JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal from Original Decree is directed against the judgment and decree dated 11th July 1982, passed in Ejectment Suit. No. 992 of 1 973 by Shri A. N. Basu, learned Judge, 10th Bench of the City Civil Court, Calcutta, whereby the suit for ejectment, as instituted by the plaintiff/ respondent on 13th August 1973, for recovery of the premises in suit viz. 65/1a, College Street, P. S. Amherst Street, Calcutta- 12 and for recovery of possession of the same, on the ground of default and subletting, was decreed on contest with costs and it was directed that the defendant/appellant should vacate the said premises within 30 days from the date of the determination" and deliver vacant possession therof to the plaintiff/respondent and in default, the plaintiff/respondent would be at liberty to recover khas possession of the premises in suit, by executing the decree. It should also be noted that by the judgment and decree leave under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code, as prayed for, was given to the plaintiff / respondent, for recovery of arrears of rent and means profit by a separate suit. 2. ADMITTEDLY the plaintiff respondent was the owner of the premises in suit and the defendant appellant was the tenant under her for the premises in question, on a rental of Rs. 115/-per month, payable according to English calendar month. It was alleged that the defendant appellant was a habitual defaulter and he had failed and neglected to pay rent since January 1973. Apart from alleging that the said defendant appellant, without the permission and consent of the plaintiff respondent even after coming into force of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, transferred, assigned or sublet the premises in suit to several persons and that, being the position, the defendant / appellant, according to plaintiff respondent, had rendered himself disentitled to the benefit of protection against the eviction under that Act. It was also stated in the plaint that by a combined notice dated 9th April 1973, the defendant/appellant's tenancy in respect of the premises in suit, was terminated on the expiry of the 1st day of May 1 973 and that notice which was sent by registered post, was duly received by the defendant/appellant. But, inspite of such receipt, he has failed, and neglected to comply with the requisitions as made therein. 3. But, inspite of such receipt, he has failed, and neglected to comply with the requisitions as made therein. 3. BY his written statement dated 11th June 1975, the defendant/appellant claimed the suit in question, to be not maintainable legally, apart from claiming that the same was bad for non-joinder of necessary parties and that the plaintiff/respondent had no cause of action for the suit. The relationship of landlord and tenant between the defendant/appellant and the plaintiff/respondent was also denied and disputed. It was claimed that the suit was barred on the application of the principles of estoppel and acquiescence or principles analogous thereto and in any event, the plaintiff/respondent had waived her right to maintain the same. It was also claimed that the plaintiff/respondent had suppressed the material facts in her plaint and that apart, the legality, validity and sufficiency of the notice to quit dated 9th April 1973 (Ext. 1) was denied. The defendant/appellant has also denied the allegation that he had sublet the premises as alleged. His categorical case was that he was not a defaulter. 4. ON the basis of the pleadings as mentioned above, the issues which were framed for determination, are quoted hereunder:- 1. Is there relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant ? 2. Is the defendant a defaulter in payment of rent since january 1973 ? 3. Has the defendant without the previous consent in writing of the plaintiff landlady transferred, assigned or sublet the whole or part of the suit premises ? 4. Has the notice to quit been served upon the defendant ? if so, is the said notice legal, valid and sufficient 5. To what relief or reliefs if any is the plaintiff entitled ? The learned Trial Court, on the basis of the available evidence and the materials on record, answered the Issue No. 1 which as indicated hereinbefore, related to the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff/respondent and defendant appellant in the affirmative and in favour of the plaintiff. Issue No. 2 related to the fact whether the defendant appellant was a defaulter in payment of rents since January 1973 and such issue, on consideration of the available evidence before him, was answered in favour of the plaintiff/respondent by the learned Court below. Issue No. 2 related to the fact whether the defendant appellant was a defaulter in payment of rents since January 1973 and such issue, on consideration of the available evidence before him, was answered in favour of the plaintiff/respondent by the learned Court below. In fact, the learned Court below has categorically stated that it was the plaintiff/respondent's case that the defendant appellant had failed and neglected to pay rents since January 1973 inspite of demand and that he was a habitual defaulter had gone unchallenged in cross-examination and in fact, it has also been recorded that there was or has been no contrary evidence and as such, while dealing with the issue, the learned Court below has observed that there was no other way but to hold that the defendant/appellant was a habitual defaulter and as such, he would come within the mischief of Section 13 (1) (i) of the Act. In fact, he has also recorded that in view of the above fact, the defendant / appellant's defence against delivery of possession was struck off under Section 17 (3) of the Act by Order No. 79 dated 2nd june 1980. 5. ISSUE No. 3 was on the question of subletting and there also on consideration of the evidence as available, the learned court below has returned the verdict in favour of the plaintiff and answered the issue accordingly. Similarly, Issue No. 4, which related to the validity, legality and sufficiency of the notice, on the basis of the evidence as was available, was answered in favour of the plaintiff and above being the answers to the concerned issues, in answer to Issue No. 5, the suit was directed to succeed and consequently, the judgment and decree as mentioned hereinbefore was passed. 6. MR. Mukul Prokash Banerjee, appearing in support of the appeal, in his usual fairness stated, that his client viz. the defendant/appellant has no case on merits but it was his contention that since by an application under Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code dated 2 2nd September, 1983, the subsequent purchasers of the premises in suit were substituted in terms of the Court' s order dated 15th November,, 1983 the subsequent transferees viz. the defendant/appellant has no case on merits but it was his contention that since by an application under Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code dated 2 2nd September, 1983, the subsequent purchasers of the premises in suit were substituted in terms of the Court' s order dated 15th November,, 1983 the subsequent transferees viz. the added respondent, who has now claimed to have stepped into the shoes of the decree holder cannot take the advantage of the decree and according to him, the decree as impeached cannot enure to their benefit, as the same, because of the character of their possession and so also the character of the decree itself could not be assigned. In fact, Mr. Banerjee submitted that such would also be the position, if we take into consideration the terms and language of Section 13 (1)of the said Act and so also the terms of Section 13 (6) of the said Act. According to Mr. Banerjee, the terms "notwithstanding" as used in the sub-sections of Section 13 as mentioned above, would mean and related to or should be deemed to be related to landlord and tenant and according to him, the decree could be taken advantage of by the erstwhile landlord, if she had elected to do so but not by the subsequent transferors. Then, Mr. Banerjee took us to the prayers in the "plaint and more particularly to prayer (ii), by which leave under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure was asked for and then to the decree, by which such leave, as prayed for, was granted to the plaintiff respondent, for recovery of arrears of rent and manse profit by a separate suit in the circumstances of the case. He has further submitted that under the provisions of the said Act. for any default in the matter of payment of money, either under the decree or otherwise, the decree holder viz. the erstwhile landlord i. e. plaintiff respondent smt. Gita Ghosh can bring a money suit but the arrears as have been found out, cannot be sought to be recovered by the subsequent transferors i. e., the substituted/added respondent, in execution of the decree. Mr. the erstwhile landlord i. e. plaintiff respondent smt. Gita Ghosh can bring a money suit but the arrears as have been found out, cannot be sought to be recovered by the subsequent transferors i. e., the substituted/added respondent, in execution of the decree. Mr. Sen Gupta, appearing for the substituted added respondents, on a reference to the application as mentioned hereinbefore, stated that the same was not an application for substitution but the same was really an application for addition and that being the position, the provisions of Order 22 Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code would apply. Mr. Sen Gupta has further pointed out that the substituted/added respondents can in the instant case, as an assignee continue with the appeal and since the original plaintiff/respondent is also appearing in this appeal and contesting' the appeal there would not only be no difficulty in determining the appeal but the submissions of Mr. Banerjee would be of no avail or any assistance. To substantiate his submissions Mr. Sen Gupta firstly, relied on the determinations in the case of Rai Charan Mandal and Anr. v. Biswa Nath Mandal and Ors., 20 C. L. J. 107, wherein it has been observed that the trial of a suit cannot be arrested merely by reason of the devolution of the interest of the plaintiff. The successor-in-interest nay, if he chooses, obtain leave of the Court under Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil procedure to continue the suit; but if he does not do so, the original plaintiff may continue the suit, and his successor will be bound by the result of the litigation. The consequence will be that the plaintiff, if successful, will obtain a decree which will enure to the benefit of his successor, apart from holding that the suit, carried on with the leave of the Court by the person who has acquired an interest by devolution, is not a new suit. It is the old suit carried on at his instance and he is bound by all proceedings up to the stage when he obtains leave to carry on the proceedings and a suit is to be tried in all its stages on the cause of action as it existed at the date of its commencement. It is the old suit carried on at his instance and he is bound by all proceedings up to the stage when he obtains leave to carry on the proceedings and a suit is to be tried in all its stages on the cause of action as it existed at the date of its commencement. An exception to this rule, namely, that a Court may take notice of events which have happened since the institution of the suit and afford relief to the parties on the basis of the altered conditions, is applied in cases where it is shown that the original relief claimed has, by reason of subsequent change of circumstances, become inappropriate or that it is necessary to base the decision of the Court on the altered circumstances in order to shorten litigation or to do complete justice between the parties. The next case on which reliance was placed by Sen Gupta was that of Uchhab Patra v. Brundaban Mallilk, A. I. R. 1969 Orissa 142. In that case, one "p" owned a plot of land upon which "m" trespassed and forcibly possessed a part of it. "p" filed a suit for recovery of damages of Rs. 219/- against "m". During the pendency of the suit "p" transferred the land along with the claim for damages to "u" by a registered sale deed. The transferee "u" did not get himself substituted in the place of "p" in the suit under Order 22, Rule 10 of Civil Procedure Code. The suit was decreed and the transferee "u" levied execution of the decree. The judgment debtor "m" filed an objection under section 47 saving that the subject-matter of the suit was not transferable under section 6 (a) of the Act and that the transferee "u" could not continue the proceeding after the decree was passed and on such fact it was held that while Rule 10 (1)of Order 22 of Civil Procedure Code during the pendency of the suit enables the transferee to continue the proceeding with the leave of the Court, it does not bar the transferor containing the suit for the benefit of his successor. Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure' is an alternative procedure which guards against the dangers that the original plaintiff being no longer interested in the proceedings may not vigorously prosecute them or may even collude with the adversary. Order 22 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure' is an alternative procedure which guards against the dangers that the original plaintiff being no longer interested in the proceedings may not vigorously prosecute them or may even collude with the adversary. Therefore, the transferee "u" could file the execution petition and that what was transferred to "u" was not a 'mere right to sue'. The land together with the right to recover damages from "p" was transferred. This was not barred under section 6 (a) of the T. P. Act and the expression "a mere right to sue" means a right to sue unconnected with the ownership of any property. Mere right to sue is not property but is merely a title to get future property. Where the right to recover damages in respect of a property is transferred with the property itself, the transfer does not consist of a mere right to sue. The transfer of a right to sue for damages is in such a case incidental to the property itself, it is intimately connected with the enjoyment of the property. 7. THEREAFTER, Mr. Sen Gupta referred to the Full Bench decision of the Patna High Court in the case of Mahanth Sukhdeo das and Anr. vs. Kashi Prasadl Tiwari and Ors., AIR 1958 Patna 630. That was a decision where a suit for partition by a sharer not in possession against his co-sharer who is in possession of the entire suit lands does not become infructuous on the application of the Act and the consequent vesting in government which takes place under the Act and under section 6a statutory settlement with the intermediary of the baksht lands in his khas possession on the date of the vesting of the estate, takes place. In that case it has also been observed that the "proprietor" according to the definition does not mean only the person owning an estate for his benefit and in actual possession but also includes a proprietor holding and successors in interest of a proprietor or where a proprietor is a minor or of unsound mind or an idiot, his guardian, committee or other legal curator. Similarly a "tenure holder" does not mean a person who is actually in possession of the tenure but includes also a person who holds such right in trust for others such as the guardian of a minor or the committee or other legal curator in the case of a person of unsound mind. "intermediary" in relation to an estate or tenure thus means a proprietor tenure-holder, under tenure holder and trustee. Khas possession' in section 6 considered in the light of the above definitions therefore does not mean the possession of the intermediary who was actually in possession on the date of the vesting to the exclusion of the co-intermediary. Obviously, khas possession of the intermediary means the possession of the intermediary who was cultivating land either for his benefit or in trust for others. That being so the words khas possession of an intermediary do not exclude constructive possession and the main legislative intent in giving a statutory definition to the expression 'khas possession' was to distinguish the lands in cultivating possession of the proprietor or tenure-holder from the lands in possession of the tenants' having occupancy rights therein. The emphasis on the expression khas possession' in section 6 is not on the person" holding it but on the manner and method of possession. In other words the lands which are governed by section 6 must be such as are cultivable and under cultivation and are possessed by a tenure-holder or a proprietor. If the expression 'khas possession' were to mean bodily possession the possession of the lessees and mortgagees will be excluded which is not a fact, because by virtue of clauses (a), (b) and (c), such lands also though in possession of lessees or mortgagees becomes his occupancy holding under the Act. It has also been observed in that case that even assuming that ' khas possession' meant actual possession and not mere constructive possession the co-sharer plaintiff cannot be unsuited. The effect of the Act is that during the pendency of the litigation the interest of the plaintiff developed upon the State. Notwithstanding the devolution he will be entitled to continue the litigation. Ordinarily notwithstanding the devolution of the interest a suit may be continued by or against the original party. The effect of the Act is that during the pendency of the litigation the interest of the plaintiff developed upon the State. Notwithstanding the devolution he will be entitled to continue the litigation. Ordinarily notwithstanding the devolution of the interest a suit may be continued by or against the original party. The assignee may also appear in the suit at any stage and continue the suit as a matter of right after obtaining the leave of Court under Order 22 rule 10 (1. There is no such restriction on the original parties and they can fight out the litigation to its conclusion in spite of the devolution of interest. Lastly, Mr. Sengupta referred to the case of Ambika Prasad Sexena vs. Sm. Bhagirathi debi Agerwalla and Ors., AIR 1968 Cal 242 which is also reported in I. L. R. 1967 (2) Cal 78. In that case the respondent, purchased certain properties under a conveyance under which the whole of premises along with all rights, liberties, privileges etc. to the said premises or thereunto belonging and all the estate right, title, interest, property, claims or demands whatsoever of the vendors into or upon the said premises were conveyed and the purchaser was at all times thereafter to possess and enjoy the said premises quietly and peaceably. Prior to such transfer in writing the vendors of the respondent had obtained a decree for ejectment of the appellant from the said premises and on such fact it has been held that (i) the respondent was entitled to execute the decree under Order 21 Rule 16. The conveyance in the above premises passed unto the respondent the entire rights of the vendors in or in respect of the disputed premises and that would include also all rights under the subsisting ejectment decree against a tenant of the premises is otherwise the transfer of the right of possession or enjoyment would not be complete. The conveyance in the above premises passed unto the respondent the entire rights of the vendors in or in respect of the disputed premises and that would include also all rights under the subsisting ejectment decree against a tenant of the premises is otherwise the transfer of the right of possession or enjoyment would not be complete. The conveyance, therefore, could very well be taken to be an assignment of the ejectment decree and since this transfer or assignment, was by conveyance which was in writing, it could very well come within the expression or description 'assignment in writing' within the meaning of Order 21 Rule 16 and even assuming that Order 21 rule 16 could not be invoked by the respondent on the ground that there was no express assignment of the decree in question under the conveyance it was clearly a case in which the purchaser-respondent became entitled in law to the rights of the vendors decree-holders and in any view would be entitled to be called their representative or "a person claiming under them" within the meaning of section 146, Civil Procedure Code and could execute the decree under that section. 8. MR. Sen Gupta also produced the Xerox copy of the original deed dated 16th August, 1983 between Smt. Gica Ghosh, the vendor and Shri Niresh Chandra Maizumdar, the vendee. In this deed, smt. Lina Dutta was an affixing party, it was contended by mr. Sen Gupta that in view of the stipulation/terms of the said conveyance, which specifically mentioned the decree obtained in the concerned Ejectment Suit No. 992 of 1973 by the vendor Smt. Gita Ghosh against Shri Pannalal shaw and having tested the terms of the conveyance in terms of the above determinations, the assignment of the decree in the instant case was possible and permissible. It was his specific case that the decree in the instant case was assigned by the vendor in favour of the vendee i. e. the added Respondent. . "actionable claim" as pointed out by Mr. It was his specific case that the decree in the instant case was assigned by the vendor in favour of the vendee i. e. the added Respondent. . "actionable claim" as pointed out by Mr. Sen Gupta has been defined in section 2 (c) of the Transfer of Property Act to mean a claim to any debt, other than a debt secured by mortgage of immoveable property or by hypothecation or pledge of moveable property, or to any beneficial interest in moveable property not in the possession, either actual or constructive, of the claimant, which the Civil Courts recognize as affording grounds for relief, whether such debt or beneficial interest be existent accruing, conditional or contingent and he also referred to section 6 of the Act, for establishing the properties that may be transferred. There is no doubt, that in terms of the section as indicated and referred to hereinbefore, there would be no restrictions on transfer and the general rule should be that property of any kind would be capable of being transferred and really the person who contends otherwise, will have to prove the existence of some law or custom restricting the transfer in question. In fact, such would be the exceptions to the general rule as incorporated in the section. Transfer under the section would also be permissible and possible in case there is no restriction to the contrary. While on the point, Mr. Sen Gupta placed reliance on the case of ramgopal Shrikisan Asawa vs. Satyanarayan Ramniwas Phofalia and Anr., AIR 1968 Bombay 14, wherein, while dealing with section 6 (d) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 and the effect of restriction of enjoyment under section 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1 947 and more particularly, the effect of enjoying the interest in a property under a decree passed under the said section and if such decree can be transferred, it has been held that the interest to enjoy the property under the decree passed under section 13 (1) (g) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House rates Control Act, 1 947 can be transferred, because in the first place an interest in the decree cannot be carved out separately. If the entire decree is transferred, it is not possible to retain part of the rights or interests contained in that decree. If the entire decree is transferred, it is not possible to retain part of the rights or interests contained in that decree. Secondly, the right to occupy and possess the property in pursuance of the decree is not an interest in the property restricted in its enjoyment to the owner personally. The landlord can obtain possession of property in pursuance of any decree passed under section 13 (1) (g) and the property can be enjoyed by any person other than the landlord, apart from observing that a decree is the culmination of a suit which has been filed on a cause of action. As soon as a decree is passed, the original cause of action is merged in it and has no separate existence. A decree which is a property under the general law can be transferred unless there is a specific limitation or restriction placed upon it by any law. The Bombay rent Act does not place any such limitation or restriction. We cannot infer such a restriction from the provisions of section 17. A restriction on right which is recognised under the law of the land must be provided more explicitly and as such, it has been specifically indicated that, the assignees of a decree which has been passed in favour of their assignor for possession of the suit premises for personal requirement under section 13 (1) (g) are entitled to execute the decree for possession. 9. MR. Banerjee of course,, in reply submitted that since the decree in this case has been passed in favour of the plaintiff-respondent alone and not in favour of the transferee, the same cannot be transferred under section 13 of the Transfer of Property Act and the provisions of sections 3 and 6 of that act would not include such a decree, the more so when, the same cannot also BE deemed to be an "actionable claim". Mr. Banerjee also pointed out, on a reference to the conveyance as indicated hereinbefore, that the transferee had or has no subsisting interest even thereunder or on the basis thereof. 10. THE real answer to the point as sought to be raised by mr. Banerjee would thus depend on the determination of the question whether the decree in this case could be assigned of if the same was assignable. 10. THE real answer to the point as sought to be raised by mr. Banerjee would thus depend on the determination of the question whether the decree in this case could be assigned of if the same was assignable. From the cases as cited at the Bar, it can be reasonably deduced that a successor-in-interest may, if he so,elects, ask for and obtain leave of the Court under Order XXII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure to continue the suit; but if he does not do so, the original plaintiff may continue the suit and his successor will be bound by the results of the litigation and as a result thereof, if the plaintiff succeeds in obtaining the decree that will also enure to the benefit of his successor. The said provisions do not also bar the transferor continuing the suit for the benefit of his successor and Order XXII Rule 10 is really an alternative procedure, which guards against the clinger if the original plaintiff is no longer interested in the proceedings and may not vigorously prosecute them or may even collude with the adversary and such being the position, the transferee could file the prosecution petition and claim that what was transferred to him was not a mere right to sue. Which expression again means, a right to sue unconnected with the ownership of any property. It should of course be noted that mere right to sue is not property but is merely a title to get future property. The Calcutta case as cited at the Bar, in our view would aptly apply to the facts and circumstances of this case and on the basis thereof, it cannot be held that the transferee in the instant case, was not entitled to execute the decree, the more so when, because of the terms and specific stipulations in the conveyance, he received such right in respect of the premises in the suit and more particularly when the conveyance in question, could very well be taken as an assignment of the ejectment decree and furthermore when the transfer or assignment in the instant case, was by a conveyance which was in writing, and same could very well come within the expression or description "assignment in writing", within the meaning of the Code. In fact, it should be noted here is a case where the transferee become entitled in law to the rights of the vendor/decree holders and in any view, would be entitled to be called their representative or a person claiming under them, within the meaning of section 146 of the Code and could execute the decree. It should of course also be noted that Rule 10 of Order XXII applies to all cases of devolution as otherwise mentioned in the other rules in the said Order and such "other cases" would mean cases other than those specifically mentioned in the previous Rule. In fact, Order XXII Rule 10 is the residuary Rule and a devolution of interest pending in appeal, as in this case, comes within the Rule. The words "any interest" in ' our view would include any transferable "right to sue" and not merely an interest in tangible property. It should of course be noted that right of an assignee to apply under Rule 10 does not continue on the death of the assignor plaintiff and the abatement of the suit which has been observed in the case of Kader vs. Khaitan and Sons Company, AIR 1959 Calcutta 368. As indicated earlier rules 10 and 11 would merely be enabling section and the omission of the assignee to make an application, will not entail any loss of sight and in any case, he is bound by the result of the suit. Rule 10 having merely permissive, a party who has assigned his interest if the subject-matter of the suit or appeal during the pendency of the proceedings, can prosecute it or prefer an appeal and it is no doubt true that the cases covered by Rule 10 are those in which "the persons to whom such interest has come" is arrayed on the same side in the suit as "the person from whom it has passed". We are also of the view that a person can be added as party either on his own application or of the application of the party already on record. Here in this case the transferee was substituted / added by the order as indicated hereinbefore and when he was so allowed to prosecute, it would not necessarily mean that the transferee's name should be deleted. Here in this case the transferee was substituted / added by the order as indicated hereinbefore and when he was so allowed to prosecute, it would not necessarily mean that the transferee's name should be deleted. In fact, the transferor who was the plaintiff / respondent is still on record and is contesting this appeal. 11. ON the basis of the above determinations and the views which we have expressed, we feel that the decree in the instant case was liable to be assigned and the same was assigned in favour of the transferee viz added/substituted respondent. Ever on the other branch of the submissions of Mr. Sen Gupta viz. whether the decree in the instant case could be assigned or whether the same was assignable, we find substance and hold, agreeing with his submission that the decree in the instant case was assignable and the same was appropriately assigned in favour of the transferee / who is substituted/added as respondent, as the interest to enjoy the property under the concerned decree could be transferred and such interest in the first place could not be carved out separately and the decree as a whole was, as appeared from the conveyance in question, transferred in favour of the transferee and more particularly when the right to occupy and possess the said property in pursuance of the concerned decree was not an interest in the property with any restraint on the personal enjoyment of the same by the owner. 12. ABOVE being our views in the matter, we feel that the submissions of Mr. Banerjee should fail and cannot be accepted but those of Mr. Sengupta were of: substance. As such, this appeal fails and we thus dismiss the same without any order as to costs. The prayer for stay as made is refused. Appeal dismissed.