Judgment :- 1. There are two petitioners in this O.P. They are members of the Senate of the University of Cochin. In this O.P. the challenge is against the Cochin University of Science and Technology Ordinance (Ordinance 2 of 1986). The petitioners state that there are two major infirmities in the said Ordinance. The first is that the Ordinance repealed the Cochin University Act. An Ordinance repealing an Act is unfair and improper. The second attack against the Ordinance is that the University should be a democratic autonomous body free from any sort of executive control and a perusal of this Ordinance would show that the entire Senate, the Syndicate and other bodies are nominated by the Government, which will destroy the academic freedom of the teachers and will render the University as a mere Department of the Government. The Ordinance is undemocratic in character conferring unguided and arbitrary powers on the Government and various subordinate authorities. This is also against the spirit of the Constitution. 2. I heard counsel for the petitioner, Mr. P. Balagangadhara Menon, learned Advocate General who appeared for the 3rd respondent and Mr. C.K. Sivasankara Panicker who appeared for respondents 1 and 2. There is no force in the two submissions made by counsel. An Ordinance is law. It is as much law as an Act passed by the Legislature and it is in the same unquestionable position and subject to the same inhibitions. Art.213(1) of the Constitution states that an Ordinance shall have the same force and effect as an Act of the Legislature of the State, assented to by the Governor, subject to certain conditions. (We are not concerned with the conditions in this case). There is no inhibition in repealing an Act, by an Ordinance. The contention to the contrary is repelled. The decision of the Supreme Court in A.K. Roy v. Union of India (AIR 1982 SC 710) contains a detailed discussion with regard to the scope of the Ordinance-making power of the President, which will be applicable in the case of an Ordinance promulgated by Governor. 3. The 2nd contention to the effect that the Ordinance is "undemocratic", "is against the spirit of the Constitution", "destroys the independence and autonomous character of the University", etc. is also without substance. 3. The 2nd contention to the effect that the Ordinance is "undemocratic", "is against the spirit of the Constitution", "destroys the independence and autonomous character of the University", etc. is also without substance. The petitioners' counsel has no case that the State Legislature has no power to enact the law or the Governor has no competency to promulgate the Ordinance. As stated by Gwyer C.J. In re C.P. Motor Spirit Act (AIR 1939 Federal Court 1) at page 4: "It is not for the Court to express, or indeed to entertain, any opinion on the expediency of a particular piece of legislation, if it is satisfied that it was within the competence of the Legislature which enacted it; nor, will it allow itself to be influenced by any considerations of policy, which lie wholly outside its sphere." In Seervai's 'Constitutional Law of India' 3rd Edn., Vol. I, it is stated: "the court is not concerned with the wisdom or unwisdom, the justice or injustice of the law. If that which is passed into law is within the scope of the power conferred on a Legislature and violates no restrictions on that power, the law must be upheld whatever a Court may think of it." If the Act of the Legislature or Ordinance is within Legislative competence, it is not for the court to impose a limitation in the enactment on what is claimed to be "the spirit of the Constitution." See Gopalan v. State (AIR 1950 SC 27) and Kesava Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay (AIR 1951 SC 128). The second contention that the Ordinance is undemocratic, militates against the spirit of the Constitution, etc. also falls to the ground. 4. In the result the O.P. is without merit. It is dismissed in limine.