaid order dated 14th September, 1968 of the Settlement Officer/managing Officer was challenged in appeal by the petitioner. On 17th January, 1970 a compromise was recorded between the parties in the Court of Shri Radha Krishna, Settlement Officer with delegated powers of Settlement Commissioner. The document recording the compromise, which was signed by both the brothers as well as Shri Radha Krishna on 17th January, 1970 reads as under : "present Shri D. P. Singh Kapur and Shri Vidya Sagar Kapur respondent No. 2. The appellant and the said respondent No. 2 are real brothers and have decided to compromise the dispute in respect of Qr. No. II/i/2, Lajpat Nagar, N. Delhi on the following basis : 1. That this house, in principle, is agreed to have devolved on the two brothers in equal shares as legal heirs of their late father, Shri Brij Lal Kapur. 2. Shri Vidya Sagar Kapur and his son will have no right of residence in the house which will be exclusively used for the residence of Shri D. P. Singh Kapur and his family. 3. That during the lifetime of Shri V. S. Kapur and his son Shri Jagdish Chander Kapur, Shri D. P. Singh or his descendants will not be entitled to alienate half share of the house (surrendered by Shri V. S. Kapur) to any outsider. 4. That Shri V. S. Kapur and his son Shri Jagdish Chander Kapur, will execute a formal deed of relinquishment, subject to the 418 above conditions, in favour of Shri D. P. Singh Kapur and have the same registered before the Sub-Registrar, New Delhi. 5. That in case Shri V. S. Kapur and his son Shri Jagdish Chander Kapur fails to execute the Relinquishment Deed before the Sub-Registrar, New Delhi, within three months from today, this Appeal shall be deemed to have been allowed in favour of Shri D. P. Singh and Shri V. S. Kapur will have no right or interest in the property. 6. 6. Since the right of residence in the property has been given exclusively to Shri D. P. Singh Kapur and his family, they shall be fully entitled to make any improvement in the house without any reference to Shri V. S. Kapur and get the necessary plans sanctioned from the Municipal Committee. R. O. A. C. Sd/- Radha Krishna 17-1-70 Sd/- V. S. Kapur Sd/- D. P. Singh Kapur 17-1-70 17-1-70 Sd/- Radha Krishna 17-1-70" ( 7 ) ACCORDING to the petitioner, respondent No. 3 did not act on this compromise. The matter was re-agitated before Shri Radha Krishna. On the record of the proceedings dated 18th April, 1970 it was stated that the parties had agreed to abide by the compromise dated 17th January, 1970 except that the date of execution of the relinquishment deed was now to be advanced and it was also subject to some additional terms and conditions regarding payment of arrears of ground rent. It is also mentioned in this document that when the proceedings were recorded, the parties backed out and wanted the case to be decided on merits. This document is signed by Shri Radha Krishna and Shri V. S. Kapur and it is also noted that the petitioner has refused to sign it. ( 8 ) THE matter then came up before Shri G. P. Jaggi, Settlement Officer (J) on 27th February, 1971. He recorded the statement of both the brothers. The petitioner made a statement to the effect that he would abide by the terms of the compromise recorded by Shri Radha Krishna on 17th January, 1970. Respondent No. 3, however, stated that he wanted the appeal which had been filed by the petitioner and in which the compromise was to be recorded to be decided on merits. He further stated that the compromise dated 17th January, 1970 was not binding on him. After the said statements were recorded, an order was passed by Shri G. P. Jaggi. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the compromise dated 17th January, 1970 was irrevocable and the appeal should be deemed to have been allowed on the failure of respondent No. 3 to execute the deed of relinquishment in the period of 3 months which had been prescribed for the purpose. Shri G. P. Jaggi, however, did not accept this contention. Shri G. P. Jaggi, however, did not accept this contention. He observed that from the proceedings dated 18th April, 1970 it was clear that the parties had backed out of the compromise and that no final order was passed by Shri Radha Krishna on 17th January, 1970. He further observed that V. S. Kapur, respondent No. 3, could not execute the deed unilaterally. ( 9 ) AGGRIEVED by this order, the petitioner filed an appeal to the Chief Settlement Commissioner. Shri Harish Chandra, Authorised Chief Settlement Commissioner by his order dated 29th January, 1972 did not accept the contention of the petitioner and came to the conclusion that no enforceable compromise had been arrived at. He observed that none of the parties had any defined and specific right in their favour which could be relinquished by means of relinquishment deed. He observed that there was no lawful compromise which was entered into and, therefore, it was not binding on anyone. ( 10 ) THE petitioner thereafter filed a revision petition before the Central Government which was dismissed by order dated 10th April, 1973. It was observed that the matter of the will had been placed in doubt and one of the parties had resiled from the compromise. ( 11 ) BEING aggrieved, the present petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution has been filed. The contention of the petitioner is that there was a valid and binding compromise between the parties and in terms of the said compromise the appeal which was pending before the Settlement Officer should be deemed to have been accepted as respondent No. 3 and his son had not executed a relinquishment deed. The petitioner has prayed for an appropriate writ for quashing the orders of the respondents and for a direction that his name be substituted in place of Shri Brij Lal Kapur. ( 12 ) MR. Iterora, the learned counsel for respondent No. 3, has stated that there was no valid compromise between the parties. He has given three reasons for it. According to the learned counsel there was no written document which was filed before the Settlement Officer, secondly, the statements of the brothers were not recorded on oath and thirdly the son of Vidya Sagar Kapur was not a party and, therefore, there could be no compromise which was binding on him. He has given three reasons for it. According to the learned counsel there was no written document which was filed before the Settlement Officer, secondly, the statements of the brothers were not recorded on oath and thirdly the son of Vidya Sagar Kapur was not a party and, therefore, there could be no compromise which was binding on him. ( 13 ) AS one reads the document dated 17th January, 1970 there can be no manner of doubt that the parties had willingly entered into a compromise. The terms of the compromise were set-out in that document. It is difficult to agree with the contention of the learned counsel for respondent No. 3 that in order that there should be a binding compromise it is necessary that a formal document in writing should be filed before the Settlement Officer or that the statements of the parties should be recorded on oath. There is no such requirement in law. ( 14 ) WHAT happened before the Settlement Officer is quite evident. Both the parties appeared and proceedings were recorded in which the settlement between the parties was spelt out. This was signed not only by the Presiding Officer but was also signed by both the parties in token of their consent. The appeal in which this compromise was arrived at was only between the petitioner and respondent No. 3. No other member of either of the party s family was a party to the appeal. Respondent No. 3 knowingly agreed that deed of relinquishment would be executed by him and his son. It is obvious that he must have been sure at that time that he would be able to persuade his son to sign such a deed. ( 15 ) THE terms of the compromise proceeded on the assumption that there was no will. That is evident from the fact that in paragraph 1 it was stated that in principle it was agreed that the property had devolved on the two brothers in equal shares. The compromise further provided that property will devolve on the petitioner exclusively but he will have no right to sell the same as long as respondent No. 3 and his son were alive. In order to effect complete ownership in favour of the petitioner, it was agreed that a formal deed of relinquishment would be executed. The compromise further provided that property will devolve on the petitioner exclusively but he will have no right to sell the same as long as respondent No. 3 and his son were alive. In order to effect complete ownership in favour of the petitioner, it was agreed that a formal deed of relinquishment would be executed. It was also provided that if such a deed is not executed then the appeal will be deemed to have been allowed. ( 16 ) AS already noted by me, the son of respondent No. 3 was not a party to the appeal. It is only V. S. Kapur who was a respondent. There is nothing which could have debarred him from agreeing to such a compromise, even if the compromise envisaged the execution of a deed of relinquishment by his son, in addition to himself. If V. S. Kapur was not able to procure the relinquishment deed from his son, it would only mean that the appeal which was pending before the Settlement Officer at that time would succeed. ( 17 ) AS noticed by the Central Government in its impugned order, one of the parties resiled therefrom. Now this could not be done. The grievance of the petitioner is that once a compromise has been arrived at, there is no scope for any of the parties to resile. The Central Government has not indicated as to how it could permit one of the parties to back out of a compromise. Even if no formal order was passed by the Settlement Officer, his signing of the proceedings clearly implies that the compromise was not only binding between the parties but if relinquishment deed was not executed, the appeal which was pending would be deemed to have been allowed in favour of the petitioner. The use of the words "shall be deemed to have been allowed in favour of Shri D. P. Singh. . . . . . . . . . . . " clearly mean that no further formal order was called for in the appeal. All that had to be done after the period had elapsed was that effect had to be given to the appeal having been deemed to have been allowed. . . . . . . . . . . . " clearly mean that no further formal order was called for in the appeal. All that had to be done after the period had elapsed was that effect had to be given to the appeal having been deemed to have been allowed. ( 18 ) IN my opinion, therefore, the compromise dated 17th January, 1970 was binding on the parties, no party could resile therefrom at will and the Rehabilitation Authorities were bound to give effect to the same. ( 19 ) FOR the aforesaid reasons the writ petition is allowed. Order dated 10th April, 1973 of the Central Government is quashed and it is declared that the appeal which had been filed by the petitioner, being Appeal No. SC (J)/appeal/147/69 entitled D. P. Singh Kapur v. Shri H. L. Goswami and Vidya Sagar Kapur, is deemed to have been allowed and the Managing Officer is directed to give effect to the same. The parties are left to bear their own costs.