K. L. SHRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition under the Criminal P. C. 1973 (for short 'the Code') is directed against the order dt. 14-10-1985 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Jhabua in Sessions Trial No. 321 of 1985 whereby in exercise of powers under S. 319 of the Code he has ordered that the applicant and another be also proceeded against for the offences in question. ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to the application are these. On a prosecution launched by the police against them, the Judicial Magistrate first class, Thandla found that the accused Sammun and Joyala had committed offences one of which is exclusively triable by the Court of Session. The case was accordingly ' committed under S. 209 of the Code and the sessions trial referred to above came to be registered. ( 3 ) IN the Sessions Court an application was filed on behalf of the State that the applicant Mahendra Kumar Tiwari and one Moise had also committed the offences under Ss. 366 and 493, IPC. ( 4 ) ON a perusal of the statement of the prosecutrix recorded by the police, the learned Additional Sessions Judge in exercise of powers under S. 319 of the Code holding that Mahendra and Moise were equally liable as the other two accused, ordered that they too be proceeded against as accused persons. ( 5 ) THE applicant Mahendra Kumar has come up in revision against that order. ( 6 ) THE point for consideration is whether the impugned order deserves to be set aside. ( 7 ) THE relevant provisions embodied in sub-secs. (1) and (4) of S. 319 of the Code are in these words : - section 319 : Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence :- (1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed. (2 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . (3 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . (4) Where the court proceeds against any person under sub-sec. (2 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . (3 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . (4) Where the court proceeds against any person under sub-sec. (1) then - (a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and the Witnesses re-heard : (b) subject to the provisions of cl. (a) the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced. ( 8 ) THE learned trial court relying on the decision in Dwarika Prasad v. State of Bihar, 1979 Cri LJ 618 held that the fact that the case was not committed to the Court of Session in relation to the applicant and Moise is no bar to the exercise of power under Section 319 of the Code. In the aforesaid decision the head note reads as under : - section 319 (1) empowers a Court which is inquiring or trying an offence to summon for trial along with other accused persons if it appears from the evidence that a person who is not an accused has committed an offence. Therefore, the provisions of S. 193 do not stand in the way of Sessions Judge exercising powers under S. 319 (1 ). The word 'court' in earlier part of S. 319 indicates a trial Court whereas in sub-sec. (4) (b) the word 'court' has been qualified with the words 'took cognizance'. Undoubtedly, the use of word 'court' in S. 319 apart from sub-sec. (4) (b) means a Court trying an offence irrespective of the fact that it is a Sessions Court or the Court of a Magistrate and the word 'court' in sub-section (4) (b) means a Magistrate's Court that took cognizance. The only interpretation is this that once a person is summoned to face a trial under S. 319 he will be treated to be an accused from the very inception i. e. the stage of cognizance. The word 'court' in sub-sec. The only interpretation is this that once a person is summoned to face a trial under S. 319 he will be treated to be an accused from the very inception i. e. the stage of cognizance. The word 'court' in sub-sec. (4) (b) of S. 319 cannot possibly have the same meaning as in the rest of the sections because a Court taking cognizance is not always a trial court even if a case is being tried by a Magistrate.-In the Supreme Court decision in Sri Mahant Amar Nath's case, AIR 1983 SC 288 order passed by the Sessions Judge under S. 319 of the Code after recording of evidence, it was held was not illegal. Learned counsel for the applicant relying on the decision in Gunaram Tanti v. State of Assam, 1983 Cri LJ 289 (Gauh) urges that the power under S. 319 of the Code to proceed against a person other than accused cannot be exercised placing reliance on statements recorded under S. 161 of the Code. According to him, the word 'evidence' as used in S. 319 read along with other provisions of the section means statements of witnesses as recorded by the court. ( 9 ) IN the decision in Sukarnaram v. State of Rajasthan, 1982 Cri LJ 2341 it has been held that statements recorded under Ss. 161, 164 and 202 of the Code cannot be treated as evidence for the limited purpose of S. 319 of the Code. ( 10 ) IT is urged that perusal of S. 319 (4) (a) of the Code shows that proceedings in respect of the person against whom an order has been passed under sub-sec. (1) of this section shall be commenced afresh and the witnesses re-heard. This is indicative of the legislative intent that the power under sub-sec. (1) is to be exercised only after the witnesses have been heard, i. e. evidence has been led in the Court. ( 11 ) IN the decision in, Indu Bhushan Kumar's case 1983 Cri LJ NOC 128 (Pat) it has been pointed out that in order to safeguard risk of false implication hard test of 'evidence' adduced in the Court has been provided, Notes 98 and 99 are also pertinent. ( 12 ) IT may be pointed out that under S. 209 of the Code what is committed is the case and not the accused persons. ( 12 ) IT may be pointed out that under S. 209 of the Code what is committed is the case and not the accused persons. In this connection the decision in Joginder Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1979 SC 339 is pertinent. In para. 9 thereof it has been stated that under S. 319 of the Code persons against whom evidence showing their involvement in the offence comes before the criminal Court, are included in the expression, 'any person not being the accused' occurring in the section. ( 13 ) THE question is whether S. 319 of the Code is the sole repository of the power. As pointed out in para. 15 of the decision in Aravindakishan v. State of Kerala, 1985 Cri LJ 1389 with reference to a Supreme Court decision, there is well defined and well demarcated function in the field of crime detection and subsequent adjudication between the police and the Magistrate. In this connection S. 319 of the Code has also been referred to. ( 14 ) ONCE a Court of competent jurisdiction be it a Magistrate or a Court of Session takes cognizance of the offence the general power to summon additional accused is part and parcel of taking cognizance. Commitment of the case under S. 209 of the Code lifts the bar under S. 193, Ibid. ( 15 ) IT is the duty of the Court to do justice by punishing the real culprit. Where the investigating agency for any reason does not array one of the real culprits as an accused, is the Court rendered powerless in the matter? The answer can only be in an emphatic 'no'. Once this power in the Court is recognized, there is no logic behind limiting it to the late stage of evidence contemplated in S. 319 of the Code which is located in the chapter of general provisions. It may be pointed out here that the power to summon material witness can be exercised by the Court at any stage of inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the Code so that justice is done. It may be pointed out here that the power to summon material witness can be exercised by the Court at any stage of inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the Code so that justice is done. On a careful consideration, I am of the view that the enabling S. 319 of the Code brought on the Statute Book to remedy the defects of S. 351 of the repealed Code is not the sole repository of the power coupled with duty to summon additional accused and operates, as is clear from the language employed therein at the stage when the inquiry or trial has commenced. The power when exercised at such a late stage, the section rightly provides that the witnesses already examined have to be re-heard so as to ensure a fair trial. The procedure under S. 319 of the Code is only a hand-maid of justice and the section cannot be interpreted as a debarring provision curtailing the general power of the Court to summon additional accused at the pre-inquiry or pre-trial stage. Properly speaking, it is at the stage of framing of charge that the Court of Session applies its mind to the material placed before it and can certainly exercise its power to summon additional accused if the material already on record warrants this course being adopted. ( 16 ) IN the Supreme Court decision in Hareram Satpathy case, 1978 Cri LJ 1687, no fresh evidence was at all recorded and the Magistrate had summoned the additional accused only on the basis of statements made under S. 151 of the Code. Reversing the High Court's view, the Supreme Court upheld the Magistrate's action observing that the Magistrate did not exceed the power vested in him under S. 19-O of the Code. This decision and some others have been relied upon in the Full Bench decision in S. K. Latfur Rahman v. State, 1985 Cri LJ 1238 (Pat) which makes an illuminating reading on the question in controversy. The decision in Anupam Chakraborrthy's case, 1984 Cri LJ 733 (Gauh) is also pertinent. This decision and some others have been relied upon in the Full Bench decision in S. K. Latfur Rahman v. State, 1985 Cri LJ 1238 (Pat) which makes an illuminating reading on the question in controversy. The decision in Anupam Chakraborrthy's case, 1984 Cri LJ 733 (Gauh) is also pertinent. ( 17 ) ON a careful consideration of the material on record, I am of the view that apart from S. 319 of the Code, the Court has the power to summon additional accused and the impugned order is not liable to be interfered with in exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction under S. 401 or 482, Ibid. ( 18 ) IN the result, the revision petition fails and is hereby dismissed. The parties are directed to appear before the trial Court on 2-5-1986. Petition dismissed. .