JUDGMENT 1. THE Union of India and others have preferred these two appeals along with applications under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 against two judgments and orders of the learned trial Judge respectively dated 9. 10. 85 and 17. 9. 85. 2. MR. Kabir, appearing on behalf of the respondent petitioner has submitted that these appeals having been presented after the establishment of the Central Administrative Tribunal by notification under sub-section 2 of section 14 of the administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, this court has no longer any jurisdiction to entertain these appeals or the applications under section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay in presenting the instant appeals. Accordingly to Mr. Kabir, the proviso to section 29 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 has preserved jurisdiction to this court hear and dispose of appeals pending of the date on which the notification under section 14 (2) of the said Act had come into force. The appeals before us were not pending on the appointed day but, as already stated, have been presented after the establishment of the Central Administrative Tribunal constituted under the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 read with Article 223a of the constitution of India. The short point before us is whether even after the appeal against the decision of the trial judge disposing of a writ application can be filed under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. Having given our anxious consideration are unable to accept the submission raised on behalf of the respondents that the Administrative Tribunal Act,1985 has either expressly or by necessary implication, abolished the right to prefer an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters patent against the judgement and order passed by a Single Judge before the establishment of the central Administrative Tribunal. The learned advocates appearing on both sides have not disputed the legal position succinctly summarised by S. R. Das. CJ. in paragraph 23 of his judgement in the case of Garikapati Veeraya vs. N. Subhiah Choudhary and Ors. reported in AIR 1957 SC 540 . The second proposition enunnciated by the learned Chief dure but was substantive right. The third proposition laid down was that the institution of a suit carried down with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force were preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. The second proposition enunnciated by the learned Chief dure but was substantive right. The third proposition laid down was that the institution of a suit carried down with it the implication that all rights of appeal then in force were preserved to the parties thereto till the rest of the career of the suit. The fourth proposition was that the right of appeal was a vested right such a right to enter the superior court accrued to the litigant and existed as on and from the date the lis commenced and although be actually exercised when the adverse judgement was pronounced such right was to be governed by the law prevailing at the date of the institution of the suit or proceeding and not by the law that prevailed at the date of its or at the date of the appeal. 3. IN the two cases before us the writ proceedings were instituted much earlier than the appointed day notified by the Administrative Tribunal Act,1985. Therefore,the right of the parties to the writ proceedings to prefer appeal under clauses 15 of the Letters Patent was a vested substantive right and in the absence of any express enactment or necessary statutory intendment the same continued up to the date of the pronouncement of the judgment by the trial court. The parties aggrieved thereby, According to law prevailing on the date of the institution of the writ proceedings, were entitled to present appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent. 4. WE have perused the provisions of sections 28 and 29. We find that they do not either expressly or by necessary implication abolish the right of the appellants to prefer appeals against the judgment pronounced before the commencement of the said Act. Mr. 4. WE have perused the provisions of sections 28 and 29. We find that they do not either expressly or by necessary implication abolish the right of the appellants to prefer appeals against the judgment pronounced before the commencement of the said Act. Mr. Gupta, appearing on behalf of the appellants, is right in his submission that section 28 primarily excludes jurisdiction of the court except the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution to entertain suits and proceedings in relation to recruitment and matters concerning recruitment to any service or post or service matters concerning members of the services specified therein, Section 29 (1) provides for transfer of every suit or other proceeding pending before any court or other authority immediately before the date of establishment of a Tribunal under the Act, subject to the proviso that sub-section 1 shall not apply to an appeal pending as aforesaid before the High Court or the Supreme Court. The present writ proceeding were instituted before the establishment of the Tribunal under section 14 of the Act. They were disposed of by pronouncement of judgment made before the appointed day. The writ proceedings, therefore, in no sense were pending as contemplated in sub-section (1) of section 29 of the Act. We hold that both sections 2 8 and 2 5 were in applicable to the present appeals. These two provisions do not expressly or by necessary intendment affect provision in clause 15 of the Letters Patent for appeals against judgments of Single Judges. In the above view we conclude that these appeals under clause 15 of the Letters Patent are maintainable in this court. 5. IN our view, sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of delay in preferring these two appeals. Immediately after pronouncement of the judgment of the learned trial judge the appellants had applied to the office of this court for supply of certified copies of the judgment and order passed by the trial court. The said copies are not yet ready according to the appellants. Presumbly, in order to obtain stay of the operation of the orders appealed against they have preferred these appeals and by reason of the fact that the memoranda of appeal are not accompanied by the certified copies the appeal have been reported to be out of time. The said copies are not yet ready according to the appellants. Presumbly, in order to obtain stay of the operation of the orders appealed against they have preferred these appeals and by reason of the fact that the memoranda of appeal are not accompanied by the certified copies the appeal have been reported to be out of time. Mistakes on the part of the filing advocates have also teen pleaded as one of the grounds. We hold that both of them make sufficient causes for condonation of delay in presenting the appeals. We accordingly condone the delay and direct the Memoranda of Appeal to be registered if otherwise in form. 6. UPON hearing both parities we direct that the operation of the judgment and orders under appeal shall remain stayed to the following extent till the hearing of the appeals. Within three weeks from date the appellants will complete computation of the benefits, if any, admissible to each of the writ petitioners without prejudice and subject to the decision in the appeals but disbursement of the sums to the writ petitioners will remain stayed till the disposal of the appeals. In the event the appellants fail unless otherwise directed within three weeks from the date of the disposal the appellants would be bound to pay the sums in question. Filing of paper books be dispensed with. The appeals are fixed for hearing at the top of the list four weeks hence. Let certified copy, applied for, be immediately furnished to the learned advocates. We express no opinion regarding the merits of the claims and contentions of the parties in the contempt matter which we understand is pending. There will be no order as to costs. Application allowed.