A. P. RAVANI, J. ( 1 ) IN case a lawyer files no-instruction purshis and request the Court to permit him to withdraw from the case should the Court straight away accept the request and permit the advocate to withdraw from the case and thereafter should the Court proceed further in absence of the litigant? These are the questions which have arisen in this revision application challenging the legality and validity of the order refusing to condone the delay in filing an application to set aside an ex parte decree. ( 2 ) THE petitioners are original defendants against whom the respondent-original plaintiff filed a suit Inter alia praying that he was the owner of the suit property i. e. land admeasuring 11 acres and 23 gunthas bearing Survey No. 663 of village Supadi Taluka Dhoraji District Rajkot. The plaintiff also prayed for possession of the suit property. It appears that the case of the plaintiff was that he had purchased the suit land for a consideration of Rs. 5 0 by sale deed dated 5/04/1971 The defendants appeared in the suit and resisted the same inter alia contending that in fact it was not a sale transaction but it was a money-lending transaction. After issues were framed there were negotiations for settlement. As per the case of the petitioners-defendants they did not remain present in the Court because there was settlement. On the relevant date of recording evidence the petitioners-defendants did not remain present and the advocate representing them filed no instruction purshis. Therefore the Court decreed the suit filed by the plaintiff on 7/02/1978 The petitioners-defendants filed an application for setting aside the ex-parte decree. The petitioners submitted that they bad come to know about passing of the decree on June 1978 and they were filing the application on 19/06/1978 i. e. within the proscribed period of limitation after they came to know about the passing of the decree. However as there was delay an application for condonation of delay was also filed. This application was resisted by the respondent-plaintiff. The trial Court recorded the evidence before deciding the application. After hearing the parties the trial Court came to the conclusion that the petitioners had not been able to show sufficient cause for condoning the delay. However as there was delay an application for condonation of delay was also filed. This application was resisted by the respondent-plaintiff. The trial Court recorded the evidence before deciding the application. After hearing the parties the trial Court came to the conclusion that the petitioners had not been able to show sufficient cause for condoning the delay. Hence the application was rejected by order dated 22/07/1982 Against this order the petitioners-defendants have filed this revision application and challenged the legality and validity of the same. ( 3 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent-plaintiff submitted that this is a revision application under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure and therefore this Court has very limited jurisdiction. In his submission the High Court can exercise revisional jurisdiction only if there is jurisdictional error in deciding the case even if the trial Court has not gone wrong either on point of law or on facts the High Court would not and should not exercise its revisional jurisdiction. Reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee and Others AIR 1964 SC 1336 and it is submitted that only the question regarding irregular exercise or non-exercise of jurisdiction or illegal assumption of jurisdiction by the lower Court may be examined by the tigh Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction. In his submission revisional jurisdiction cannot be exercised against the erroneous conclusion of law or that of fact. ( 4 ) THE limited scope of revisional jurisdiction of the High Court is well settled by a series of decisions. These principles have got to be kept in mind while examining the legality and validity of the order passed by the trial Court. ( 5 ) THE petitioners case before the trial Court was that they came to know about passing of the decree against them on 1/06/1978 Thereafter they immediately applied for certified copy and on obtaining certified copy the application has been filed on 19/06/1978 There is no dispute with regard to the fact that there is delay of about three months in filing the application. In the facts and circumstances of the case the trial Court was required to decide as to whether the ground advanced by the petitioners-defendants in support of the prayer for condonation of delay can be said to be sufficient cause or not. In the facts and circumstances of the case the trial Court was required to decide as to whether the ground advanced by the petitioners-defendants in support of the prayer for condonation of delay can be said to be sufficient cause or not. Unfortunately the trial Court did not decide this question at all. The trial Court has discussed the evidence led by the parties and has come to the conclusion that the petitioners case that they had not responded to the request of the advocate for coming to the Court and had remained absent an account of the fact that there was settlement between the parties cannot be believed With utmost respect for the learned trial Court Judge the trial Court has missed the real issue. The real issue which was required to be decided by the trial Court was to see whether the petitioners-defendants knew about the decree having been passed on 7/02/1978. If the cane put forth by the petitioners-defendants is not believed it would at the most come to this that the petitioners had no reasonable ground for not remaining absent before the Court on the date when the case was fixed for recording evidence. But from this one cannot jump to the conclusion that the petitioners-defendants had knowledge about the decree having been passed against them on 7/02/1978 Thus the trial Court has failed to decide the real issue Not grasping the point at issue and failure to decide the same is equivalent to non-exercise of jurisdiction or failure to exercise the jurisdiction vested in the trial Court. ( 6 ) FROM the record of the case it can only be said that the advocate engaged by the petitioners defendants had filed no- instruction purshis on the date of recording of evidence. There is nothing on record to show that the advocate engaged by the petitioners-defendants had informed them that the case had proceeded further and that decree was passed against them. There is a statement on oath made by the petitioners that they came to know about the decree having been passed against them only on 1/06/1978 This statement has remained uncontroverted. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and particularly in view of the case put forth by the petitioners- defendants that the land admeasuring 11 acres and 71 gunthas (about 30 bighas) was alleged to have been Fold for Rs. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and particularly in view of the case put forth by the petitioners- defendants that the land admeasuring 11 acres and 71 gunthas (about 30 bighas) was alleged to have been Fold for Rs. 5 0 only) it would not be proper to discuss about the rival case put forth by the parties. However it would be reasonable to infer in view of the special facts and circumstances of this case that no defendant would like that his land admeasuring about 30 bighas be disposed of for Rs. 5 0 only without his contention that the transaction was a money-lending transaction and that there was no sale of land being decided on merits. The trial Court referred to the principles laid down by this High Court in the case of Mohatta Bros v. Chaturbhaidas Chimanlal and Ors. XXIII (1) GLR 585. It appears that the trial Court was aware about the principles laid down by this High Court and the Supreme Court regarding the approach to be adopted by the Court in matters of condonation of delay. It is well settled that sufficient cause has to be construed liberally so as to advance the cause of justice and not the cause of technicalities. As far as possible a case should be decided on merits and a party should not be deprived of his right to get the case examined en merits. It appears that the trial Court was aware of the principle that hyper-technical pedantic and unpragmatic view should not be taken while deciding the question of sufficient cause in matters of condonation of delay. Even so the trial Court has done exactly contrary to the principles laid down by this High Court and the Supreme Court. Therefore it is clear that the trial Court has irregularly exercised the jurisdiction vested in it. The decision taken by the trial Court is likely to result in miscarriage of justice inasmuch as the petitioners-defendants have been denied the right to agitate their case on merits. ( 7 ) ). The learned trial Court Judge relied upon the statement of the advocate that the defendants were not turning up to give instructions for conducting the suit. This may be so. ( 7 ) ). The learned trial Court Judge relied upon the statement of the advocate that the defendants were not turning up to give instructions for conducting the suit. This may be so. Even after accepting the statement of the learned advocate the learned Judge could not and should not have proceeded to dispose of the suit in absence of the petitioners-defendants. With almost respect this appears to be an escape-route or an easy way to dispose of the suit and add the number in disposal figure. Here it is necessary to refer to the rules framed by the Bar Council of India under the provisions of sec. 49 (1) (c) of the Advocates Act 1961 Rule 12 of the aforesaid rules which is relevant for the purpose reads as follows:12 An advocate shall not ordinarily withdraw from engagements once accepted without sufficient cause and unless reasonable and sufficient notice is given to the client. Upon his withdrawal from a case he shall refund such part of the fee as has not been earned. When the learned trial Court Judge accepted no-instruction purshis and permitted the advocate to retire from the cases he ought to have examined as to whether there was sufficient cause and as to whether reasonable and sufficient notice was given to the petitioners-defendants or not. As per the provisions of these rules before permitting an advocate to retire from the case the Court must examine that (1) there is sufficient cause and (2) reasonable and sufficient notice is given by the advocate to his client. It appears that the trial Court was not at all aware about the provisions of these rules. In the instant case it appears to have so happened that the no-instruction purshis filed by the advocate is instantaneously accepted without verifying as to whether there was sufficient cause for the learned advocate to retire and whether there was reasonable and sufficient notice to the litigant. Before accepting no- instruction purshis the Court must have examined the aforesaid aspects. Not doing so would certainly amount to failure to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. Before accepting no- instruction purshis the Court must have examined the aforesaid aspects. Not doing so would certainly amount to failure to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. ( 8 ) IN cases where the Court feels that no-instruction purshis was filed by the advocate for sufficient cause and with reasonable and sufficient notice to the litigant it should be necessary for the Court again to satisfy about the later part of the rule which says that the advocate shall refund such part of the fee as has not been earned. In the larger interest of justice and with a view to see that the common man is not put to avoidable hardship it would be better and proper that the Court takes care of this aspect also and sees to it that the part of the fee which has not been earned by the advocate is refunded to the litigant. Without complying with this later part of the rule ordinarily the advocate should not be permitted to retire from the case. ( 9 ) EVEN when it is shown to the Court that there is sufficient compliance with the provisions of the rule as stated hereinabove it would be desirable and proper that the Court insists for the presence of the party in the Court before permitting the advocate to retire from the case. In case the Court feels that it is impossible for the advocate or it is very much difficult for him to secure the presence of the party the advocate may be permitted to retire. However before doing so the Court must feel satisfied that the provisions of the aforesaid rules are complied with. Thereafter the Court ought not to proceed further in absence of the parties. The Court itself must make efforts to secure the presence of the parties. At any rate without issuing fresh summons directing the party to remain present in the Court neither personally or through advocate) and without informing him about the necessity to make appropriate arrangements for proceeding further with the case the Court should not take further steps in the case. If this is not done the object and the spirit with which the aforesaid rule has been enacted by the Bar Council of India will be frustrated. Moreover the basic principles of natural justice will also be violated. If this is not done the object and the spirit with which the aforesaid rule has been enacted by the Bar Council of India will be frustrated. Moreover the basic principles of natural justice will also be violated. ( 10 ) I am aware of the fact that this may result into some inconvenience to the trial Court. But the institution of the Court exists not for disposal of cases alone. It exists for doing justice and that too substantial justice. It must be realised that in an unjust society where the large masses are illiterate and ignorant about their rights it is the duty of the Court to see that their cause is not frustrated on account of their ignorance and/or for some technical breach. In a society where the socio-economic order is inherently unjust and exploitative the path for securing substantial justice will always be strewn with thorns and and other road-blocks. Therefore little more inconvenience and greater obstacles that may be encountered in securing substantial justice should not come in the way of adopting such an interpretation to the aforesaid rule. ( 11 ) IN this case it would be clear that the trial Court was not at all aware about the provisions of the aforesaid rules nor has it complied with the provisions of the same. Therefore also the trial Court has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested in it. ( 12 ) IN the result the revision application is allowed. The order passed by the trial Court below application Exhibit 5 in Civil Miscellaneous Application No. 20 of 1978 is quashed and set aside. The application for condonation of delay is allowed. Rule made absolute accordingly. There shall be no order as to costs. Revision allowed: Delay condoned. .