JUDGMENT : S.C. Mohapatra, J. - Judgment-debtor is the petitioner in this Civil Revision against the order rejecting his prayer for stay of the execution proceeding in exercise of the power under Order 21, Rule 29, CPC during pendency of the suit seeking the relief to get rid of the effect of the decree. 2. Judgment-debtor was a tenant in respect of a house in Cuttack town. On the application of the decree-holder for evicting the judgment-debtor from the house on the ground of his confide requirement of the same, the House Rent Controller passed the order of eviction which was confirmed in appeal Judgment-debtor has filed Title Suit No. 150 of 1985 for a declaration that the order of eviction passed in the house rent control proceeding under the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') is without jurisdiction and is a nullity and for a permanent injunction restraining the decree-holder from evicting him from the disputed house under such a void order. The suit is now pending trial. 3. The decree-holder filed Execution Case No. 3 of 1984 in the Court of Munsif, First Court, Cuttack, for evicting the judgment-debtor as provided u/s 15 of the Orissa House Rent Control Act, 1947. An objection u/s 47, CPC, was filed challenging the executability of the decree on the ground that the same in a nullity which has not been entertained on merits. Thereafter the application for stay of the Execution Case was filed giving rise to the impugned order. 4. The trial Court rejected the application for stay on the ground that the plea in the suit was raised before the House Rent Control authorities to be negative. The same plea was also raised in the execution proceeding not to be entertained on merits. That order has not been assailed and the suit has been filed on the self-same ground. On such finding, the trial Court observed : " ..Law is fairly settled that the discretion to stay execution of the decree u/s 21, Rule 29, CPC, pending a suit by the judgment-debtor should be exercised judicially and not mechanically as a matter of course and Court should duly consider that the party who has obtained a valid decree is not deprived enjoying the fruits thereof. In this case the Jdr. In this case the Jdr. after repeatedly agitating the same plea, in different forums has come up with the present suit and hence simply because he has filed a suit the further proceedings of the execution case should not be stayed...." 5. Mr. M. N Das, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, submitted that the executing Court exercised the jurisdiction with material irregularity in giving undue importance to the point of attack of the eviction order being refused in the various forums and has not unduly given importance that the decree-holder would be deprived of enjoying the fruits of the decree obtained by him. It has not taken into consideration the question of balance of convenience and nature of injury that would be sustained by the petitioner if he is evicted during the pendency of the suit. Mr. S. P. Misra, the. learned counsel appearing for the opposite party-decree-holder, submitted that the executing Court has rejected the application keeping the correct principle in view and in revision the discretionary power exercised keeping in view the correct principle ought not to be interfered with. 6. To appreciate the rival Contentions, Order 21, Rule 29, CPC, is to be kept in view which reads as follows ; "29. Stay of execution pending suit between decree-holder and judgment-debtor: Where a suit is pending in any Court against the' holder of a decree of such Court or of a decree which is executed by such Court on the part of the person against whom the decree was passed, the Court may, on such terms as to security or otherwise, as it thinks fit, stay execution of the decree until the pending suit has been decided : Provided that if the decree is one for payment of money, the Court shall, if it grants stay without requiring security, record its reasons for so doing." A plain reading of the provision makes it dear that wide discretion has been vested in the Court, It is to be remembered that wider the discretion the greater is the restraint in exercise of the same. 7. 7. Mr M. N. Das relied upon a Divsioni) Bench decision reported in 1972(2) CWR 1952 (DukhiShyam Das v. Satyabadi Sahu) in support of the plea taken in the suit that the House Rent Control Act is not applicable" to the house in question in view of Section 20 thereof excluding the houses owned by the State Government from operation of the Act. He submitted that the darpatadari right of the landlord having been extinguished the opposite party does not continue to be a landlord and the house belongs to the State Government to be excluded from operation of the House Rent Control Act. There are two decisions of this Court reported in 54 (1982) CIT 67( Abhimanyu Jee v. Dr. Gaya Prasad and others) and 1986 (1) O.HC.C. 8(Ghasi Sahu and Anr. v. Himachal Sahu and another), whether it has been held that the House Rent Control authorities have the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the relationship of landlord and tenant which determination is a rejuridicata in any adjudication in a civil suit. Mr M. N. Das submitted that the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Rent Control authorities would be confined to the order of eviction as provided u/s 6 of the Act and the finding relating to relationship of landlord and tenant is not expressly vested in the House Rent Control authorities under any of the provisions of the' Act which would only be ancillary finding and in view of the Division Bench decision reported in Yallalaka Apanna Vs. Bhagirathi Padhy and Others the Civil Court has always the jurisdiction to-determine the relationship of landlord and tenant. He .also relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court reported in ILR 1965 Cut 539 (M/s. Beharilal Meparam (firm) v. urdhaba Chat an Shau and others), where it has been held that the jurisdiction of the Reuse Rent Control1 authorities relating to determination of the question of relationship of landlord and tenant is not final. It has been observed : "...It is, however, true that the decision given by the House Rent Controller on these preliminary or jurisdiction facts, as it appears from the terms and scheme of the Act is neither final nor conclusive and, therefore, to that extent the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred-as is the case thereunder in respect of decisions given by him on the essential facts-.." 8. In view of the aforesaid three Division Bench decisions of this Court, Mr. Das submitted that it cannot be said that the judgment-debtor-petitioner was not proceeding bona fide merely because his contentions could not be appreciated by the authorities earlier. 9. Although 1 was tempted to give a decision on this question, the same would have the effect of determining an issue in the suit itself. Therefore, not to prejudice either party, I restrain myself from entering into the said question. Sufficient it is to say at this stage that there is no material to come to the conclusion that the petitioner was acting mala-fide. in filing the suit just to prolong the litigation. In case this would have been the only ground, I would have no hesitation to set aside the order of the trial Court. However, mere bona fides, in filing a suit are not sufficient for say of the execution proceeding. 10. Scope of exercise of the discretion under Order 21, Rule 29, C. P. C, has been well-explained in a decision of this Court reported in ILR 1970 Cut 320 (Judhistir Jena v. Surendra Mohanty and another) where it has been held that the fundamental consideration is that the party obtaining a decree should not be deprived of the fruits of the decree except for good reasons and until set aside it stands good and should not be legally dealt with of the off chance that another suit to set aside the decree might succeed. While so observing, it was held : "No hard and fast rule can be laid down in what cases stay would be granted or refused:.." Relying upon the aforesaid decision, this Court in a decision reported in Rauf Khan Vs. Sara Bibi and Others, held that the judgment-debtor who was a tenant under the Orissa House Rent Control Act to be evicted in the execution case can' recover possession of the house of the off chance of his success and the decree-holder-landlord cannot be deprived of enjoying the fruits of the order of eviction obtained by her. In another decision of this Court reported in Pholi Dibya Vs. In another decision of this Court reported in Pholi Dibya Vs. Idan Bibi and Others, ) it has been observed : "Courts are to examine whether there would be irreparable injury unless the stay is granted and in whose favour the balance of convenience would lie" In that case it was found out that the tenant to be evicted under the Act had a house of his own close to the dispute property and was not to become homeless and the decree-holder-landlord had been deprived of the fruits of the decree for long eighteen years On the facts and in the circumstances of both those cases, it was held that no stay should be granted. The net effect of the above three decisions is that the wide discretionary power of the executing Court to -stay 'execution proceeding during the pendency of a suit in that Court is to be exercised keeping in view the fact that the grant of stay will have the effect of depriving the decree-holder of the enjoyment of the fruits of the decree obtained by him and therefrom the nature of the injury and the balance of convenience in granting or refusing the stay would be carefully Considered on the facts and circumstances available in a case . 11. The Executing Court has not considered this aspect of the matter excepting observing that the discretion is to be exercised judicially, as has been quoted earlier. the order on that ground is also vitiated. 12. In spite of the fact that I come to the conclusion that the impugned order is liable to be set aside, I find that no useful. purpose would be served in setting aside the order since on reading the application under Order 21, Rule 29, C. P. C I find that except making a vague statement of irreparable injury no facts and circumstances have been indicated therein for judicial determination of the balance of convenience and irreparable injury by a Court. When no useful purpose would be served in setting aside the order and remitting back the matter for re-consideration on a vague application, the revisional power u/s 115, C. P. C, need not be exercised in this case. 13. When no useful purpose would be served in setting aside the order and remitting back the matter for re-consideration on a vague application, the revisional power u/s 115, C. P. C, need not be exercised in this case. 13. Sn conclusion while observing that the Executing Court ought not to have considered the merit of the validity of the decree as raised in the suit and the order was not sustainable in law, I am not able to interfere with the order of rejection on account of the vagueness of the assertions in the application for stay under Order 21/Rule 29, C.P. C. 14. The Civil Revision is accordingly dismissed, but without any order as to costs. Final Result : Dismissed