Udhav Rao Saheb Magar v. Laxmibai w/o. Udhav Magar & another
1986-03-18
M.S.RATNAPARKHI
body1986
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT - M.S. RATNAPARKHI, J.:---The petitioner who was a judgment-debtor before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Latur, in Misc. Criminal Application No. 42 of 1983 (filed under section 128 of the Criminal Procedure Code) seeks to revise the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Latur, dismissing the objection raised by the petitioner to the execution filed by present respondent No. 1. 2. The facts giving rise to this litigation may be briefly stated as follows:— The present petitioner and respondent No. 1 are the husband and wife and the wedlock still subsists. It is also an undisputed position that the wife obtained an order of maintenance against her husband in Misc. Criminal Application No. 21 of 1976. The husband was directed to pay the maintenance of Rs. 45/- per month to his wife. It appears that the maintenance was not regularly paid and hence, the wife put in an application for execution contemplated under section 128 of the Criminal Procedure Code. This application was opposed by the present petitioner on the ground that after the passing of the order of maintenance by the learned Magistrate, there was an amicable settlement between the parties whereunder the husband gave five acres of land to his wife in lieu of maintenance. It was his contention that in view of this compromise, the wife filed Regular Civil Suit No. 590 of 1980 against her husband in the Civil Court and got a compromise decree. The copy of the alleged compromise decree has been filed before the trial Court. The main terms of the compromise appear to be that in lieu of maintenance the husband shall put the wife in possession of five acres of land towards northern side out of Gut No. 260 and accordingly possession was delivered to her on 8-10-1980. Another term of the compromiser was that in view of the settlement, the wife will not be entitled to claim maintenance in pursuance of the order of the Criminal Court. Another main term of the compromise was that in case there was any difficulty in the way of the wife in securing possession of the land so granted, she will have a right to claim maintenance according to the order passed by the Criminal Court. Other conditions are not necessary for the decision of controversy. 3.
Another main term of the compromise was that in case there was any difficulty in the way of the wife in securing possession of the land so granted, she will have a right to claim maintenance according to the order passed by the Criminal Court. Other conditions are not necessary for the decision of controversy. 3. It was the contention of the husband, that in view of this compromise, the order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, granting maintenance has become extinct. He, therefore, prayed that the order should be cancelled. 4. It was the contention of the wife that there was never any settlement and she was never put in possession of the property. It was also her contention that the amount of maintenance has remained unpaid. She, therefore, pressed her claim in execution. 5. The learned Magistrate before whom these proceedings went on found that there was an amicable settlement culminating into a compromise decree and, therefore, the maintenance order does not survive. He, therefore, passed an order on 30-6-1984 and dismissed the execution. 6. Feeling aggrieved with this order, the wife went in revision before the Sessions Court at Latur. The learned Additional Sessions Judge who heard this revision found that the compromise as alleged by the husband was more than doubtful. He also found that though under the compromise the husband was duty-bound to put the wife in possession of the property, she was never put in possession. In para 7 of the judgment, it has been observed that the respondent is an un-scrupulous person, that no lands stand in his name and the land which was made the subject-matter of the compromise decree in fact belonged to his father and not to himself. In the result, the learned Additional Sessions Judge allowed that revision, set aside the order passed by the learned Magistrate and rejected the objection raised by the husband. 7. Feeling aggrieved with this order, the husband has come up in his revision. As the Court of revision, it will no be proper for this Court to enter into the controversy of facts. Admittedly, an order for maintenance has been secured by the wife and except for two initial years commencing from 1976, not a farthing has been paid to her by way of maintenance though so many years have elapsed.
As the Court of revision, it will no be proper for this Court to enter into the controversy of facts. Admittedly, an order for maintenance has been secured by the wife and except for two initial years commencing from 1976, not a farthing has been paid to her by way of maintenance though so many years have elapsed. When the wife filed the execution petition before the trial Court in 1983, the husband put in an objection introducing a story that during the intervening period there was an amicable settlement between the two parties. There was also, according to the husband, a civil suit filed by the wife and in that suit, a decree came to be passed. It is interesting to note at this stage that the suit was filed by the wife and on the very day a compromise decree has been obtained. Admittedly, the wife in this case is completely illiterate and she is not staying with her husband, it will not be proper for this Court to offer any comments further. But suffice it to say that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has observed something about the conduct of the husband and I do not think that those comments are unjustified in the circumstances. 8. The only point that was canvassed before me was that in pursuance of the compromise, possession of the land was delivered to the wife. However, on this point the wife categorically denied the same. On the other hand, the husband entered into the witness-box and deposed on oath that the wife was put in possession of the property and in support of it, he has examined one witness Pandhari who also corroborated him on this point. This Pandhari was already cultivating the field of the present petitioner. He, therefore, cannot be called as an independent witness. The learned Additional Sessions Judge after going through the record found that the allegation that the wife was put in possession of the property was unfounded particularly in view of the documentary evidence. Though it has been the case of the husband that the wife was put in possession of the property, there is not a single entry in the 7/12 extract showing that the wife is in possession of the property. Even the mutation entry stands in the name of father of the petitioner.
Though it has been the case of the husband that the wife was put in possession of the property, there is not a single entry in the 7/12 extract showing that the wife is in possession of the property. Even the mutation entry stands in the name of father of the petitioner. The learned Counsel for the petitioner urged before me that it was for present respondent No. 1 to apply before the Tahsildar for getting the mutation entry in her name. In fact, he is a person who has voluntarily surrendered this land in favour of the wife and that too for a noble purpose of providing maintenance to her. An expectation that he should himself go before the Tahsildar and apply for a change in the mutation would not be unnatural in the circumstances. But now he wants to say that the wife should go before the Tahsildar for effecting the change is something which cannot be expected of the husband. It is not necessary at this stage to consider the merits before the competent forum. For the present it is enough to point out that one of the terms of the compromise decree was that in case the wife is not put in possession of the property, the husband shall be under obligation to pay maintenance, according to the orders passed by the Criminal Court. It is this eventuality which persist even today and, therefore, there is no justification in setting aside or cancelling the order in the execution proceedings as contended by the present petitioner. In my opinion, therefore, there is no merit in this revision. It deserves dismissal. Rule is discharged. Costs of this revision shall be borne by the petitioner of respondent No. 1. Rule discharged. -----