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1986 DIGILAW 120 (RAJ)

Banwari Lal v. Om Parkash

1986-02-07

MOHINI KAPUR

body1986
JUDGMENT 1. This is an appeal under section 39(1)(vi) of the Arbitration Act, 1940, against the order of Additional District Judge No. 2, Jaipur City, dated April 8, 1972, by which he refused to set aside the award of the arbitrator. On basis of the award passed a decree for Rs. 9,231.40 paisa with proportionate cost and interest pendente lite and further at rate of 6% per annum till the date of realization. 2. The facts of the case may be mentioned briefly only to the extent to which they are relevant for the purpose of this appeal. 3. The plaintiff respondent carried on a business in the name of M/s Jaipur Electric and General Industries and on November 1, 1962, the defendant appellant Banwari Lal and defendant respondent Ramesh Kumar agreed to form a partnership along with the plaintiff to carry on the aforesaid business in the same name. The terms and conditions of the partnership were reduced to writing in deed dated November 2, 1962. However, this partnership business did not last long and after some differences arose between the parties, they agreed to part with each other. The plaintiff agreed to retire from the partnership and after settling the accounts, it was agreed between the parties that a sum of Rs. 10,098.50 was payable to the plaintiff. In lieu of this agreed amount, the defendants issued a crossed cheque, in favour of the plaintiff on December 31, 1962. A deed of retirement was executed by the parties. However, when the cheque was presented to the Bank for encashment, the same was refused on the instructions of the drawer. The plaintiff then brought a suit for the recovery of this amount along with interest. The defendant moved the Court, with an application under Section 34 of the Indian Arbitration Act for referring the dispute to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the partnership deed and for the stay of the suit. However, it was held by the trial Court on January 31, 1964, when the partnership deed had been superseded by the dissolution deed and in the dissolution deed, there was no clause to refer the dispute to the arbitration so the application was dismissed thereafter, the defendant filed a written statement and also admitted that they issued a cheque for Rs. 10,098.50 but they justified the stopping of the payment of the same on the ground that some other amounts were to be recovered from the plaintiff. According to the defendant, a sum of Rs. 9,487/- was to be transferred to the defendants, in accordance with the partnership agreement and as this amount was not transferred so they had withheld the payment of cheque. Another adjustment sought by the defendants was of Rs. 875/- said to be paid at the instance of the plaintiff to discharge the liability of the old concern. After this counter claim was made in the written statement, the plaintiff moved an application that the dispute regarding amount, claimed by the defendant in his written statement arose out of the partnership agreement and therefore, this matter may be referred to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the partnership deed. This application was accepted and the dispute was referred to Shri Avadh Bihari Lal Mathur, Advocate as Arbitrator to consider the point in dispute. The Arbitrator filed his award on September 15, 1970. Except for a sum of Rs. 867/- which the defendant wanted to adjust, the other items of Rs. 2,370/- and Rs. 7,000/- were not accepted. According to the Arbitrator, this amount could have been realised by the defendants from the concerned firms and they were not entitled to any adjustment of Rs. 10,098/- payable to the plaintiff. 4. Objections were invited against this award. The defendants filed objections on December 7, 1970. The learned Additional District Judge No. 2, Jaipur City, heard the objections and found no force in them. The main grounds raised by the defendants were that they could not receive the sum of Rs. 7,000/- from M/s Indian Iron & Steel Company Ltd., Calcutta and Rs. 2,370/- from the Indian Steel and Wire Products Ltd., Tatanagar, as the concerns could not pay the amount to the defendants. As this plea was not accepted by the Arbitrator, this was said to be a legal misconduct. 7,000/- from M/s Indian Iron & Steel Company Ltd., Calcutta and Rs. 2,370/- from the Indian Steel and Wire Products Ltd., Tatanagar, as the concerns could not pay the amount to the defendants. As this plea was not accepted by the Arbitrator, this was said to be a legal misconduct. Learned District Judge held that the reference of the dispute to the arbitrator was proper and he had arrived at a conclusion after hearing the parties and his award could not be said to be bad on the ground of legal misconduct, as the Court cannot sit in appeal over the award given by the arbitrator, there was no reason to set aside the award, the same was confirmed and a decree was passed as aforesaid. 5. The learned counsel for the appellant has raised two contentions before me. The first contention is that according to clause 16 of the partnership deed, dated November 2, 1962, all disputes and questions whatsoever, relating to the partnership wee to be referred to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the Arbitration Act. 6. It is argued that the plaintiff respondent ought to have referred the dispute to arbitration and not instituted a suit for the recovery of any amount, which was in dispute based on the partnership agreement. In this connection, reliance has been placed on Erach F.D. Mehta v. Minoo F.D. Mehta, 1970(2) SCC 724 , in which it was held that whether the arbitration clause over a dispute as to whether the parties has agreed that the partnership be dissolved then the dispute whether the partnership was dissolved by mutual agreement was clearly a dispute between the parties touching the partnership agreement. 7. In the present case, it may be mentioned that the defendant did not prefer an appeal against the earlier order of the Additional District Judge, dated January 31, 1964, by which the application of the defendant for referring the dispute to arbitration was refused. In this case the subsequent proceedings show that the defendant made a counter claim and the dispute was found to be arising out of the partnership agreement and according to the arbitration clause, in the partnership agreement, it could be referred to arbitration, then this procedure was adopted and the arbitrator was appointed. In this case the subsequent proceedings show that the defendant made a counter claim and the dispute was found to be arising out of the partnership agreement and according to the arbitration clause, in the partnership agreement, it could be referred to arbitration, then this procedure was adopted and the arbitrator was appointed. There remains force in the contention of the appellant that the refusal of the Court to refer the original dispute to arbitration in any way affects the merits of the matter in dispute. The contention of the appellant does not relate to setting aside award. 8. The next contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the Court has awarded interest pendente lite and future, at rate of 6% p.a. on Rs. 9231.40, when under Section 29 of the Indian Arbitration Act, interest could be awarded only from the date of decree. According to Section 29 of the Indian Arbitration Act, where and in so far as an award is for the payment of money the Court may, in the decree, order interest, from the date of the decree at such rates as the Court deems reasonable, to be paid on the principal sum as adjudged by the award confirmed by the decree. According to this provision interest can be awarded only from the date of decree. 9. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the plaintiff respondent has contended that the Court has decreed the suit which was instituted before it and when a money suit is decreed, the Court can award pendente like interest, even if the decree is based on an award of the arbitration. 10. In the present case, the Court has passed the decree on basis of the award of the arbitration and as such the provision as regards the allowing of interest on the principal sum found due, shall be the one provided in the Arbitration Act and not the one provided in the Civil Procedure Code. When Section 29 of the Arbitration Act restricts the interest to be allowed only from the date of decree then in such circumstances, the interest allowed prior to the date of decree cannot be said to be proper. In S.N. Srikantia and Co. v. Union of India and Another, AIR 1967 Bombay 347 , the same view has been taken. I am also in respectful agreement with this view. In S.N. Srikantia and Co. v. Union of India and Another, AIR 1967 Bombay 347 , the same view has been taken. I am also in respectful agreement with this view. When a decree is passed on basis of the award of an arbitrator, it no longer remains a decree in a suit instituted by the plaintiff so as to take it out from the implications of Section 29 of the Arbitration Act. The interest can be allowed only from the date of the decree but as the rate of interest has been left to the discretion of Court, which it deems it reasonable, then in the present case, I would consider it proper to allow interest at rate of 9% p.m. from the date of decree. 11. I am informed by the learned counsel for the parties that a sum of Rs. 7,000/-, and 9,370/-, which the defendant appellant has to receive from two different firms of Calcutta and Tatanagar, has already been received by the Court for payment to the person entitled to receive the same. Thus the defendant appellant cannot be said to be having any genuine grievance about the matter in dispute. 12. In view of my above findings this appeal deserves to be accepted to a very limited extent about interest, which is awarded from the date of the decree of the Court instead of the date of institution of the suit. The rate at which the interest shall be paid, shall be at 9% per annum instead of 6% per annum. 13. Accordingly, the appeal is partly allowed.Appeal partly allowed. *******