Judgment :- 1. On a claim preferred by the Official Liquidator, a learned single judge of this Court passed a decree against the appellant for a sum of Rs. 13,600/- with interest at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from 16-2-1972. The claim is that the said amount is due from the appellant to a company in liquidation. The appellant's plea of discharge was found against by the learned Judge. Hence this appeal. 2. The appellant was a subscriber of a kuri conducted by M/s. Imperial Chit Funds (Pvt.) LTD. (hereinafter referred to as 'the company') and he prized the said kuri on 16-9-1971 for a bid amount of Rs. 7480/-. He executed Ext.B2 bond undertaking to pay off the future instalments without default. The company was ordered to be wound up on 18-4-1973. The Official Liquidator, on finding from the books of accounts of the company that the appellant defaulted the instalments from 7th to 40th, issued a demand notice on 3-1-1974 calling upon the appellant to pay the defaulted instalments. As the demand was not complied with, the Official Liquidator preferred the said claim petition on 30-3-1976 for the grant of a decree for Rs. 13,600/- with interest and costs. 3. The appellant, in his written statement dated 28-9-1978, contended that he had paid the entire amount due to the company (Rs. 14,350/-) on 3-4-1973 as per Ext.B1 receipt, and he got back Ext.B2 bond subsequently. He also contended that he received back the title deeds of his property given as security for the repayment of the liability due to the company. He produced Exts.B1 and B2 along with his written statement. 4. In the light of the above written statement the Official Liquidator filed a replication denying the receipt of the sum mentioned in the written statement of the appellant. According to the Official Liquidator, the cash book of the company does not show that an amount of Rs. 14,350/- had been received by the company either on 3-4-1973 or on any date prior or subsequent thereto. The Official Liquidator obtained a written explanation from the former Managing Director of the company and produced it along with the replication. According to the Official Liquidator, the cash book of the company does not show that an amount of Rs. 14,350/- had been received by the company either on 3-4-1973 or on any date prior or subsequent thereto. The Official Liquidator obtained a written explanation from the former Managing Director of the company and produced it along with the replication. On the strength of the said written explanation the Official Liquidator had contended in the replication that Ext.B1 receipt could have been created by the appellant in connivance with some of the officers and employees of the company. It is further contended that the appellant had wangled Ext.B2 bond from the company with the ulterior motive to forestall the company's claim. 5. The former Managing Director of the company was examined as P.W. 1. The appellant was examined as R.W.1. Ext.A1 is the written explanation which P.W.1 gave to the Official Liquidator. 6. The learned single judge repelled the contentions of the appellant and declined to accept the testimony of P.W.1, and held that the appellant failed to prove his plea of discharge. Consequently the claim was decreed as aforesaid. 7. The main argument raised before us by the learned counsel for the appellant is based on S.114 Illustration (i) of the Evidence Act, 1872. The impugned order shows that the said argument was urged before the learned single judge also, but that did not find favour with him. It is contended that as the appellant got back Ext.B2 bond the presumption is in favour of his plea of discharge, and the said Illustration supports such a presumption being drawn. According to Illustration (i) in S.114 of the Evidence Act, the Court may presume that "when a document creating an obligation is in the hands of the obligor, the obligation has been discharged". 8.The presumption is an inference, affirmative or disaffirmative of the existence of some fact drawn by a court by a process of probable reasoning from some matter of fact, judicially noticed or admitted by parties or established by legal evidence (Vide Field's Law of Evidence, 11th Edition page 3898 of Vol. IV). Presumption is only a rule of guidance in the evaluation of evidence in the case. The presumption envisaged in S.114 of the Evidence Act is only an optional presumption. IV). Presumption is only a rule of guidance in the evaluation of evidence in the case. The presumption envisaged in S.114 of the Evidence Act is only an optional presumption. The Act contains a number of other provisions dealing with presumptions, and in some of them the expression used is that "the court shall presume", while in S.114 of the Act the expression "the court may presume" is employed. The manifest intention of the legislature in using the term 'may' in S.114 is to leave it to the court either to draw the presumption or not to do so, depending on the facts and circumstances. In other words, it is only a permissive presumption and the court of fact cannot always be compelled to draw such a presumption. Even apart from the use of the word 'may' in S.114 there are other indications in the body of the section suggesting that it is only an optional presumption that is envisaged therein. The presumption that can be drawn is as to the existence of any fact "which the court thinks likely to have happened", that with due regard to three factors (i) common course of natural events, (ii) common course of human conduct and (iii) common course of private business, and they should be "in relation to the facts of the particular case." (Vide Emperor v. Sibnath Banerjee, A.I.R.1943 F.C. 75, S. Mammad v. K. Mammed, A.I.R. 1957 Ker.63 and Kandaswami v. Theagaraja, A.I.R. 1968 Mad. 203). 9. The learned single judge was disinclined to draw a presumption on the strength of Ext. B2 being produced by the appellant. According to the learned single judge, in the normal course of business a person entitled to get Rs. 13,600/- with interest at the rate of 12 per cent per annum from 16-2-1972 would not have accepted Rs. 14,350/- on 3-4-1973 as the full amount. We agree with the reasoning of the learned judge that in the normal course of business no creditor would acknowledge complete discharge of the liability on receiving a sum which is far less than what is actually due, unless there are other compelling reasons. In his evidence the appellant has put forward a new case that it was not he who paid the amount of Rs. 14,350/-to the company, but the payment was made by Sri. Balakrishnan Nair. In his evidence the appellant has put forward a new case that it was not he who paid the amount of Rs. 14,350/-to the company, but the payment was made by Sri. Balakrishnan Nair. The appellant as P.W.1 had stated that he paid a sum of Rs. 5350/- to Shri Balakrishnan Nair and executed a promissory note in favour of the latter's wife for a sum of Rs. 9000/-. R.W.1 believes that the sum of Rs. 14,350/-was paid by Shri Balakrishnan Nair to the company. He so believes since Shri Balakrishnan Nair returned Exts. B1 and B2 to him. For reasons best known to the appellant he suppressed the above case in his written statement in this case, wherein his only version is that "I have paid the entire amount due to the claimant i.e. Rs. 14,350/- on 3-4-1973 as per receipt No. 33C of the claimant company". The transaction with the said Shri Balakrishnan Nair was not even spelled out nor even the name of the said person mentioned in the written statement. The said Balakrishnan Nair is said to be no more. But there is no explanation for not examining Mrs. Balakrishnan Nair in whose favour the appellant claims to have executed a promissory note for Rs. 9000/-. 10. Ext. B2 is the bond executed by the appellant on 15-11-1971. It consists of seven stamped papers of different value and in each of the sheets there is an endorsement "closed on 3-4-1973". The evidence shows that the said endorsements were made by Shri Sivadatta Menon. Advocate. What is bis authority to make the said endorsements in Ext. B2 is not explained. The person who made the endorsements is not examined. We are not in a position to ascertain the circumstances under which the said Sivadatta Menon had occasion to make the endorsements in Ext. B2. The appellant wants us to act on Ext. B1 receipt which is admittedly signed by P.W.1. P.W.1, the former Managing Director, has stated in his evidence that he was in the habit of keeping signed receipt forms in the office of the company so as to enable the cashier to issue proper receipts to the subscribers against payments made and P.W 1 suspects that one such signed receipt form might have been clandestinely used for forging Ext. B1. We cannot reject what P.W.1 said as wholly untrue. Ext. B1. We cannot reject what P.W.1 said as wholly untrue. Ext. B1 contains writings made by somebody other than P.W.1 himself. It is said to be in the handwriting of the abovementioned Shri Sivadatta Menon. Ext. B1 does not bear the signature of the cashier although a column is set apart for it in the printed form. The receipt also contains columns for entering the number of the ledger folio and also for the signature of the ledger clerk. These columns also remain blank. As the person who prepared Ext. B1 receipt has not been examined and the other relevant columns in the receipt form remain blank, we are not inclined to treat Ext. B1 as a duly executed receipt acknowledging the payment of the amount mentioned therein. 11. Another circumstance which creates suspicion about the plea of discharge is that the alleged payment is made on 3-4-1973 which is only a fortnight prior to the filing of the application for winding up of the company. What compelled the appellant to raise funds necessary to make repayment of such a substantial sum when he could not pay earlier even smaller instalments when they became due? As R.W.1 he says that since the Managing Director of the company pressed him, he sold gold ornaments belonging to his wife to some traders who are not dealers in jewellery. On bis own admission the appellant's business was passing through very difficult financial strains during two or three years including 1973-74. If that was his financial position then the story that he raised funds by selling gold ornaments belonging to his wife solely for obliging P.W.1 who was pressing him to repay the kuri amount due to a company, does not appear to us to be true or even probable. 12. In view of the f totality of facts and circumstances and the evidence in this case, we don't think that this is a fit case to draw any presumption contemplated in Illustration (i) to S.114 of the Evidence Act. The appellant has failed to prove the plea of discharge. We are, therefore, in agreement with the findings of the learned single Judge. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal, with costs. Dismissed.