Judgment :- 1. The appellant filed an application before the Forest Tribunal for a declaration that an extent of 102.78 acres of land is not a vested forest within the purview of the Kerala Private Forests (Vesting and Assignment) Act, 1971 (for short'the Act'). The application was dismissed by the Forest Tribunal, except in regard to an extent of 2 acres which was found to be not a private forest. Hence this appeal. 2. The material averments in the application are as follows: He purchased the land described therein as per Ext.Al assignment deed dated 16-1-1972 and the said land is part of an extensive area planted with rubber for which a licence was issued by the Rubber Board in 1961 in favour of the predecessors-in-title of the appellant. The whole area was enjoyed as a full grown rubber estate by name "Mahe Malappuram Estate", until it was ravaged by successive out-breaks of wild fire during the period immediately prior to Ext.Al assignment. The appellant applied to the Rubber Board and obtained a licence for replanting rubber in this area and on the strength of the said licence planting operations were again made in the land. But due to continued labour unrest in the Estate it was not possible for the appellant to maintain the rubber plantation efficiently. Due to the lack of attention and maintenance of the rubber plants for a long period, wild growths or shrubs spread over the area and consequently major part of the rubber plantation became extinct. However a few rubber trees remain even now in the property, though in a scattered manner. When the labour disputes were settled the appellant made arrangements to replant the whole area with rubber. But at this juncture the Forest Officials obstructed the appellant from carrying on the said work on the plea that the area forms part of vested forest. As his requests to the Forest Officials to desist from obstructing him did not yield favourable results, he filed the application under S.8 of the Act for the declaration as aforesaid. 3. But at this juncture the Forest Officials obstructed the appellant from carrying on the said work on the plea that the area forms part of vested forest. As his requests to the Forest Officials to desist from obstructing him did not yield favourable results, he filed the application under S.8 of the Act for the declaration as aforesaid. 3. In the counter statement-filed by the Divisional Forest Officer on behalf of the State of Kerala and the Custodian of Vested Forests the following contentions, inter alia, are raised: The property described in the application was a portion of the private forest in Arakkurissi village of Mannarghat taluk, falling within the purview of the repealed Madras Preservation of Private Forests Act, 1949 (for short 'the M.P.P.F. Act'), and on the coming into force of the Act of 1971 the property has vested in the Government. The rubber trees grown in the area before 10-5-1971 were burned and practically got destroyed and the rubber plants now seen in the area are those planted after 10-5-1971. Since the area has vested in the Government on the said date, Ext.Al assignment deed of 1972 has no legal validity. 4. The application was dismissed on 7-9-1977 against which the appellant had preferred M.F.A. No. 210 of 1977 in this Court and the case was remanded to the Forest Tribunal as per judgment of this Court dated 13-6-1979, setting aside the earlier order of the Forest Tribunal. The parties were allowed to adduce further evidence and the Forest Tribunal was directed to dispose of the application afresh. After remand both sides let in further evidence. As per the impugned order the Forest Tribunal held that since there were only few rubber trees "here and there" in the property on 10-5-1971 the land cannot be treated as principally used for cultivation of rubber as on the appointed date. Hence it was found that the disputed area has vested in the Government being a private forest within the purview of the Act (except in regard to 2 acres). Accordingly the Forest Tribunal passed the impugned order. 5. Hence it was found that the disputed area has vested in the Government being a private forest within the purview of the Act (except in regard to 2 acres). Accordingly the Forest Tribunal passed the impugned order. 5. The recitals in Ext.Al assignment deed show that as per the licence dated 21-3-1961 granted by the Rubber Board rubber had been planted in an area or of 300 acres including the disputed land, that rubber trees were destroyed by fire which broke out before and after 1966, that no proper maintenance could be done for the upkeep of the estate and that rubber trees are standing only here and there in the property at the time of the assignment. Though the said document was executed only a few months after 10-5-1971 the Forest Tribunal held that the recitals therein about the condition of the rubber plantation can be accepted as true. Hence it was found by the Forest Tribunal that the property had been planted with rubber in 1961 and that several rubber trees were destroyed by fire before and after 1966. The Tribunal took note of the fact that even R.W.I, the only witness examined on behalf of the respondents had not denied the above facts, but on the other hand R.W.1 admitted that he had heard about the planting of rubber in this area and about their destruction by fire. Ext. A13 is an application for registration of a rubber estate filed by the appellant before the Rubber Board on 5-3-1973 for planting rubber in an area of 31.57 hectares. The Rubber Board made an endorsement in Ext.A13 treating the application as registered in the office of the Rubber Board on 25-5-1973. The Forest Tribunal also noted from Ext.A13 that the appellant had planted rubber in the said portion soon after the assignment in 1972. But the Forest Tribunal found it difficult to accede to the appellant's claim because there were only "very few rubber trees in the property on 10-5-1971" and as such the Tribunal could not hold that the land was used principally for the cultivation of rubber as on 10-5-1971. 6. "Private forest" is defined in S.2(f) of the Act. Lands excluded from the ambit of the said definition include the following class of land as contained in clause (B) to S.2(f) (1) (i) of the Act. 6. "Private forest" is defined in S.2(f) of the Act. Lands excluded from the ambit of the said definition include the following class of land as contained in clause (B) to S.2(f) (1) (i) of the Act. "Lands which are used principally for the cultivation of tea, coffee, cocoa, rubber, cardamom or cinnamon and lands used for any purpose ancillary to the cultivation of such crops or for the preparation of the same for the market." Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the disputed land was principally used for the cultivation of rubber despite the fact that only few rubber trees remained in the property on 10-5-1971. His contention is that if the land was converted into a rubber plantation long prior to the appointed date, it does not cease to be rubber plantation merely because the rubber trees went out of existence during some period either due to felling or due to destruction of the trees by other causes and replantation is made within a reasonable period. 7. It is not unusual that old or non-yielding or less yielding rubber trees are removed from a particular area preparatory to replanting the area with rubber. Similarly when rubber trees are destroyed due to natural calamities, or otherwise, the owner of the plantation may resort to replantation of the area with rubber. In such instances, the intermediate period between the removal of rubber trees and actual replantation may vary in different cases depending upon a variety of factors and circumstances. It is improper and inadvisable to conclude definitely that the lands involved in such instances cease to be rubber plantations as soon as the rubber trees cease to exist therein. There can be no doubt that if the destruction or removal of rubber trees in a particular area takes place only after 10-5-1971 no vesting of that area could have taken place, as per S.3 (1) of the Act. On the same principle it can be said that if rubber trees had been destroyed prior to the said date the affected land would not go out of the purview of the exclusion clause contained in S.2 (f) (1) (i) (B) of the Act. If measures are in contemplation to replant the area with rubber, the intermediate stage, when the land does not contain rubber plants, is not decisive in determining the nature of the use of the land. If measures are in contemplation to replant the area with rubber, the intermediate stage, when the land does not contain rubber plants, is not decisive in determining the nature of the use of the land. Merely because the duration of that intermediate stage is prolonged, no hard and fast inference shall be drawn that the idea of replantation of the land did not exist. 8. A situation almost similar to the above can be envisaged under S.87 of the Kerala Land Reforms Act, 1963 (for short 'the K.L.R. Act'). As per that section, a person who acquires land after the date notified under S.83 of the K.L.R. Act and consequently the total extent of land owned or held by such person exceeds the ceiling area, shall surrender such excess land to the authority prescribed. Explanation II to S.87 provides that "where, after the date notified under S.83, any class of land specified in Schedule II has been converted into any other class of land specified in that Schedule or any land exempt under S.81 is converted into any class of land not so exempt and in consequence thereof the total extent of land owned or held by a person exceeds the ceiling area, so much extent of land as is in excess of the ceiling area, shall be deemed to be land acquired after the said date." The question came up for consideration in C.R.P. No. 2575 of 1976 of this Court whether a land ceased to be rubber plantation in a case where planting process had admittedly begun before 1-1-1970 and was continued thereafter also, though the exact interval between clear-felling and planting was not known. M. P. Menon, J. who delivered judgment in the case held that "if as a matter of fact such extensive areas were planted with rubber soon after 1-1-1970 but as part and parcel of an activity which had commenced earlier, it will be defeating the aim of the K.L.R. Act to permit the plantations being taken over and destroyed in the process of distribution." In Aleykutty John v. Taluk Land Board (1981 KLT 731) one of us (Bhat, J.) had occasion to consider a similar question. It has been observed in that judgment as follows: "If clearfelling was over and the land ceased to be private forest prior to 1-4-1964 it may have to be held that the exemption under S 81 (1) (d) is not available. Even then the intention with which the clear-felling was done will have a bearing on the decision of such question. Clear-felling, under all circumstances will not make the land cease to be private forest. If felling was done with the intention of exploiting the forest wealth and to leave it for degeneration the land will not cease to be private forest. If clear-felling was done with the intention of making the land, nilam or garden or plantation the land cannot be treated as continuing to be private forest" Again, in another case where rubber trees were slaughter tapped after 1-1-1970 as those trees became practically non-yielding but the owner of the land had an idea to replant, though replantation was not done till 1978, the question came up whether the land had been converted from one exempted category to a non-exempted category. The case was considered by Bhat J. in the decision reported in Varghese v. Taluk Land Board, (1982 K.L.T. 72). The relevant observations in the said decision are the following: "The act of cutting down old rubber trees by itself cannot lead to the inference that the land is converted into other dry land. It may be so in certain circumstances. It may not be so in other circumstances. If there is a scheme for replantation, if the land has been ear-marked for the purpose or replanting and if the act of cutting rubber trees is in pursuance of the scheme and part of an integrated activity towards such an end, from the mere fact that there has been delay in carrying out the work of replanting, it cannot be said that the land has been converted from plantation into other dry land. The act of cutting rubber trees may be part of an act of such conversion or it may be part of the scheme of replanting. Whether it is one or the other depends upon the intention, earmarking, scheme and other attendant circumstances." The principles stated in the above decisions are consistent with what we have stated earlier. The observation quoted above therefore supports the view taken by us. 9. Whether it is one or the other depends upon the intention, earmarking, scheme and other attendant circumstances." The principles stated in the above decisions are consistent with what we have stated earlier. The observation quoted above therefore supports the view taken by us. 9. The Forest Tribunal has not considered the case in the above perspective. We consider that in the interest of justice it is only proper to afford the appellant an opportunity to adduce further evidence. In case the appellant adduces any further evidence it is open to the respondents also to place further evidence, if they so wish. We, therefore, allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order. The case is remanded to the Forest Tribunal for fresh disposal in the light of the observations and directions made above. There will be no order as to costs. The case shall be called by the Forest Tribunal on 28-4-1986. Allowed.