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Kerala High Court · body

1986 DIGILAW 123 (KER)

SULAIMAN v. RAMACHANDRAN

1986-03-26

THOMAS

body1986
Judgment :- 1. In a suit on a promissory note, the defendant denied the execution of the promissory note, and disowned the signature therein. He filed an application in the trial court for sending the promissory note to a handwriting expert along with some other documents containing his admitted signatures, for examination by the expert. The court below rejected the application and hence the defendant has come up in revision. 2. The learned Sub Judge while dismissing the application has relied on the observations of Ramamurti, J. in Narasimhan v. Narayana Chettiar (1968) (ii) M.L.J. 48) deprecating the practice of sending original documents, in the custody of the court, to handwriting experts. Those observations are as follows: "The practice of sending original documents in the custody of Court to handwriting experts is a highly objectional and a very bad procedure. Under no circumstances should a Court permit or allow the documents to go out of its custody, as such an evil practice is attendant with various risks. The proper procedure in such cases would be only to permit the handwriting expert to inspect the document in the Court premises itself in the presence of some responsible officer of the Court and also if necessary permit the expert to have photographic copies of documents in the presence of a responsible officer of the Court. Any lapse in taking the necessary safeguards in this direction may result in miscarriage of justice, besides creating complications." 3. It appear that the learned Sub Judge declined to send the documents, to a handwriting expert, mainly on account of the observations of Ramamurti J. quoted above. In a later decision another single judge of the Madras High Court in Nagarathinammal v. Rangaswamy Chettiar (88 Law Weekly 71) distinguished the earlier decision and held that the observations in Narasimhan's case (1968 (ii) M.L.J. 48) have to be confined to the facts of that case only. According to Raghavan, J, who passed the said judgment "the said observations of (Ramamurti, J.) in my opinion, have to be confined to the facts which the learned judge was dealing with, viz., of sending original documents to a private expert, and the said observations cannot be applied where the request of a party is to send original documents to a Government expert for his opinion, regarding genuineness, age of the writing etc. The grave risks contemplated in sending such original documents outside court may not be present in such cases." But the reasoning on which Narasimhan's case was distinguished by Raghavan, J. was not approved by Sethuraman, J. in Doraiswamy v. Paravammal (A.I.R.1976 Mad. 66). The stand taken in the latter decision is substantially in concurrence with the observations of Ramamurthi, J. quoted above. What is clear from the above three different decisions of the Madras High Court, is that the practice of sending documents to private handwriting expert is by and large disfavoured by the Madras High Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner herein contended that the said stand of the Madras High Court may not be followed as it is not in consonance with the accepted practice here and it would deprive a litigant who bona fide denies the genuineness of a document, of the opportunity to get expert opinion on disputed signatures. 4. S.45 of the Evidence Act allows a court to consider the opinion of an expert in the process of identification of the disputed handwriting or signature. Of course there is no warrant that the court is bound to accept such an opinion. But if the court is satisfied that the opinion, after a careful consideration of it, is dependable, there is no legal inhibition in acting on that opinion. While examining the opinion of an expert the Court is free to take into consideration all the other relevant evidence. In Murali Lal v. State of M.P. (A.I.R.1980 S. C. 531) the Supreme Court has observed thus: "We are firmly of the opinion that there is no rule of law, nor any rule of prudence which has crystallised into a rule of law, that opinion-evidence of a handwriting expert must never be acted upon, unless substantially corroborated. But, having due regard to the imperfect nature of the science of identification of handwriting, the approach, as we indicated earlier, should be one of caution Reasons for the opinion must be carefully probed and examined. All other relevant evidence must be considered. In appropriate cases, corroboration may be sought. In cases where the reasons for the opinion are convincing and there is no reliable evidence throwing a doubt the uncorroborated testimony of an handwriting expert may be accepted. All other relevant evidence must be considered. In appropriate cases, corroboration may be sought. In cases where the reasons for the opinion are convincing and there is no reliable evidence throwing a doubt the uncorroborated testimony of an handwriting expert may be accepted. There cannot be any inflexible rule on a matter which, in the ultimate analysis, is no more than a question of testimonial weight. We have said so much because this is an argument frequently met with in subordinate courts and sentences torn out of context from the judgments of this court are often flaunted." If a party seeks to secure the opinion of an expert at his own expense, in a case where the signature and handwriting are disputed, it would not be proper to deny him that opportunity. A bare possibility of the document being tampered with shall not be used as the sole ground to reject a prayer for forwarding the document for examination by the expert. It does not mean that, if the court has reasons to suspect a particular person named as an expert or if the court has reasons to doubt his reputation, the court has no power to withhold the sending of the document to that person In many instances examination of the questioned documents may have to be performed in the laboratory of the expert or in the places provided with the equipments to carry out scientific examination of such documents. An expert will have to be directed in some cases to conduct scientific examination of material objects: e. g. in prosecution for the offence of counterfeiting of currency notes, the questioned currency notes are examined by experts in specially equipped places. Chemical examinations are performed invariably in chemical or forensic laboratories . It may not be feasible for the expert to transmit all his equipments to the court room or the court's office to conduct such examinations. It would be impractical in many cases, to direct him to do so. A bare possibility of the materials being tampered with or lost is not a sufficient reason to deprive a party of his right to place expert opinion about such materials. Such deprivation of his right may lead to miscarriage of justice. What the court must do is to take or direct to take adequate and necessary safeguards to prevent such mischiefs to happen. Such deprivation of his right may lead to miscarriage of justice. What the court must do is to take or direct to take adequate and necessary safeguards to prevent such mischiefs to happen. Law does not insist that examination of documents should be done only by a government expert, though it may be prudent to prefer an expert attached to the Government. But sometimes the government expert may not be available and sometimes the government laboratories are overloaded or overbooked with requisitions for expert opinions. In such cases the opinion of the government expert cannot be obtained without inordinate delay even if he is able to send up his opinion. There is nothing in law which prevents the court from choosing a reputed handwriting expert to do the work and send up his opinion on a questioned document. 4. In Balaram v. Achutanada (A.I.R.1975 Orissa 125) a party made an application to send some documents to two experts for examination and opinion. The trail court rejected the application, relying on the observations of Ramamurti, J. (in Narasimhan's case cited supra). But the Orissa High Court reversed that order. Misra, C. J. has stated in the said decision as follows: "So far this State is concerned (State of Orissa) the usual practice is to send the documents to the experts and obtain their opinion. If it becomes necessary to examine the expert, any of the parties is at liberty to do so. Heavy expenses are to be incurred by the parties at the time when the expert is examined as a witness. In some cases the expert may not be examined at all. There are ample instances when a party does not choose to cross-examine the expert. It would therefore not be proper to lay down a rule saying that in no circumstances the documents can be sent to the experts and the experts must be summoned always to examine the documents in the Court premises. I am therefore not inclined to accept the aforesaid observations (of Ramamurti. J ) as laying down the correct rule though it is open to the Courts in particular cases to direct that the examination would be held in the first instance within the Court premises." 5. I am therefore not inclined to accept the aforesaid observations (of Ramamurti. J ) as laying down the correct rule though it is open to the Courts in particular cases to direct that the examination would be held in the first instance within the Court premises." 5. I am in respectful agreement with the aforesaid reasoning made by Misra, C.J. The application to send the disputed document in this case, to an expert for examination should not have been rejected outright. The court can pass an order to send the document to the Director of the Government Forensic Laboratory, Trivandrum. If that course is found to be not feasible due to any practical difficulty, the court can direct any other expert to do that work, and the choice of the expert can be made by the court. Whatever safeguards which the court thinks necessary to impose to prevent the tampering with or loss of the document, could be imposed. For the foregoing reasons I allow this C.R.P. and set aside the impugned order. I direct the court below to pass appropriate orders in the light of the observations made above. No costs.